THE    SCIENCE    OF    POLITICS 

PART   I. 

THE  THEORY  OF  HUMAN  PROGRESSION. 


Dove.,  "Patrick  EdwafcL - 

THE  ^THEORY 


HUMAN    PROGRESSION, 


NATURAL  PROBABILITY 


REIGN    OF    JUSTICE 


"  The  charm  that  exercises  the  most  powerful  influence  on  the  mind  is  derived 
less  from  a  knowledge  of  that  which  is  than  from  a  perception  of  that  which  will  be, 
even  though  the  latter  be  nothing  more  thnj  a  n»w  ffinrujjtifui  of  a  known  existence." 
—  Humboldt's  Cosmos.      1 


BENJAMIN    B.   MUSSEY    &    CO., 

29    CORNHTLL. 

1851.  t 


6"*^> 


STEREOTYPED  AT   THE 
BOSTOH     STEREOTYPE     FOUNDRY. 


DEDICATION 


TO 

MONSIEUR    VICTOR    COUSIN, 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AT  PARIS. 


Sir:  —  To  you  I  beg  leave  to  dedicate  the  following  Essay 
on  Human  Progression,  with  those  sentiments  of  esteem  and 
admiration  which  I  share  in  common  with  so  many  of  my  coun- 
trymen. 

The  truth  I  endeavor  to  inculcate  is  —  That  credence  rules  the 
world  —  that  credence  determines  the  condition  and  fixes  the 
destiny  of  nations  —  that  true  credence  must  ever  entail  with  it 
a  correct  and  beneficial  system  of  society,  while  false  credence 
must  ever  be  accompanied  by  despotism,  anarchy,  and  wrong  — 
that  before  a  nation  can  change  its  condition,  it  must  change  its 
credence  ;  that  change  of  credence  will  of  necessity  be  accom- 
panied sooner  or  later  by  change  of  condition :  and  consequently, 
that  true  credence,  or  in  other  words  knowledge,  is  the  only 
means  by  which  man  can  work  out  his  well  being  and  ameliorate 
his  condition  on  the  globe. 

To  no  one  could  I  dedicate  a  work  intended  to  elucidate  these 
principles  so  appropriately  as  to  yourself — to  you,  Sir,  who 
have  labored  so  earnestly  and  so  well  to  give  to  your  country- 
men a  correct  system  of  Ethical  Philosophy,  and,  through  them, 
to  communicate  to  Europe  a  scheme  of  natural  morals  which 
must  ere  long  bear  a  rich  and  most  beneficial  harvest. 
1* 


6  DEDICATION. 

The  question  is  often  asked,  What  is  the  use  of  philosophy? 
— nor  is  the  answer  difficult.  Next  to  religion,  philosophy  is, 
of  all  known  causes,  the  element  that  most  powerfully  tends  to 
determine  the  condition  of  a  country.  It  is  a  power  —  a  power 
so  vast  that  we  are  scarcely  likely  to  over-estimate  its  effects  ; 
and,  though  it  must  ever  be  unable  to  solve  the  great  questions 
in  which  our  race  is  involved,  it  may,  by  uprooting  political 
superstitions  and  false  religions,  exercise  an  influence  that  no 
calculation  can  compute.  The  theories  of  one  generation  become 
the  habitual  credence  of  the  next;  and  that  habitual  credence, 
.transformed  into  a  rule  of  action,  is  ere  long  realized  as  a  pal- 
pable fact  in  the  outward  condition  of  society.  And  thus  it  may 
be  truly  said  —  As  the  philosophy  of  a  country  w,  so  its  condition 
will  be. 

In  aiding  so  powerfully  as  you  have  done  to  substitute  a 
rational  philosophy  for  the  sensationalism  that  previously  pre- 
vailed, you  have  conferred  a  boon  on  France  and  on  the  world; 
and  your  eloquent  appeals  for  the  principles  of  natural  duty  will, 
no  doubt,  find  a  response  in  the  hearts  of  your  countrymen,  that 
must  carry  them  onward  to  even  a  higher  and  more  stable  glory 
than  they  have  ever  yet  attained. 

France  has  yet  to  read  her  great  lesson  of  new  philosophy 
to  the  continent  of  Europe  ;  and  every  student  of  the  world's 
thoughts  and  the  world's  actions  must  rejoice  that  you,  Sir,  have 
been  her  instructor,  and  that  you  have  laid  on  her  those  moral 
obligations,  of  which  to  propagate  the  principles  must  open  up 
to  her  a  new  and  glorious  career. 

Accept,  Sir,  the  dedication  of  this  work  as  a  tribute  of  respect 
from  your  sincere  admirer, 

THE  AUTHOR. 


CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION. 

»AGE 

PRELIMINARY    EXPLANATION     OP     THE     NATURE      OP    POLITICAL 


SCIENCE, 


15 


CHAPTER    I. 

ON  THE  ELEMENTS   OP  HUMAN  PROGRESSION. 

SECTION  I. 

Remarks  on  the  Matters  involved  in  Political  Science,        ...  31 

Liberty  and  Property, 83 

SECTION  n. 

On  the  Mode  in  which  Men  have  made  Laws, 37 

Liberty  of  thought,  speech,  publication,  and  action,        ...  37 

Restrictive  laws, 41 

The  game  laws,  &c, 42 

The  excise  laws, 48 

Taxation  of  labor, 50 

Indirect  taxation, 52 

Customs  and  excise, 53 

Unlimited  legislation,  ........  55 

Its  gradual  limitation, 56 

Legislation  for  thought, 56 

Sectarian  legislation,        .........  57 

Immutability  of  justice, 58 

Legislation  beyond  its  province, 59 

Change  of  laws  —  result, 60 

Freedom  of  expression, 62 


8  CONTENTS. 

The  censorship, 63 

Despotic  power  —  its  means, 64 

Combinations, 66 

Religious  liberty, 67 

Reaction  under  pressure, •        .  69 

The  people  and  the  rulers, 70 

Despotism  and  superstition, •  71 

Change  of  conditions, 73 

Free  intercourse, 74 

Retrogression  of  Spain, 75 

section  m. 

The  Combination  of  Knowledge  and  Reason, 76 

The  Bible, 77 

Causes, 80 

Demonology, 82 

Popish  miracles  —  Popery,    .                84 

Persecution  of  witches, 86 

Patriotism, 86 

Mercenaries,       ..*....•...  87 

The  turning-point  of  modern  times, 88 

Inductive  reasonings, 90 

Mental  philosophy .92 

Ethics 93 

Revelation, 94 

Correct  credence, 95 

The  Bible, 96 

Natural  phenomena  —  social  laws, 97 

Induction, 100 

Dogmatism  and  scepticism, 102 

Philosophy, 106 

The  method  of  Bacon, 107 

Gradual  circumscription  of  philosophy, 109 

Common  credonce  —  primary  knowledge,     ,        .        .        .        .110 

Science  and  philosophy, 112 

Ontology,           .                        113 

Criticism  of  knowledge, 114 

Form  and  matter  of  knowledge, 116 

Evolution  of  freedom, 119 


CONTENTS.  9 

Conditions  of  freedom, 122 

Credence,      . 124 

SECTION  IV. 

The  Use  and  Operation  of  the  Combination  of  Knowledge  and  Reason,  125 

Man's  moral  imperfection, 126 

Evils  of  injustice, 127 

y      Political  association, 128 

The  progress  of  society, 129 

Use  of  combination, 130 

Change  of  credence, 131 

Negro  slavery, 132 

Emancipation  of  the  Negroes, 133 

Anti-slavery  combination, 135 

Predicted  evils, 136 

True  character  of  Negro  emancipation, 137 

The  tax  of  the  twenty  millions, .        .  139 

The  corn  laws, 139 

Repeal  of  the  corn  laws,      ........  147 

The  slave  and  corn  laws, 149 

The  argument  of  justice, 153 

The  argument  of  benefit, 155 

Moral  force, 156 

The  end  of  progression, •       •        .  157 

The  origin  of  progress,          ........  158 

Means  of  progress, 159 

Propositions  on  the  operation  of  knowledge,      ....  160 


CHAPTER    II. 

ON  THE   THEOBY   OP  MAN'S   INTELLECTUAL  PROGRESSION. 

SECTION  L 

The  Order  of  the  Sciences, 168 

The  sciences 170 

The  categories, 171 

The  modes, 172 


10  CONTENTS. 

Nature,  knowledge,  language, 172 

The  forms  of  reasoning,    ...»«...  174 

The  growth  of  the  sciences, 178 

The  process  of  science, 184 

Man  science,                                • 193 

A  millennium, 198 

Order  of  the  sciences,   ...."••••  201 

Dependence  of  the  sciences, 203 

Evolution  of  the  sciences, 204 

The  marks  of  a  science, 205 

Present  position  of  the  sciences, 206 

SECTION  n. 

Determination  of  the  Character,  Position,  and  Boundaries  of  Political 

Science, 220 

§  I.  General  observations, 220 

Political  science, 221 

J  II.  The  province  and  position  of  political  economy,    .        .        .  229 

Its  position, 234 

Its  object,          .                                 235 

The  welfare  of  man, 238 

Growth  of  economy,          ...                ....  239 

A  natural  system  of  political  economy,        ,       .        .        .        .  240 

Laws  of  nature  deranged  by  man, 243 

The  ultimatum  of  political  economy, 244 

§  III.  The  province  and  position  of  politics  proper,          .        •        .  246 

Truth  progressive, 247 

Politics  proper  —  its  position, 249 

Socialism  and  communism, 250 

Character  of  political  relations, 252 

Justice  the  foundation  of  political  society,          ....  254 

Essential  character  of  political  society, 257 

Posterior  limit  of  political  science, 259 

Position  of  politics  proper, 262 


CONTENTS.  11 
CHAPTER    III. 

ON   THE   THEORY   OF   MAN'S  PRACTICAL  PROGRESSION. 

SECTION  I. 
Outline  of  the  Argument,  that  there  is  a  natural  probability  in  favor  of 

the  Reign  of  Justice, 263 

A  reign  of  justice,  or  political  millennium,         ....  264 

Order  of  knowledge,        .        . 266 

Correct  knowledge  produces  correct  action,        ....  268 

Correct  action  produces  the  beneficial  condition,    ....  270 

Anticipation  of  a  political  millennium, 272 

/      Influence  of  Christianity, 276 

The  millennium  of  Scripture, 278 

The  millennium  of  nature, 280 

The  revelation  through  nature, 282 

Natural  truth  —  divine, 283 

SECTION  II. 

The  Influence  of  Science  on  Man' s  Terrestrial  Condition,  .        .        .  284 

Sensation  and  reason, 285 

Reason  posits  power, 286 

Astronomy,  geography,  navigation, 288 

Measurement  of  time, 289 

Application  of  mathematics, 290 

Mechanics  and  locomotion, 291 

Machinery,  chemistry,  and  electricity, 293 

The  soil  and  its  productions, 295 

/       Tenure  of  land 296 

'          Drainage, 298 

Improvement  of  domestic  animals, 299 

Empirical  and  scientific  physiology, 301 

Extension  of  human  life 305 

SECTION  III. 

Application  of  the  Theory  of  Progression  to  Man's  Political  Condition,  306 

Pauperism, 307 

Condition  of  Britain, 310 


12  CONTENTS. 

Origin  of  pauperism, 313 

The  radical  evil, 315 

The  two  parties, 316 

The  two  questions  —  liberty  and  property, 317 

Right  of  representation, 319 

\  Social  science, 320 

Method  of  science, 321 

Arbitrary  determination  of  crime, 326 

"What  is  a  crime  ? 327 

\  Crime  and  property, 328 

Property  and  land, 335 

Major  and  minor  of  political  science, 338 

Law  measured  by  justice,      .  340 

Supremacy  of  justice, 343 

Law  versus  legislation,  .  344 

Universality  of  justice, 345 

Definition  of  crime,       .........  347 

Serfdom  and  aristocracy, 348 

Deterioration  of  man, 355 

Liberty  and  property, 355 

The  lord  and  the  serf, 357 

Equality  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  and  in  the  scheme  of  the  state,     .  359 

Perpetual  supremacy  of  justice, 369 

Disposition  of  the  soil, 370 

Equality  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  and  in  the  scheme  of  the  state,  372 

Property  in  the  soil, 378 

The  feudal  system, 384 

Conversion  of  arable  into  pasture, 398 

Enclosure  of  commons, 400 

The  politics  of  landed  property, 401 

The  gradual  evolution  of  truth, 412 

A  theoretic  ultimatum, 413 

The  classes  of  society, 414 

The  practical  man  and  the  theorist, 415 

Final  propositions  on  the  end  of  progression,        ....  419 


CONTENTS.  13 


CHAPTER   IV. 

BRIEF  OUTLINE  OF  AN  HISTORICAL  SKETCH,  BEING  AN  ATTEMPT  TO 
APPREHEND  THE  SENTIMENTS  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND  WHICH  HAVE 
RULED  SOCIETY,  AND  TO  APPRECIATE  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  DE- 
VELOPMENT  OF   MAN  THROUGH   HISTORIC   MANIFESTATIONS,   .  421 

Theories,       .                   422 

The  papacy  and  the  feudal  system, 423 

"War  feudalism,         ..........  424 

The  feudal  constitution  of  society, 424 

The  equitable  constitution  of  society, 426 

Causes  of  war, 427 

The  trader,        .        . 428 

"War  feudalism  and  parchment  feudalism, 429 

The  trader  and  the  feudal  system, 433 

The  feudal  lords, 434 

"War,  pleasure,  and  policy, 438 

Trade, 440 

The  period  of  barbarous  war,  .        , 441 

The  period  of  knightly  war, 442 

The  period  of  court  pleasures, 443 

The  period  of  court  policy, 444 

The  occupations  of  the  ruling  classes,    ....<.  451 

War,  pleasure  and  policy, 451 

The  policy  system,     ....               .....  454 

^     Political  economy, 455 

The  equity  system,          .........  458 

Historic  summary, 459 

Historic  development  of  man  in  the  state, 460 


CONCLUSION. 

Ultimate  knowledge— unity  of  credence, 462 

A  valid  natural  theology,     ■ 464 

Growth  of  theology, 47I 

Substance,  infinity,  and  power, 473 

2 


14  CONTENTS.     • 

Design,     ....  474 

Intelligence,  intelligent  design,  ...;...  476 

Possibility  of  moral  theology, 478 

Gradual  evolution  of  a  genuine  natural  theology,         .        .        .  482 

Man's  fallen  nature, 485 

Revelation, 487 

Theology,  strictly  scientific, 488 

Present  position  of  natural  theology, 491 

Dependence  of  natural  theology  on  natural  science,        .        .  494 

Ultimate  effects  of  scientific  knowledge, 496 

Christianity  the  main  cause  of  human  civilization,    .        .        .  497 

Truth  restored  to  man, 499 


APPENDIX. 

On  the  Classification  of  the  Sciences,       .       .     .  •       .       .    601 


THE 


THEORY  OF  HUMAN  PROGRESSION. 


INTRODUCTION. 

PRELIMINARY  EXPLANATION  OF  THE  NATURE  OF 
POLITICAL  SCIENCE. 

Before  attempting  to  exhibit  an  argument  to  estab- 
lish the  possibility  of  a  science  of  politics,  and  to 
prove  also  the  probability  that  such  a  science  may 
reasonably  be  expected  to  evolve  at  this  period  of 
man's  progressive  acquisition  of  knowledge,  it  is  ne- 
cessary to  define  exactly  what  we  mean  by  a  science 
of  politics. 

Science  is  nature  seen  by  the  reason,  and  not  merely 
by  the  senses.  Science  exists  in  the  mind,  and  in  the 
mind  alone.  "Wherever  the  substantives  of  a  science 
may  be  derived  from,  or  whatever  may  be  their  char- 
acter, they  form  portions  of  a  science  only  as  they  are 
made  to  function  logically  in  the  human  reason.  Un- 
less they  are  connected  by  the  law  of  reason  and  con- 
sequent, so  that  one  proposition  is  capable  of  being 
correctly  evolved  from  two  or  more  other  propositions, 


16  PRELIMINARY    EXPLANATION    OF 

called  the  premises,  the  science  as  yet  has  no  existence, 
and  has  still  to  be  discovered.  Logic,  therefore,  is  the 
universal  form  of  all  science.  It  is  science  with  blank 
categories,  and  when  these  blank  categories  are  filled 
up,  either  with  numbers,  quantities,  and  spaces,  as  in 
the  mathematical  sciences,  or  with  the  qualities  and 
powers  of  matter,  as  in  the  physical  sciences,  mathe- 
matics and  physics  take  their  scientific  origin,  and 
assume  an;  ordination  which  is  not  arbitrary.  Science, 
-then,*  wherever  itt  is  developed,  is  the  same  for  the 
:hutr>a# \  intellect  wherever  that  intellect  can  compre- 
inend'lt.  *  *  It"  abolishes  diversity  of  credence,  and  rees- 
tablishes unity  of  credence. 

We  have  then  to  ask,  "  What  is  the  matter  of  polit- 
ical science?"  Of  what  does  it  treat?  What  are  its 
substantives  ?  What  is  the  general  character  of  the 
truths  it  professes  to  develop  ? 

1.  It  treats  exclusively  of  men. 

2.  It  treats  exclusively  of  the  relations  between  man 
and  man. 

3.  It  treats  exclusively  of  the  relations  of  men  in 
equity. 

Equity  or  justice  is  the  object-noun  of  the  science 
of  politics,  as  number  is  the  object-noun  of  arithmetic ; 
quantity,  of  algebra }  space,  of  geometry ;  or  value  of 
political  economy.* 

*  It  must  be  observed  that  equity  or  justice  is  not  itself  capable 
of  definition.  If  it  were  so,  it  could  not  be  the  object-noun  of  a 
science,  as  no  science  ever  defines  its  object-noun.  For  instance, 
unity,  quantity,  space,  force,  matter,  value,  are  all  incapable  of  defi- 
nition ;  but  forms  of  unity,  forms  of  quantity,  forms  of  space,  forms 
of  force,  forms  of  matter,  forms  of  value,  are  capable  of  definition. 


THE    NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  17 

Politics,  then,  is  the  science  of  EQUITY,  and  treats 
of  the  relations  of  MEN  in  equity. 

The  fundamental  fact  from  which  its  propositions 
derive  a  practical  importance,  is  the  following :  — 

"  Men  are  capable  of  acting  equitably  or  unequita- 
bly  towards  each  other," 

To  obliterate  all  unequitable  (or  unjust)  action  of 
one  man  towards  another,  or  of  one  body  of  men 
towards  another  body  of  men,  is  therefore  the  practical 
ultimatum  of  the  science  of  politics. 

Politics,  then,  professes  to  develop  the  laws  by 
which  human  actions  ought  to  be  regulated,  in  so  far 
as  men  interfere  with  each  other. 

Human  actions  may  be  viewed  under  various  dis- 
tinct aspects :  — 

1.  In  their  physiological  aspect.  In  this  aspect,  to 
kill  a  man  is  to  inflict  such  an  injury  on  his  bodily 
frame  as  causes  the  cessation  of  his  functions. 

2.  In  their  economical  aspect.  In  this  aspect,  to  kill 
a  man  is  to  destroy  a  mechanism  which  possessed  so 
much  value ;  and,  consequently,  to  inflict  a  greater  or 
less  injury  to  society,  according  to  the  value  of  the 
person   killed.     Men  cost  a  considerable   expense  to 

On  this  subject  we  have  some  observations  to  offer  hereafter ;  but 
if  the  reader  should  suppose  that  a  science  ought  to  define  its 
object-noun,  he  has  only  to  refer  to  the  mathematical  sciences,  not 
one  of  which  ever  attempts  to  offer  a  definition  of  its  noun-sub- 
stantive major.  Were  a  geometrician  to  offer  the  smallest  specula- 
tion as  to  what  space  is,  he  would  have  departed  altogether  from 
the  province  of  geometric  science.  Spurious  definitions  of  value 
are  occasionally  set  forth ;  that  is,  we  are  told  not  what  value  is, 
but  what  it  does,  a  mode  of  definition  altogether  illicit. 

2* 


18  PRELIMINARY    EXPLANATION    OP 

rear,  and  the  destruction  of  the  object  reared  is,  or 
may  be,  the  loss  of  the  cost  and  profit, 

3.  In  their  political  aspect.  In  this  aspect,  to  kill  a 
man  may  be  a  crime,  or  a  duty,  or  neither,  (an  accident, 
for  instance.)  If  by  accident,  the  physiological  fact  is 
the  same,  the  economical  fact  the  same,  but  the  politi- 
cal fact  is  essentially  different  from  intentional  killing. 

4.  In  their  religious  aspect.  In  this  aspect,  to  kill  a 
man  may  be  either  a  sin  or  a  righteous  act ;  and  in 
this  aspect  the  killing  involves  all  the  three  previous 
modes,  as  intention  is  taken  for  granted. 

Politics  then,  in  its  position,  is  posterior  to  political 
economy,  and  anterior  to  religion.  It  superadds  a  new 
concept  to  economics,  and  religion  again  superadds  a 
new  concept  to  politics.  Political  economy  in  no  re- 
spect can  be  allowed  to  discourse  of  duty,  nor  can  pol- 
itics be  allowed  to  discourse  of  sin.  Economy  super- 
adds the  concept  value  to  physiology,  and  the  physiol- 
ogist has  exactly  the  same  case  to  deny  the  value  of 
the  economist  that  the  economist  has  to  deny  the 
equity  of  the  politician,  or  the  politician  to  deny  the 
religious  quality  of  actions  posited  by  the  divine. 
The  four  regions  are  perfectly  distinct;  distinct  in 
their  noun-substantive  major,  distinct  in  the  end  of 
their  inquiries,  distinct  in  their  method,  and  distinct  in 
their  practical  signification  and  importance,  although 
all  meeting  in  the  organized,  intellectual,  moral,  and 
religious  being,  MAN. 

Into  politics,  therefore,  no  action  can  be  allowed  to 
enter  which  is  not  at  the  same  time  intentional,  and 
the  action  of  one  man,  or  one  body  of  men,  on  an- 
other man,  or  body  of  men. 


THE    NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  19 

The  substantives,  then,  that  enter  the  science  of 
politics,  are 

Man,  Will,  Action ; 

and  the  general  problem  is  to  discover  the  laws  which 
should  regulate  the  voluntary  actions  of  men  towards 
each  other,  and  thereby  to  determine  what  the  order 
of  society  in  its  practical  construction  and  arrange- 
ment ought  to  be.  Men  have  social  rules  of  action ; 
and,  from  the  condition  of  men  on  the  surface  of  the 
globe,  men  must  have  social  rules  of  action,  whether 
those  rules  are  right  or  wrong.  A  practical  necessity 
exists  for  some  kind  of  determination ;  but  it  is  plain 
from  history,  that  in  many  cases  the  practical  rules 
have  been  altogether  erroneous  and  criminal.  It  is 
therefore  necessary  to  discover  what  the  rules  ought  to 
be ;  for  the  rules  determine  the  political  condition  of 
society. 

In  politics,  as  in  every  other  science,  it  is  necessary 
to  classify  the  forms  of  the  matter  with  which  we 
reason ;  thus  geometry  classifies  the  forms  of  space 
into  lines,  angles,  and  figures. 

Actions,  then,  are  classified  into  duties  and  crimes. 
But  as  duty  and  crime  are  thus  viewed  subjectively,  it 
is  necessary  to  determine  the  objective  characteristics 
of  a  duty  and  a  crime,  so  as  to  be  able  to  determine 
the  character  of  the  action  itself,  without  inquiring 
into  its  motives.  The  only  requisite  would  then  be  to 
ascertain  whether  it  was  or  was  not  intentional,  for 
this  intentionality  can  never  be  laid  aside. 

Again,  it  is  not  only  necessary  to  take  into  con- 
sideration man,  the  subject,  with  whom  lies  the 
whole  question  of  human  liberty,  but  the  earth,  the 


20  PRELIMINARY    EXPLANATION    OF 

object,  with  which  lies  the  whole  question  of  human 
property. 

The  same  division  that  enabled  us  to  classify  hu- 
man actions,  will  enable  us  to  exhibit  the  aspects  in 
which  the  earth  is  considered. 

1.  The  earth  may  be  viewed  as  involved  in  physical 
science.  In  this  aspect,  it  is  involved  in  astronomy, 
mechanics,  chemistry,  &c. 

2.  The  earth  may  be  viewed  as  involved  in  econom- 
ical science.  In  this  aspect,  it  is  a  power  of  produc- 
tion —  a  power  capable  of  producing  wealth. 

3.  The  earth  may  be  viewed  as  involved  in  political 
science.  In  this  aspect,  the  power  of  production  has 
superadded  to  it  the  concept,  property.  Economy  can 
no  more  discourse  of  property  than  it  can  discourse  of 
duty  or  crime.  Property  is  a  quality  altogether  inca- 
pable of  being  apprehended  in  the  object  itself  by 
means  of  sensational  observation,  exactly  as  the  crim- 
inality of  an  action  can  never  be  apprehended  in  the 
physiological  characteristics  of  an  action. 

4.  The  earth  may  be  viewed  as  involved  in  religion. 
"  The  earth  is  the  Lord's,  and  the  fulness  thereof." 
The  difference  between  the  political  and  the  religious 
mode  of  viewing  the  earth  as  property,  is  this:  In 
politics,  the  power  of  production  is  viewed  as  property ; 
in  religion,  the  substance  is  viewed  as  property.  Poli- 
tics in  no  respect  treat  of  the  substance,  although  the 
feudal  system  —  according  to  which  the  king  derived 
his  rights  from  God  —  assumed  the  proprietorship  of 
the  substance,  exactly  as  the  correlative  system,  the 
papacy,  claimed  for  its  head  the  spiritual  vicegerency 
of   God,  and   assumed    the   power   of  forgiving  sin. 


THE    NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  21 

The  feudal  system  has  transmitted,  on  this  subject  of 
property,  a  superstition  strictly  analogous  to  that  of 
slavery.  The  slave  was  an  object,  not  an  agent,  —  a 
thing,  not  a  being ;  he  was  property,  and  could  not 
possess  property.  In  course  of  time,  however,  he 
passed  from  the  objective"  and  superstitious  mode  of 
estimation,  and  became  transformed  into  a  political 
agent  and  power.  The  earth  has  not  yet  been  trans- 
formed into  a  power ;  but  the  whole  analogy  of  scien- 
tific progress  would,  we  think,  lead  to  the  belief  that  it 
will  come,  ere  long,  to  be  viewed  in  this  light. 

It  is  quite  evident  that  the  earth  cannot  function  in 
political  economy  until  it  is  transformed  into  a  power 
of  production  having  a  value.  And,  to  carry  it  for- 
ward into  the  science  of  politics,  all  that  is  requisite  is 
to  apply  the  axiom,  "  an  object  is  the  property  of  its 
creator ; "  so  that  when  political  economy  has  deter- 
mined, by  a  scientific  method  which  is  not  arbitrary, 
what  value  is  created  and  who  creates  this  value,  poli- 
tics takes  up  the  question  where  political  economy 
had  left  it,  and  determines,  according  to  a  method 
which  is  not  arbitrary,  to  whom  the  created  value  should 
be  allocated. 

We  have  thus  the  substantives  man,  will,  action, 
duty,  crime,  property ;  but  as  action  of  one  man  upon 
another  necessarily  implies  an  agent  and  an  object,  a 
doer  and  a  sufferer,  the  same  action  may  be  regarded 
in  its  relation  to  the  agent  and  in  its  relation  to  the 
object.  Thus  the  action  which  is  called  a  crime  in 
the  agent,  is  called  a  wrong  in  respect  to  the  person 
against  whom  the  crime  is  committed;  and  again, 
whatever  duty  lie  upon  one  man,  gives  birth  to  a  coex- 


22  PRELIMINARY    EXPLANATION    OF 

tensive  and  correlative  right  in  all  other  men.  If  one 
man  is  bound  not  to  murder  or  to  defraud,  another 
man  has  a  coextensive  and  correlative  right  to  be  un- 
murdered  and  undefrauded ;  and  herein  lies  the  whole 
theory  of  human  rights.  Thus  the  terms  present 
themselves  in  the  following  manner :  — 

Agent  or  Person  acting.  Person  acted  upon. 

A  duty.  A  right 

A  crime.  A  wrong. 

Finally,  then,  the  principal  substantives  of  the  sci- 
ence of  politics  are  —  man,  will,  action,  duty,  crime, 
rights,  wrongs,  and  property.  And  equity  or  justice  is 
the  object-noun  of  the  science  in  which  the  relations 
have  to  be  determined. 

From  the  previous  considerations  it  is  evident  that 
political  science,  if  it  can  be  exhibited  as  really  and 
truly  a  branch  of  knowledge,  must  assume  to  deter- 
mine, not  merely  the  laws  that  should  regulate  an 
individual,  but  any  number  of  individuals  associated 
together.  If  an  action  be  criminal  for  an  individual, 
it  is  no  less  criminal  for  ten  individuals,  or  a  hundred, 
or  a  thousand,  or  a  million.  If  it  be  a  crime  for  one 
man  to  seize  another  man  and  reduce  him  to  slavery, 
the  criminality  of  the  action  is  in  no  respect  dimin- 
ished if  a  whole  nation  should  commit  the  action  with 
all  imaginable  formalities.  If  it  be  a  crime  for  one 
man  who  is  more  powerful  than  another  to  deprive 
that  other  of  property  without  his  consent,  the  action 
is  no  less  criminal  if  a  thousand  or  a  million  deprive 
another  thousand  or  million  of  their  property  without 
their  consent.  Science  can  acknowledge  none  of 
these  arbitrary  distinctions.     If  there  be  a  rule  at  all, 


THE    NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  23 

it  must  be  general;  and  therefore  political  science 
must  assume  to  determine  the  principles  upon  which 
political  societies  ought  to  be  constructed,  and  also  to 
determine  the  principles  on  which  human  laws  ought 
to  be  made. 

And  as  there  cannot  be  the  slightest  doubt  that  God 
has  made  truth  the  fountain  of  good,  it  may  perhaps 
be  fairly  expected,  that  if  ever  political  science  is  fairly 
evolved  and  really  reduced  to  practice,  it  will  confer  a 
greater  benefit  on  mankind,  and  prevent  a  greater 
amount  of  evil,  than  all  the  other  sciences. 

Political  science  is  peculiarly  man-science ;  and 
though,  as  yet,  the  subject  is  little  or  no  better  than 
a  practical  superstition,  we  propose,  in  the  present 
volume,  to  exhibit  an  argument,  affording,  we  think, 
sufficient  ground  for  believing  that  it  will,  at  no  dis- 
tant period,  be  reduced  to  the  same  form  and  ordina- 
tion as  the  other  sciences. 

Of  course,  any  thing  like  a  unity  of  credence  is  at 
present  altogether  out  of  the  question.  Such  a  unity 
is  neither  possible  nor  desirable.  It  could  only  be  a 
superstition  —  that  is,  a  credence  without  evidence. 
To  produce  conviction,  therefore,  is  not  so  much  our 
hope,  as  \o  endeavor  to  open  up  the  questions  that 
really  require  solution.  And  here  we  must  be  allowed 
a  remark  on  the  subject  of  politics,  taking  the  term  in 
its  general  signification.  Perhaps  no  subject,  except 
religion,  absorbs  so  large  a  share  of  the  attention  of 
Britain,  and  perhaps  no  subject  has  so  small  a  portion 
of  English  literature  devoted  to  its  exposition.  At 
the  utmost,  there  are  only  a  very  few  works  which  can 
be  called  dissertations  on  the  principles  of   political 


24  PRELIMINARY    EXPLANATION    OP 

ethics.  This  paucity  of  special  works  is  certainly  one 
of  the  most  curious  facts  in  the  history  of  literature. 
The  word  politics  is  in  almost  every  man's  mouth ;  the 
subject  involves  interests  of  the  utmost  magnitude; 
questions  of  politics  are  continually  in  debate;  the 
greatest  assembly  in  the  kingdom  assembles  yearly  to 
discuss  practical  measures,  which  are  necessarily 
founded  on  some  theoretic  principles,  (right  or  wrong ;) 
and  yet,  perhaps,  no  subject  of  ordinary  interest  could 
be  named  that  has  so  small  a  quantity  of  literature 
devoted  to  the  exposition  of  its  more  general  truths. 

The  current  literature  of  politics  is  one  of  the  won- 
ders of  the  world,  but  the  book  literature  is  of  the 
scantiest  character.  Some  of  it  is  said  to  be  anti- 
quated, (Milton  and  Locke,  for  instance  —  a  very  great 
mistake,  as  we  propose  to  show  hereafter,)  and  some 
of  it  never  even  approaches  the  main  questions.  Un- 
der these  circumstances,  therefore,  perhaps  no  apology 
is  requisite  for  an  endeavor  to  systematize  the  subject. 

The  first  question  in  every  branch  of  knowledge 
is  its  method.  So  long  as  the  method  is  in  dispute, 
the  whole  subject  is  necessarily  involved,  not  only  in 
obscurity,  but  in  doubt.  Without  method  there  can 
be  no  standard  of  appeal,  no  process  of  proof,  no 
means  of  determining  otherwise  than  by  opinion, 
whether  a  proposition  is  true  or  false.  But  even  if 
opinion  were  the  rule,  this  could  not  exclude  the 
necessity  for  theoretic  principles.  Wliose  opinion  is 
to  be  taken  as  the  rule?  Is  it  the  opinion  of  the 
emperor,  as  in  Russia?  or  the  opinion  of  the  free 
population,  as  in  the  United  States?  or  the  opinion 
of  the  whole  male  population,  as  in  France  ?  or  the 


THE    NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  25 

opinion  of  a  small  portion  of  the  population,  as  in 
Britain  ?  Whatever  system  may  be  practically  adopt- 
ed, that  system  necessarily  involves  a  theory;  and 
the  question  is,  "  Is  there  any  possibility  of  discover- 
ing or  evolving  a  natural  theory  which  is  not  arbi- 
trary?" Is  there,  in  the  question  of  man's  political 
relation  to  man,  a  truth  and  a  falsity  as  independent 
of  man's  opinion  as  are  the  truths  of  geometry  or 
astronomy  ?  A  truth  there  must  be  somewhere,  and 
in  the  present  volume  we  attempt  to  exhibit  the 
probability  of  its  evolution. 

Our  argument  is  based  on  the  theory  of  progress, 
or  the  fact  of  progress  —  for  it  is  a  fact  as  well  as  a 
theory;  and  the  theory  of  progress  is  based  on  the 
principle,  that  there  is  an  order  in  which  man  not 
only  does  evolve  the  various  branches  of  knowledge, 
but  an  order  in  which  man  must  necessarily  evolve 
the  various  branches  of  knowledge.  And  this  neces- 
sity is  based  on  the  principle,  that  every  science  when 
undergoing  its  process  of  discovery  is  objective,  that 
is,  the  object  of  contemplation  ;  but  when  discovered 
and  reduced  to  ordination  it  becomes  subjective,  that 
is,  a  means  of  operation  for  the  discovery  and  evolu- 
tion of  the  science  that  lies  logically  beyond  it,  and 
next  to  it  in  logical  proximity. 

If  this  logical  dependance  of  one  science  on  another 
could  be  clearly  made  out  for  the  whole  realm  of 
knowledge,  it  would  give  the  outline,  not  only  of  the 
classification  of  the  sciences,  but  of  man's  intellectual 
history  —  of  man's  intellectual  development  —  where 
the  word  development  means,  not  the  alteration  of 
man's  nature,  but  the  extension  of  his  knowledge,  and 
3 


26  PRELIMINARY    EXPLANATION    OF 

the  consequent  improvement  of  his  mode  of  action, 
entailing  with  it  the  improvement  of  his  condition. 

And  if  the  law  of  this  intellectual  development  can 
be  made  out  for  the  branches  of  knowledge  which 
have  already  been  reduced  to  ordination,  it  may  be 
carried  into  the  future,  and  the  future  progress  of  man- 
kind may  be  seen  to  evolve  logically  out  of  the  past 
progress. 

Let  us  then  consider  the  aspects  in  which  a  science 
of  politics  may  be  viewed. 

1.  In  the  probability  of  its  evolution,  based  on  the 
logical  determination  of  its  position  in  a  scheme  of 
classification. 

2.  In  its  constituent  propositions,  and  the  method 
it  employs  for  their  substantiation. 

3.  In  the  history  of  its  doctrine  (not  the  history  of 
its  books)  —  in  the  history  of  the  past  reduction  of  its 
theoretic  principles  to  practice,  and  in  the  application 
of  its  principles  to  the  present  condition  of  society; 
thereby  attempting  to  estimate  what  changes  ought 
to  be  made,  and  what,  in  fact,  ought  to  be  the  one 
definite  form  of  political  society. 

The  present  volume  professes  to  treat  of  the  first 
of  these  divisions. 

In  attempting  to  classify  the  sciences,  and  to  show 
that  they  evolve  logically  out  of  each  other,  we  do  not 
profess,  in  the  slightest  degree,  to  discourse  on  the 
matter  of  the  sciences  themselves,  further  than  their 
primary  propositions  are  concerned  ;  but  on  their  form, 
their  position,  their  actual  development,  (as  commonly 
acknowledged,)  and  on  the  lesson  which,  as  a  whole, 
they  must  ultimately  teach. 


THE    NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  27 

With  regard  to  the  classification  of  the  mathemati- 
cal sciences,  we  have  not  the  slightest  misgivings. 
We  believe  that  the  order  in  which  they  are  presented 
will  be  found  correct;  and  as  logic  has  not  usually 
been  considered  as  the  first  and  simplest  of  the  math- 
ematical sciences,  we  have  said  rather  more  on  logic 
than  might  otherwise  have  been  necessary. 

With  regard  to  the  inorganic  physical  sciences,  the 
mode  of  classification  is  by  no  means  so  evident. 
The  method  according  to  which  they  must  be  classed,  if 
we  knew  their  characteristics,  is  apparent  enough ;  but 
that  difficulties  attend  the  application  of  the  method, 
so  as  to  locate  the  various  suites  of  phenomena  in 
an  unobjectionable  scheme,  must  certainly  be  admit- 
ted. The  difficulties  will  no  doubt  be  ultimately 
removed ;  but  they  must,  in  the  first  place,  be  removed 
by  the  acquiescence  of  men  of  science  before  the  mere 
logician  can  profess  to  arrange  the  materials,  and  to 
schematize  the  branches  of  knowledge  according  to 
their  essential  characteristics. 

Thus  it  belongs  to  the  physicist  to  determine 
whether  there  is,  or  is  not,  a  material  substance  called 
light ;  but  it  does  not  belong  to  the  physicist  to  deter- 
mine whether  the  mechanical  phenomena  of  light  are, 
or  are  not,  to  be  confounded  with  its  chemical  phe- 
nomena. Let  light  be  what  it  may,  the  mechanical 
(including  the  geometric)  phenomena  of  light  fall 
necessarily  before  the  chemical  phenomena.  Again, 
it  belongs  to  the  physicist  to  determine  what  sound  is ; 
but  the  mechanics  of  sound  (vibration)  must  be  logi- 
cally separated  from  the  music  of  sound,  (tone,  &c.,) 
inasmuch  as  the  music  might  be  studied  without  even 


28  PRELIMINARY    EXPLANATION    OF 

the  knowledge  that  the  sound  was  accompanied  by, 
or  produced  by,  vibration ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
vibrations  might  be  observed  and  measured  by  a  deaf 
person,  who  could  have  no  knowledge  of  tone,  and  to 
whom  the  vibrations  would  be  only  motions. 

Chemistry,  again,  treats  of  the  qualitative  charac- 
teristics of  matter,  and  it  may  be  viewed  in  one  sense 
as  a  science  complete  in  itself.  But  if  such  a  major 
power  could  be  discovered  as  would  produce  the  phe- 
nomena logically  in  the  observed  conditions,  then 
chemistry,  from  being  a  science  in  itself,  would  become 
only  the  classification  of  a  science,  and  the  power, 
whatever  name  it  might  receive,  would  assume  the 
precedence,  because  the  qualitative  relations  would  be 
made  to  function  under  the  influence  of  the  power. 

Every  function,  of  whatever  character,  or  wherever 
found,  we  assume  to  present  itself  under  the  form  of 

An  Agent,  An  Object,  A  Product ; 

and  this  division  belongs,  in  no  respect,  to  any  one 
particular  science,  but  to  all,  —  that  is,  it  is  a  necessary 
form  of  thought,  and  being  so,  it  belongs  to  the  meta- 
physician. Now,  if  a  science  be  viewed  as  a  complete 
function,  it  must  range  all  its  substantives  under  one 
of  these  heads.  Every  thing  of  which  science  treats 
must  be  ranked  either  as  agent,  object,  or  phenome- 
non ;  and  no  science  can  be  considered  as  completed, 
even  in  part,  until  it  has  made  such  a  logical  ordina- 
ti'jn  as  will  make  the  phenomenon  to  result  logically 
from  the  operation  of  the  agent  on  the  object.  But 
while  a  science  is  undergoing  its  process  of  discovery, 
this  logical  ordination  of  its  parts  is  illegitimate,  and 
cannot  be  made  on  sufficient  grounds;  so  that  the 


THE    NATURE    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  29 

development  of  the  constituent  propositions  of  a  sci- 
ence is  necessary  before  its  various  portions  can  be 
classified  in  such  a  manner  as  to  satisfy  the  require- 
ments of  the  reason. 

Under  these  circumstances,  we  have  given  only  a 
general  estimate,  sufficient  to  direct  the  line  of  argu- 
ment without  trespassing  on  special  departments,  or 
intruding  opinions  on  subjects  that  lie  beyond  our 
province.  To  construct  an  argument  that  should  be 
in  the  main  correct,  is  all  we  could  hope  to  achieve. 
3* 


CHAPTER  L 
ON  THE  ELEMENTS  OF  HUMAN    PROGRESSION. 


SECTION    I. REMARKS    ON    THE    MATTERS    INVOLVED    IN 

POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

A  distinction  must  necessarily  be  drawn  between 
the  science  of  politics  itself,  and  its  application  to 
Man. 

The  science  is  purely  abstract  and  theoretic.  It 
professes  only  to  determine  the  trueness  or  falsity  of 
certain  propositions  which  are  apprehended  by  the 
reason ;  and  the  reason  may  take  into  consideration 
this  trueness  or  falsity,  without  dwelling  on  the  fact 
that  man  is  a  moral  being,  who  ought  to  act  in  accord- 
ance with  such  principles  as  are  legitimately  substan- 
tiated. In  this  sense  the  science  of  politics  is  as 
purely  abstract  as  geometry,  which  determines  the 
general  relations  of  figures,  without  in  the  slightest 
degree  attempting  to  pronounce  whether  there  are  any 
real  material  objects  to  which  its  truths  can  be  applied. 

But  when  we  have  admitted  the  fact,  that  man  is  a 
moral  being,  the  theoretic  dogma  becomes  transformed 


32       REMARKS  ON  THE  MATTERS  INVOLVED 

into  a  practical  rule  of  action,  which  lays  an  impera- 
tive obligation  on  man  to  act  in  a  particular  manner, 
and  to  refrain  from  acting  in  another  manner.  The 
theoretic  truth  determines  the  relations  of  moral  be- 
ings, and  consequently  determines  what  ought  to  be 
their  conditions  with  regard  to  each  other ;  the  practi- 
cal rule  determines  what  man  may,  or  may  not,  do 
justly,  and  consequently  what  the  political  construc- 
tion of  civil  society  ought  to  be. 

The  science  of  politics  then  treats  of  equity,  and  of 
the  relations  of  men  in  equity.  And  the  general  ques- 
tions which  the  science  has  to  solve  are,  — 

1.  What  are  those  actions  which  men  may  do 
equitably  ? 

2.  What  are  those  actions  which  men  are  by  equity 
bound  to  do  ? 

3.  What  are  those  actions  which  men  cannot  do 
equitably?  that  is,  what  are  those  actions  which, 
though  they  may  actually  be  done,  are  not,  and  never 
can  be,  equitable  ? 

Political  science,  therefore,  discourses  of  human 
actions ;  and  these  actions  classified  with  regard  to  the 
agent,  are  divided  into  duties,  crimes,  and  negative 
actions.  But  when  the  moral  motives  of  the  agent 
are  left  out  of  account,  the  actions  themselves  are  in- 
vestigated as  to  their  characteristics,  and  they  may 
then  be  treated  of  in  their  relation  to  the  two  great 
categories  of  political  science,  liberty  and  ]>roperty. 

Under  the  heads  of  liberty  and  property  all  ques- 
tions of  politics  may  be  discussed,  bearing  in  mind 
always  that  political  science  treats  exclusively  of  the 
relations  of  men.  The  questions  then  assume  the 
form  of, — 


IN    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  33 

1.  What  are  the  equitable  relations  of  men  in  the 
matter  of  liberty  ? 

2.  What  are  the  equitable  relations  of  men  in  the 
matter  of  property  ? 

Both  of  these  objects,  liberty  and  property,  may  be 
treated  of  under  the  head  of  human  action,  (the  moral 
laws  of  property  being  nothing  more  than  rules  which 
prescribe  or  prohibit  certain  modes  of  human  action,) 
but  the  division  conveniently  expresses  a  distinction 
of  the  objects  upon  which  action  may  be  exercised. 
Thus,  an  exposition  of  the  laws  of  liberty  should  de- 
termine the  moral  rules  that  preside  over  the  actions 
of  men  in  the  matter  of  mutual  interference ;  while 
an  exposition  of  the  laws  of  property  should  deter- 
mine the  moral  rules  that  preside  over  men  in  their 
possession  of  the  earth. 

But  politics,  taking  into  consideration  only  the  rela- 
tions of  men,  cannot  take  cognizance  of  any  duty 
which  would  still  be  a  duty  if  only  one  man  were  in 
existence.  The  duties  of  religion  that  relate  to  the 
Creator  are  beyond  and  above  the  sphere  of  politics ; 
and  so  also  are  the  duties  of  benevolence,  which  be- 
long to  another  category  than  equity. 

It  is  only  as  men  may  act  towards  each  other  equi- 
tably or  unequitably  that  we  consider  their  relations. 
An  act  of  benevolence  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  either 
equitable  or  unequitable.  The  recipient  has  no  equi- 
table claim  to  the  bounty ;  and  what  the  donor  gives, 
he  gives  not  to  satisfy  the  law  of  equity,  but  a  higher 
law,  which  applies  to  him  as  an  individual,  but  which 
it  is  impossible  to  apply  (by  law  and  force)  to  a  soci- 
ety.    The  relations  of  men  in  society  must  first  be 


34       REMARKS  ON  THE  MATTERS  INVOLVED 

constructed  on  the  principle  of  equity,  and  then  each 
individual  may  exercise  his  benevolence  as  occasion 
may  require.  Were  there  no  equity,  there  could  be  no 
benevolence,  because  no  man  could  know  what  was 
his  own,  or  what  he  had  a  right  to  give* 

Liberty,  like  slavery,  poverty,  depravity,  purity, 
beauty,  &c,  is  one  of  those  concepts  that  men  have 
idealized,  and  made  into  nouns-substantive,  for  the 
purpose  of  using  them  with  greater  facility  in  lan- 
guage. As  such,  it  is  incapable  of  definition,  not 
being  composed  of  any  more  simple  concepts.  In 
this  sense  it  is  an  object,  and  may  be  reasoned  with 
like  any  other  noun.  But  it  also  signifies  a  condition, 
namely,  the  condition  in  which  a  man  uses  his  powers 
without  the  interference  of  another  man.  It  differs 
from  freedom  in  the  circumstance  of  amount.  Free- 
dom appears  to  signify  the  absolute  condition  in  which 
interference  by  human  will  is  altogether  removed ;  in 
which  case  there  would  be  a  perfect  equality  of  politi- 
cal rights,  and  the  law  would  recognize  no  difference 
whatever  between  the  individuals  of  whom  a  state 
was  composed.  Liberty,  on  the  contrary,  appears 
capable  of  indefinite  variation,  from  the  smallest 
amount  that  the  most  oppressed  slave  has,  to  the  ut- 
most and  most  perfect  amount,  which  then  becomes 
freedom.^ 

#  For  instance,  the  kings  of  England  gave  lands  (which  be- 
longed to  the  crown,  that  is,  to  the  nation)  to  private  individuals. 
The  question  then  is,  Had  the  incumbent  monarch  a  right  to 
alienate  those  lands  in  perpetuity  from  the  nation  ? 

f  Such,  at  all  events,  would  seem  to  be  the  sense  usually  affixed 
to  the  two  terms.     But,  in  that  case,  the  word  freedom  would  ad- 


IN    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  35 

Licentiousness  is  compatible  with  liberty,  but  not 
with  freedom.  For  instance,  a  slaveholder  has  far  too 
much  liberty  —  that  is,  he  is  at  liberty  to  perform  acts 
of  licentiousness ;  but  where  there  is  freedom,  there 
can  be  no  surplus  liberty ;  for  the  moment  the  equilib- 
rium of  equity  is  disturbed  by  the  licentious  exercise 
of  power,  that  moment  freedom  has  vanished,  and  lib- 
erty becomes  relative.  One  man  then  comes  to  have 
too  much  liberty,  and  another  man  too  little. 

The  powers  of  man  involved  in  the  general  term 
liberty,  are  the  powers  of  feeling,  thinking,  speaking, 
writing  and  publishing,  and  acting.  The  sum  total  of 
these  is  implicated  in  the  fact  of  life ;  so  that,  if  the 
life  be  taken  away,  the  whole  of  the  powers  are  taken 
away.  Politically  speaking,  therefore,  to  take  away 
life  is  to  take  away  the  sum  total  of  liberty,  and  to 
destroy  or  obliterate  a  free  agent. 

Liberty,  in  its  most  extensive  signification,  involves 
the  whole  powers  or  conditions  of  men  which  can  be 
affected  by  the  agency  of  other  men ;  but  liberty  has 
also  a  more  restricted  signification,  which  confines  it 
to  liberty  of  thought,  speech,  publication,  and  action. 
In  the  former  sense,  life  is  involved  in  liberty ;  in  the 
latter  sense,  life  assumes  a  separate  standing,  and  be- 
comes a  category  by  itself.  And  again,  the  moral 
feelings  may  be  interfered  with  by  slander  or  defama- 
tion ;  and  this  gives  rise  to  another  category  of  pol- 
itics, namely,  reputation. 

vantageously  supplant  liberty  in  several  passages  of  the  New  Tes- 
tament, such  as  Rom.  viii.  21;  2  Cor.  iii.  17;  Gal.  ii.  4 ;  v.  1, 
13,  &c,  where  absolute  freedom,  or  emancipation,  seems  to  be 
spoken  of. 


36  MATTERS    INVOLVED   IN    POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

Life,  liberty,  property,  and  reputation,  are  then 
viewed  as  the  possessions  of  men  ;  and  the  laws  which 
should  regulate  men  in  their  mutual  action  on  each 
other,  with  regard  to  life,  liberty,  property,  and  reputa- 
tion, have  to  be  determined  by  political  science. 

With  regard  to  life,  we  do  not  believe  that  any 
principle  whatever  can  be  found  in  natural  knowledge 
that  would  justify  the  taking  away  of  life,  save  in 
defence  of  self  or  others.  For  life,  therefore,  there  can 
only  be  a  negative  theory  of  very  limited  extent.  All 
that  can  be  said  on  the  subject  must  necessarily  re- 
solve itself  into  one  or  two  propositions.  Laws  may 
take  lives,  but  laws  cannot  create  axioms  of  the  rea- 
son ;  and  without  these  there  can  be  no  principle  to 
determine  otherwise  than  superstitiously  when  a  life 
ought  to  be  taken.  That  the  laws  by  which  lives  have 
been  taken  away  have  been  only  formal  superstitions, 
is  plainly  evident  from  the  changes  which  the  laws 
have  undergone.  The  laws  have  no  other  basis  than 
vague  opinion,  directed  by  human  passion  ;  and  the 
day  appears  to  be  not  far  distant  when  capital  punish- 
ment will  be  either  abolished  altogether,  or  confined  to 
the  case  of  the  murderer,  if  it  be  determined  that 
Scripture  commands  or  implies  the  execution  of  him 
who  has  taken  away  the  life  of  his  fellow. 

The  genuine  essence  of  all  liberty  is  non-interference, 
and  to  secure  universal  non-interference  is  the  first  and 
most  essential  end  of  all  political  association. 

But  interference  may  be  from  the  government  and 
law,  quite  as  much  as  from  the  individual,  and  inter- 
ference by  law  is  incomparably  more  prejudicial  to  a 


ON  THE  MODE  IN  WHICH  MEN  HAVE  MADE  LAWS.  37 

community  than  any  amount  of  casual  interference 
that  would  be  likely  to  take  place  in  a  civilized 
country. 


SECTION     II. ON     THE     MODE      IN     WHICH      MEN     HAVE 

MADE     LAWS. 

Liberty  presents  itself  under  the  form  of  liberty  of 
thought,  liberty  of  speech,  liberty  of  publication,  and 
liberty  of  action;  and  political  liberty  evolves  chrono- 
logically in  the  order  of  thought,  speech,  publication, 
and  action.  To  secure  this  liberty  by  law,  and  to 
make  it  exactly  equal  for  all  individuals  in  the  eye  of 
the  law,  is  the  great  end  of  political  civilization. 

Thought  is  now  (in  Britain)  almost  emancipated 
from  state  interference,  although  the  time  was,  and 
not  so  very  long  since,  when  men  attempted  to  con- 
trol each  other  in  their  thoughts.  Religious  supersti- 
tion has  ever  played  the  most  prominent  part  in  this 
species  of  interference,  and  the  priest  of  by-gone  days 
was  the  licentious  tyrant  of  the  mind,  who  would 
have  forced  uncredited  conviction  by  the  fagot  and  the 
flame.  Not  only  was  freedom  of  speech  controlled, 
and  punished  by  the  rack,  the  dungeon,  and  the  linger- 
ing death  of  infamy,  but  the  very  thoughts  were  scru- 
tinized ;  and  unless  a  man  renounced  his  creed,  he  was 
tortured  by  the  ruthless  arm  of  power,  and  carried  to 
the  stake  as  the  living  offering  of  bigotry  to  the  demon 
of  superstition. 

Feeling  is  not  under  man's  control,  and  therefore 
4 


38  FREEDOM    OF    SPEECH. 

they  have  allowed  each  other  to  escape  from  profession 
upon  that  subject,  at  the  same  time  taking  advantage 
of  the  nerves  for  the  infliction  of  as  much  pain  as 
man  could  reasonably  devise.  What  is  technically 
called  torture  (in  the  art  of  inflicting  pain)  is  also 
abolished,  and  some  obscure  principle  of  retribution  is 
now  substituted,  which  sometimes  shuts  a  man  up  in 
a  prison,  sometimes  transports  him  to  the  southern 
hemisphere,  sometimes  fines  him  a  sum  of  money, 
and  sometimes  allows  him  to  escape  altogether,  be- 
cause the  legal  punishment  is  felt  to  be  disproportioned 
to  the  crime.* 

Speech  is  still,  and  properly  enough,  made  a  matter 
of  superintendence.  A  man  may  injure  another  by 
his  speech,  and  consequently  speech  does  come  within 
the  limits  of  politics.  Immense  changes,  however, 
have  taken  place  in  the  laws  that  relate  to  the  expres- 
sion of  thought,  more  especially  on  political  subjects. 
Freedom  of  speech,  and  of  public  speech,  and  in  any 
number  of  speakers  or  auditors,  is  one  of  the  first 
essentials  of  true  liberty.  Wherever  it  is  not  enjoyed, 
liberty  is  a  shadow  and  tyranny  is  a  substance. 
France  has  yet  to  learn  this  essential  lesson  of  liberty, 


*  "  In  France,  the  average  values  have  been  from  0*477  to  0*665 
for  the  six  years  previous  to  1831.  Thus  the  chances  are  only  477 
to  1000  that  the  individual  will  be  condemned  when  accused  of 
crime  against  persons  ;  665  when  the  crime  is  one  against  property. 
The  principal  cause  of  this  inequality  appears  to  be,  as  has  been 
frequently  remarked,  that  we  are  averse  to  apply  punishment  when 
it  has  a  certain  degree  of  severity,  or  appears  severe  in  proportion 
to  the  crime ;  this  is  especially  the  case  with  crimes  against  per- 
sons." —  Quetelet's  Treatise  on  Man,  Book  IV.  Chap.  ii. 


FREEDOM    OF    SPEECH.  39 

and  until  the  French  either  obtain  or  take  the  freedom 
of  speech  that  they  have  not  now,  and  never  have  had, 
they  must  be  in  a  state  of  political  subserviency  to  the 
executive  power,  that  should  make  a  nation  blush 
with  shame,  where  so  many  cultivated  men  have 
turned  their  attention  to  the  public  affairs  of  the  state. 
That  France  should  submit  to  restriction  on  public 
discussion,  is  one  of  the  best  evidences  that  something 
more  than  revolution  is  required  to  make  a  people 
free. 

Freedom  of  discussion  is  the  great  turning-point  of 
liberty,  the  first  great  field  of  battle  between  the  na- 
tion and  the  rulers.  If  the  nation  gain  the  day,  its 
progress  is  onward  towards  freedom ;  but  if  the  rulers 
gain  the  day,  the  nation  must  submit  to  tyranny,  and 
must  groan  under  the  licentious  hand  of  a  self-consti- 
tuted government.  So  soon  as  freedom  of  speech  is 
prevented,  no  other  resource  than  revolution  can  possi- 
bly remain,  and  the  men  who  might  not  speak  with 
tongues  must  have  recourse  to  weapons  of  more 
powerful  argument.  Where  there  is  freedom  of  dis- 
cussion, there  is  always  hope  for  the  nation.  The 
government  may  enforce  its  privileges  for  a  time ;  but 
so  certainly  as  freedom  of  discussion  is  preserved,  so 
certainly  must  those  privileges  be  curtailed,  one  after 
another,  and  freedom  of  action  must  eventually  com- 
plete the  evolution. 

Writing  and  publication  are  as  essential  as  speech. 
The  censorship  is  an  abomination  altogether  incom- 
patible with  freedom,  and  every  country  that  tolerates 
it  must  lay  its  account,  not  for  the  reformation  of 
reason,  but   for   the  revolution  of  violence  —  not  for 


40 


CRIMES    AND    FALSE    CRIMES. 


change  effected  by  the  intellect  of  the  country,  but  (or 
change  effected  by  the  explosion  of  pent-up  passions 
seeking  to  destroy  rather  than  to  reconstruct. 

England  has  almost  achieved  her  emancipation  in 
the  matter  of  thought,  speech,  and  writing  •  but  very 
considerable  changes  still  remain  to  be  effected  before 
liberty  of  action  can  be  said  to  be  achieved.  There 
are  actions  which  are  naturally  crimes,  and  which 
never  can  be  any  thing  else  than  crimes  —  robbery  and 
murder,  for  instance.  Such  actions  are  criminal  ante- 
rior to  all  legislation,  and  independently  of  any  human 
enactment  whatever.  They  are  unjust  from  their 
nature,  and  we  can  predicate,  a  priori,  that  they  are 
unjust,  as  well  as  prove,  a  posteriori,  by  their  effects, 
that  they  are  eminently  prejudicial. 

Such  actions,  and  such  actions  alone,  is  the  govern- 
ment of  a  country  competent  to  prohibit,  and  to  class 
as  crimes.  But  let  us  observe  what  takes  place  in 
actual  legislation.  No  action  can  be  less  criminal 
than  the  purchase  of  the  productions  of  one  country, 
and  the  transport  of  those  productions  to  another 
country,  for  the  legitimate  profit  of  the  trader  and  the 
convenience  of  the  inhabitants.  The  government, 
however,  passes  a  law  that  such  transport  shall  not  be 
allowed,  and  that  the  man  who  still  persists  in  it  shall 
be  called  a  criminal,  and  treated  as  such.  The  govern- 
ment thus  creates  a  new  crime,  and  establishes  an 
artificial  standard  of  morality,  one  of  the  most  perni- 
cious things  for  a  community  that  can  possibly  exist,. 
as  it  leads  men  to  conclude  that  acts  are  wrong  only 
because  they  are  forbidden,  and  also  enlists  in  favor  of 
the  offender  those  feelings  which  ought  ever  to  be 
retained  in  favor  of  the  law. 


RESTRICTIVE    LAWS.  41 

The  restriction  would  be  a  crime  if  it  were  only  a 
restriction,  and  prevented  the  international  exchange 
of  produce.  But  what  are  its  effects  ?  It  calls  into 
existence  a  set  of  men  who  devote  themselves  by  pro- 
fession to  infringe  the  law.  The  act  of  transport  is 
perfectly  innocent  and  highly  beneficial ;  but  so  soon 
as  it  is  prohibited  by  law,  the  man  who  engages  in  it 
is  obliged  to  use  the  arts  of  deception  and  conceal- 
ment, and  from  one  step  of  small  depravity  to  another, 
sinks  lower  and  lower,  until  he  at  last  employs  vio- 
lence, and  does  not  hesitate  to  murder.  The  act  of 
transport  in  which  the  smuggler  is  engaged  is  one  of 
the  most  legitimate  modes  of  exercising  the  human 
powers.  Every  kind  of  advantage  attends  it.  First,  it 
is  profitable  to  the  foreign  seller.  Second,  it  is  profit- 
able to  the  merchant.  Third,  it  is  profitable  to  the 
carrier.  Fourth,  it  is  profitable  to  the  home  consumer ; 
for  if  the  goods  were  not  more  highly  esteemed  by  him 
than  the  money,  he  would  not  purchase  them  at  the 
price.  And  fifth,  it  is  injurious  to  no  one.  The  first 
three  profits  are  money  profits  ;  the  fourth,  the  profit  of 
convenience  and  gratification.  But  the  moral  effects 
are  no  less  beneficial.  First,  the  man  who  is  engaged 
in  lawful  trading  is  well  employed,  and  likely  to  be  a 
peaceful  and  good  citizen.  Second,  the  fact  of  pur- 
chasing from  a  foreigner  gives  the  trader  an  interest  in 
that  foreigner,  and  eminently  tends  to  break  down 
those  national  antipathies  which  have  descended  from 
the  darker  ages.  The  buyer  and  the  seller  are  a  step 
further  from  war  every  bargain  they  conclude  in 
honest  dealing;  and  the  iniquitous  doctrine,  that  a 
"  Frenchman  is  the  natural  enemy  of  an  Englishman,,, 


42  THE    GAME    LAWS. 

must  every  day  find  its  practical  refutation  in  the  sub- 
stantial benefits  of  trade.  First,  then,  the  prohibitory 
law  sacrifices  all  these  benefits,  and  the  law  of  restric- 
tion diminishes  them  to  the  full  extent  of  its  restric- 
tion. But  what  takes  place  ?  The  contraband  trader 
is  created  by  the  prospect  of  gain  arising  from  the 
increase  of  price.  This  increase  of  price,  instead  of 
being  a  benefit  to  the  legal  trader,  is  his  curse.  It  is 
neither  more  nor  less  than  a  premium  held  out  to  the 
smuggler  to  evade  the  custom  and  to  undersell  the 
legal  trader,  thereby  tending  constantly  to  reduce  his 
profit,  as  well  as  to  diminish  his  sale.  But  this  is  not 
all.  It  is  a  premium  to  the  reckless  to  break  the  law  ; 
and  the  man  who  lives  in  the  habitual  breach  of  the 
law  soon  becomes  a  ruined  character   and  a  ruined 

MAN. 

There  are,  perhaps,  few  courses  of  life  that  end  so 
certainly  in  ruin  as  the  smuggler's  and  the  poacher's ; 
and  yet,  barring  the  law,  the  acts  in  which  they  are 
engaged  are  perfectly  innocent  and  perfectly  legiti- 
mate. The  man  who  takes  to  smuggling  or  to  poach- 
ing as  the  means  of  gaining  his  bread,  is  almost  as 
certainly  beyond  recovery  as  the  drunkard  or  the  thief. 
It  has  been  our  lot  to  see  some  of  these  characters, 
and  to  observe  the  influence  of  their  pursuits,  and  we 
can  say  no  otherwise  than  that  we  have  been  shocked 
to  see  men  of  energy  and  great  natural  endowment 
destroyed  by  the  temptations  which  the  law  had  so 
superfluously  placed  in  their  way.  When  once  the 
habit  of  breaking  the  law  is  established,  the  distinction 
is  overlooked  that  would  not  otherwise  have  been  for- 
gotten, namely,  that  there   is  a  right  and  a  wrong' 


THE    GAME    LAWS.  43 

independently  of  the  law;  and  the  man  who  com- 
menced by  shooting  a  hare  in  his  cabbage-plot  finishes 
by  shooting  a  keeper,  and  expiating  the  offence  on  the 
gallows. 

We  do  not  mean  that  a  man  has  a  right  to  shoot 
every  where  and  any  where,  but  we  mean  that  the  act 
of  shooting  the  game  —  the  legal  crime  —  is  not  a 
crime,  and  never  can  be  such ;  and  that  the  conse- 
quences are  in  a  great  measure  the  fruits  of  the  law, 
and  must  be  charged  against  it.* 

Let  us  take  another  case.  The  Creator,  in  his 
bounty,  has  distributed  rivers  over  our  country;  and 
the  rivers  of  Scotland,  at  a  certain  season,  teem  (or 
did  teem  till  the  sea  nets  were  established)  with 
abundance  of  food  in  the  shape  of  salmon,  which  are 
thus  brought,  as  it  were,  to  the  very  door  of  the  inhab- 
itants. The  uncultivated  moors  of  the  same  district 
abound  with  wild  birds,  to  an  extent  perhaps  une- 
qualled in  the  world.  It  might  be  supposed  reasonable 
that  these  gifts  of  Providence  should  be  of  some  ser- 
vice to  the  stated  inhabitants  who  labor ;  and  as  corn 
land  is  not  so  plentiful  in  the  north  as  in  the  south, 
Providence  appears  to  have  thrown  the  salmon  and 
the  grouse  into  the  scale  to  furnish  the  necessary  food 
for  man.  But  what  has  the  law  done  ?  To  shoot  a 
grouse  is  not  merely  a  trespass  on  the  occupier  of  the 
land,  but  a  crime,  a  criminal  act,  a  thing  that  must  be 
punished,  a  deed  for  which  the  half-starved  Highlander 


#  Since  the  above  was  written,  some  partial  changes  have  been 
made  with  regard  to  hares,  preparatory,  we  hope,  to  the  total  aboli- 
tion of  all  game  laws  whatever. 


44 


THE    GAME    LAWS. 


can  be  hailed  to  prison,  and  shut  up  as  an  offender 
against  the  laws  of  his  country,  when  that  country- 
had  reduced  him  to  the  verge  of  starvation.  And  to 
spear  a  salmon,  a  fish  from  the  sea  that  no  man  may 
ever  have  seen,  and  cannot  possibly  recognize,  is  also 
attended  with  pains  and  penalties  for  killing  the  fish 
that  Heaven  had  sent  for  food. 

Let  us  consider  that  Providence  has  made  some 
animals  susceptible  of  domestication.  A  man  takes 
the  trouble  of  rearing  a  lamb  or  a  bullock;  and  by 
every  principle  of  equity  they  are  his  —  at  least  he 
has  the  claim  of  preference,  which  no  other  man  has 
a  right  to  invade.  Were  any  man  to  take  this  sheep 
or  ox  for  his  own  use,  we  see  at  once  the  impropriety 
of  the  action.  First,  it  is  an  interference  with  another 
man  without  a  justifying  reason  ;  and  second,  were 
such  interference  allowed  generally,  the  domestication 
of  animals  would  cease,  and  food  would  become  so 
much  the  less  abundant. 

In  this  case,  there  is  a  breach  of  equity  involved, 
and  the  taking  is  a  crime.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
Providence  has  made  other  animals  incapable  of  do- 
mestication, and  distributed  them  over  the  country, 
apparently  for  the  very  purpose  of  affording  food,  and 
this  in  the  very  districts  that  are  not  so  highly  favored 
with  the  cereal  productions  of  the  soil.  Such,  in 
Scotland,  are  the  salmon  and  the  grouse ;  and  these, 
at  one  period,  were  so  abundant  as  to  afford  a  staple 
article  of  food,  and  even  now  are  sufficiently  numerous 
to  feed  a  large  portion  of  the  population  from  August 
to  December.  And  what  has  the  law  done  with  regard 
to  these  bountiful  gifts  of  Providence  ?     The  law  has 


THE    GAME    LAWS.  45 

made  it  a  crime  for  the  poor  man  to  touch  them.  The 
poor  man  now  can  never  legally  have  either  a  salmon 
or  a  grouse ;  and  in  the  very  parishes  where  those  ani- 
mals are  sufficiently  numerous  to  feed  the  whole  resi- 
dent pauper  population,  the  poor  may  take  their 
choice  between  starvation  and  expatriation. 

Now,  in  the  case  of  the  animals  that  are  not  capable 
of  domestication,  there  is  an  important  distinction  to 
be  observed.  To  shoot  one  of  these  animals  is  not  a 
breach  of  equity  —  that  is,  the  wild  one  is  no  man's 
property,  while  the  domesticated  one  must  practically 
be  regarded  as  such ;  and  therefore,  as  the  wild  ani- 
mals could  not  be  regarded  as  property  —  for  property 
must  be  recognizable  —  the  law  has  made  it  a  crime 
for  the  poor  man  to  take  them  for  his  use.  And  the 
privileged  classes,  not  content  with  all  the  land,  and 
nearly  all  the  offices  of  the  state,  have  usurped  the 
fowls  of  the  air,  and  the  fish  of  the  sea,  that  never 
owned  a  master  save  the  Lord  of  heaven  and  earth. 

It  may  be  considered  that  the  question  is  of  no 
great  importance ;  neither  perhaps  is  it,  compared 
with  the  weightier  question  of  the  land;  but  we  have 
taken  it  as  an  illustration  (the  first  that  happened  to 
occur)  of  the  principle  of  legislation  as  regards  action. 
As  regards  action,  England  is  not  a  free  country,  and 
the  sooner  the  nation  is  convinced  of  the  fact,  the 
better  for  the  community.  And  by  free  country,  we 
mean  a  country  in  which  every  man  has  a  legal  right 
to  do  every  thing  that  is  not  naturally  a  crime.  Where 
a  man  can  do  what  is  a  crime,  freedom  is  no  more. 
But  the  law  may  be  the  criminal  as  well  as  the  nation  ; 
and  injustice  from  the  law  is  quite  as  unjust,  and  ten 


46  THE    GAME    LAWS. 

times  more  detrimental,  than  injustice  from  the  indi- 
vidual. 

With  regard  to  the  crime,  the  real  criminality  of  the 
action,  measured  either  by  reason  or  by  Scripture,  and 
with  regard  to  the  detriment,  measured  by  the  conse- 
quences, let  us  ask  the^  following  question,  and  let  any 
man  answer  it  on  his  conscience:  Here  are  animals 
provided  by  nature  in  abundance  —  they  cannot  follow 
even  the  laws  of  property  established  in  all  analogous 
cases,  inasmuch  as  they  are  not  recognizable,  and  can- 
not be  claimed  as  ever  having  been  in  possession. 
These  animals  are  distributed  widely,  and  spread 
throughout  the  country  in  a  manner  to  afford  a  con- 
venient supply  to  the  various  districts.  The  fish  arrive 
from  the  sea  in  their  highest  condition,  and  afford  good 
and  wholesome  food.  The  birds  are  of  the  poultry 
kind,  distinguished  for  the  quality  and  quantity  of 
their  flesh,  and  for  their  powers  of  reproduction, — 
characters  that  have  always  drawn  a  line  of  demarca- 
tion between  them  and  the  birds  of  prey,  and  pointed 
them  out  for  food.  These  animals  are  distributed  by 
nature  throughout  the  habitable  districts  where  culti- 
vation must  be  limited,  and  where  animal  food  must 
be  required,  both  from  the  scarcity  of  corn  and  from 
the  nature  of  the  climate.  Such,  at  least,  is  the  judg- 
ment of  Providence,  as  manifested  in  the  works  of 
creation,  and  in  the  harmony  which  is  every  where 
perceptible  between  the  productions  of  a  region  and 
their  suitability  to  man.  These  districts  (from  the 
monopoly  of  the  land)  are  now  inhabited  by  a  race 
reduced  to  the  lowest  state  of  poverty,  and  in  many 
cases  to  a  degradation  that  would  class  them  with  the 


THE    GAME    LAWS.  47 

savages.  Let  us  ask,  which  is  the  crime  ?  That  these 
people  should  take  the  animals  which  nature  has  pro- 
vided, or  that  the  privileged  classes  of  the  country 
should  pass  a  laiv  to  prevent  their  touching  a  single 
one  of  them  under  the  pain  of  fine  and  imprisonment? 
And  be  it  remarked,  these  animals  are  not  property, 
even  by  the  wording  of  the  enactment,  which  does  not 
punish  for  interference  with  property,  but  for  interfer- 
ence with  animals,  which  the  privileged  classes  wish 
to  monopolize  for  other  purposes.  Hundreds  of  tons 
of  fish,  and  thousands  of  boxes  of  birds,  are  annually 
taken  away  for  sale  from  these  districts,  and  yet  not 
one  of  the  poor  of  the  inhabitants  may  touch  a  feather, 
nor  finger  a  scale,  without  being  guilty  of  a  crime  ;  and 
from  one  year's  end  to  the  other,  the  mass  of  the  pop- 
ulation have  not  the  legal  right  to  take  one  single  meal 
from  a  bird  without  danger  of  imprisonment,  nor  from 
a  fish  without  danger  of  a  fine.  Is  it  a  crime,  or  is  it 
not,  that  the  privileged  classes  should  pass  such  a  law  ? 
And  is  it  a  crime,  or  is  it  not,  that  the  nation  should 
allow  such  laws,  and  such  privileged  classes,  to  con- 
tinue ?  * 

#  "  We  are  inclined  to  believe  that  the  real  value  of  game  in 
this  country  is  not  in  general  fully  understood.  It  is  usually  looked 
upon  as  kept  chiefly  for  amusement,  and  its  commercial  importance 
is  little  thought  of.  Yet  its  direct  value  as  a  marketable  commod- 
ity is  very  considerable  ;  and  its  indirect  value,  as  enhancing  landed 
property,  is  so  great  that  it  is  not  easy  to  form  an  estimate  of  it. 
The  prices  of  ordinary  game  are  pretty  well  known  in  Scotland. 
In  England  they  are  still  higher,  and  there  is  always  a  ready  de- 
mand. The  value  of  a  brace  of  grouse  is,  on  an  average,  6s.  in 
England  ;  pheasants,  6s. ;  partridges,  3s. ;  hares,  2s.  each  ;  wood- 
cocks from  6s.  to  10s.  a  pair.     The  average  value  of  a  Highland 


48 


THE    EXCISE    LAWS. 


Again,  the  manufacturers  of  certain  articles,  who 
are  certainly  not  guilty  of  crime,  or  even  of  the 
shadow  of  offence,  are  not  allowed  to  carry  on  the 
necessary  operations  except  under  the  lock  and  key 
of  the  state  officials;  and  the  regulations  are  of  so 
stringent  a  character,  that  if  they  were  not  partially 
relaxed  by  the  exciseman,  the  business  could  scarcely 
be  carried  on  without  incurring  penalties  from  the  law. 

The  soap  manufacturer  is  certainly  engaged  in  the 

red  deer  is  not  less  than  £5.  So  much  for  the  direct  value  of 
game  ;  and  when  we  consider  its  importance  indirectly,  we  are  first 
led  to  think  of  the  Highland  moors  which  it  has  rendered  so  profit- 
able. For  the  following  facts  on  this  portion  of  the  subject,  we 
are  indebted  to  an  able  letter  on  the  Game  Laws  by  Lord  Malmes- 
bury.  A  vast  number  of  moors  are  now  let  for  £400  or  £500  a  year, 
which  formerly  brought  nothing  to  the  proprietor,  as  they  are  unfit 
even  for  sheep.  Large  tracts,  which  formerly  let  as  sheep  farms, 
are  fiow  converted  into  deer  forests,  and  pay  at  least  one  third,  and 
even  one  half,  more  than  they  did  formerly.  Five  hundred  deer 
may  be  kept  on  a  space  of  ground  that  will  feed  twelve  hundred 
sheep.  Taking  the  sheep  at  the  average  price  of  18s.  each,  these 
would  be  worth  £1080 ;  but  the  deer  would  realize  nearly  double 
that  sum  —  namely,  £2000  ;  for  the  average  price  of  stags  in  sum- 
mer, and  hinds  in  winter,  is  fully  £4.  From  a  long  standing 
knowledge  of  the  Highland  moors,  Lord  Malmesbury  is  of  opinion 
that  they  are  yearly  advancing  in  price,  and  becoming  a  more  im- 
portant kind  of  property.  He  saw  a  list  last  year  of  one  hundred 
and  six  moors  let  for  shootings,  the  rent  of  which  could  not  be 
averaged  at  less  than  £300,  which  makes  a  total  of  £31,800. 
There  were  twice  as  many  more  let  at  an  average  of  £100,  and  a 
third  portion  unlet,  whose  value  may  be  fairly  stated  at  £17,000 ; 
the  whole  making  together  a  rental  of  £70,000  on  the  Highland 
shootings.  He  adds,  that  this  may  be  looked  upon  as  a  clear  gain 
as  far  as  respects  the  grouse  moors,  and  an  increase  of  two  fifths 
on  deer  ground  called  "  forest"  —  Journal  of  Agriculture. 


THE    EXCISE    LAWS.  49 

production  of  an  article  that  benefits  the  community; 
and  even  the  distiller  (for  whom  as  much  cannot  be 
said)  is  entitled  to  carry  on  his  business  on  the  same 
footing  as  every  other  man.  The  legislators  make  a 
pretext  of  revenue;  and  revenue  of  course  is  neces- 
sary, although  not  to  the  extent  to  which  revenue  is 
raised  in  Britain.  But  when  the  necessity  of  revenue 
is  granted,  is  it  at  all  necessary  that  the  man  who  is 
engaged  in  the  lawful  manufacture  of  an  article  re- 
quired by  the  community,  should  be  obliged  to  give 
notice  to  a  state  official  that  he  is  about  to  perform 
this,  that,  and  the  other  process  of  his  manufacture, 
and  be  esteemed  a  criminal  worthy  of  punishment  if 
that  notice  is  forgotten  or  neglected  ?  * 

All  these  restrictions  are  the  remnants  of  the  more 
exclusive  privileges  claimed  and  enforced  by  the  privi- 
leged classes  of  other  times,  and  the  remnants  of  that 
political  superstition  which,  next  to  religious  supersti- 
tion, every  man  ought  to  lend  his  aid  to  destroy. 

The  pretext  that  revenue  is  necessary,  is  one  that 
would  scarcely  be  entitled  to  attention,  were  it  not  ac- 
companied by  the  injustice  and  detriment  that  follow 
in  its  train.     Revenue,  so  far  as  necessary  for  the  ac- 


*  "  The  duty  on  paper  is  levied  with  a  multiplicity  of  detail 
known  only  in  the  department  of  the  excise.  The  duty  is  taken 
upon  every  single  ream ;  and  every  single  ream  has  to  be  weighed, 
and  stamped,  and  cut,  and  made  up,  and  labelled,  and  endorsed, 
and  certified,  and  entered  in  a  particular  and  special  manner ;  and 
if  there  is  the  slightest  infraction  of  the  excise  regulations,  the 
board  is  immediately  down  upon  the  manufacturer  for  a  penalty." 

Tax  on  soap,  1848, £795,981 

Tax  on  paper, 578,704 


50  LAND    AND    LABOR. 

tual  requirements  of  a  state,  need  form  a  very  trifling 
portion  of  a  nation's  expenditure.  The  whole  cost  of 
the  administration  of  justice,  and  of  every  other  val- 
uable service  that  the  state  really  requires,  is  a  mere 
trifle  in  comparison  to  the  actual  revenue,  and  to  the 
still  greater  cost  occasioned  by  the  enactments  of  the 
legislature.  But  as  revenue  may  be  derived  from  two 
sources,  the  privileged  classes  have  taken  care  that  it 
shall  be  derived  from  that  source  in  which  they  are  not 
so  immediately  interested. 

We  have  spoken  of  the  liberty  of  human  action; 
and  one  of  the  forms  of  that  action  is  labor.  The 
material  objects  of  the  creation  possess  a  value  of 
exchange ;  that  is,  people  are  willing  to  pay  for  them. 
But  labor  also  possesses  a  value  of  exchange,  and 
people  are  willing  to  pay  for  it  as  well  as  for  the  ma- 
terial objects  that  constitute  the  globe  and  its  inhab- 
itants. Let  it  be  observed  that  labor  is  essentially 
private  property.  It  has  a  value,  and  the  land  has  no 
more  than  a  value. 

Let  it  also  be  observed  that  the  land  is  not  essen- 
tially private  property,  and  that  naturally  one  man  has 
as  much  right  to  the  land  as  another. 

Labor  on  the  one  hand,  and  land  on  the  other,  are 
susceptible  of  taxation. 

The  privileged  classes,  in  the  earlier  stages  of  so- 
ciety, had  all  the  land  and  all  the  labor.  The  lord  #aa 
the  lord  not  only  of  the  land,  but  of  the  labor  of  those 
who  were  engaged  in  the  useful  arts  of  industry.  In 
the  course  of  time  the  serfs  obtained  a  small  portion 
of  their  rights,  and  towns  were  formed  where  the  citi- 
zens could  carry  on  their  labor  with  a  certain  degree 


LAND    AND    LABOR.  51 

of  advantage  to  themselves,  and  with  a  certain  degree 
of  emancipation  from  the  licentious  will  of  the  lord. 
Taxation  could  consequently  be  on  the  land  of  the 
lord,  or  on  the  labor  of  the  townsman,  for  all  the 
townsman's  capital  was  originally  the  produce  of  his 
labor.* 

If  we  consider  the  various  states  of  Europe,  from 
Russia  to  England,  we  shall  find  the  lord  and  the 
laborer  to  occupy  various  stages  of  the  political  scale 
of  evolution,  by  which  the  laborer  at  last  succeeds  in 
withdrawing  his  industry  from  the  interference  of  the 
lord,  and  from  the  taxation  of  the  state. 

Let  it  be  observed,  that  when  the  land  is  taxed,  no 
man  is  taxed ;  for  the  land  produces,  according  to  the 
law  of  the  Creator,  more  than  the  value  of  the  labor 
expended  on  it,  and  on  this  account  men  are  willing 
to  pay  a  rent  for  land.  But  when  the  privileged 
classes  had  monopolized  the  land,  they  called  it  theirs 
in  the  same  sense  in  which  labor  is  supposed  to  belong 
to  the  laborer;  and,  although  the  absurdity  of  the 
proposition  is  sufficiently  apparent,  the  laborer  was 
glad  enough  to  escape  with  even  a  small  portion  of 
his  liberty,  and  to  rejoice  that  he  could  call  his  life  and 
his  family  his  own. 

But  then  the  lords  of  the  land  were  the  rulers  and 
the  makers  of  the  laws,  and  the  imposers  of  taxation, 
and  it  was  not  reasonable  to  suppose  that  they  should 
tax  the  land.  The  king  required  money,  and  various 
persons  about  kings  in  all  ages  require  money,  and  of 

#  Probate  and  legacy  duties,  1843 :  — 

Legacies, £1,223,342 

Probates  and  administrations,            -  922,839 

Taxes  on  the  inheritance  of  land,    -  0 


52  INDIRECT    TAXATION. 

course  the  only  choice  in  the  matter  of  taxation  is 
between  labor  and  the  land. 

To  tax  labor,  then,  becomes  a  matter  of  the  most 
palpable  necessity,  and  those  who  have  been  divested 
of  almost  every  single  particle  of  earth  or  sea  that 
could  be  of  any  benefit  to  them,  must  also  be  made  to 
bear  the  burdens  of  the  state,  and  to  pay  for  the  sup- 
port of  a  government  that  was  of  little  use  to  the 
community,  and  that  only  existed  by  the  right  of  the 
strongest,  or  the  consent  of  superstition.* 

The  principle  of  taxing  labor  is  only  a  remnant  of 
the  serfdom  of  the  darker  ages,  and  it  has  been  con- 
tinued in  this  country  by  the  ingenious  device  of  what 
are  termed  indirect  taxes,  by  which  labor  is  taxed, 
although  the  laborer  is  only  made  acquainted  with  the 
fact  by  the  distress  that  periodically  oppresses  him. 

#  Immediately  a  bad  government  is  of  no  use  to  the  community, 
but  mediately  and  prospectively  the  most  stringent  despotism  in  the 
world  is  of  the  highest  importance  and  of  the  greatest  value. 
Man  must  apparently  progress  through  centralization  ;  and  a  bad 
government,  provided  it  centralizes,  is  the  foundation  of  after 
changes  most  beneficial  to  mankind.  The  good  part  of  the  Rus- 
sian government  is  its  centralization ;  and,  notwithstanding  the 
antipathy  manifested  against  that  government,  we  have  little  hesi- 
tation in  maintaining,  that  on  the  whole  it  is  doing  good  to  the  pop- 
ulation under  its  rule.  It  is  gradually  subjecting  savage  tribes  to 
the  ordinary  course  of  homogeneous  law ;  and,  though  the  laws 
are  bad,  and  the  administration  worse,  the  phase  is  one  which  the 
nomadic  tribes  and  the  semi-barbarous  population  must  pass 
through  before  they  arrive  at  political  freedom.  In  the  general 
history  of  man  it  seems  requisite  that  central  monarchy  should 
destroy  the  privileges  of  multiple  aristocracy ;  and  Russia  is  grad- 
ually effecting  this  great  change.  The  sympathy  manifested 
towards  the  Poles  is  questionable,  inasmuch  as  the  great  majority 
of  Poles  were  ruled  by  individual  aristocrats  instead  of  by  laws. 


CUSTOMS    AND    EXCISE.  53 

The  man  who  is  poisoned  without  his  knowledge 
does  not  die  the  less  certainly  for  his  ignorance,  and 
the  people  who  are  taxed  do  not  suffer  the  less  because 
the  taxes  happen  to  be  imposed  in  such  a  manner  that 
the  unthinking  and  the  ignorant  do  not  perceive  those 
taxes  in  the  price  they  pay  for  almost  every  article  of 
consumption.  All  the  real  harm  is  done  to  a  country 
as  effectually  by  indirect  taxation,  as  if  every  penny 
were  paid  out  of  the  day's  wages  to  the  tax-gatherer 
of  the  state.  But  the  rulers  know  full  well  that  if  the 
tax-gatherer  were  to  present  himself  at  the  pay-table 
of  the  laborer,  at  the  counter  of  the  shopman,  at  the 
office  of  the  merchant,  and  at  the  ship  of  the  seafaring 
carrier,  the  doom  of  labor  taxation  would  be  sealed, 
and  the  country  would  not  tolerate  so  glaring  an  in- 
justice. And  the  indirect  system  of  taxation  is  em- 
ployed, not  that  it  prevents  the  community  from  suf- 
fering, but  that  it  prevents  the  community  from  dwell- 
ing on  the  cause  of  their  suffering,  and  thereby  retards 
a  revolution  against  the  privileged  classes. 

Such  are  the  circumstances  that  led  to  the  establish- 
ment of  customs  and  excise ;  and  the  total  and  com- 
plete abolition  of  those  two  branches  of  interference 
is  one  of  the  necessary  changes  that  must  take  place 
before  this  country  can  be  free,  and  before  this  country 
can  enjoy  that  commercial  liberty,  without  which  a 
periodical  crisis  must  necessarily  be  the  lot  of  the 
laborer,  the  merchant,  and  the  manufacturer.*     It  is 

*  "  Simultaneously  with  the  relaxation  of  the  restrictive  policy 

of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  from  whose  example  we  derive 

the  system,  has  relaxed  hers.     She  has  modified  her  corn  laws,  and 

reduced  many  other  duties  to  moderate  revenue  rates.     After  ages 

5* 


54  CUSTOMS    AND    EXCISE. 

true  that  the  total  abolition  of  the  customs  appears 
chimerical  at  present ;  yet,  if  we  consider  the  history 
of  the  changes  that  have  already  taken  place,  and 
seize  their  abstract  form,  (the  only  form  that  contains 
real  instruction,)  we  have  sufficient  ground  to  hope, 
not  only  for  the  abolition  of  every  species  of  tax  upon 
labor,  but  for  the  recovery  of  each  man's  natural  prop- 
erty.  So  certainly  as  this  country  continues  to  pro- 
gress, so  certainly  must  every  restraint  be  removed 
from  every  action  that  is  not  a  crime ;  and  the  cus- 
toms' laws  can  no  more  be  perpetuated,  if  the  present 
liberty  of  discussion  continues,  than  restraints  upon 
discussion  could  be  perpetuated  after  men  had  learnt 
to  think  for  themselves,  and  to  form  their  convictions 
according  to  the  evidence  before  them. 

of  experience,  the  statesmen  of  that  country  have  been  constrained 
by  stern  necessity,  and  by  a  public  opinion  having  its  deep  founda- 
tion in  the  sufferings  and  wants  of  impoverished  millions,  to  aban- 
don a  system,  the  effect  of  which  was  to  build  up  immense  fortunes 
in  the  hands  of  the  few,  and  to  reduce  the  laboring  millions  to 
pauperism  and  misery.  Nearly  in  the  same  ratio  that  labor  was 
depressed,  capital  was  increased  and  concentrated  by  the  British 
protection  policy. 

"  The  evils  of  the  system  in  Great  Britain  were  at  length  ren- 
dered intolerable,  and  it  has  been  abandoned,  but  not  without  a 
severe  struggle  on  the  part  of  the  protected  and  favored  classes  to 
retain  the  unjust  advantages  which  they  have  so  long  enjoyed.  It 
was  by  the  same  classes  in  the  United  States,  whenever  an  attempt 
was  made  to  modify  or  abolish  the  same  unjust  system  here.  The 
protective  policy  had  been  in  operation  in  the  United  States  for  a 
much  shorter  period,  and  its  pernicious  effects  were  therefore  not 
so  clearly  perceived  and  felt.  Enough,  however,  was  known  of 
these  effects  to  induce  its  repeal."  —  President's  Message,  1846, 
{United  States.) 


UNLIMITED    LEGISLATION.  55 

The  great  source  of  the  evil  that  weighs  so  heavily 
on  the  unprivileged  classes  of  society  is  to  be  found 
in  the  doctrine,  "  that  rulers  are  competent  to  legislate 
for  every  thing  and  for  any  thing" 

This  doctrine  appears  to  be  universally  adopted  in 
states  that  are  just  beginning  to  emerge  from  a  condi- 
tion of  barbarism.  Thoughts,  words,  and  actions  are 
all  legislated  for,  without  even  an  inquiry  into  the 
right  of  the  ruler  to  promulgate  a  law  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  his  enactment.  The  right  is  assumed,  and  the 
ruler  has  the  power  to  enforce  the  law.  The  multitude, 
who  are  obliged  to  devote  their  attention  to  the  means 
of  their  livelihood,  offer  a  passive  acquiescence,  and 
endeavor  to  carry  on  as  well  as  they  can,  until  they 
find  the  operation  of  the  law  so  prejudicial  that  they 
can  bear  it  no  longer,  and  then  a  struggle  ensues,  by 
which  liberty  is  advanced  a  step;  and  the  multitude 
return  to  their  toils.  In  course  of  time,  however,  it  is 
found  that  the  remaining  laws  are  as  prejudicial  to  the 
advanced  stage  of  society  as  those  which  were  abol- 
ished were  prejudicial  to  its  earlier  stage.  A  new 
struggle  ensues,  and  liberty  is  advanced  another  step. 
Knowledge  increases,  and  trade  increases,  and  still  it 
is  found  that  the  laws  are  so  prejudicial  that  they  must 
be  abolished.  This  process  goes  on  for  centuries  ;  and 
law  after  law  is  repealed,  because  the  actual  conditions 
of  the  people  can  permit  their  existence  no  longer. 
In  this  process  of  evolution,  we  perceive  laws  going 
one  after  the  other,  in  proportion  as  knowledge  in- 
creases ;  but  it  is  quite  evident  that  such  process  can- 
not continue  indefinitely;  and  it  becomes  an  interest- 
ing question  to  inquire,  how  it  happens  that  such  a 


56  LEGISLATION    FOR    THOUGHT. 

process  should  be  necessary,  and  what  is  its  natural 
termination. 

The  process  is  necessary,  because  legislators  had 
overstepped  the  boundaries  of  legislation,  and  inter- 
fered with  matters  beyond  their  province.  Instead  of 
confining  themselves  to  the  prohibition  (or  rather  to 
the  proclamation  of  the  prohibition)  of  every  action  by 
which  one  man  injured  another  man,  they  legislated 
for  men's  thoughts,  and  enacted  laws  about  religion, 
and  persecuted  by  law  those  who  differed  from  the 
sect  that  happened  to  be  in  power. 

This  persecution,  a  few  centuries  since  in  England, 
and  not  a  century  since  in  Spain,  was  at  its  utmost 
possible  extreme ;  that  is,  men  inflicted  all  the  possible 
pain  that  they  could  on  their  fellow-creatures  of  a  dif- 
ferent creed,  and  finished  by  committing  them  to  the 
flames. 

In  course  of  time,  however,  knowledge  increased, 
and  men  thought  it  scarcely  right  to  proceed  to  the 
utmost  possible  extreme;  and  a  modification  of  the 
auto  da  fe  was  introduced  in  the  shape  of  imprison- 
ment, fine,  banishment,  &c,  &c. 

The  Protestant  creed  introduced  a  very  important 
change  in  the  credence  of  the  country  in  this  matter 
of  religion. 

The  Romanists  always  professed  to  slaughter  men 
to  the  glory  of  God ;  and  so  long  as  the  theological 
propriety  of  immolation  was  current  in  the  minds  of 
men,  there  was  little  chance  of  their  seeing  the  char- 
acter of  their  actions.  The  Protestants,  on  the  con- 
trary, abandoned  the  high  ground  of  sacrifice  to  the 
Deity,  and  substituted  the  more  rational  idea  of  sacri- 


SECTARIAN    LEGISLATION. 


57 


fice  to  the  king-.  The  unfortunate  Covenanter,  who 
was  shot  or  decapitated,  was  not  an  offering  to  the 
Deity,  but  an  offering  to  the  king;  and  the  difference 
was  of  immense  importance  to  the  country,  although 
of  no  particular  consequence  to  the  Covenanter.  So 
soon  as  persecution  (legislation  for  men's  thoughts) 
was  conceived  to  be  for  man,  and  not  for  God,  men 
began  to  inquire  whether,  after  all,  the  king  had  really 
the  right  to  legislate  to  such  an  extent.  And  as 
knowledge  increased,  they  began  to  relax  their  princi- 
ples a  little,  and  to  think  that  the  deprivation  of  civil 
privileges  would  be  punishment  sufficient  for  the  of- 
fence of  thinking  differently  from  the  sect  in  power. 

The  modification  still  goes  on,  and  measure  after 
measure  is  abolished,  until  at  last  the  professors  of 
different  creeds  almost  begin  to  think  that  they  can 
inhabit  the  same  country  without  persecuting  each 
other  on  account  of  their  religion. 

Catholic  emancipation  was  one  of  the  insignificant 
measures  that  concluded  the  evolution  with  regard  to 
that  sect.  The  repeal  of  the  Test  and  Corporation 
Act  was  another  insignificant  measure  that  brought 
up  the  rear  of  a  system  of  persecution  that  had  been 
waxing  weaker  and  weaker  for  a  century  or  two. 

Both  of  these  measures  were  hailed  as  the  glorious 
evidences  of  Britain's  impartiality,  and  certainly  the 
measures  were  necessary,  (if  freedom  be  necessary ;) 
but,  after  all,  they  were  no  more  in  comparison  to  the 
measures  that  had  preceded  them,  than  the  nursery 
tales  and  the  popular  superstitions  are  to  the  gorgeous 
pagan  credences  from  which  they  had  their  birth. 

The  last  remnant  of  this  religious  superstition  that 


58  IMMUTABILITY    OF    JUSTICE. 

once  played  so  prominent  a  part  in  Britain,  is  now  to 
be  found  in  the  taxation  of  nonconformists ;  and  the 
church-rates,  and  the  official  distinction  between  the 
various  sects,  are  the  last  representatives  of  that 
system  of  legislation  that  lit  the  fires  of  Smithfield, 
and  sent  Claverhouse  and  his  dragoons  to  murder  the 
hill-side  peasant,  and  to  torture  the  differently  thinking 
Presbyterian. 

But  what,  after  all,  is  the  principle  that  has  so  mod- 
ified the  laws  of  Britain  ?  Whence  comes  it  that  men 
should  have  so  singularly  changed  their  opinions  in 
the  course  of  a  century  or  two  ? 

It  is  perfectly  evident  that  justice  does  not  vary  from 
age  to  age.  Justice  is  the  same  from  the  beginning 
of  the  world  to  the  time  that  man  shall  change  his 
constitution.  An  act  of  justice  can  no  more  alter  its 
character  (without  a  revelation)  than  the  diameter  of 
the  circle  can  alter  its  relation  to  the  circumference. 
What  was  just  yesterday  is  just  to-day,  was  just  a 
thousand  years  ago,  and  will  be  just  a  thousand  years 
to  come. 

How  then  does  it  happen  that  so  strange  a  modifi- 
cation should  have  come  over  the  credence  of  our 
race,  and  how  does  it  happen  that  men  should  legis- 
late so  differently  ? 

The  credence  has  changed  with  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge,  and  the  legislation  has  changed  with  the 
credence. 

Men  have  discovered  that  legislators  have  no  right 
to  legislate  for  credences,  and  thus  the  last  remnants 
of  such  legislation  are  obliged  to  appear  under  another 
name,  and  to  assume  a  false  guise,  that  they  may  be 
allowed  to  continue  a  few  years  longer. 


LEGISLATION    BEYOND    ITS    PROVINCE.  59 

Legislation,  with  regard  to  thought,  never  was  just, 
and  never  can  be  just ;  and  the  abstract  form  of  the 
change  is  nothing  more  than  that  the  legislators  have 
so  far  been  driven  off  a  ground  that  they  never  had  a 
right  to  occupy. 

For  the  man  animal,  food  is  the  first  necessity;  but 
for  the  man  mental,  credence  according  to  evidence  is 
the  first  correct  law  of  his  intellectual  nature.  Food 
is  one  of  the  conditions  of  existence  ;  and,  until  it  can 
be  procured  in  tolerable  quantity,  and  with  some  de- 
gree of  certainty,  a  community  cares  little  about  the 
mind,  and  allows  the  question  of  free  thought  to  re- 
main in  abeyance. 

When  a  community  begins  to  emerge  from  barba- 
rism, and  legislation  assumes  a  definite  form,  every 
thing  is  legislated  for.  Food,  thought,  speech,  action, 
property,  and  in  all  their  various  forms,  are  all  made 
subjects  of  enactment;  and  men  thus  endeavor  to 
improve  the  world  that  God  made,  by  passing  laws  to 
amend  the  order  of  nature.  The  first  necessity  for  the 
community  is  to  have  some  small  opportunity  of  pro- 
curing food,  and  when  the  necessary  conditions  are 
obtained,  (which  involve  some  degree  of  liberty,)  men 
turn  their  attention  to  other  subjects,  according  to  the 
character  of  their  theological  belief.  The  religious 
impulses  of  our  nature  require  satisfaction,  perhaps, 
before  any  other  portion  of  the  mental  constitution ; 
and  as  men  must  have  some  kind  of  theological  cre- 
dence, right  or  wrong,  they  believe  any  thing  rather 
than  remain  in  doubt.  And  as,  where  there  is  no  evi- 
dence, there  can  be  no  truth  and  no  error,  but  mere 
arbitrary  superstition,  the   state  has  generally   estab- 


60  CHANGE    OF    LAWS. 

iished  some  form  of  credence  by  law,  and  committed 
the  care  of  the  supersitition  to  the  priest.  But  there 
does  happen  to  be  a  true  religion  as  well  as  an  indefi- 
nite number  of  superstitions ;  and,  after  the  revival  of 
learning,  when  the  truth  began  to  break  on  men's 
minds,  that  religion  was  not  a  matter  of  mere  arbi- 
trary church  authority,  but  a  real  matter  of  truth  and 
falsehood,  in  which  life  and  death  were  involved,  the 
Christianity  of  the  Bible  came  into  collision  with  the 
established  superstitions  of  the  papal  priesthood,  and 
a  struggle  was  commenced,  which  began  by  the  maxi- 
mum of  persecution,  and  ended,  in  this  country  at 
least  in  the  maximum  of  liberty  of  thought.* 


#  "  But  we  shall  next  consider  the  state  of  religion  in  England. 
From  the  days  of  Wickliffe  there  were  many  that  differed  from  the 
doctrines  commonly  received.  He  wrote  many  books  that  gave 
great  offence  to  the  clergy,  yet  being  powerfully  supported  by  the 
duke  of  Lancaster,  they  could  not  have  their  revenge  during  his 
life ;  but  he  was,  after  his  death,  condemned,  and  his  body  was 
raised  and  burnt.  The  Bible,  which  he  translated  into  English, 
with  the  preface  which  he  set  before  it,  produced  the  greatest 
effects.  In  it  he  reflected  on  the  lives  of  the  clergy,  and  con- 
demned the  worship  of  saints  and  images,  and  the  corporeal  pres- 
ence of  Christ  in  the  sacraments ;  but  the  most  criminal  part  was 
the  exhorting  all  people  to  read  the  Scriptures ;  when  the  testimo- 
nies against  those  corruptions  were  such,  that  there  was  no  way  to 
deal  with  them  but  to  silence  them.  His  followers  were  not  men 
of  letters,  but  being  wrought  on  by  the  easy  conviction  of  plain 
sense,  were  by  them  determined  in  their  persuasions.  They  did 
not  form  themselves  into  a  body,  but  were  contented  to  hold  their 
opinions  secretly,  and  did  not  spread  them  but  to  their  particular 
confidents.  The  clergy  sought  them  out  every  where,  and  did 
deliver  them,  after  conviction,  to  the  secular  arm,  that  is,  to  the 
Qte,n — Burnet's  History  of  the  Reformation,  abridged,  p.  14. 


RESULT.  61 

But  it  is  not  one  single  shade  more  right  now  than 
it  was  two  or  five  hundred  years  since,  that  men 
should  think  and  believe  for  themselves  without  the 
interference  of  the  legislator.  The  legislator  never  had 
a  particle  of  right  to  interfere  in  matters  of  faith, 
which  right  he  does  not  possess  to  the  full  extent  in 
the  present  day.  And  the  real  essence  of  the  change 
is  to  be  found,  not  in  the  alteration  or  improvement 
of  the  laws,  but  in  the  total  exclusion  of  legislation 
from  the  province  of  thought.  The  legislator  was 
altogether  out  of  his  sphere  ;  and  every  law  was  neces- 
sarily unjust,  whether  mild,  moderate,  or  severe.  No 
matter  what  the  character  of  the  enactment  happened 
to  be,  it  was  an  injustice  and  a  licentious  invasion  of 
the  natural  rights  of  man  ;  and  as  such,  the  only  ques- 
tion that  could  legitimately  be  taken  into  consideration 
respecting  it  was  its  abolition. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  a  country  is 
in  the  same  circumstances  before  a  law  has  been  called 
into  existence,  and  after  its  abolition.  Before  the  law 
is  enacted  men  are  naturally  free,  but  when  the  law 
has  been  abolished,  men  are  legally  free.  A  country, 
arrived  at  complete  freedom  after  the  various  trans- 
formations of  superstition  and  injustice,  is  a  very  dif- 
ferent thing  from  a  country  where  legislation  has  only 
commenced.  The  actual  laws  that  exist  in  both  cases 
might  perhaps  be  the  same ;  but  in  the  one  case  they 
are  the  stepping  stones  to  an  indefinite  series  of  legis- 
lative acts,  and  in  the  other  case  they  are  the  perma- 
nent records  of  a  nation's  final  judgment.  England, 
before  men  legislated  for  thoughts,  and  England  after 
men  have  legislated  for  thoughts,  and  abolished  such 
6 


62  FREEDOM    OF    EXPRESSION! 

legislation,  is  in  very  different  circumstances;  inas- 
much as  it  may  now  be  reckoned  a  matter  of  ascer- 
tained truth,  that  legislation  for  matters  of  belief  is 
preeminently  prejudicial,  as  well  as  unjust.  And  the 
probability  of  new  legislation  on  the  subject  can 
scarcely  be  contemplated,  unless  some  very  unexpected 
change  take  place,  altogether  out  of  the  order  of  the 
scheme  of  progress  that  may  naturally  be  anticipated. 

But  if  legislation  can  be  out  of  its  sphere  in  the 
matter  of  thought,  it  can  also  be  out  of  its  sphere  in 
the  matters  of  speech,  action,  and  property. 

Next  to  liberty  of  thought  comes  liberty  of  speech, 
writing,  and  publication. 

Speech  and  publication  are  very  extensively  legislat- 
ed for,  and  the  countries  of  continental  Europe  appear 
all,  or  nearly  all,  to  admit  the  unlimited  right  of  the 
legislator  to  interfere  as  much  as  he  pleases  with  the 
natural  rights  of  the  community  in  the  sphere  of  the 
expression  of  thought 

Where  rulers  govern  by  power,  and  not  by  the  en- 
lightened choice  of  the  nation,  they  are  a  party  opposed 
to  the  nation.  On  the  one  hand  is  the  nation  and  the 
national  interest ;  and  on  the  other  hand  is  the  govern- 
ment and  the  interest  of  the  individuals  connected  with 
it.  The  more  power  the  rulers  have,  the  less  liberty 
the  people  have ;  and  the  more  land  and  privilege  the 
rulers  have,  the  less  wealth  have  the  population.  Now 
wealth  and  power  are  exactly  what  men  are  desirous 
of  possessing ;  and  as  rulers  are  men,  it  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at  that  they  dip  their  fingers  into  every 
man's  dish,  equitably  or  unequitably,  and  monopolize 
the  best  things  that  happen  to  be  going.     The  land, 


THE    CENSORSHIP.  63 

of  course,  either  in  kind  or  in  some  other  form,  falls  to 
the  lot  of  the  rulers  and  their  coadjutors  —  the  nobles 
and  the  priests.  The  cultivation  of  the  land,  (the  la- 
bor,) instead  of  also  falling  to  the  lot  of  the  privileged 
classes,  becomes  the  portion  of  the  people. 

But  excessive  privileges  are  much  easier  maintained 
against  a  weak  people  than  against  a  strong  one ;  and 
as  the  people  can  only  be  strong  by  knowledge,  virtue, 
and  combination  —  knowledge,  virtue,  and  combina- 
tion are  in  little  favor  with  despotic  governments. 
Political  knowledge  (that  is,  the  knowledge  of  their 
rights  and  interests)  is  carefully  excluded  from  the 
mass  of  the  population ;  and  as  political  knowledge 
grows  out  of  discussion  about  social  welfare,  as  well 
as  out  of  the  thoughtful  toil  of  the  author,  both  dis- 
cussion and  authorship  are  subjected  to  partial  or  total 
prohibition.  The  most  frantic  blasphemies  will  find  a 
readier  license  for  publication  than  a  sober  treatise  on 
the  public  welfare ;  and  a  philosophical  denial  of  all 
right  and  wrong  whatever  will  be  more  tolerable  than 
an  inquiry  into  the  foundations  of  the  rulers'  privi- 
leges. The  most  infamously  immoral  production  is 
less  likely  to  be  scrutinized  than  a  dissertation  on 
political  economy ;  and  an  association  for  murdering, 
torturing,  and  expatriating  the  population,*  would  be 
more  readily  authorized  than  an  association  for  for- 
warding the  rights  of  the  people. 

Any  thing  in  the  shape  of  superstition  (that  is, 
uninquiring  credence)  is  esteemed  proper  enough  ;  but 
the  moment   men  begin   to  inquire  and  to  seek   for 

*  An  inquisition,  for  instance. 


64  THE    CENSORSHIP. 

reasons,  that  moment  is  the  government  alarmed,  and 
that  moment  must  means  be  put  in  operation  to  stop 
the  course  of  knowledge.*  Governments,  like  those 
of  Russia,  Austria,  and  Italy,  can  only  exist  by  means 
of  superstition ;  and  the  question  with  them  is,  not  as 
to  the  propriety  of  allowing  men  to  obtain  knowledge 
and  to  express  their  thoughts,  but  as  to  the  propriety 
of  the  existence  of  the  government ;  and  every  restric- 
tive measure  that  affects  the  free  expression  of  opinion, 
is  only  an  act  of  self-defence  against  the  nation.  The 
government  must  either  give  up  its  privileges,  or  keep 
the  people  in  slavery  with  regard  to  expression  of 
opinion;  and  the  stringent  laws  of  the  continental 
powers,  relative  to  every  kind  of  political  meeting,  are 
no  more  than  measures  of  precaution,  analogous  to 
those  practised  by  the  pirate  who  scuttles  his  prize 
(with  its  crew)  as  a  measure  conducing  to  his  safety. \ 

*  "Thus  the  universities  governed  by  ecclesiastics  persuaded 
the  poor  bigot  Philip  III.  to  pass  a  law  prohibiting  the  study  of  any 
new  system  of  medicine,  and  requiring  Galen,  Hippocrates,  and 
Avicenna ;  they  scouted  the  exact  sciences  and  experimental  phi- 
losophy, which  said  they  made  every  medical  man  a  Tiberius ;  and 
so  they  scared  the  timid  Ferdinand  VII.  in  1830,  by  telling  him 
that  the  schools  of  medicine  created  materialists,  heretics,  and  rev- 
olutionists;  thereupon  the  beloved  monarch  shut  up  the  lecture 
rooms  forthwith."  —  Ford's  Spain. 

f  The  pirate  is  rationally  correct ;  that  is,  his  act  does  conduce 
to  his  immediate  safety,  for  dead  men  tell  no  tales,  and  sunk  ships 
cannot  appear  in  evidence.  And  despotic  governors  are  also  ra- 
tionally correct;  that  is,  an  ignorant  and  superstitious  population 
has  less  power  and  less  desire  for  liberty  than  a  population  that 
thinks  for  itself,  and  has  free  opportunity  of  expression.  The  re- 
mote consequences,  however,  are  sometimes  overlooked.  When  the 
truth  is  discovered,  the  pirate  is  hanged,  and  the  ruler  guillotined. 


DESPOTIC    POWER ITS    MEANS.  65 

The  objects  of  a  despotic  government  must  necessa- 
rily be  distinguished  from  its  means.  The  objects  are 
wealth  and  power  ;  the  means,  tyranny  and  super- 
stition. Tyranny  is  power  without  right,  and  super- 
stition is  credence  without  evidence.  The  means  of 
a  despotic  government,  therefore,  are  power  without 
right,  and  credence  without  evidence.  The  governor 
of  a  country,  in  the  earlier  stage  of  legislation,  is  the 
strongest  man  in  the  country ;  and,  by  conversion,  the 
strongest  man  in  the  country  is  the  governor.  Now, 
one  strongest  man,  who  has  the  opportunity  of  taking 
a  thousand  weaker  men  in  detail,  is  stronger  than  the 
whole  thousand  if  he  can  prevent  them  from  combining. 
This  is  the  concise  explanation  of  the  theory  of  a  des- 
potic government.  A  noble,  a  chief,  even  a  bishop, 
may  become  a  sovereign,  and  remain  so  as  long  as  he 
has  power  or  dexterity  to  prevent  the  people  from 
combining.  As  soon  as  they  combine,  he  is  no  longer 
the  strongest,  and  his  wealth  as  well  as  his  power  is  in 
a  fair  way  to  depart.  It  therefore  becomes  a  matter 
of  serious  consideration  for  him  to  discover  and  put  in 
practice  those  means  that  tend  to  secure  his  power,  and 
prevent  his  enemies  (his  subjects)  from  combining. 

In  the  first  place,  he  must  have  more  wealth ;  and, 
as  he  cannot  have  it  by  his  own  honest  industry,  he 
must  have  it  by  the  industry  of  others,  or  by  the  mo- 
nopoly of  those  natural  objects  which  other  men  must 
possess  as  the  conditions  of  their  existence. 

Land  is  the  great  source  of  wealth ;  forests  and  fish- 
eries are  also  tolerable ;  mines  and  minerals  are  capa- 
ble of  yielding  a  revenue ;  and,  in  addition  to  these, 
comes  the  taxation  of  labor. 
6* 


66  COMBINATIONS. 

These  sources  of  wealth,  therefore,  must  be  turned 
to  account,  and  the  governor,  of  course,  does  not  neg- 
lect them.  Wealth  is  power  for  the  ruler,  as  knowl- 
edge is  power  for  the  people ;  and  the  more  wealth  the 
ruler  has,  the  more  power  has  he  for  taking  advantage 
of  his  subjects.  Wealth,  therefore,  is  both  a  means 
and  an  end  —  a  means  of  getting  more  wealth  and  of 
getting  more  power.  Wealth  gives  birth  to  a  standing 
army,  and  a  standing  army  gives  birth  to  more  power, 
as  it  enables  the  ruler  to  apply  his  principles  more 
extensively  and  with  greater  security. 

But  if  a  people  were  to  combine  against  any  stand- 
ing army  that  is  likely  to  exist,  the  ruler  would  no 
longer  be  a  ruler,  and  the  army  would  no  longer  be  an 
army.  It  therefore  becomes  a  matter  of  serious 
thought  for  the  ruler  to  obviate  the  tendencies  towards 
combination. 

There  are  two  or  three  kinds  of  combination. 

1st.  The  combination  of  national  antipathy.  This 
combination  may  exist  where  there  is  abundance  of 
ignorance.  The  Indians  might  combine  against  the 
whites  on  the  continent  of  America,  and,  though  the 
combinations  were  partial,  they  did  a  great  deal  of 
mischief  in  by-gone  times.  The  Tyrolese  might  com- 
bine on  the  same  principle,  and  so  might  the  Poles, 
the  Swiss,  the  Greeks,  &c.  It  must  not  be  supposed 
that  these  are  contests  for  freedom.  On  the  contrary, 
they  are  contests  against  a  foreign  tyranny  in  favor  of 
a  domestic  one.  Such  combinations  are  interesting 
as  matters  of  history,  but  of  very  little  importance  to 
the  progress  of  real  freedom. 

2d.  Religious  combination.     This  also  is  a  matter 


RELIGIOUS    LIBERTY.  67 

of  sentiment,  and  by  no  means  advances  freedom  as 
a  matter  of  necessity.  The  crusades  were  singular 
exhibitions  of  this  kind  of  combination  carried  out 
on  a  large  scale.  The  wars  of  the  Ligioe  also  exhibit 
a  double  combination  of  ruffians  on  both  sides,  who 
perpetrated  astonishing  crimes  for  the  advancement 
of  their  religious  party.* 

The  Presbyterians  of  Scotland,  and  the  Puritans  of 
England,  had  hold  of  the  truth  ;  and,  though  they 
had  scarcely  yet  learnt  to  view  it  in  its  true  light,  they 
progressed  immensely  towards  freedom.  They  did 
confound  civil  and  religious  liberty ;  but  notwithstand- 
ing, it  is  to  them,  under  God,  that  we  owe  the  preser- 
vation of  the  cause  of  liberty  in  this  country,  when 
the  continent,  and  especially  France,  either  extin- 
guished the  little  liberty  that  had  begun  to  illuminate 
the  people,  or  so  impeded  its  progress  that  they  have 
still  their  convulsions  before  them.  The  extinction  of 
Protestantism  in  France  rendered  a  physical  force 
convulsion  necessary  before  the  obstacles  to  the  prog- 

*  Absurd  as  the  crusades  were  in  themselves,  they  were  of  the 
highest  value  to  Europe ;  in  fact,  it  seems  that  whatever  the  tem- 
porary evils  attendant  on  any  one  part  of  human  condition,  or  ot 
human  manifestation,  that  condition  was  a  phase  of  progress,  cal- 
culated to  leave  society  in  a  better  state  than  it  found  it.  This 
principle  is  applicable  also  to  the  first  French  revolution.  It  was  a 
fearful  scene  when  viewed  individually.  But  if  we  look  to  the  con- 
dition of  France  before  the  revolution,  and  again  after  the  revo- 
lution, we  cannot  deny  that  its  effects  were  of  the  greatest  value  to 
the  country.  Those  who  attend  merely  to  the  revolution  and  its 
horrors,  are  like  those  who  go  to  see  a  criminal  executed  without 
asking  the  reason  of  his  execution,  or  inquiring  into  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  laws  which  demand  his  execution.  The  French  revo- 
lution was  produced  by  the  laws  of  nature.    Who  made  those  laws  ? 


68  RELIGIOUS    LIBERTY. 

ress  of  society  could  be  removed ;  and  if  full  liberty 
of  thought  bad  been  accorded,  instead  of  the  revoca- 
tion of  the  edict  of  Nantes,  in  all  probability  the  pro- 
gression of  society  would  have  taken  place  by  the 
gradual  removal  of  abuses,  instead  of  being  arrested 
until  the  bulwarks  of  despotism  were  no  longer  strong 
enough  to  retain  the  expansive  energies  of  the  popu- 
lation. To  suppose  that  the  French  revolution  could 
have  been  prevented  by  any  of  the  individuals  who 
happened  to  figure  in  it,  is  to  suppose  that  causes  are 
no  causes,  and  effects  no  effects.  But  France  has  still 
her  work  to  do ;  and,  although  none  of  the  past  frenzy 
can  be  again  anticipated,  as  the  causes  do  not  exist  to 
produce  it,*  France  has  yet  to  shake  off  despotism, 

*  The  atrocities  of  the  first  French  revolution  were  French ;  the 
atrocities  of  the  last  were  Parisian.  In  the  former  case  there  was 
not  only  insurrection  in  the  towns,  but  there  was  the  most  fearful 
of  all  convulsions  —  a  rural  insurrection.  The  atrocities  of  the 
last  revolution,  &c,  were  very  partial.  They  were  confined  to  a 
few  of  the  lowest  population  in  Paris ;  and,  no  doubt,  there  are  in 
Paris,  at  the  bottom  of  society,  persons  who  would  do  any  thing. 
There  is  no  possibility,  however,  of  instituting  a  comparison  be- 
tween the  frenzy  of  the  late  revolution  and  that  of  the  former.  It 
is  perfectly  absurd,  and  only  shows  how  panic  and  party  feeling 
will  blind  the  judgment  and  make  the  tongue  rave  nonsense. 

To  those  who  speak  so  loudly  and  so  long  of  the  horrors  of 
insurrection,  we  propound  a  question :  "  Which  is  the  worst,  the 
most  atrocious,  the  most  base,  and  the  greatest  reproach  to  a  nation, 

"  1st.  The  atrocities  that  accompany  a  political  insurrection?  or, 

"  2d.  Women  poisoning  people  by  scores  for  the  sake  of  obtain- 
ing burial  fees  ?  "  In  the  paper,  yesterday,  we  read  an  account  of 
a  woman  thus  disposing  of  eight  of  her  offspring. 

The  first  is  French. 

The  latter  is  English. 

The  demoralization  going  on  in  Britain  is  such,  that  if  ever  there 


REACTION    UNDER    PRESSURE.  69 

and  to  form  a  government  that  shall  rule  otherwise 
than  by  a  standing  army  and  a  system  of  officials. 

In  the  convulsions  of  France  we  have  a  third  kind 
of  eombination;  namely,  combination  to  overthrow 
an  evil  that  presses  on  the  feelings,  thoughts,  and  in- 
terests of  men.  The  population  suffered  from  a  com- 
mon evil ;  and  when  that  evil  was  exposed,  they  com- 
bined to  overthrow  it.  The  combination,  however, 
was  not  of  a  high  character.  It  was  a  mere  reaction 
under  pressure.  To  get  rid  of  the  pressure  was  nearly 
the  sum  and  substance  of  the  combination;  and  dis- 
union and  licentiousness  followed  when  the  pressure 
was  removed. 

But  there  is  another  kind  of  combination,  and  a  far 
more  important  one  for  the  welfare  of  the  world  —  the 
combination  of  knowledge  and  reason.  Knowledge  is 
credence  based  on  sufficient  evidence;  and  reason  is 
the  power  of  perceiving  consequences,  and  of  inferring 
antecedents.  Without  reason  man  would  only  be  a 
higher  kind  of  ape;  as  it  is,  he  is  a  spirit  and  an 
immortal. 

Man  has  an  intellect,  as  well  as  a  bodily  frame,  and 
this  intellect  has  its  laws  and  its  requirements.  Ob- 
servation is  its  food,  reason  is  its  process  of  digestion, 
and  truth  is  its  circulating  fluid,  without  which  it  de- 
generates and  dies.  Truth  makes  the  mind  strong, 
ignorance   makes   it  weak,   and  error  infects  it  with 

were  any  thing  like  an  insurrection,  it  is  impossible  to  predict  the 
extent  to  which  frenzy  might  he  carried.  The  demoralization  of 
the  population  is  England's  greatest  danger;  and,  if  not  met  in 
time  by  means  of  moral  and  intellectual  training,  it  may  produce 
the  direst  evils,  and  make  England  a  manufacturing  hell. 


70  THE  PEOPLE  AND  THE  RULERS. 

disease.  Knowledge  is  not  only  power  —  it  is  strength 
—  strength  of  the  mind,  health,  and  life,  and  strength. 
To  obliterate  this  strength,  therefore,  is  the  object  of 
the  despotic  ruler.  If  the  people  are  strong,  the  despot 
must  be  weak 'T  but  the  legitimate  ruler  is  so  much  the 
stronger  as  the  people  are  stronger.  When  the  rulers 
and  the  nation  are  in  opposite  scales,  the  less  weight 
the  people  have,  the  more  easily  are  they  outweighed ; 
but  when  both  are  in  the  same  scales,  the  heavier  they 
both  are  the  better  for  both,  and  the  worse  for  those 
who  are  opposed  to  them.  In  a  free  country,  where 
law  was  absolutely  supreme  and  really  equitable,  every 
man  would  feel  the  ruler  to  be  a  portion  of  himself, 
and  would  lend  his  arm  or  his  aid  to  further  the  ends 
of  justice.  The  ruler  of  a  free  country  should  be  the 
pure  administrator  of  the  law  —  the  first  magistrate 
of  equity,  to  whom  every  man  was  bound  by  the  right- 
eous bonds  of  justice,  and  by  the  sentiments  of  rever- 
ence implanted  in  our  nature  to  elevate  our  race  above 
the  creatures  that  surround  us, 

In  a  despotism,  superstition  takes  the  place  of 
knowledge,  and  the  fear  of  suffering  helps  to  procure 
an  unwilling  obedience. 

The  ruler  is  the  wolf,  the  people  are  the  flock,  and 
the  lawyers  *  and  priests  f  are  the  foxes  who  prepare 
the  flock  for  slaughter, 

*  England,  happy  in  the  integrity  and  mildness  of  her  judges  in 
the  18th  century,  and  in  our  own  times  —  during  the  Stuart  reigns, 
was  cursed  by  a  succession  of  ruffians  in  ermine,  who,  for  the  sake 
of  court  favor,  violated  the  principles  of  law,  the  precepts  of  reli- 
gion, and  the  dictates  of  humanity."  —  Campbell's  Lives  of  the 
Chancellors: 

t  In  speaking  lightly  of  the  priests,  we  do  not  speak  lightly  of 


ESPOTISM    AND    SUPERSTITION.  71 

When  the  priesthood  lose  their  influence,  an  army 
must  be  resorted  to,  and  physical  tyranny  and  central- 
ization must  do  the  work  of  superstition.  At  all 
hazards,  the  people  must  be  kept  down,  or  the  game 
of  despotism  is  lost. 

The  simplest  plan  of  a  despotism  is  to  make  the 
people  believe  that  the  ruler  is  a  distant  relation  to 
some  of  the  deities  of  the  country.  A  greater  or  less 
degree  of  this  method  appears  to  be  common  in  infant 
stages  of  society,  but  a  small  advance  of  knowledge 
suffices  to  disturb  so  convenient  a  doctrine ;  and  this 
is  partly  the  reason  why  so  dire  an  antipathy  should 
be  manifested  by  the  rulers  of  various  countries  to  the 
introduction  of  the  gospel  as  contained  in  revelation. 
Russia,  Austria,  and  Italy  are  little  better  than  pagan 
countries,  and  the  rulers  are  partially  or  altogether 
believed  to  have  some  special  connection  with  the 
object  of  worship,  and  to  rule  by  right  divine.*     The 


men  holding  a  sacred  office.  The  priest  —  that  is,  the  sacrificer 
and  the  mediator  —  does  not  hold  a  sacred  office.  Every  human 
priest  is  an  antichrist.  In  the  Christian  religion  there  is  but  one 
Priest,  and  his  sacrifice  is  offered,  so  that  there  remains  no  more 
offering  for  sin.     "  It  is  finished ! " 

The  only  real  Priest  has  ascended  into  heaven,  and  to  those  who 
wait  for  him  he  will  come  a  second  time  unto  salvation.  All  other 
priests  are  antichrists. 

The  present  priests,  including  the  Roman  sacrificers  and  media- 
tors, must  be  classed  with  alchemists,  astrologers,  and  necromancers, 
partly  deceived,  and  partly  deceivers.  Next  to  that  of  becoming 
the  object  of  worship,  (like  the  Grand  Llama,)  the  office  of  priest  is 
the  most  wicked  that  it  is  possible  for  man  to  fill. 

*  "  Emperors,  kings,  and  other  superiors  have  their  power  from 
God,  because  they  are  the  substitutes  of  God  on  earth." 


72  CHANGE    OF    CONDITIONS. 

pope,  of  course,  is  a  kind  of  partial  divinity,  from 
being  the  high  priest  of  the  Roman  superstitions ;  and, 
in  Russia,  "God  and  the  emperor"  are  much  on  the 
same  footing  as  God  and  the  pope.  Both  the  pope 
and  the  emperor  are  blasphemously  associated  with 
the  divine  Majesty,  and  the  authority  of  Heaven  is 
supposed  in  some  obscure  way  or  other  to  attach  to 
the  persons  of  those  worthies.  France  has  passed  the 
theological  view  of  government,  and  the  priest  is  no 
longer  a  jackall  to  the  king.  Superstition  has  lost  its 
hold;  and  though  the  women  must  still  have  some 
kind  of  religion,  the  men  have  got  beyond  the  point 
of  believing  merely  on  authority;  and  as,  unfortu- 
nately, they  have  been  denied  the  truth,  they  have  sunk 
into  passive  infidelity.  Superstition  and  the  ruler  are 
no  longer  allied  in  their  thoughts,  and  an  innumerable 
multitude  of  officials  must  be  called  into  existence  to 
keep  them  from  indulging  in  political  disturbances. 

Mere  superstition,  however,  is  insufficient  to  enslave 
a  people  that  has  commercial  intercourse  with  other 

Ques.  —  "  How  must  subjects  behave  towards  their  sovereign  ? 

Ans.  — "  Subjects  must  behave  towards  their  sovereign  like 
faithful  slaves  towards  their  master. 

Qwes.  —  "  Why  must  subjects  behave  like  slaves  ? 

Ans.  —  "  Because  their  sovereign  is  their  master,  and  has  power 
over  their  property  as  well  as  over  their  life. 

Ques. —  "  Are  subjects  bound  to  obey  also  bad  sovereigns  ? 

Arts.  —  "  Yes,  subjects  are  bound  to  obey  not  only  good,  but  also 
bad  sovereigns." — The  Didy  of  Subjects  towards  their  Sovereign, 
for  Instruction  in  Reading,  in  the  Second  Class  of  Elementary 
Schools.     Milan:  1824. 

Such  are  the  deliberate  blasphemies  inculcated  by  order  of  the 
Austrian  government. 


CHANGE    OF    CONDITIONS. 


73 


nations.  So  long  as  the  country  can  be  surrounded 
with  a  barrier,  and  (ree  communication  prevented, 
superstition  may  do  its  work  tolerably  well,  and  a  na- 
tion may  remain  in  much  the  same  state  for  an  indefi- 
nite period.*     When,  for  a  thousand  years,  the  sun 

*  We  have  only  to  look  at  Spain  to  see  how  effectually  super- 
stition eradicates  even  an  aspiration  after  freedom.  Let  it  be  re- 
membered that,  a  few  centuries  since,  Spain  was  second  to  no 
country  in  Europe  in  the  extent  of  her  political  power.  What  is 
she  now,  and  what  has  superstition  made  her  ?  "  The  masses  care 
no  more  for  a  constitution  than  the  Berber  or  Oriental ;  with  them 
this  thing  of  parchment  is  no  reality,  but  a  mere  abstraction,  which 
they  neither  understand  nor  estimate.  The  people  do  not  want 
their  laws  to  be  changed,  but  to  have  them  fairly  administered ; 
the  laws  are  good  in  theory,  but  worm-eaten  in  practice,  by  bribery 
and  corruption.  Confer  a  spick-and-span  patent  Benthamite  con- 
stitution on  Spaniards,  and  they  will  take  it  without  thanks ;  annul 
it,  and  they  will  respond  by  a  patient  shrug.  Their  only  idea  of 
government  is  despotism."  —  Ford's  Spain,  p.  862. 

Mr.  Ford  adds,  that  though  despotism  may  be  odious  in  theory,  it 
never  pressed  harshly  on  the  nation  in  ptadice.  This  is  rather  a 
singular  way  of  reading  Spanish  history ;  and  we  would  ask,  if 
despotism  have  not  pressed  hard,  what  is  it  that  has  pressed  so 
hard  ?  If  despotism  has  not  pressed  hard  on  Spain,  what  was  it 
that  burnt  30,000  of  her  inhabitants,  and  imprisoned  and  expatriated 
an  immense  multitude  of  her  industrious  population  ?  Of  course 
the  Roman  superstitions  were  at  the  bottom  of  the  persecutions, 
but  the  despotism  was  the  efficient  agent  in  carrying  out  the  dia- 
bolical instigations  of  the  monks  and  priests.  Where  there  is  not 
a  despotism,  the  power  of  the  priest  is  annulled.  He  can  no  longer 
procure  the  death  or  the  exile  of  those  who  differ  in  belief.  And 
wherever  the  priest  is  found,  there  will  be  found  an  ally  and  a 
supporter  of  despotic  power.  Superstition  ruined  the  credence  of 
Spain,  and  despotism  ruined  the  country.  The  two  walk  hand  in 
hand,  like  the  invisible  pestilence  and  the  loathsome  disease  that 
shows  that  pestilence  to  the  world. 
7 


74  FREE    INTERCOURSE, 

rises  every  day  upon  simUa/r  conditions,  it  is  by  no 
means  wonderful  that  change  should  not  take  place. 
In  the  political,  as  well  as  the  physical  world,  the  con- 
ditions must  be  changed  before  we  can  look  for  a 
change  in  the  phenomena.  Change  the  conditions, 
and  some  change  or  other  will  be  exhibited  in  the  con- 
sequent results.  For  those  who  have  the  land  and  the 
privilege,  every  change  is  dangerous ;  and  the  invaria- 
ble tendency  of  the  privileged  classes  to  oppose  change 
is  only  a  prudent  exercise  of  foresight. 

One  of  the  most  important  changes  in  the  condition 
of  a  people  is  free  intercourse  with  strangers.  Inter- 
change of  thought  and  opinion  takes  place,  informa- 
tion is  given  and  received,  new  arts  are  learnt  and 
communicated,  and  something  analogous  to  a  chemi- 
cal effervescence  takes  place  between  the  two  people, 
who  are  thus  mutually  excited  to  a  state  of  social  fer- 
ment. But  not  only  are  nations  stimulated  by  inter- 
course with  others ;  it  appears  to  be  a  law  of  animal 
development,  that  {he  mixture  of  races  produces  a 
higher  and  better  type  than  either  of  the  originals,  and 
the  finest  races  are  those  in  whose  elements  the  origi- 
nal types  have  almost  disappeared.  Races  of  men 
may,  at  the  same  time,  be  so  mingled  as  to  produce  a 
lower  type,  and  this  law  also  extends  to  the  lower  ani- 
mals ;  but  while  two  races,  already  low,  may  be  inju- 
diciously crossed,  to  the  detriment  of  the  progeny, 
there  seems  little  reason  for  doubt  that  the  intermix- 
ture of  national  blood,  where  the  races  are  of  a  higher 
character,  is  conducive  to  the  physical  perfection  of 
mankind.  The  races  of  western  Europe,  that  now  take 
the  preeminence  in  the  world,  are  complex,  and  the 


RETROGRESSION    OF   SPAIN.  75 

result  of  many  amalgamations.  The  south  of  Britain, 
especially,  which  produces  men  probably  inferior  to 
none  on  the  whole  surface  of  the  globe,  is  peopled  by 
a  race  resulting  from  many  tribes  who  successively 
invaded  the  shores,  and  left  a  greater  or  less  impress 
on  the  character  of  the  inhabitants.*  The  Spaniard 
and  the  Frenchman  are  also  the  results  of  mixed 
blood ;  and,  though  the  kingdom  of  Spain  has  sunk  to 
insignificance  from  the  effects  of  superstition  and  tyr- 
anny, the  Spaniard  is  a  high  type  of  the  human  spe- 
cies, and  only  wants  truth  and  freedom  to  enable  him 
to  play  a  distinguished  part  in  the  destinies  of  the 
world.  When  England  and  France  were  as  supersti- 
tious and  as  enslaved  as  Spain,  Spain  was  perhaps  the 
most  powerful  kingdom  in  Europe ;  but  since  Spain 
did  not  progress  in  freedom,  she  has  naturally  sunk 
into  every  kind  of  licentiousness ;  and  the  Spanish 
race,  with  all  its  immorality  and  recklessness  of  blood- 

*  "The  Saxons  and  Normans  having  sprung  from  the  same 
Teutonic  stock,  the  mixture  of  races,  aided  by  the  common  ser- 
vices and  sympathies  of  religion,  became  a  matter  of  much  greater 
facility  than  the  same  process  in  other  countries.  And  this  mixture 
we  know  has  ever  given  the  most  powerful  impetus  to  the  progress 
of  civilization.  Perhaps  no  race  of  men  ever  ceased  to  be  barbarous 
and  stationary  without  mingling  blood  with  another  race.  On  the 
other  hand,  such  interfusion  has  rarely  if  ever  occurred,  without 
imparting  benefit  to  both  sides  —  energy,  knowledge,  enterprise, 
and  advancement  in  the  arts  of  life.  These  causes  combined,  as 
well  as  others  that  might  be  mentioned,  gradually  gave  prevalence 
to  the  Saxon  language,  and  ultimately  produced  the  '  Commons  of 
England,'  before  whose  ascendancy  Norman  feudalism  must  '  hide 
its  diminished  head  ;1  while  the  'Englishry?  whom  it  so  long  tram- 
pled down  and  spurned,  are  now  the  most  illustrious  and  the  might 
iest  nation  on  the  globe-"  —  North  British  Review. 


76  COMBINATION    OF    KNOWLEDGE   AND    REASON. 

shed,  is  a  living  evidence  of  what  kings  and  priests 
can  do  with  a  nation,  when  the  nation  does  not  de- 
stroy their  influence  in  time.  Had  Spain  established 
freedom  of  thought,  instead  of  torturing  and  expatri- 
ating her  industrious  inhabitants,  she  might  now  have 
been  a  second  England,  with  wealth  and  power  be- 
yond any  other  continental  country.  Freedom  of 
thought  is  now  evolving  in  Spain ;  and  if  a  moderate 
tyranny  could  be  established,  to  consolidate  the  dis- 
jointed elements  of  the  country,  Spain  might  still 
progress.  But  freedom  of  thought  is  now  necessary; 
and  if  any  attempt  be  made  to  curtail  it,  the  progress 
of  revolution  may  go  on  for  years  and  years,  until 
worn  out  by  anarchy,  and  the  credences  of  the  rising 
generation  running  counter  to  the  old  superstitions, 
some  bold  adventurer  may  seize  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment, and  exhibit  Spain  in  an  entirely  new  aspect. 
That  the  present  rulers  will  continue  is  almost  an 
impossibility. 


SECTION    III. THE     COMBINATION    OF    KNOWLEDGE    AND 

REASON. 

[Knowledge  is  Credence  based  cm  sufficient  Evidence,  and  Reason 
is  the  Pcnoer  of  perceiving  Consequences*,  and  of  inftning  An- 
tecedents.} 

The  combination  of  knowledge  and  reason  is  the 
great  moving  power  destined  to  emancipate  the  world. 
It  is  the  only  ground  of  hope  for  the  unprivileged 


THE    BIBLE,  77 

classes,  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  is  a  sure  ground  of 
hope,  and  the  more  rapidly  knowledge  increases,  the 
more  rapidly  will  its  all-powerful  influence  be  made 
apparent  to  the  world. 

The  first  great  condition  of  true  knowledge  is  the 
Bible.  Without  this,  man  knows  nothing.  He  nei- 
ther knows  what  he  is,  nor  what  is  his  destiny ;  and 
though  he  may  guess  at  some  of  the  important  truths 
in  which  the  race  is  involved,  he  gropes  in  obscurity 
as  to  the  most  essential.  Without  the  Bible,  supersti- 
tion and  infidelity  reign  universally.*  But  God  never 
made  man  to  be  either  superstitious  or  an  infidel ;  and 

*  "  It  will  be  better  to  avoid  all  religious  discussions  whatever, 
on  which  the  natives  are  very  sensitive.  There  is  too  wide  a  gulf 
between,  ever  to  be  passed.  Spaniards,  who,  like  the  Moslems, 
allow  themselves  great  latitude  in  laughing  at  monks,  priests,  and 
professors  of  religion,  are  very  touchy  as  regards  the  articles  of 
their  creed ;  on  these,  therefore,  beware  of  sportive  criticism.  The 
whole  nation  in  religious  matters  is  divided  into  only  two  classes  — 
bigoted  Romanists  or  infidels;  there  is  no  via  media.  The  very 
existence  of  the  Bible  is  unknown  to  the  vast  majority,  who,  when 
convinced  of  the  cheats  put  forth  as  religion,  have  nothing  better 
to  fall  back  on  but  infidelity.  They  have  no  means  of  knowing 
the  truth,  and  even  the  better  classes  have  not  the  moral  courage  to 
seek  it ;  they  are  afraid  to  examine  the  subject ;  they  anticipate  an 
unsatisfactory  result,  and  therefore  leave  it  alone  in  dangerous 
indifferentism.  And  even  with  the  most  liberal,  with  those  who 
believe  every  thing  except  the  Bible,  the  term  hereje,  heretic,  still 
conveys  an  undefined  feeling  of  horror  and  disgust,  which  we  tol- 
erant Protestants  cannot  understand.     A  Lutheran  they  scarcely 

believe  to  have  a  soul,  and  almost  think  has  a  tail 

One  thing  is  quite  clear ;  that  however  serious  and  discouraging 
the  blows  recently  dealt  to  the  pope,  the  cause  of  infidelity,  and 
not  of  Protestantism,  has  hitherto  been  the  sole  gainer."  Ford's 
Hand-book  for  Spain,  p.  168.  It  would  say  very  little  for  Protes- 
7* 


78  THE    BIBLE. 

as  soon  as  either  of  these  forms  is  stamped  upon  a 
nation,  every  kind  of  error  is  let  loose,  and  the  errone- 
ous credence  in  the  matter  of  religion  extends  to  the 
temporal  affairs  of  the  state.  There  is  but  one  truth; 
and  if  men  go  wrong  in  the  most  important  item,  we 
cannot  wonder  that  they  should  err  as  to  the  moral 
principles  by  which  they  should  be  guided  in  their 
actions  towards  each  other.  If  they  know  not  their 
duties  to  their  Creator,  how  can  it  be  expected  that 
they  should  fulfil  their  duties  to  their  fellows  ?  * 

Independent  of  all  considerations  of  a  hereafter,  the 

tantisin  if  it  did  gain  where  there  is  710  evidence.  The  process  by 
which  Romanists  pass  to  infidelity  is  very  easily  explained. 
Popery  is  a  positive  credence ;  that  is,  it  maintains  a  great  many 
positive  propositions.  When  these  are  examined,  the  evidence  on 
which  they  ought  to  be  based  is  found  wanting,  and  the  inquirer 
properly  abandons  them,  thereby  sinking  into  a  negative  state.  He 
should,  however,  return  to  the  God  of  nature  until  he  finds  evidence 
for  a  positive  creed. 

"  From  the  state  of  matters  in  this  country,  it  will  not  be  long  in 
all  probability  before  the  fruit  of  this  religious  toleration  begins  to 
appear.  There  is  already  much  secret  infidelity,  and  that  will  now 
no  longer  be  concealed,  so  that  we  shall  have  an  infidel  party. 
There  will  also  be  a  considerable  body  who  hold  pertinaciously  by 
the  forms,  ceremonies,  miracles,  and  worship  of  Rome,  whom  you 
may  call  the  Romanist  party ;  and  there  will  be  a  third,  which  I 
trust  by  God's  blessing  may  be  a  rapidly  increasing  party.  Though 
small  in  its  beginnings,  you  may  call  it  the  evangelical  party" 
—  Letter  from  Italy,  Witness,  March  8,  1848. 

*  In  saying  that  without  the  Bible  man  knows  nothing,  we  do 
not  mean  that  science  or  philosophy  are  to  be  learned  from  the 
Bible.  All  natural  knowledge  may  be  learned  without  the  Bible ; 
but  suppose  a  nation  were  possessed  of  all  natural  knowledge,  and 
yet  had  not  the  Bible,  what  doubts  and  mysteries  would  remain  to 
overwhelm  the  inquirer  ?    Besides,  man,  as  man,  is  a  worshipping 


THE    BIBLE.  79 

Bible  has  an  eminent  effect  in  regulating  the  condi- 
tions of  men  in  this  world.  Religious  superstition  is 
essentially  tyrannical.  It  interferes  with  men's  thoughts 
and  actions  in  almost  every  country  of  the  globe,  and 
freedom  appears  to  be  scarcely  possible  wherever  it 
has  a  decided  hold  on  the  community.  Superstition 
is  the  basis  of  bigotry,  and  bigotry  is  the  basis  of  per- 
secution. Destroy  the  superstition,  and  both  bigotry 
and  persecution  will  soon  fall  to  the  ground. 

The  Bible  strikes  at  the  root  of  persecution,  by  re- 
moving the  false  credence  on  which  it  is  based ;  and 
wherever  the  Bible  gains  an  ascendency  over  the  priest- 
craft of  a  superstition,  we  may  be  certain  that,  sooner 
or  later,  all  persecution  will  disappear,  and  liberty  of 

creature,  and  all  history  informs  us  that  where  the  revelation  of 
truth  was  unknown,  men  plunged  madly  into  superstition.  The 
Bible  saves  from  this  great  whirlpool  of  destruction ;  and  by  en- 
lightening man  on  his  nature  and  destiny,  and  by  revealing  more 
clearly  and  specifically  the  wonderful  benevolence  of  the  Creator, 
and  the  constant  interest  taken  by  the  Divine  Being  in  the  affairs 
of  this  world,  the  Bible  enables  man  to  settle  his  credence,  and  to 
classify  his  knowledge  upon  a  system  unknown  to  those  who  have 
not  the  truth.  When,  above  all  our  philosophy,  there  remains  an 
infinite  void  or  an  infinite  unknown,  we  doubt,  and  speculate,  and 
wander  in  obscurity.  But  when  revelation  opens  up  the  highest 
truths  that  involve  our  race,  and  teaches  what  we  must  do  to  he 
saved,  all  other  knowledge  ranges  itself  lower  down  in  the  scale, 
and  assumes  a  definite  position,  instead  of  floating  loosely  amidst 
the  vague  mysteries  of  the  imagination.  Philosophy,  however 
clear,  is  but  the  deceitful  moonlight  that  mocks  with  its  illusions  ; 
and  though  much  may  be  seen  and  known  even  by  the  moonlight, 
the  calm  and  steady  rays  of  day  are  requisite  before  the  spell  of 
the  fancy  is  dissolved,  and  before  the  form  and  color  of  creation 
can  be  seen  in  their  reality. 


80 


CAUSES. 


thought  be  established.  The  Bible  sanctions  no  per- 
secution, but  teaches  men  that  they  are  made  of  one 
flesh,  and  that  they  are  personally  responsible  to  their 
Creator. 

Next  to  the  Bible  is  the  knowledge  of  material  na- 
ture. An  endless  variety  of  phenomena  are  constantly 
occurring  around  us,  and  these,  by  a  law  of  our  men- 
tal constitution,  are  referred  to  causes. 

These  causes  have  ever  played  a  most  prominent 
part  in  the  history  of  mankind,  and  the  fancy  has  ever 
thrown  around  them  that  mysterious  mantle  of  the 
imagination  by  which  they  were  clothed  with  person- 
ality. From  necessary  forms  of  rational  thought,  they 
became  transfigured,  each  and  all  of  them,  into  con- 
scious existences,  that  willed  and  acted  for  themselves, 
and  produced  the  multifarious  phenomena  of  nature. 
The  child  asks  us,  not  "  What  ?  "  but  "  Why  ?  "  *  And 
infant  nations,  who  never  belie  the  great  principles  of 
our  nature,  whether  moral,  intellectual,  or  sensual, 
whether  good  or  evil,  rushed  from  the  exhibition  of 
the  phenomenon  to  the  cause  creator  that  produced  it 
—  endowed  that  cause  with  all  the  attributes  of  mind, 
and  filled  the  world  with  half  material  spirits,  demons 
and  demigods,  and  all  the  vague  mythologies  of  mys- 
terious influences  that  spring  from  the  unhallowed 
heart  of  man,-which,  naked  and  shamed,  has  sought 
refuge  in  the  dark  caverns  of  superstition.  As  man 
was,  so  were  the  causes :  fierce  warrior  deities  with 
the  warlike  nations  —  emblems  of  thought,  "  sitting  on 

*  A  child  never  thinks  of  measuring  a  phenomenon,  but  asks, 
"  What  produced  it  ?  "    "  Why  did  it  take  place  ?  " 


CAUSES.  81 

a  lotus  leaf,  immersed  in  the  contemplation  of  their 
own  divinity,"  among  the  mystic  speculators  of  the 
sunlit  lands  —  demons  of  carnage,  figured  in  the  tiger 
fetish  of  the  oppressed  progeny  of  Ham  —  Molochs, 
Baals,  or  Saturns  —  fates,  furies,  or  destinies;  while 
the  classic  poesy  of  Greece  and  Rome  deified  the  sen- 
timents of  the  human  mind,  and  pictured  them  as 
beings  presiding  over  nature,  though  steeped  in  all  the 
vices  of  mankind. 

Still,  wherever  there  was  intellect  there  was  beauty. 
False  as  were  the  credences,  we  cannot  now  turn  to 
them  without  recognizing  the  glorious  attributes  of 
reason  with  which  mankind  has  been  endowed.  Nor 
can  we  wonder  at  tlie  spell  of  fascination,  when  we 
find  the  mere  abstractions  of  our  thought  presented  in 
the  form  of  a  Hebe,  a  Venus,  or  Minerva.  Dark  as 
were  the  times  of  ancient  paganism,  there  was  a 
beauty  of  imagination  that  speaks  home  to  the  intel- 
lect of  man,  and  leaves  a  sad  regret.  Let  us  not  for- 
get, however,  that  we  behold,  not  as  actors  in  the 
scene,  but  as  the  spectators  at  those  gladiatorial  shows, 
where  the  contest  of  man  with  death  was  the  absorb- 
ing drama  for  the  onlooker,  while  the  victims  in  the 
arena  poured  forth  their  blood  and  perished. 

It  was  reserved  for  the  corruption  of  Christianity  to 
throw  the  darkest  shade.  It  is  said  that  "  the  shadow 
is  nowhere  so  dark  as  immediately  under  the  lamp ; " 
and  the  true  light  of  Heaven  was  converted,  not  into 
the  lamp  that  lightens,  but  into  the  lamp  that  casts  a 
shade.  Piety  died  away,  and  theology  took  her  place. 
Creeds  and  confessions  were  substituted  for  living  vir- 
tue. Christians  forgot  to  fix  their  eyes  on  Heaven, 
and  deified  the  symbols  of  religion. 


82  DEMONOLOGY. 

The  wisdom  that  is  from  above  is  not  a  creed,  but  a 
principle  of  life  imbued  with  truth ;  and  when  the 
church  forgot  the  life,  the  truth  vanished  from  the 
symbol,  and  left  the  dead  remains  of  unspiritual 
knowledge.  The  shadows  were  dark  before,  but  now 
night  shrouded  in  a  veil. 

Now  was  the  night  of  degradation.  Now  was  man 
seen,  not  in  the  energies  of  his  pride,  not  in  the  bril- 
liant colors  of  his  fancy,  not  in  the  heroism  of  a  noble 
heart,  that  had  framed  its  country  for  its  God,  and 
rushed  to  death  self-sacrificed  —  but  in  the  drivelling 
wretchedness  of  priestcraft,  and  in  the  sensuality  of 
worse  than  pagan  Rome.  Now  indeed  was  darkness. 
Truth  had  few  worshippers  —  tradition  had  her  hosts. 
Virtue  was  gone,  and  man  was  content  with  cere- 
mony. Causes  were  no  longer  deities ;  and  all  that 
had  remained  of  beauty  was  drowned  in  the  senseless 
legend  of  the  monkish  tale. 

Causes  now  were  demons  and  demi-demons.  The 
atmosphere  of  earth  was  filled  with  spirits  of  malig- 
nity. Pern  on  s  and  devils  stared  from  out  the  ordinary 
phenomena  of  nature.*  Tempests  had  their  witches, 
winds  had  their  wizards,  and  saints  were  prayed  to  for 


*  "  Such  were  the  words  which  Paracelsus  addressed  to  his  con- 
temporaries, who  were  as  yet  incapable  of  appreciating  doctrines 
of  this  sort ;  for  the  belief  in  enchantment  still  remained  every 
where  unshaken,  and  faith  in  the  world  of  spirits  still  held  men's 
minds  in  so  close  a  bondage,  that  thousands  were,  according  to 
their  own  conviction,  given  up  as  a  prey  to  the  devil ;  while,  at  the 
command  of  religion  as  well  as  of  law,  countless  piles  were 
lighted,  by  the  flames  of  which  human  society  was  to  be  purified." 
—  Hector's  Epidemics  of  the  Middle  Ages,  p.  100. 


POPISH    MIRACLES.  83 

protection.  Now  was  death  triumphant.  Death  of  all 
that  was  noble,  death  of  all  that  was  true,  death  of  all 
that  was  brave.  Now  was  the  reign  of  ignorance,  and 
now  was  the  priest  man's  deity.  Now  was  "  the  heel 
bruised,"  and  now  was  truth  transformed  into  a  lie. 
Lies  in  the  life,  lies  in  the  heart,  lies  on  the  tongue, 
lies  in  the  creed,  lies  in  the  ceremony,  lies  in  the  vow, 
lies  in  the  church,  lies  at  the  altar,  and  lies  to  the  lips 
of  the  last  expiring  agonies  of  man.  O,  mystery  of 
iniquity ! 

But  the  causes  did  not  fall  alone.  As  the  causes 
fell,  so  fell  man.  Man  and  his  deities  are  linked  by  a 
chain  that  nothing  severs  but  death ;  for  as  the  object 
of  our  worship  is,  so  shall  we  be,  more  and  more  nearly. 

"While  we  look  to  the  night  of  intellect  and  virtue 
that  followed  the  teaching  of  the  priest,  let  us  also 
look  to  one  incident  that  shows  the  depth  of  human 
degradation.  Man  had  anciently  deified  the  cause,  and 
created,  according  to  a  necessary  law  of  our  nature,  a 
something  that  should  afford  an  explanation  of  phe- 
nomena. The  priest  now  creates  not  a  cause,  but  a 
phenomenon. 

So  long  as  man  takes  the  fact  in  nature,  and  seeks 
to  assign  a  cause,  he  follows  the  true  path ;  and  that 
path  is  abstractly  correct,  however  absurd  may  be  the 
fancied  explanation.  The  priest,  however,  who  turned 
every  thing  into  a  lie,  forsook  even  this  great  principle 
of  our  intellect,  and  took  a  cause  and  worked  a  miracle. 
He  sought  no  longer  to  personify,  but  to  simulate. 
And  the  vulgar  miracles  of  the  papal  heresy  were  sim- 
ulated facts,  wrought  for  the  purposes  of  deception. 
His  bleeding  idols  and  moving  pictures,  and  all  the 


84  POPISH    MIRACLES. 

ather  stock-in-trade  of  lying  priestcraft,  were  imitations 
of  phenomena*;  while  wooden  virgin  Marys  and  hu- 
man saints  were  supposed  to  preside  over  the  opera- 
tions of  the  elements. 

To  suppose  that  any  thing  else  than  vice,  abomina- 
tion, and  tyranny  could  exist  with  such  a  system,  is 
out  of  the  question.  All  the  history  of  man  teaches 
us,  that  where  there  is  a  corrupt  priesthood,  there  is  a 
corrupt  people.  And  if  the  people  are  corrupt  —  if 
from  the  king  on  the  throne  to  the  peasant  who  tills 
the  field,  lies  and  superstition  form  the  sum  and  sub- 
stance of  theolQgical  credence,  where  in  all  the  world 
can  liberty  be  expected  to  come  from  ?  Does  liberty 
grow  out  of  lies  ?  or  out  of  truth  ?  Out  of  ignorance 
and  vice  ?  or  out  of  knowledge  and  virtue  ?  And  if 
it  does  grow  out  of  truth,  there  is  but  one  truth  ;  and 
that  truth  is  the  condition  of  man's  welfare,  and  the 
only  price  at  which  true  freedom  can  be  purchased. 

It  may  be  supposed  that  we  dwell  too  strongly  and 
too  long  on  the  superstitions  of  the  Roman  heresy. 
Not  so.  These  superstitions  have  more  political  influ- 
ence for  the  destruction  of  freedom,  than  all  the  other 
causes  that  act  on  the  states  of  central  and  southern 
Europe.  Read  the  history  of  any  country  where  Ro- 
manism has  been  the  prevailing  superstition ;  read  the 
best  accounts  of  the  present  condition  of  any  Roman 
Catholic  countries  —  and  then  say  if  you  can  find  any 
thing  whatever  that  can  be  called  even  an  approach  to 
liberty  —  to  an  equitable  condition  of  society.  Take 
France  before  the  revolution,  (and  even  forget  the 
ameliorating  influence  of  time  in  softening  down  the 
asperities  —  an   influence   that  makes   us   look  with 


POPERY.  85 

almost  calm  indifference  at  deeds  however  dark,  pro- 
vided they  are  far  enough  removed,)  and  ask  what 
Romanism  had  done  for  France  ?  See  brute  carnality- 
pursued  intentionally ',  see  despotism  not  even  arrested 
at  the  oubliettes,  see  a  peasantry  taught  lies  by  the 
priest,  while  the  farmers  of  the  taxes  ground  them  into 
madness  and  desperation,  the  state  corrupt  in  every 
function,  the  best  and  the  most  industrious  part  of  the 
population  expatriated  or  destroyed,  and  liberty  of 
thought  uprooted  by  the  sabres  of  the  soldiery.  When 
at  last  (without  the  aid  of  what  is  called  Protestant- 
ism) the  very  people,  who  from  infancy  had  been 
taught  to  reverence  the  priest  and  his  mysteries,  could 
no  longer  believe  his  lies,  what  could  be  expected  ? 
When  every  thing  had  been  so  corrupted  that  France 
was  rotten  to  the  core,  and  there  remained  no  single 
bond  that  could  keep  the  nation  together  as  a  society ; 
and  when  the  very  light  of  reason,  that  professed  to 
teach  nothing,  destroyed  the  superstitions  of  the  priest, 
and  unhinged  the  credence  of  the  nation ;  when  the 
priest  was  found  a  deceiver  and  the  ruler  a  despot, 
and  men's  reason  told  them  that  it  was  so,  even  with- 
out the  Bible ;  and  when  all  religious  credence  was 
swept  away  in  the  reaction  of  the  poisoned  intellect 
—  what  could  we  expect?  And  can  it  be  supposed 
that  Russia  and  Austria  have  nothing  of  the  kind 
in  store?  Will  ignorance  remain  there  forever,  and 
teach  men  that,  though  they  have  a  reason,  they  must 
not  exercise  it,  but  be,  like  the  beasts  of  the  field,  sub- 
ject to  their  master?  Some  may  think  that  "to-mor- 
row shall  be  as  to-day,  and  much  more  abundant." 
"  God  forbid ! "  must  be  the  prayer  of  every  freeman. 
8 


86  PATRIOTISM. 

The  degradation  of  the  causes  of  natural  phenom- 
ena entailed  some  of  the  most  horrid  cruelties  that 
have  stained  the  history  of  the  world.  God  was  de- 
throned from  the  realm  of  nature,  as  well  as  from  the 
realm  of  religion ;  and  when  virgins,  saints,  old  bones, 
and  bits  of  wood  became  the  objects  of  men's  worship, 
witches  and  sorcerers  were  the  minor  deities  of  nature, 
and  the  causes  of  phenomena.  The  priest,  however, 
had  the  power,  and,  as  he  dealt  in  miracles  himself,  the 
witches  trenched  too  closely  on  his  domain,  and  he 
removed  them  by  a  process  more  frantically  cruel  than 
that  by  which  he  himself  was  afterwards  removed  by 
the  few  insane  atheists  of  France.  The  terrible  crimes 
that  were  committed,  under  the  pretext  of  punishing 
witchcraft,  show  us  that  nature  as  well  as  religion  was 
provided  with  an  inquisition  by  the  priest;  and  the 
multitudes  of  sorcerers  who  were  immolated  in  the 
middle  ages,  were  as  much  the  victims  of  nature  mis- 
interpreted, as  the  martyr  Christians  were  the  victims 
of  a  false  theology.  Truth,  in  either  case,  would  have 
prevented  the  commission  of  the  crimes. 

Not  only,  however,  does  popery  destroy  the  elements 
of  freedom ;  it  uproots  that  most  pure  and  most  holy 
of  all  man's  natural  sentiments  —  patriotism.  Some 
have  come  to  speculate  about  the  country  that  pro- 
duces most  food,  most  population,  most  machinery, 
and  most,  &c,  &c,  as  if  that  were  necessarily  the  best 
country.  Granted,  if  man  were  to  live  forever.  But 
as  threescore  years  and  ten  are  the  time  of  man's  days 
upon  earth,  he  who  has  a  country  has  but  one.  All 
trade,  all  fairness,  all  peace,  all  good  will  to  all  the 
nations  in  the  world ;  but  yet  there  is  a  country  for 


MERCENARIES. 


87 


which  something  else  is  reserved.  It  is  not  merely  the 
country  of  our  birth ;  that  is  an  accident  that  goes  for 
nothing  in  the  case  of  birth  abroad.  It  is  the  land  of 
our  fathers,  the  land  of  our  hopes,  the  land  of  our  lan- 
guage, the  land  of  our  affections,  and  the  land  of  our 
heart.  It  is  the  land  that  we  should  stand  with  or  fall 
with.  Were  there  ten  thousand  Tamerlanes  ravaging 
the  earth,  we  might  look  on  as  spectators ;  it  might,  or 
it  might  not,  be  our  duty  to  interfere.  But  our  land  is 
the  land  of  our  sanctuary,  on  which  foeman's  foot  is 
the  impress  of  pollution ;  and,  so  long  as  there  beats  a 
patriot's  heart,  there  will  be  found  the  patriot's  sword. 
Nothing  in  the  history  of  the  world  ever  struck  patri- 
otism dead,  save  the  blasphemous  doctrines  of  Rome. 
Search  all  history  for  a  thousand  years,  read  tales  and 
legends,  and  records  of  all  that  has  come  down  of 
papal  Roman  history,  and  say  if  you  can  find  one 
single  Roman  patriot.  Ask  if  there  be  one  man  in  all 
that  city,  and  that  state,  whose  heart  has  beat  for  Rome, 
and  whose  hand  grasped  a  patriot's  brand  on  the 
threshold  of  his  fathers.  Saxons  and  Franks,  North- 
men, Genoese,  Pisans,  Venetians,  Sicilians,  Burgun- 
dians,  Flemings,  Spaniards,  Moors,  Normans,  Europe- 
ans, Africans,  and  Asiatics,  all  the  races  that  ran  to 
seek  a  country,  or  staid  to  defend  one,  have  left  a 
name  in  the  annals  of  the  age.  And  where  amidst 
them  all  is  the  Roman  ?  Rome  fought,  but  not  with 
Romans.  She  who  buys  and  sells  souls,  and  purgato- 
rial fires,  and  redemption  with  a  bloodless  sacrifice, 
bought  and  sold  men,  and  hired  the  arms  of  hirelings. 
Rome  taught  men  that  they  might  fight  here  to-day, 
there  to-morrow,  and  sell  their  swords  for  gold.     Men 


88 


THE    TURNING-POINT    OF    MODERN    TIMES. 


fought  because  it  was  their  trade,  and  worked  for  the 
employer  that  gave  most  wages  —  wretches  without  a 
country,  fit  emblems  of  their  instructor.  Patriotism 
was  disbanded,  save  with  the  peasant  cultivators  of 
the  soil,  who  still  could  fight  for  their  homes,  like  the 
tiger  for  his  lair. 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  material  benefits,  of 
countries,  one  thing  is  certain  —  a  country  where  there 
is  no  patriotism  is  not  safe  for  a  day.  Patriotism  is  a 
country's  true  strength ;  for  where  there  is  no  patriot- 
ism there  is  no  bond  of  union.  When  France  was 
patriotic,  and  trusted  her  frontier  to  her  peasantry,  all 
the  armies  of  Europe  could  set  no  foot  upon  her  soil. 
But  when  men  fought  for  the  emperor,  and  not  for 
their  country,  France  was  humbled  in  the  dust.  Ten 
grains  of  true  patriotism  would  have  saved  Spain, 
Italy,  and  Germany  from  Napoleon ;  but,  alas !  "  they 
had  them  not,"  and,  what  is  more,  never  will  have,  and 
never  can  have,  till  Roman  priestcraft  is  destroyed. 

But  time  rolled  on,  and  night  was  drawing  to  a 
close.  Broken  gleams  of  light  flickered  here  and 
there,  to  give  warning  of  the  coming  day.  Day  broke 
at  last,  and  nature  was  emancipated  from  the  mystic 
folds  of  superstition.  The  great  turning-point  of 
modern  times  was,  when  the  doctrine  of  constant  repe- 
tition of  similar  phenomena  in  similar  conditions  was 
substituted  for  the  dread  of  unseen,  and  too  often 
malevolent,  agency. 

Man  learned  at  last  to  bend  his  eye  on  the  phenom- 
enon, accurately  to  observe  the  conditions,  and  accu- 
rately to  measure  the  change.  Physical  truth  was  the 
result  of  this  operation,  so  simple,  now  we  know  it, 


INDUCTIVE    REASONINGS.  89 

yet  of  such  vast  importance  to  the  welfare  of  the 
world.  Superstition  here  received  its  blow  of  death ; 
and,  just  in  proportion  as  the  inductive  philosophy  (in 
physical  science)  was  received  and  cultivated,  so  was 
man  emancipated  from  the  terrors  of  unseen  agency, 
and  the  phenomena  of  nature  were  fixed  on  a  stable 
basis,  that  invited  man  constantly  to  further  inquiry. 

But  what  had  become  of  the  causes  ?  The  immense 
revolution  that  had  taken  place  in  man's  view  of  na- 
ture, was  accompanied  by  another  revolution  that 
went  far  to  destroy  the  priestcraft  of  Rome,  and  to 
bring  man  back  to  the  spiritual  worship  of  his  Creator. 
The  Bible  had  been  resuscitated,  and  some  at  all 
events  had  learned  to  love  the  pure  beauty  of  religion 
as  taught  by  God,  and  to  forsake  the  doctrines  of 
devils  as  taught  by  man.  Instead  of  stocks,  and 
stones,  and  graven  images,  and  the  remnants  of  the 
human  frame,  men  learned  to  bow  the  knee  to  Him 
who  sitteth  on  the  throne  of  righteousness,  and  to  con- 
fide in  the  God  of  heaven,  who  had  sent  his  Son  for 
the  redemption  of  the  world. 

The  causes  were  now  no  longer  beings,  but  the  laws 
by  which  the  one  God  carries  on  the  government  of  the 
material  world.  No  wonder  that  Rome  will  have  no 
science. 

But  has  this  view  of  nature  a  direct  bearing  on  the 
political  condition  of  mankind  ?  No  doubt  of  it 
whatever.  Those  who  have  advocated  the  utilitarian 
theory  are  true  benefactors  to  their  country;  and, 
though  we  may  take  occasion  to  advert  to  the  cases 
in  which  that  theory  has  been  carried  altogether  out 
of  its  legitimate  province,  we  of  course  accept  it  to  its 
8* 


90  INDUCTIVE    REASONINGS. 

utmost  extent  in  those  matters  that  come  within  its 
range.  But  what  is  the  utilitarian  theory,  and  what  is 
its  connection  with  inductive  philosophy  ? 

Let  us  suppose  men  legislating  on  a  theological 
principle,  (no  matter  what,)  and  carrying  out  their 
laws  by  force.  Let  us  suppose  an  inductive  philoso- 
pher beginning  at  the  effects  of  these  laws,  carefully 
collecting  the  statistics  of  the  things  he  can  observe, 
and  arranging  them  into  an  exhibition  of  facts.  Let 
us  suppose  that  these  facts  (as  it  is  most  likely  they 
would)  show  the  results  of  the  legislation  to  have  been 
eminently  detrimental  to  the  great  body  of  the  popu- 
lation. Suppose  he  publishes  these  details.  Of  course 
those  who  legislate  on  a  theological  principle  care 
nothing  about  consequences ;  for  if  the  principle  be 
correct,  the  legislation  is  a  duty  at  all  hazards.  Now, 
what  is  to  be  done  ?  Of  course,  if  the  populace  are 
not  quite  so  certain  about  the  principle  as  the  legislat- 
ors are,  they  might  begin  to  suspect  a  mistake  in  the 
rulers'  method  of  proceeding,  and  perhaps  they  might 
weigh  the  statistics  against  the  theology,  and  give  the 
preference  to  the  former.  This  is  very  likely.  Now, 
what  course  have  the  rulers  ?  Either  to  abandon  their 
legislation,  or  to  expel  the  philosopher,  and  prevent  all 
further  inquiries  of  the  kind.  But  suppose  the  induc- 
tive mode  of  judging  of  legislative  acts  should  happen 
to  procure  free  course,  it  is  quite  impossible  that  facts, 
mere  facts,  should  not  tell  on  the  country  in  the  long 
run,  and  that  reasonings  upon  those  facts  should  not 
spring  up  in  every  man's  mind,  and  cause  him  to  throw 
all  his  weight  into  every  change  in  which  he  could  see 
his  own,  and  the  interest  of  his  fellows,  involved. 


INDUCTIVE    REASONINGS.  91 

But  suppose  a  new  light  were  to  break  upon  the 
nation.  Suppose  men  should  happen  to  reflect  that 
facts  come  from  the  operations  of  the  laws  of  God, 
and  suppose  the  thought  should  strike  them  that  God 
is  a  benevolent  and  a  just  God  —  that  he  made  a  good 
world,  gave  it  good  laws,  and  that  social  evils  spring 
from  man's  injustice  to  his  fellow,  and  from  the  ivrong 
way  in  which  things  have  been  divided.  Suppose  the 
idea  should  go  abroad  that  God  is  no  respecter  of  per- 
sons,  but  that  perhaps  the  welfare  of  a  peasant  is  of 
as  much  value  in  the  eyes  of  Him  who  doeth  all  things 
well,  as  the  welfare  of  a  king.  Now,  suppose  to  these 
reflections  were  joined  another  or  two,  that  God  made 
man's  reason,  and  made  man  to  hate  pain  and  flee 
from  it ;  and  also  that  man's  nature  obliges  him  to  live 
in  society,  and  that  societies  may  make  mistakes,  as 
the  child  does  who  puts  his  finger  into  the  flame,  and 
that  the  pain  is  to  teach  him  to  beware  in  future. 
Were  such  notions  to  go  abroad,  it  is  perfectly  evident 
that  the  inductive  philosophy,  when  it  found  out  evils 
and  suffering  attending  legislative  acts,  would  come, 
backed  with  the  authority  of  Him  who  made  the  laws 
of  nature,  and  it  would  lead  to  the  belief  that  the 
welfare  of  the  great  masses  of  the  population  was 
never  sacrificed  to  procure  the  wealth  of  the  few,  with- 
out God's  displeasure  being. always  made  manifest  in 
the  suffering  that  ensued.  Not  that  this  suffering  was 
a  miraculous  interference,  but  the  result  of  the  ordinary 
laws  which  God  has  made  for  the  government  of  the 
world. 

Suppose,  however,  one  more  principle  should  be 
admitted,  namely,  that  "  that  which  is  just  is  beneficial, 


92  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

and  for  the  good  of  the  greatest  number."  Suppose 
men  should  reflect  that  induction  requires  time  and 
knowledge  before  it  can  be  brought  to  perfection,  and 
that  God  endowed  man  with  an  a  priori  principle  of 
justice,  to  enable  him  to  steer  clear  of  injuring  his  fel- 
low, even  where  the  inductive  evidence  should  not  be 
at  hand.  Suppose  the  results  of  this  justice  and  of 
this  induction  should  happen  to  turn  out  always  and 
invariably  coincident,  and  although  pursuing  different 
paths  to  reach  the  same  end,  yet  the  end  arrived  at 
never  was  different. 

Were  all  this  admitted,  (and  though  it  takes  many 
words  to  tell  it,  perhaps  it  might  be  seen  all  at  one 
view,)  it  is  plain  that  the  inductive  method  of  exam- 
ining the  condition  of  the  country  would  have  the  most 
direct  and  the  most  powerful  influence  on  the  legisla- 
tion of  the  country.  Where  suffering  was  considered 
not  the  mere  accident  of  chance,  nor  the  work  of  a 
malevolent  spirit,  but  the  voice  of  a  just  and  benevo- 
lent God,  telling  men  to  amend  the  order  of  society, 
and  to  return  to  those  elementary  principles  of  justice 
that  he  had  implanted  in  their  mind  —  surely  we  can 
see  that  the  progress  of  this  nation  must  be  very  dif- 
ferent from  the  progress  of  that  nation  from  which 
inductive  philosophy  was  banished,  and  where  men 
legislated  for  themselves  and  pretended  to  be  legislating 
for  God. 

Next  to  a  rational  view  of  nature  comes  a  true  phi- 
losophy of  the  mind  and  of  the  mental  operations.  It 
might  be  supposed  that  this  could  have  little  influence 
on  the  political  condition  of  a  nation ;  and  if  all  the 
great  truths  relating  to  man  were  not  so  inseparably 


ETHICS.  93 

linked  together,  that  error  in  the  one  usually  involves 
or  implies  error  in  the  other,  perhaps,  taken  alone,  it 
might  be  of  no  great  importance.  But  from  some 
cause  or  other,  speculative  errors  about  man  have  usu- 
ally involved  speculative  errors  about  God,  and  specu- 
lative errors  about  God  have  usually  unhinged  the 
whole  framework  of  human  duty,  and  obscured  the 
distinction  between  right  and  wrong.  This  subject 
the  reader  will  find  discussed  in  the  first  volume  of  M. 
Cousin's  "  History  of  the  Moral  Philosophy  of  the 
Eighteenth  Century,"  where  he  traces,  with  a  grace 
peculiar  to  himself,  the  doctrine  of  "  no  causes  but 
physical  causes  "  to  the  "  sensation  "  school  of  mental 
philosophy.* 

Of  M.  Cousin's  work,  it  is  perhaps  impossible  to 
speak  too  highly,  and  we  rejoice  to  see  so  eminent  a 
man,  and  so  candid  a  reasoner,  speaking  out  for  the 
natural  principles  of  duty,  declaring  his  honest  convic- 
tion, that,  as  a  philosopher,  he  finds  a  law  of  justice 
written  in  the  constitution  of  man.  At  the  same  time, 
we  cannot  but  hope  that  those  who  adopt  that  philos- 
ophy will  not  confine  themselves  to  the  general  idea 
of  a  just  and  righteous  God  made  manifest  through 
the  glorious  works  of  nature  and  of  mind,  but  con- 
tinue in  the  onward  path  of  truth,  and  really  investi- 
gate with  the  same  candor  the   authenticity  of  the 

#  The  doctrine  of  no  causes  but  physical  causes,  is  said  to  have 
produced,  perhaps,  the  most  frightful  exclamation  that  ever  crossed 
the  lips  of  man,  —  "  Nous  pouvons  faire  ce  que  nous  voulons,  il  n'y-a 
pas  de  Dieu ! "  said  to  have  been  uttered  by  the  rabble  at  Arras, 
as  the  executioner's  cart  tracked  its  way  with  blood.  Fit  doctrine 
to  fit  deed. 


94  REVELATION. 

BIBLE.  For  ourselves  we  cannot  speak  as  if  the 
Bible  were  not  a  revelation,  or  even  as  if  it  were  a 
collection  of  doubtful  documents;  and  therefore  we 
cannot  speculate  as  if  there  were  a  question  as  to 
whether  God  has  revealed  himself  directly,  as  well  as 
by  necessary  inference  from  his  works.  Christianity  is 
never  to  be  found  in  nature,  although  religion  is ;  and 
THE  CHRIST,  the  Son  of  the  living  God,  equal 
and  one  with  the  Father,  forms  as  necessary  a  part  of 
all  true  acceptance  with  God,  and  of  all  present  reli- 
gion, (now  since  the  fall,)  as  the  most  clear  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  Creator.  When  we  confine  ourselves 
purely  to  philosophy,  and  ask  what  may  be  learnt  by 
the  unaided  exercise  of  the  reason,  we  do  well,  so  long 
as  we  do  not  advance  our  results  to  the  exclusion  of 
revelation ;  but  when  we  form  a  system  of  philosophy 
from  nature,  however  perfect  that  system  may  be,  we 
suggest  that  it  is  not  logical  to  predicate  any  thing 
whatever  about  the  reality  or  unreality  of  a  revelation, 
with  only  that  philosophy  for  the  premises.  Nothing 
whatever  is  capable  of  being  the  premises  of  the  ques- 
tion of  revelation,  except  the  evidence  on  which  any 
particular  revelation  is  stated  to  be  founded.  And 
although  the  attributes  of  the  Deity  are  made  evident 
through  nature,  we  must  never  from  that  leap  to  the 
conclusion,  that  God  has  not  made  known  his  particu- 
lar acts,  which  could  never  be  inferred,  as  we  can  infer 
his  attributes.  "  God  that  made  the  world  and  all 
things  therein,  seeing  that  he  is  Lord  of  heaven  and 
earth,  dwelleth  not  in  temples  made  with  hands; 
neither  is  worshipped  with  men's  hands,  as  though  he 
needed  any  thing,  seeing  he  giveth  to  all  life,  and 


CORRECT    CREDENCE.  95 

breath,  and  all  things;  and  hath  made  of  one  blood 
all  nations  of  men  for  to  dwell  on  all  the  face  of  the 
earth,  and  hath  determined  the  times  before  appointed, 
and  the  bounds  of  their  habitation ;  that  they  should 
seek  the  Lord,  if  haply  they  might  feel  after  him,  and 
find  him,  though  he  be  not  far  from  every  one  of  us. 
For  in  him  we  live,  and  move,  and  have  our  being; 
as  certain  also  of  your  own  poets  have  said,  For  we 
are  also  his  offspring.  Forasmuch  then  as  we  are  the 
offspring  of  God,  we  ought  not  to  think  that  the  God- 
head is  like  unto  gold,  or  silver,  or  stone,  graven  by  art 
and  man's  device.  And  the  times  of  this  ignorance 
God  winked  at;  but  now  commandeth  all  men  every 
where  to  repent :  because  he  hath  appointed  a  day,  in 
the  which  he  will  judge  the  world  in  righteousness  by 
that  Man  whom  he  hath  ordained;  whereof  he  hath 
given  assurance  unto  all  men  in  that  he  hath  raised 
him  from  the  dead"  —  Paul's  Address  to  the  Athenians. 

But  what,  after  all,  is  the  sum  and  substance  of  our 
argument  concerning  the  combination  of  knowledge 
and  reason  ?  Merely  this,  that  correct  credence  is  ab- 
solutely essential  to  the  human  race,  before  that  race 
can  know  and  work  out  its  own  well  being. 

The  elements  of  this  correct  credence  are,  1st.  The 
Bible.  2d.  A  correct  view  of  the  phenomena  of  ma- 
terial nature.  3d.  A  correct  philosophy  of  the  mental 
operations.* 

*  We  do  not,  in  this  place,  enter  on  the  subject  of  moral  science, 
having  to  treat  it  more  specially  hereafter.  A  correct  philosophy 
of  the  mental  operations  would  of  course  include  the  science  of 
equity,  but  a  science  of  equity  there  cannot  possibly  be,  so  long  as 
there  is  a  sensational  philosophy ;  and  therefore  we  have  affirmed. 


96  THE    BIBLE. 

1st.  The  Bible.  There  is  but  one  truth,  and,  if  the 
Bible  system  be  true,  every  other  system  must  be  erro- 
neous, and  must  lead  to  a  course  of  action  prejudicial 
to  mankind.  The  question  is  not  as  to  the  necessity 
of  all  men  becoming,  what  is  sometimes  termed  reli- 
gious, but  as  to  the  general  acceptance  or  rejection  of 
that  system  of  revealed  knowledge  which  is  contained 
in  the  Bible  alone ;  and,  when  we  consider  how  vast  an 
amount  of  information  is  there  afforded  us  respecting 
man,  man's  nature,  aud  man's  destiny,  we  see  at  once, 
that  if  all  that  information  be  correct  and  be  rejected, 
men  shut  themselves  out  from  the  light,  and  plunge 
wilfully  into  vague  and  hopeless  darkness.  So  far 
from  the  Bible  being  in  opposition  to  the  reason  of 
mankind,  the  Bible  is  the  great  emancipator  of  the 
reason ;  the  first  great  influence  that  delivers  man  from 
the  empire  of  passion  and  superstition,  and  leaves  him 
free  to  exercise  those  faculties  with  which  the  Creator 
has  endowed  his  intellect.  Sceptics  may  frame  their 
sophisms,  and  point  incredulous  to  its  insoluble  myste- 
ries ;  but  History  dashes  their  sophisms  into  the  dust, 
and  shows  us  the  great  evolution  of  freedom  and  civ- 
il i/ation  taking  place  under  the  shadow  of  revealed 
truth,  while  the  mass  of  the  earth's  inhabitants  struggle 
helplessly  onward  in  a  vain  endeavor  to  deliver  them- 

that  a  correct  mental  philosophy  is  essential  to  human  welfare.  At 
the  conclusion  of  the  volume,  we  shall  endeavor  to  show  how  a 
genuine  philosophy  may  become  possible,  and  possible  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  cast  aside  dispute.  Philosophy,  strictly  sprnkin<r,  can 
never  assume  a  satisfactory  form  until  the  whole  of  the  direct  sci- 
ences are  completed,  and  then  philosophy  will  become  purely 
critical. 


NATURAL    PHENOMENA.  97 

selves  from  the  evils  that  inseparably  accompany 
superstition.  No  truth  can  be  more  certain,  than  that 
the  welfare  of  the  human  race  is  wrapped  up  in  the 
universal  acceptance  of  the  Bible  as  the  Word  of  God, 
and  the  only  true  source  from  which  man  must  draw 
the  first  great  facts  in  which  all  the  children  of  men 
are  irrevocably  implicated. 

2d.  A  correct  view  of  natural  phenomena.  In  this, 
two  things  are  implied:  1st.  A  knowledge  of  natural 
phenomena,  (science;)  and,  2d.  The  attribution  of 
those  phenomena  to  their  true  cause.  If  God  be  the 
Creator  of  the  universe,  God  is  also  the  physical  Gov- 
ernor of  the  universe ;  and  as  such  we  must  regard  the 
occurrences  of  nature  as  the  results  of  the  laws  estab- 
lished by  him.  And  when  once  men  shall  really  awake 
to  the  conviction,  that  the  social  evils  of  the  commu- 
nity (poverty  and  want,*  with  the  accompaniments  of 

*  That  poverty  and  want  have  a  direct  tendency  to  produce 
crime,  is  a  fact  which  may  be  ascertained  inductively  in  the  same 
manner  as  any  general  fact  or  principle  is  ascertained  and  estab- 
lished in  the  physical  sciences.  If  prevention  be  better  than  cure, 
it  is  most  certainly  better  than  punishment,  which  has  proved  itself, 
in  the  general  history  of  the  world,  to  be  the  clumsiest  and  most 
inefficient  means  of  preventing  crime  that  has  ever  been  employed 
towards  a  population.  There  is  a  vast  difference  between  the  man 
who  is  by  habit  and  repute  a  criminal,  and  the  man  who  is  led  to 
commit  crime  under  certain  circumstances  of  social  distress.  Al- 
most every  man  in  the  world  is  of  such  a  nature  that  he  would 
commit  crime  in  certain  circumstances ;  and  this  very  fact  should 
point  out  the  necessity  of  reforming  the  circumstances,  as  well  as 
endeavoring  to  restrain  the  offenders  by  threats  of  consequent  in- 
fliction. So  intimately  is  crime  connected  with  the  physical  condi- 
tion "of  the  population,  that  it  may  almost  be  said  to  fluctuate  with 
9 


98  SOCIAL    LAWS. 

crime,  ignorance,  and  disease)  arise  from  an  infringe- 
ment of  certain  invariable  laws,  no  more  uncertain  in 
their  nature  than  those  which  regulate  the  fall  of  a 
stone  or  the  motion  of  a  planet,  we  may  reasonably 

the  price  of  provisions  and  the  demand  for  labor ;  and  the  only  sore 
mode  of  reducing  it  to  a  minimum,  is  to  remove  those  political  ob- 
stacles which  prevent  the  cultivator  and  the  laborer  from  reaping 
their  natural  reward,  or  which  prevent  them  from  employing  their 
labor  on  the  earth,  which  God  has  given  as  a  storehouse  for  food, 
but  which  the  laws  of  men  reduce  to  sterility  by  the  common  sys- 
tem of  landed  property.  How  many  thousands  of  criminal  Irish- 
men might  be  made  useful  members  of  society,  by  allowing  them 
to  cultivate  the  land,  according  to  the  law  of  God's  word  and  of 
God's  nature,  for  their  own  profit !  Let  any  one  compare  the  fol- 
lowing statement  of  Irish  crime  with  the  price  of  provisions  in 
Ireland  at  the  respective  periods,  and  deny,  if  he  can,  the  same  in- 
ductive relation  of  cause  and  effect  which  forms  the  essence  of  all 
physical  science :  — 

"  Outrages.  —  Ireland,  October,  1847.  —  Returns  have  just  been 
issued  (pursuant  to  an  order  of  the  House  of  Lords,  dated  June  28) 
stating  the  number  and  kind  of  outrages  reported  by  the  constabu- 
lary in  Ireland,  from  the  month  of  June,  1845,  to  the  month  of  May, 
1847,  inclusive.  This  return  is  intended  as  a  continuation  of  the 
sessional  paper,  No.  279  of  1845.  The  results  of  this  latest  docu- 
ment show  a  fearful  and  extraordinary  increase  of  crime  in  Ireland. 
Thus  the  total  number  of  outrages  specially  reported  to  the  constab- 
ulary force  in  Ireland,  during  the  month  of  July,  1844,  was  552. 
In  June,  1845,  the  number  was  896,  and  in  July,  3845,  it  was  708. 
In  September  of  the  same  year  it  was  552 ;  in  August,  1846,  it  was 
478;  while  in  the  following  month  it  had  increased  to  829.  In 
October,  the  number  of  offences  again  increased  to  1482  —  (nearly 
three  times  as  many  as  during  the  corresponding  period  of  the  pre- 
ceding year ;)  in  November  last  it  was  1761 ;  and  in  the  concluding 
month  of  the  year,  no  less  a  number  than  2666  — (upwards  of  four 
times  as  many  as  in  December,  1845.)  Of  that  number,  1389  were 
cases  of  cattle  stealing ;  14  homicides,  (in  one  month ;)  22  cases  of 


induction.  yy 

expect  that  men  will  bend  their  eye  on  the  phenome- 
non, endeavor  to  ascertain  the  conditions  and  forces 
that  result  in  good  or  evil,  and  thus  to  discover  a  nat- 
ural science  of  society  that  may  open  a  new  era  in  the 
history  of  civilization.  Induction  is  no  less  applicable 
to  the  phenomena  of  men  than  it  is  to  the  phenomena 
of  matter ;  and,  although  there  are  disturbing  causes 
that  render  the  study  more  complex  and  more  difficult, 
we  can  have  no  reason  for  supposing  that  the  same 
stability  that  prevails  in  the  inorganic  world,  does  not 
also  prevail  in  the  social  world  of  men,  and  entail 
many  effects  which  are  too  often  attributed  to  the  vol- 
untary volitions  of  the  mind.  Not  that  there  are  no 
phenomena  in  the  social  world  which  cannot  be  ac- 
counted for  by  physical  laws  —  for  this  would  oblit- 
erate man's  moral  nature ;  but  that  certain  social  con- 
ditions are  for  the  most  part  accompanied  by  certain 
social  phenomena,  which  may  be  studied  in  the  same 
manner  as  the  facts  of  any  other  science,  and  made 
the  basis  of  social  action  and  of  human  legislation. 

firing  at  the  person ;  25  aggravated  assaults,  &c.  Thirty-five  of 
the  offences  were  of  an  agrarian  character.  In  the  first  month  of 
the  present  year,  (1847,)  the  number  of  offences  reported  by  the 
constabulary  in  Ireland  was  still  further  augmented,  for  it  amounted 
to  2885  —  (1276  in  Munster  alone.)  In  May  it  was  2647,  of  which 
number  1446  were  cases  of  cattle  stealing ;  while  in  the  May  pre- 
ceding there  were  only  69  of  these  offences  reported.  The  return 
from  which  these  results  are  extracted  does  not  come  lower  than 
the  month  of  May.  During  the  two  years  included  in  the  account, 
(June,  1845,  to  May,  1847,  both  inclusive,)  the  total  number  of  out- 
rages reported  by  the  constabulary  in  Ireland  amounted  to  no  fewer 
than  29,302,  or  at  the  rate  of  more  than  40  outrages  every  day  in 
the  year."—  Witness,  October  30,  1847. 


100  INDUCTION. 

Thus  every  religion  and  every  political  system  may 
be  judged  of  inductively  (by  an  examination  of  the 
condition  of  the  people  where  it  prevails)  as  well  as 
dogmatically,  by  an  inquiry  into  its  own  inherent  na- 
ture ;  and  we  may,  as  politicians,  pronounce  the  utter 
condemnation  of  idolatry,  on  account  of  its  fruits  of 
ignorance,  vice,  crime,  and  detriment  to  the  social  con- 
dition of  mankind ;  while,  as  theologians,  we  exhibit 
its  falsity  and  error,  and  condemn  it  because  its  cre- 
dence is  unsupported,  and  therefore  superstitious.  It 
is  true  that  this  view  may,  by  certain  classes,  be  es- 
teemed a  low  one ;  but  all  truth  is  worthy  of  atten- 
tion, much  more  especially  that  which  affects  the  social 
condition  of  men,  because  these  effects,  that  may  be 
observed  by  the  natural  exercise  of  our  faculties,  must 
be  considered  as  the  results  of  God's  laws  operating 
in  the  world.  It  is  no  mean  advantage  to  truth,  that 
she  has  always  the  benefit  (the  common  worldly  ben- 
efit) on  her  side ;  neither  is  it  a  small  argument  against 
any  erroneous  system,  that  we  may  point  to  its  deadly 
fruits,  and  show  the  demoralizing  influence  of  its 
operation. 

But  if  idolatry  may  be  judged  of  by  its  fruits,  so 
may  despotist)^  so  may  slavery,  so  may  restrictive  laws, 
and  so  may  all  those  inventions  of  worldly  legislation, 
by  which  a  small  benefit  is  conferred  on  the  few  at  the 
expense  of  the  mass  of  the  population.  And  these 
effects,  whatever  their  kind,  belong  to  a  natural  and 
inductive  science  of  society,  the  great  principles  of 
which  remain  the  same  in  all  ages  and  in  all  condi- 
tions, however  much,  or  however  little  advantage 
may  have  been  derived  by  a  nation  from  their  con- 
templation. 


INDUCTION.  101 

3d.  A  correct  philosophy  of  the  mental  operations. 

Whenever  we  approach  what  is  termed  metaphysical 
philosophy,  we  feel  that  we  approach  a  quagmire,  over 
which  a  dense  mist  seems  to  hold  its  perpetual  habita- 
tion.* The  footing  is  all  unsound,  or  at  least  suspi- 
cious, and  the  little  light  there  is,  is  only  sufficient  to 
confuse  and  perplex  us.  If  we  attempt  to  advance, 
two  ultimate  and  hitherto  impassable  objects  present 
themselves  to  view.  On  the  one  hand' is  #fte  bottom* 
less  pit  of  scepticism,  and  on  tlw  other  is  the  com- 
manding but  inaccessible  height  of  absolute  .truth; 
Some,  wearied  with  vain  endeavors  to  scale  the  preci- 
pice, have  at  last,  as  if  despairingly,  advanced  beyond 
the  brink,  and  sunk  into  the  unfathomable  void ;  while 

#  In  speaking  thus  of  metaphysical  philosophy,  we  do  not  speak 
of  that  genuine  philosophy  which  consists  in  the  enumeration  and 
discussion  of  the  primary  elements  and  propositions  of  human  cre- 
dence, but  of  that  spurious  speculation  that  endeavors,  by  a  subtle 
use  of  language,  and  of  half-formed  thought,  to  uproot  the  founda- 
tions of  truth.  Let  us  suppose  that  every  man  in  the  world  imme- 
diately gives  his  assent  to  the  necessary  and  universal  truth  of  an 
axiom,  (no  matter  what.)  Some  philosophers  say,  "  But  your  axiom 
is  only  a  subjective  conviction;  now  prove  to  me  its  objective 
truth."  The  most  definite  reply  to  this  objection,  and  one  which 
the  sceptic  may  fail  to  get  over  with  all  his  ingenuity,  is  this,  "  Give 
me  a  definition  of  objective  truth."  Axioms  are,  it  is  true,  incapa- 
ble of  proof ;  but  why  ?  because  they  are  the  standards  of  all  other 
propositional  truth  whatever.  The  idealist,  on  the  other  hand,  ac- 
cepts truth,  but  confuses  the  question  of  reality.  The  fact  we 
believe  to  be,  that  if  truth  and  reality  were  fairly  defined,  and  not 
jumbled  together  in  a  kind  of  mysterious  way,  both  the  sceptic  and 
the  idealist  (the  Berkleyian)  would  at  once  be  convicted  of  intro- 
ducing a  new  term  into  their  conclusion,  and  making  a  palpable 
logical  fallacy. 

9* 


102  PHILOSOPHY    AND    SCEPTICISM. 

others,  startled  at  the  plunge,  have  flattered  themselves 
that,  by  some  mighty  effort  of  their  own  faith  or  imagi- 
nation, they  could  compensate  for  the  reality,  that 
could  only  be  obtained  by  setting  the  foot  on  the  sum- 
mit and  casting  the  eye  over  universal  nature. 

Between  scepticism  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  dog- 
matism of  unsupported  faith  on  the  other,  philosophy 
has  slowly  swayed  backwards  and  forwards,  leaving 
man  as  little^ farther,  advanced  in  ontology  as  he  was 
five  hundred,  or  a  thousand,  or  two  thousand  years 

S.juv.   i  , 

To  suppose,  however,  that  philosophy  is  the  useless 
jargon  that  some  writers  appear  desirous  of  represent- 
ing, because  it  has  failed  to  solve  the  great  problem, 
namely,  "  How  can  objective  existence  be  rationally 
substantiated  ?  "  is  surely  to  look  at  history  with  only 
one  eye.  Philosophy  has  failed ;  that  is,  the  human 
intellect  has  failed;  that  is,  man  as  man  has  failed; 
that  is,  in  fact,  that  after  all  the  mental  toil  of  the 
greatest,  the  problem  appears  insoluble,  and  seems  to 
teach  us  that  humanity  cannot  arrive  at  objective 
truth  by  its  own  unaided  efforts ;  neither,  we  candidly 
confess,  does  it  appear  to  us  to  be  of  the  slightest  im- 
portance whether  it  can  or  cannot. 

Grant  that  scepticism  in  philosophy  is  the  ultimate 
result  of  all  investigation ;  let  us  only  be  consistent, 
and  make  that  scepticism  universal,  and  the  bugbear 
of  scepticism  disappears  forever.  Let  us  write  a  plus 
or  a  minus,  a  sign  positive  or  a  sign  negative,  before 
all  our  knowledge,  and  what  difference  can  it  possibly 
make?  Knowledge  remains  the  same  in  all  its  rela- 
tive proportions;  and  all  that  man  has  really  ascer- 


SCEPTICISM-  103 

tained  to  be  true,  remains  as  permanently  stable,  and 
as  really  capable  of  application,  as  if  ten  thousand 
syllogisms  had  proven  that  knowledge  was  truth,  and 
that  the  axiomatic  credence  of  mankind  was  really 
veracious.  Scepticism,  whatever  be  its  dangers,  is 
only  dangerous  when  partially  applied,  and  when  we 
apparently  undermine  one  branch  of  knowledge  by 
insisting  on  rational  proof,  while  at  the  same  time  we 
admit  as  much,  and  perhaps  infinitely  more,  without 
any  process  of  proof  whatever,  but  merely  because  we 
are  constrained  to  believe.  When  one  man  shall  have 
demonstrated  to  another  man  his  own  existence,  (and 
the  most  sceptical  oi  the  sceptics  admits  the  existence 
of  the  me,)  it  will  then  be  time  to  substantiate  objec- 
tive existence,  by  a  process  of  proof  that  can  have  no 
difficulties,  when  once  the  proof  of  the  one  me  is  fur- 
nished to  the  other.  If  we  will  be  sceptics,  let  us  be 
consistent;  and  let  us  write  our  sign  negative,  not 
merely  before  objective  knowledge,  but  before  the  ex- 
istence of  that  me,  whose  existence  is  absolutely  as 
incapable  of  every  approach  to  rational  proof  as  is  the 
existence  of  an  external  world.* 


*  It  is  commonly  supposed,  that  philosophic  scepticism  has  some 
mysterious  power  to  unhinge  the  very  framework  of  morals.  Now 
suppose  that,  after  all,  the  whole  of  man's  knowledge  should  be 
proven  subjective,  what  difference  can  it  make  ?  Suppose  a  sub- 
jective man  is  arrested  by  a  subjective  policeman,  tried  by  a  sub- 
jective jury,  and  condemned  to  subjective  imprisonment  —  is  the 
pain  the  less  real  because  it  is  subjective  ?  Or,  to  extend  the 
argument,  suppose  the  whole  system  of  morals  should  be  subjec- 
tive, and  that  there  shall  be  a  subjective  day  of  judgment,  and  a 
subjective  eternity.    What  difference  could  the  mere  mode  of  ex- 


104  SCEPTICISM. 

When,  however,  we  take  the  existence  of  the  me  for 
granted,  and  then  insist  that  other  objective  existence 
should  produce  a  proof  of  which  it  is  incapable,  our 
scepticism  is  not  only  dangerous  but  fatal,  and  the 
tangled  web  of  sophistry  is  made  to  envelop  certain 
subjects,  as  if  they,  and  they  only,  were  shrouded  in 
obscurity.  To  proceed  in  this  manner  is  no  more  ra- 
tional than  it  would  be  to  take  objective  existence  for 
granted,  and  then  to  reflect  on  the  me,  and  imperatively 
to  demand  its  rational  proof.  Rational  proof  there  is 
none,  either  in  the  one  case  or  the  other ;  for  the  me  is 
as  really  objective  to  all  our  consciousness,  as  is  matter 
or  universal  mind.  We  are  conscious  of  mental  phe- 
nomena alone;  and  the  me  is  as  far  removed  from 
immediate  appreciation,  as  is  any  other  substantive 
existence  that  our  race  admits  with  persevering  uni- 
versality. Let  us  only  make  scepticism  (philosophic 
scepticism)  absolutely  universal,  and  the  foundations 
of  real  knowledge  are  laid  anew,  and  the  glorious  edi- 
fice of  science  acquires  its  fair  proportions,  and  be- 
comes the  settled  home  of  man's  intellect,  where  he 
may  dwell  in  peace  and  safety,  having  buried  scepti- 
cism in  a  grave  of  its  own  digging.* 


pression  make  ?  If  scepticism  were  practical,  il  would  save  from 
terrestrial  consequences  and  terrestrial  pain ;  and,  if  it  cannot  do 
so,  it  makes  the  most  groundless  assumption  when  it  proposes  to 
abolish  future  punishment.  Even  if  matter  were  only  an  idea,  it  is 
plain  that  pain  is  to  be  avoided,  even  if  it  were  only  subjective ; 
and  consequently  if  criminality  of  action  brings  pain,  it  is  plain 
that  the  most  certain  of  all  knowledge  is  morals.  The  moral  law  is 
abiding,  whatever  view  may  be  taken  of  matter. 

*  There  is  one  argument  which  appears  to  us  valid  against  all 


SCEPTICISM.  105 

For  ourselves,  we  believe  that  scepticism  may  be 
fairly  met,  and  fairly  vanquished  by  the  most  strict 
rules  of  logic  Its  stronghold  is  in  the  ambiguity  of 
terms,  and  in  the  use  of  terms  which  it  has  no  logical 
right  to  use.  Let  us,  however,  without  descending 
into   abstract  disputations,   take  it  up   on  the  fact. 

philosophers  who  admit  the  me,  and  require  rational  proof  of  the 
existence  of  the  not  me.  Let  us  grant  that  all  the  external  mate- 
rial world  may  come  to  be  viewed  by  that  philosopher  as  an  assem- 
blage of  the  sensations  or  phenomena  of  the  me.  This  may,  per- 
haps, be  possible ;  but  these  philosophers  use  arguments  and  write 
books.  Now,  for  what  purpose  are  these  books  written  ?  Surely 
not  to  convince  the  me,  for  the  me  is  supposed  convinced  already, 
but  to  convince  some  other  me,  that  is,  some  objective  mental  exist- 
ence which  can  never,  even  by  the  utmost  stretch  of  scepticism,  be 
confounded  with  the  me  personal.  An  argument  is  to  convince  a 
mind ;  and  assuredly  that  mind  never  made  a  sensual  impression  on 
the  sceptic.  Nothing  in  the  shape  of  a  sensual  impression,  nothing 
in  the  shape  of  observation,  nothing  in  the  shape  of  phenomenal 
affection,  could  ever  be  experienced  by  the  sceptic  of  that  mind, 
whose  existence  he  takes  for  granted  when  he  endeavors  to  con- 
vince it  Every  philosopher  who  writes  a  book  or  uses  an  argu- 
ment, appears  to  us  to  admit  objective  existence  in  a  manner  that  is 
not  liable  to  the  reply  usually  given  to  his  admission  of  the  mate- 
rial world.  That,  we  have  granted,  may  be  phenomenal ;  but  when 
he  acts  for  the  conviction  of  a  judgment  by  publishing  an  argu 
ment,  will  it,  or  can  it,  be  advanced  that  that  judgment  is  phenom 
enal?  Is  it  not  absolutely  and  essentially  another  me,  perfectly 
distinct  and  perfectly  distinguished  from  every  thing  that  the  me 
who  writes  can  possibly  predicate  of  itself?  We  can  easily  imagine 
a  sceptic  viewing  men's  bodies  as  phenomena,  and  classing  them 
among  the  modifications  of  himself;  but  when  he  endeavors  to 
convince  their  judgments,  he  thereby  substantiates  external  exist- 
ence objective  to  himself,  and  utterly  incapable  of  ever  being 
reduced  to  that  modification  of  the  me,  that  forms  the  essential 
groundwork  of  the  sceptical  philosophy. 


106  PHILOSOPHY, 

Scepticism  says,  "  You  have  no  proof  for  the  objec- 
tive truth  of  your  subjective  convictions,"  We  deny 
the  fact,  and  allege  that  an  argument  based  on  the 
calculation  of  probabilities  would  establish,  beyond 
the  smallest  possibility  of  doubt,,  the  objective  veracity 
of  the  subjective  laws  of  reason.  The  mathematical 
sciences  are,  every  one  of  them,  —  namely,  arithmetic, 
algebra,  geometry,  and  statics, — purely  subjective; 
every  one  of  their  primary  propositions  is  an  axiomatic 
truth  taken  for  granted,  self-evident,  incapable  of  ques- 
tion, purely  abstract,,  and  that  does  not  pronounce  on 
the  real  existence  of  any  concrete  reality  whatever. 
Now  how  comes  it,  that  when  these  subjective  sci- 
ences are  applied  to  matter,  an  entity  with  which  they 
have  nothing  to  do,  they  are  invariably  as  correct  as 
when  merely  contemplated  by  the  reason  ?  How,  if 
the  subjective  convictions  and  subjective  processes  of 
the  reason  are  not  correct,  can  an  astronomer  predict 
the  return  of  a  comet  ?  —  and  the  comet  does  return, 
to  other  men's  perceptions,  years  after  he  is  dead. 
Scepticism  is  the  greatest  imposition  that  ever  fooled 
man's  reason,  yet  it  must  be  fairly  met. 

Never,  perhaps,  was  the  absence  of  a  definition 
productive  of  so  much  fruitless  toil,  as  when  men  set 
to  work  on  philosophy.  It  had  been  well  if  philoso- 
phers had  definitely  laid  before  them  the  object  they 
were  about  to  pursue,  and  satisfied  themselves  that  the 
means  of  arriving  at  their  end  were  really  within  their 
reach.  What  is  the  object  of  philosophy  ?  What  is 
philosophy  ?  What  does  a  man  propose  to  expound 
when  he  teaches  philosophy?  These  are  questions 
usually  evaded  by  some  oblique  dissertation  on  the 


THE    METHOD    OF    BACON.  107 

general  form  of  knowledge,  the  nature  of  things,  &c, 
&c.,  and  the  definite  object  to  be  pursued  is  never  as- 
certained. For  a  long  period  philosophy  was  ontology ; 
that  is,  the  knowledge  of  being,  entirely  and  exclu- 
sively objective  in  its  character,  entirely  and  exclusively 
subjective  in  its  means  of  operation.  That  is,  men 
endeavored  to  substantiate  both  the  reality  and  the 
form  of  the  universe  in  their  own  minds,  without  the 
connecting  link  —  evidence  —  that  renders  one  form  of 
thought  knowledge.  There  was  no  evidence,  therefore 
there  was  no  knowledge.  With  such  a  system  the 
abstract  sciences  alone  are  possible,  as  in  them  the 
evidence  is  subjective,  and  supplied  by  the  rational 
constitution  of  the  mind. 

The  Baconian  philosophy  broke  up  ontology,  by 
supplying  the  connecting  link  that  must  unite  the 
object  and  the  subject.  That  link  was  evidence,  and 
that  evidence  was  only  possible  by  means  of  observa- 
tion. Philosophy  now  separated  into  two  parts  —  one 
of  which  was  metaphysics,  the  representative  of  the 
ancient  philosophy ;  and  science,  the  new  philosophy 
that  arose  from  the  new  method  of  founding  knowl- 
edge on  evidence. 

The  new  philosophy  has  advanced  with  wonderful 
strides,  enlightening  man's  intellect,  and  dispersing 
innumerable  benefits,  which  reproduce  themselves  in 
an  infinity  of  forms,  and  hold  out  hopes  of  great  and 
permanent  advantage  to  our  race.  The  old  philosophy 
remains  much  where  it  was,  as  regards  its  nature,  but 
in  a  very  different  position  as  to  the  extent  of  the 
ground  it  occupies. 

At  one  period  the  ontological  method  of  making 


108      GRADUAL    CIRCUMSCRIPTION    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

science  (that  is,  the  method  of  making  science  without 
evidence)  was  universal.  It  was  applied  to  physics  as 
well  as  to  metaphysics,  and  its  domain  was  supposed 
to  extend  over  every  thing  that  could  become  the  sub- 
ject of  human  knowledge.  Not  only  was  there  a 
scholastic  theology,  but  a  scholastic  series  of  assertions 
with  regard  to  the  essence  of  matter,  all  explanatory 
of  observed  phenomena.  Alchemy,  astrology,  &c., 
completed  the  circle,  and  reduced  to  art  the  principles 
of  dogmatic  assertion.  During  the  reign  of  this  sys- 
tem, it  is  worthy  of  remark  that  diversity  of  credence 
and  contradiction  of  statement  were  just  as  prevalent 
in  matters  of  physical  science,  as  they  now  are  in 
matters  of  politics  and  philosophy. 

When,  however,  a  new  method  was  discovered, 
diversity  of  credence  and  the  ontological  system  re- 
tired from  all  those  regions  where  real  knowledge  was 
acquired ;  and,  as  the  new  philosophy  extended  its 
domain,  the  old  philosophy  was  curtailed  in  its  sphere 
of  operation,  and  restricted  to  those  subjects  that  have 
not  yet  been  reduced  to  scientific  ordination.  Thus 
the  region  of  conflicting  belief  was  one  of  indefinite 
boundary,  or  rather  one  whose  boundary  was  con- 
stantly fluctuating  and  retiring  before  the  advance 
of  real  knowledge.  The  history  of  real  or  positive 
knowledge  might  almost  be  termed  the  history  of  the 
retrogression  of  philosophy;  and  just  as  the  new 
method  was  enabled  to  substantiate  its  propositions  in 
such  a  manner,  that  all  who  investigated  the  evidence 
arrived  at  the  same  unity  of  credence,  was  philosophy 
constrained  to  abandon  its  ground,  and  to  retire  to 
those  heights  where  it  now  enjoys  but  a  precarious 
authority. 


GRADUAL    CIRCUMSCRIPTION    OF    PHILOSOPHY.      109 

Let  us  now  firmly  lay  hold  of  the  fact,  that  philos- 
ophy at  one  period  pretended  to  explain  the  phenom- 
ena of  the  external  world,  and  that  philosophy  has 
now  been  driven  from  every  part  of  that  region  that 
has  been  occupied  by  positive  science. 

Can  nothing  be  learned  from  this  fact  ?  We  think 
that  something  can,  and  it  is  this :  That  philosophy, 
after  retrograding  from  every  region  of  thought  to 
which  man  may  apply  his  attention,  shall  at  last  re- 
solve itself  into  the  science  of  human  thought,  and 
pronounce  nothing  whatever  on  any  subject  that  is  not 
merely  and  exclusively  human  thought.  If  we  con- 
sider knowledge,  we  shall  find  that  it  implies  three 
things  ;  the  object,  (that  is,  the  universe ;)  the  subject, 
(that  is,  the  human  mind ;)  and  the  connecting  link 
between  them,  that  is,  evidence.  Now,  if  we  consider 
that  philosophy  has  abandoned  one  portion  after  an- 
other of  the  object,  just  in  proportion  as  positive  sci- 
ence has  occupied  that  portion,  we  can  see  that,  if  the 
process  continues,  the  whole  of  the  object  must  ulti- 
mately be  abandoned,  and  the  subject  alone  become  the 
object  of  contemplation.  And  if  so,  then  will  philos- 
ophy teach  only  psychology*  that  is,  the  science  of 
mental  phenomena,  which  we  can  have  no  reason  to 

*  Psychology,  taking  that  term  extensively  to  signify  mental 
science.  Of  course,  mental  science  has  its  divisions.  First,  there 
is  inductive  psychology,  the  observational  part  of  mental  science ; 
and,  second,  there  is  the  science  proper  of  thought.  The  latter 
alone  is  entitled  to  the  name  of  philosophy ;  the  former  is  the  natu- 
ral history  of  mind.  All  the  direct  sciences  must  be  evolved  before 
there  can  be  a  science  proper  of  thought.  On  this  subject,  how- 
ever, we  shall  remark  towards  the  close  of  the  volume. 
10 


110  COMMON     CREDENCE* 

doubt  may  assume  somewhat  of  the  same  ordination 
that  prevails  in  those  sciences  that  have  the  material 
world  for  their  foundation. 

Let  us  now  for  a  moment  reflect  upon  our  argu- 
ment, and  endeavor  to  seize  the  point  at  which  phi- 
losophy broke  away  from  the  path  of  legitimate  in- 
quiry, and  lost  itself  amid  the  shifting  quicksands  of 
doubt,  denial,  and  contradiction. 

Let  us  place  both  the  vulgar  multitude  and  the 
philosophers  before  us,  and  examine  their  various  oc- 
cupations. 

The  multitude,  in  all  ages  and  in  all  places,  have 
admitted  the  existence  of  the  mind,  the  existence  of 
the  external  world,  and  the  existence  of  Deity.  These 
appear  to  be  the  common  facts  which  those  who 
do  not  enter  on  philosophic  inquiry  admit  and  act 
upon  as  matters  requiring  neither  proof  nor  specific 
investigation.  They  are  the  common  and  general 
groundwork  of  human  credence  and  of  human  action  ; 
and  their  certitude  is  never  shaken  in  the  popular  mind 
until  some  philosopher  shall  have  promulgated  some 
abstract  speculations  as  to  the  evidence  on  which 
those  propositions  are  received.  The  multitude,  then, 
believed  and  acted  on  their  belief,  taking  the  three 
great  facts  we  have  mentioned  as  the  most  common 
and  ordinary  truths,  without  which  the  whole  econo- 
my of  thought  must  be  overturned,  and  laid  in  inex- 
tricable confusion. 

The  philosophers,  however,  were  desirous  of  render- 
ing some  intelligible  account  of  the  phenomenon  pre- 
sented by  the  multitude,  and  clearing  their  minds  of 
more   ordinary  belief,  endeavored  to  give  a   rational 


PRIMARY    KNOWLEDGE.  Ill 

explanation  of  the  theory  of  human  credence.  Their 
object  was  not  to  accept  these  great  facts,  and  thence 
to  proceed  to  specific  knowledge,  but  to  lay  anew  the 
rational  evidence  on  which  these  facts  themselves  were 
to  be  admitted. 

This  intention  appears  at  first  sight  to  be  praise- 
worthy, and  the  process  may  seem  not  altogether 
illegitimate. 

Let  us  however  posit  the  universal  fact,  that  before 
man  can  reason,  three  substantives  must  be  given  or 
taken  for  granted,  and  that  two  propositions  must  also 
be  given,  involving  those  three  substantives  as  the 
terms,  before  man  can  by  any  possibility  arrive  at  a 
proposition  established  by  rational,  that  is,  by  logical, 
proof.  Let  men  therefore  pursue  their  inquiry  as  far 
back  as  the  most  subtle  intellect  can  possibly  reach, 
there  must  necessarily  be  found  at  the  bottom  of  all 
real  or  of  all  hypothetical  reasoning,  three  substantives 
and  two  propositions,  which,  if  accepted,  may  lead  to 
real  knowledge,  and,  if  rejected,  must  land  us  without 
further  difficulty  in  scepticism,  absolutely  universal, 
obliterating  all  truth,  all  possibility  of  knowledge,  and 
all  existence  of  whatever  kind  or  character,  subjective 
or  objective. 

Such  being  the  case,  we  may  unhesitatingly  assert, 
that,  at  the  bottom  of  all  knowledge  whatever,  there 
must  be  found  some  substantive  existences  absolutely 
incapable  of  rational  substantiation,  and  some  propo- 
sitions absolutely  incapable  of  rational  demonstration. 
Without  these  it  is  impossible  for  man  to  reason. 

Any  man,  therefore,  who  admits  any  rational  knowl- 
edge whatever,  does  thereby  necessarily  admit  certain 


112  SCIENCE    AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

undemonstrable  propositions,  and  the  existence  of  cer- 
tain substantives  which  he  has  necessarily  taken  for 
granted. 

The  specific  difference,  then,  between  real  knowl- 
edge and  philosophy  appears  to  be  this :  Real  knowl- 
edge, or  positive  science,  accepts  the  ordinary  belief  of 
the  multitude,  and,  pursuing  it  forwards,  endeavors  to 
determine  its  limitations,  becoming  at  every  step  less 
and  less  general.  Philosophy,  on  the  contrary,  com- 
mencing at  the  ordinary  belief  of  the  multitude,  pur- 
sues its  course  backwards,  endeavoring  at  every  step 
to  become  more  and  more  general.  The  ultimate 
termination  of  this  course  must  ever  necessarily  be, 
either  to  accept  some  propositions  as  primary  and  un- 
proven,  or  to  maintain  a  consistent  scepticism,  which 
absolutely  obliterates  the  possibility  of  rational  knowl- 
edge. To  show  how  this  difference  is  manifested,  we 
have  only  to  inquire  upon  what  terms  the  primary 
substantives  of  the  sciences  are  accepted  by  science 
and  philosophy. 

The  geometrician,  for  instance,  accepts  space,  with- 
out the  smallest  inquiry  into  its  nature.  His  object  is 
to  limit,  define,  and  exhibit  the  relations  of  spaces. 
Philosophy,  on  the  contrary,  going  backwards,  might 
discourse  forever  on  the  nature  of  space,  without  elicit- 
ing one  truth  that  should  be  of  the  smallest  impor- 
tance to  mankind.  The  sister  substantive  of  space, 
namely,  time,  is  also  accepted  by  the  man  of  science, 
whose  only  object  is  to  measure  it  accurately  ;  that  is, 
definitely  to  determine  the  limitations  of  its  portions. 
The  physical  sciences,  again,  accept  matter;  and  with- 
out the  smallest  speculation  as  to  what  matter  really 


ONTOLOGY.  113 

is,  they  each,  in  their  several  branches,  endeavor  to  de- 
termine definitely  its  various  forms,  and  accurately  to 
specify  its  manifestations.  Philosophy,  on  the  contra- 
ry, endeavors  to  go  backwards  from  the  ordinary  cre- 
dence, and  to  furnish  some  explanation  as  to  what 
matter  is  or  is  not,  for  some  have  attempted  to  oblit- 
erate it  altogether. 

The  two  substantives,  space  and  matter,  are  suffi- 
cient for  our  purpose.  Positive  science,  accepting 
space,  and  pursuing  the  inquiry  forwards  —  investigat- 
ing first  the  forms  of  spaces,  and  then  the  necessary 
relations  that  exist  between  those  forms  —  furnishes 
us  with  geometry.  While  by  accepting  matter,  and  in- 
quiring only  into  the  forms  of  its  manifestation,  and 
the  relations  that  are  observed  to  exist  between  those 
forms,  we  are,  by  the  exercise  of  the  human  reason, 
at  last  presented  with  the  sciences  of  astronomy,  me- 
chanics, chemistry,  physiology,  &c;  where  we  know 
not  whether  most  to  admire  the  power  and  wisdom  of 
God  as  displayed  in  the  objects  themselves,  or  his 
goodness  in  endowing  man  with  an  intellect  to  com- 
prehend them. 

Against  this,  what  has  philosophy  to  place  in  the 
opposite  scale  ?  Starting  from  the  very  same  point, 
only  pursuing  her  fancied  investigation  backwards, 
what  are  the  treasures  she  has  amassed  on  her  way, 
and  what  the  results  she  has  presented  to  mankind  ? 
A  thousand  years  of  speculation  as  to  whether  matter 
be  a  substance  or  a  shadow,  an  existence  real  or  ideal; 
and,  notwithstanding  that  the  most  acute  minds  have 
devoted  no  small  time  to  the  speculations,  not  one 
single  hair's  breadth  of  progress  has  ever  been  made 
10* 


114  CRITICISM    OF    KNOWLEDGE. 

towards  the  determination.  Every  discussion  as  to 
the  nature  of  matter  or  of  space,  may  be  raised  to-day 
as  well  as  two  thousand  years  ago ;  and,  for  all  that 
we  can  possibly  have  reason  for  anticipating,  may  be 
raised  at  any  future  period  of  man's  existence  on  the 
earth,  with  just  as  much  and  just  as  little  probability 
of  ever  terminating  in  any  other  proposition  than 
"  space  is  space,  and  matter  is  matter." 

We  conceive,  then,  that  the  moment  at  which  phi- 
losophy wandered  and  went  astray  was,  when  it  at- 
tempted to  discuss  the  objective  truth  or  falsehood  of 
the  primary  credences  or  convictions  of  mankind. 
These  primary  convictions,  in  their  general  form,  are 
at  the  bottom  of  all  human  knowledge ;  but  whether 
human  knowledge  have  or  have  not  an  external,  real, 
and  objective  counterpart,  which  would  remain  if  man 
and  man's  intellect  were  annihilated,  neither  philos- 
ophy nor  any  other  natural  method  can  possibly  de- 
termine. Whether  knowledge  be  truth  is  (to  philoso- 
phy) an  insoluble  mystery ;  neither  has  any  reason 
ever  been  exhibited  to  the  world  for  supposing  that  the 
means  of  solution  are  at  all  within  the  reach  of  man. 

But  if  it  be  impossible  for  philosophy  to  solve  the 
question  of  objective  existence,  and  if  all  the  various 
sciences  accept,  without  inquiry,  the  primary  substan- 
tives of  which  they  respectively  treat,  what  conclusion 
must  we  come  to  as  to  the  character  of  knowledge  ? 
and  what  object  must  we  allocate  to  philosophy  to 
constitute  it  a  possible  branch  of  knowledge  ? 

First.  All  human  knowledge,  obtained  by  the  nat- 
ural exercise  of  the  faculties,  is  real  only  in  so  far  as 
it  is  phenomenal.     That  is,  knowledge,  being  only  a 


CRITICISM    OF    KNOWLEDGE.  115 

form  of  thought,  exists  in  the  mind,  and  it  is  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  human  faculties  to  ascertain  certainly 
whether  the  mental  propositions  which  constitute 
knowledge  coincide  with  actual  and  external  realities. 
That  they  do  so,  is  a  matter,  not  of  knowledge,  which 
can  be  rationally  substantiated,  but  of  primary,  Tin- 
proven,  and  unprovable  credence* 

Second.  If  every  portion  of  what  is  commonly  un- 
derstood by  the  objective  universe  be  made  the  sub- 
ject of  some  one  particular  science,  (which  always  ac- 
cepts its  primary  substantives,  and  inquires  only  into  the 
modes  of  their  manifestation,)  and  if  ontological  or 
metaphysical  philosophy  be  rejected  from  every  por- 
tion of  that  object  which  positive  science  comes  to 
occupy,  then  can  philosophy  no  longer  attempt  to  pro- 
nounce a  priori  upon  what  is,  or  what  is  not,  but  must 
confine  itself  exclusively  to  thought,  and  to  thought 
alone  ;  thereby  changing  its  character  from  metaphys- 
ics to  a  proper  science  of  thought.  This,  then,  we 
believe  to  be  the  true  province  of  philosophy,  not  to 
inquire  into  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  primary  con- 
victions of  the  intellect,  but  to  observe  and  record  what 
those  primary  convictions  are,  to  enumerate  them,  to 


*  The  fallacy  of  philosophic  scepticism  is,  not  in  viewing  knowl- 
edge from  the  subjective  point  of  view,  which  is  in  fact  a  legiti- 
mate process,  but  in  supposing  that  this  mode  of  viewing  knowl- 
edge entails  any  consequences  whatever  affecting  morals.  Crime 
maybe  viewed  by  the  philosopher  in  its  subjective  aspect  —  that 
is,  in  the  mind ;  and  the  punishment  that  follows  crime  may  also  be 
viewed  in  its  subjective  aspect  —  that  is,  in  the  pain  experienced 
by  the  criminal.  But  is  the  pain  one  single  atom  less  an  evil  be- 
cause it  happens  to  be  viewed  subjectively  ? 


116      FORM  AND  MATTER  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

determine  the  forms  of  their  manifestations,  and  to 
pursue  with  regard  to  human  thought  the  same  kind 
of  inquiry  that  the  mathematical  sciences  pursue  with 
regard  to  numbers,  quantities,  and  spaces,  and  more 
nearly  still,  the  same  kind  of  inquiry  that  the  physical 
sciences  pursue  with  regard  to  matter  and  its  mani- 
festations. 

One  of  the  most  valuable  distinctions  that  has  ever 
been  made  in  philosophy,  and  one  that  we  believe  will 
ultimately  incline  mankind  to  clearer  views  of  the  true 
province  of  philosophy,  is  the  distinction  between 
the  matter  of  knowledge  and  the  form  of  knowledge. 
This  distinction  will,  we  have  no  doubt,  ultimately 
strike  at  the  root  of  metaphysical  speculation.  For 
what,  after  all,  is  ontology?  An  attempt  to  construct 
the  universe  out  of  the  general  convictions  of  the  un- 
derstanding. Now,  let  us  suppose  that  the  human 
mind,  so  far  from  being  an  unwritten  tablet,  formed 
merely  for  the  reception  of  impressions,  is,  as  it  were, 
organized  up  to  the  highest  possible  point,  so  that  it 
universally  and  invariably  stamps  a  form  on  those  im- 
pressions, which  form  is  in  nowise  dependent  on  the 
external  objects,  but  due  to  the  constitution  of  the 
mind  itself.  This  form  will  every  where  be  present  in 
every  portion  of  knowledge.  What  then  ?  Shall  we 
thence  conclude  that  we  may,  by  some  more  than  usu- 
ally subtle  process  of  mental  analysis,  reconstruct  a  men- 
tal universe  harmonious  with  that  without  us,  merely 
by  excogitation  ?  Shall  we  not  rather  still  adhere  to 
the  belief  that,  be  the  mind  as  complex  as  it  may,  it 
could  of  itself  originate  not  one  single  iota  of  knowl- 
edge, unless  the  substantive  groundwork  of  that  knowl- 


OBSERVATION.  117 

edge  were  furnished  to  it  from  without  ?  *  Observation, 
psychological  or  sensational,  can  alone  furnish  us  with 
a  fact,  and  a  fact  in  one  form  or  other  must  lie  at  the 
bottom  of  every  chain  of  reasoning  not  purely  hypo- 
thetical. Let  us  grant  to  the  utmost  possible  extent 
that  the  form  of  knowledge  is  determined  by  the  con- 
stitution of  the  intellect  itself;  yet  the  substantive  and 
concrete  element,  the  primary  matter  of  knowledge, 
whether  relating  to  the  me  or  the  not  me,  must  be  de- 
rived exclusively  from  observation,  and  never  can  by 
any  possibility  be  more  than  guessed  at  by  the  mere 
metaphysician.  Ontology,  however,  has  always  as- 
pired to  determine  the  matter  as  well  as  the  form  of 


*  In  affirming  that  observation  is  the  origin  of  all  knowledge,  we 
mean  the  chronological  origin,  not  the  logical  origin.  The  doctrine 
that  makes  all  knowledge  to  consist  of  transformed  sensation  —  in 
other  words,  the  sensationalist  doctrine  —  is  perfectly  untenable. 
It  cannot  be  consistently  maintained,  even  in  a  conversation  that 
lasts  but  a  few  minutes.  The  sensationalist,  whatever  he  may  ar- 
gue, is  under  the  constant  necessity  of  using  terms  to  which  he 
can  assign  no  physical  correlative.  He  argues  as  a  sensationalist, 
and  in  so  doing  exhibits  himself  an  intellectualist.  He  cannot  help 
it — no  man  ever  could.  Sensation,  however,  is  necessary  to  call 
the  mind  into  activity ;  and  thus  all  knowledge  may  be  said  to  origi- 
nate, not  in  sensation,  but  through  the  sensations.  Were  there  no 
sensation,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  there  would  be  knowledge ; 
but  when  once  there  is  sensation,  the  mind,  from  its  internal  con- 
stitution, posits  things  altogether  and  essentially  distinct  from  sen- 
sation, or  from  any  possible  transformation  of  sensation.  It  is  very 
singular  that  sensationalism,  which  is  commonly  supposed  to  lead 
to  absolute  materialism,  does  actually  lead  to  absolute  idealism. 
Instead  of  substantiating  matter,  it  obliterates  it,  and  leaves  nothing 
but  the  phenomenon;  the  substances,  mind  and  matter,  being  both 
extinguished.  —  See  MorelPs  Hist,  of  Philosophy. 


118  MATTER   OF    KNOWLEDGE. 

knowledge,  and  never  till  it  abandons  the  vain  attempt, 
can  we  hope  to  see  philosophy  regenerated,  and  recon- 
structed, as  it  may  be,  into  perhaps  the  most  interest- 
ing of  all  human  sciences.  The  form  of  knowledge, 
and  not  the  matter,  is  the  true  object  of  philosophy.* 

*  In  saying  that  philosophy  should  confine  itself  to  psychology, 
we  do  not  mean  that  it  should  confine  itself  to  the  mere  record  of 
what  takes  place  in  the  mind.  This  is  the  natural  histoi-y  of 
thought,  and  the  natural  history  is  only  the  basis  of  the  science. 
Every  branch  of  knowledge  has  a  natural  history  as  well  as  a  sci- 
ence ;  and  if  we  confound  the  two,  as  the  Scotch  psychologists  did, 
we  must  either  leave  a  large  number  of  questions  unexplained,  or 
dogmatize  through  thick  and  thin,  and  attempt  to  suffocate  the  ques- 
tions instead  of  answering  them.  All  knowledge  is  necessarily 
divided  into  real-ology  and  ihought-ology,  (if  the  expressions  may 
pass,)  and  we  maintain  that  the  knowledge  of  reals  is  not  the 
knowledge  of  thought,  and  that  the  knowledge  of  thought  is  not 
trie  knowledge  of  reals.  Now,  philosophy  may  take  its  choice, 
either  to  discourse  on  reals  —  God,  Nature,  Man  —  or  to  discourse 
on  thought  —  perceptions,  abstractions,  relations;  but  it  cannot  be 
allowed  under  the  same  name  to  discourse  on  both,  unless  that  name 
be  coextensive  with  knowledge,  and  embrace  all  that  can  be  known. 
If  philosophy  be  a  peculiar  branch  of  knowledge,  it  must,  like 
every  other  branch,  select  its  object,  and  to  that  object  it  must  be 
confined.  It  is  perfectly  illegitimate  for  any  science  to  pretend  to 
discourse  on  the  subjective  intellect  that  is  in  operation.  If  this 
be  allowed,  truth  and  falsehood  are  immediately  overthrown  and 
blended  in  one  mass  of  inextricable  confusion.  Who  would  allow 
a  geometrician,  as  such,  to  discourse  on  the  trueness  or  falsity  of 
the  primary  axioms  of  geometry?  The  only  circumstance  that 
renders  geometry  possible,  is  the  subjective  truth  (necessary  and 
universal)  of  those  axioms,  and  the  circumstance  that  they  are  inca- 
pahle  of  such  questioning,  and  are  the  essence,  the  most  abstract 
form,  and  the  universal  standard  of  all  geometric  truth.  If  we 
pretend  to  make  the  axiom  objective,  and  to  inquire  into  its  truth, 
we  may  be  philosophers,  or  any  thing  else,  but  most  certainly  we 


EVOLUTION    OF    FREEDOM.  119 

"We  conclude,  then,  our  argument  with  regard  to  the 
combination  of  knowledge  and  reason.  We  mean 
not  that  men  must  combine  knowledge  and  reason, 
but  that  the  great  masses  of  the  unprivileged  classes 
must  combine  together  on  the  same  knowledge,  and 
on  the  same  principles,  that  they  have  rationally  de- 
duced from  that  knowledge.  It  has  been  said,  that 
"  for  men  to  be  free,  it  is  sufficient  that  they  will  it : " 
never  was  there  a  greater  mistake,  or  one  so  utterly  at 
variance  with  the  great  facts  of  history.  Perhaps  no 
sentiment  is  stronger  in  the  human  breast  than  the 

are  no  longer  geometricians.  And  so  it  is  with  all  other  sciences 
whatever,  even  those  that  relate  to  thought.  If  we  make  thought 
objective  for  the  purpose  of  studying  it,  and  we  can  only  study  it  by 
making  it  objective,  we  must  speak  of  thought,  the  product,  analyze 
it,  classify  its  forms,  and  exhibit  their  relations ;  but  most  certainly 
we  have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  intellect  that  is  thinking 
about  thought.  If  we  turn  from  thought,  the  product,  to  the  intel- 
lect that  thinks,  and  wish  to  know  the  intellect,  then  we  must  make 
intellect  objective,  analyze  it,  classify  its  faculties,  and  exhibit  their 
relations ;  but  here  again,  as  every  where  else,  we  must  not  con- 
found the  object  that  is  thought  about  with  the  subject  that  thinks. 
The  subjective  intellect  can  never  legitimately  be  taken  into  consid- 
eration. Philosophy  appears  to  us  to  wander  about  without  a  rest- 
ing-place for  the  sole  of  her  foot :  first,  she  speaks  of  the  absolute 
reality,  and  then  of  the  absolute  idea,  and  changes  backwards  and 
forwards  in  such  a  way,  that  really  it  requires  no  ghost  to  tell  us, 
that  questions  investigated  upon  such  a  methodless  principle  must 
ever  remain  insoluble.  If  philosophy  be  as  extensive  as  knowledge, 
then  knowledge  is  composed  of  the  various  scientific  and  historical 
branches,  with  their  relations,  and  there  is  no  peculiarity  about  phi- 
losophy. But  if,  as  we  imagine,  philosophy  is  a  peculiar  branch  of 
knowledge,  it  must  necessarily  select  its  object,  like  all  other  sci- 
ences, and  if  it  assume  to  be  the  scientia  scientiarum,  then  its  ob- 
ject is  knowledge  and  not  reality.    If  its  object  be  knowledge,  then 


120  EVOLUTION    OF    FREEDOM. 

love  of  liberty.  For  this  men  have  panted,  prayed, 
fought,  struggled,  rebelled,  and  endured  every  kind  of 
hardship,  and  every  kind  of  cruelty.  And  yet  they  are 
not  free.  To  be  free,  it  is  first  necessary  that  men 
should  know  wherein  true  freedom  consists ;  namely, 
in  the  absolute  supremacy  of  equal  and  impartial  law, 
made  without  respect  of  persons  or  classes,  and  ad- 
ministered with  uprightness  and  regularity.  Nor  is 
this  all.  True  freedom  is  the  very  highest  point  of 
political  civilization ;  and  to  suppose  that  mere  will 
can  ever  lead  to  that  point,  is  to  suppose  that  men  may 

to  knowledge  it  must  confine  its  discourse,  every  speculation  about 
reality  being  altogether  illicit  Thus,  if  philosophy  profess  to  treat 
of  God,  it  is  theology,  and  must  never  attempt  to  discourse  on  the 
idea  of  God.  All  speculations  about  absolute  ideas  are  (however  in- 
teresting, and  however  useful)  illegitimate ;  they  have  no  more  busi- 
ness there  than  speculations  on  the  idea  of  substance  have  in  trea- 
tises on  mechanics.  And  if  philosophy  select  the  idea,  and  not  the 
reality,  as  its  object,  it  may  discourse  on  absolute  ideas,  but  must 
refrain  from  discoursing  on  theology.  This  mode  of  distinctive 
investigation  is  the  great  first  principle  of  method,  and  the  great 
means  of  the  progression  of  knowledge  ;  and  when  the  day  comes 
that  the  separate  branches  have  been  completely  investigated  on  a 
principle  of  independent  inquiry,  and  the  sensationalist  has  ex- 
hausted the  world  without,  and  the  philosopher  the  world  within, 
and  the  Christian  doctor  has  attained  to  a  perfect  knowledge  of 
Scripture,  the  three  regions  may  again  blend  into  one,  and  show 
the  wondrous  harmony  of  the  universe  —  of  that  creation  which 
came  spotless  from  the  hand  of  the  Lord,  but  has  so  long  exhibited 
the  discord  and  diversity  of  sin.  Whether  that  day  may  come  ere 
the  new  heavens  and  the  new  earth  shall  be  the  place  of  man's 
abode,  we  know  not,  nor  have  the  means  of  ascertaining ;  but  that 
the  constant  progress  of  man's  intellectual  perception  is  towards 
that  final  unity,  we  can  learn,  as  certainly  as  we  can  learn  that  the 
political  progress  of  men  is  towards  a  condition  of  equality. 


FREEDOM.  121 

overleap  the  conditions  of  their  nature,  and  reach  the 
goal  without  the  struggles  of  the  race.  True  freedom, 
however  simple  in  its  theory,  is  the  highest,  and  prob- 
ably the  most  complex,  form  of  combined  society.  It 
is  the  whole  body  of  society  acting  on  the  principles 
of  knowledge,  and  carrying  truth  into  practical  opera- 
tion.     Will  can  never  achieve  this. 

True  freedom  supposes  a  condition  of  society  which 
is  incompatible  with  ignorance  and  error  —  a  condition 
negative  in  its  principles,  positive  in  its  institution  and 
establishment  —  a  condition  that  has  never  yet  been 
attained,  even  in  a  tolerable  degree,  by  any  nation 
under  the  dominion  of  superstition,  and  never  yet  com- 
pletely attained  even  by  the  most  enlightened  states, 
—  a  condition  to  be  attained  not  by  one  great  tumult, 
but  gradually  evolved  and  perfected  with  the  lapse  of 
years.  It  is  the  result  and  ultimate  end  of  a  great 
progress,  which  makes  its  way  with  knowledge,  some- 
times advancing  with  peaceful  steps,  sometimes  over- 
turning the  barriers  that  stand  in  the  way  amid  the 
din  of  revolution.  It  is  the  condition  of  society  where 
tvill  is  excluded,  and  law  is  made  on  an  objective  rea- 
son, which  convinces  man's  judgment  that  it  is  equi- 
table. It  is  a  condition  first  to  be  defined  in  its  ab- 
stract form  by  the  man  of  thought,  and  then  to  be 
striven  for  by  the  mass  of  the  population ;  a  condi- 
tion that  supposes  great  advancement  and  infinite 
benefit  to  mankind,  but  a  condition  that  must  be  pur- 
chased, and  purchased  only  on  those  terms  which  are 
prescribed  by  the  laws  of  man's  constitution. 

The  political  history  of  our  race  teaches  us  that 
11 


122  CONDITIONS  OF  FREEDOM. 

there  are  three  conditions  of  society  involving  a  cause 
on  the  one  hand,  and  an  effect  on  the  other. 

The  causes  are  Knowledge,  Superstition,  Infidelity. 
The  effects,  Freedom,  Despotism,  Anarchy. 

Knowledge  and  Freedom. 

Superstition  and  Despotism. 

Infidelity  and  Anarchy. 
Such  are  the  conditions  of  our  nature.     Man  may 
make  his   election  of  the  cause,  but  God  has  deter- 
mined the  character  of  the  consequent. 

No  fact  stands  out  more  prominently  from  the  con- 
dition of  the  various  nations,  or  from  their  history, 
than  that  those  conditions,  and  the  great  actions  of 
men  in  the  figure  of  society,  depend  upon  their  cre- 
dences; that  is,  on  the  convictions  of  their  intellect; 
that  is,  on  the  propositions  they  hold  to  be  true. 
What  makes  one  nation  press  ardently  forward  in  the 
pursuit  of  liberty,  while  another  sits  dead  and  stupid 
under  the  iron  rule  of  the  despot?  Thovg-ht,  mere 
thought,  impalpable  and  invisible  thought,  a  something 
which  can  neither  be  seen,  felt,  nor  handled  ;  but  which 
fixes  man's  destiny,  raising  him  if  correct  to  the  dig- 
nity and  energy  of  freeman,  dooming  him  if  erroneous 
to  vice,  degradation,  and  slavery.  The  history  of  the 
world  has  to  be  re-written  on  a  new  principle,  and  this 
unseen  element  has  to  be  exhibited  as  the  cause  of 
the  condition  of  the  nations.  Climate,  circumstance, 
and  race  may  all  go  for  something  or  for  much ;  but, 
far  more  influential  than  either,  is  credence*     What 


#  Mr.  John  Macgregor  (who,  by  the  way,  take3  upon  Mm  to  call 
a  far  greater  man  than  himself  a  canting  hypocrite  —  Oliver  Crom- 


CREDENCE. 


123 


makes  Africa  slumber  on  in  her  barbarous  dream  of 
semi-brutality,  as  if  her  sons  were  forever  doomed  to 
claim  kindred  with  the  beasts  of  the  field  ?  Her  cre- 
dence, her  bloody  superstitions,  her  errors  of  thought. 
And  what  makes  Asia  the  perpetual  home  of  despot- 
ism, of  cruel  exaction  and  licentious  tyranny,  of  fabled 
wealth  to  the  ruler,  and  grinding  poverty  to  the  culti- 

well,  to  wit)  begins  his  dissertation  on  the  "  Natural  Resources, 
&c,  of  the  Nations  of  Europe,"  with  the  following  passage: 
"  The  geographical  position  of  a  country  has  always  been  admitted 
as  of  the  first  importance  in  regard  to  its  prosperity  and  power." 

Mr.  Macgregor  also  informs  us,  "that  the  science  of  statistics  is 
that  of  truth ; "  but  we  will  undertake  to  affirm,  that  the  science  of 
statistics  never  did,  and  never  can,  lead  to  such  a  doctrine  as  Mr. 
Macgregor's.  Will  any  man  in  the  world  rank  the  geographical 
position  of  England  as  so  very  superior  to  that  of  Turkey  ?  or  that 
of  North  America  to  that  of  South  America  ?  or  that  of  Prussia 
and  Holland  to  that  of  Spain  and  Portugal  ?  Yet  Turkey,  South 
America,  and  Spain,  are  going  to  wreck  and  ruin ;  although  Turkey 
was  very  powerful  at  one  period,  and  Spain  was  the  first  kingdom 
in  Europe.  And  is  the  geographical  position  of  Switzerland,  with- 
out even  a  seaport,  so  very  superior  to  that  of  Ireland  ?  Yet  Dr. 
Bowring's  report  on  Switzerland  would  lead  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  country  was  prosperous,  and  not  desolated  by  hunger  fever. 
Mr.  Macgregor  himself  states,  "  with,  however,  nearly  every  natu- 
ral element  of  power  and  advantage  for  commerce,  there  is  scarcely 
any  country  in  Europe  or  Asia  so  ill  cultivated  as,  or  where  indus- 
try is  farther  in  arrear  than  in,  Asiatic  Turkey." 

The  prosperity  of  a  country  does  not  depend  on  its  position,  but 
on  the  character  of  its  inhabitants,  on  their  credence,  their  knowl- 
edge, their  institutions,  and  the  freedom  of  their  government.  The 
geographical  position  of  the  United  States  has  not  altered  since 
1776,  yet  since  that  time  the  country  has  made  a  progress  une- 
qualled in  history.  Suppose  North  and  South  America  were  to 
change  inhabitants,  would  the  position  be  of  any  imaginable  conse- 
quence ?    Position,  indeed ! 


124  CREDENCE. 

vator  of  the  soil?  Asiatic  superstition;  that  is,  the 
common  and  every-day  thought  of  the  millions  who 
inhabit  Asia.  And  what  has  fixed  the  destiny  and 
determined  the  present  position  of  the  countries  of 
Europe?  Credence.  Why  is  Spain  in  a  constant 
struggle  between  despotism  and  anarchy  ?  Because 
the  mind  of  Spain  is  struggling  between  superstition 
and  infidelity.  Why  is  Italy  worn  out  ?  and  why  is 
she  the  home  of  all  that  is  little  and  despicable  in 
the  eyes  of  Englishmen  ?  Because  her  credence  has 
ruined  the  mind  of  the  population.  And  why,  with 
every  advantage  of  earth,  ocean,  and  sky,  are  the  fair- 
est portions  of  the  earth,  the  shores  and  islands  of  the 
eastern  Mediterranean,  inhabited  by  degenerate  races, 
who  dare  not  strike  one  blow  for  liberty,  but  lie  grovel- 
ling in  vice,  without  a  thought  for  the  regeneration  of 
their  country  ?  Because  their  credence  has  degraded 
them.  And  why  is  Russia  a  vast  conglomeration  of 
slave  plantations,  with  one  great  slave  owner  for  a 
master  ?  Because  the  minds  of  Russians  are  enslaved 
by  the  greater  despot  —  superstition.  And  why  is 
England  the  mightiest  of  nations,  with  a  power  and 
an  influence  that  are  felt  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe  ? 
Because  the  mind  of  England  is  the  most  enlight- 
ened, and  because  knowledge  has  made  her  power- 
ful. What  makes  Turkey's  weakness  and  England's 
strength  ?  Not  climate,  not  geographical  position,  not 
any  physical  advantage  to  which  so  much  of  the  dif- 
ference is  usually  attributed  —  but  credence  ;  the  cre- 
dence of  England  is  correct,  and  the  credence  of  Tur- 
key is  erroneous.  Sooner  or  later  men  must  learn  the 
great  fact,  that  the  social  and  political  condition  of  a 


USE    AND    OPERATION    OF    COMBINATION.  125 

nation  is  absolutely  dependent  on  that  nation's  cre- 
dence. Correct  credence  is  knowledge,  and  knowledge 
alone  is  capable  of  regenerating  the  political  condition 
of  mankind.  Change  the  credence  of  a  nation,  and 
you  change  the  whole  current  of  its  future  progress. 
Let  the  most  darkened  and  benighted  spot  on  earth, 
the  far-away  South  Sea  island,  where  the  fierce  idola- 
ter could  feast  on  his  captive  victim,  and  the  unhappy 
mother  could  think  it  no  crime  to  destroy  her  new- 
born offspring;  where  man  was,  if  we  may  so  speak,  a 
demon  worse  than  a  beast  of  prey ;  let  that  spot  be 
but  visited  by  the  knowledge  of  the  true  God,  the  first 
great  element  of  truth  —  let  the  truth  be  but  received 
—  let  the  idolater  change  his  credence,  and  you  have 
changed  the  whole  order  of  society.  Even  let  the 
truths  of  the  gospel  descend  savingly  but  into  the 
hearts  of  a  few,  if  the  truth  obtain  an  intellectual 
assent  with  the  population,  instead  of  a  perpetual 
record  of  crime  and  abomination,  we  shall  see  man's 
reason  emancipated,  and  the  whole  figure  of  society 
transformed,  as  it  were,  beneath  the  miracle-working 
hand  of  the  Most  High. 


SECTION    IV. THE    USE    AND    OPERATION     OF    THE    COM- 
BINATION   OF    KNOWLEDGE    AND    REASON. 

We  now  turn  to  the  use  of  combination.  "Why 
should  men  combine,  and  for  what  object  should  they 
combine? 

11* 


126  man's  moral  imperfection. 

First.  There  are  certain  evils  which  belong  to  the 
race  of  mankind,  and  which  afflict  humanity  more  or 
less  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe.  Some  of  these  evils 
are  of  such  a  nature  as  to  appear  under  circumstances 
of  extreme  aggravation  in  certain  conditions  of  soci- 
ety ;  while,  in  other  and  better  conditions,  they  are 
kept  under  some  beneficial  restraint  by  the  direct  in- 
tention and  continued  effort  of  society.  In  the  exist- 
ence of  these  evils  is  to  be  found  the  reason  of  combi- 
nation ;  and  the  object  of  combination  is  to  remove  as 
much  as  possible,  or  at  all  events  to  diminish,  such  of 
these  evils  as  affect  the  political  condition  of  men,  or 
the  condition  of  men  in  society. 

The  first  great  master  evil,  and  the  one  to  which 
most  others  may  be  traced,  directly  or  indirectly,  is  the 
innate  corruption  and  depravity  of  man,  which  makes 
him  prefer  falsehood  to  truth,*  vice  to  virtue,  and  the 


*  In  saying  that  man  prefers  falsehood  to  truth,  we  do  not  mean 
that  man's  intellect  prefers  falsehood.  The  intellect,  were  it  not 
impelled  in  a  wrong-  direction  by  the  sentiments,  would  naturally 
seek  truth,  and  truth  only ;  and,  were  it  left  unbiased  by  the  will, 
would  form  its  propositions  regardless  of  all  save  the  evidence 
before  it.  From  the  complex  nature  of  man,  however,  and  from 
the  corruption  of  the  moral  portion  of  the  mind,  it  happens  that 
propositions  altogether  unfounded  are  received  as  true,  apparently 
for  the  purpose  of  filling  up  the  general  scheme  or  chart  of  knowl- 
edge, which  must  be  filled  up  either  with  truth  or  falsehood,  but,  at 
all  events,  filled  up.  Hence  all  nations,  at  one  period  or  other,  have 
had  a  false  religion,  and  a  false  scheme  of  ethics.  Whatever  met- 
aphysic  difficulties  assail  the  question,  it  is  an  historical  fact,  that  the 
human  race  has  preferred,  and  still  does,  throughout  the  greater 
part  of  the  globe,  prefer,  falsehood  to  truth  on  the  subject  of  reli- 
gion and  morality ;  and  a  false  religion  is  the  source  from  which 


EVILS    OF    INJUSTICE.  127 

gratification  of  passion  to  the  enlightened  and  ration- 
al exercise  of  his  natural  faculties.  Whatever  view 
may  be  taken  of  the  theological  question  of  natural  de- 
pravity, we  hold  it  an  historical  fact  of  the  very  first 
magnitude,  and  of  the  most  indubitable  veracity,  that 
the  human  race,  as  such,  has  always,  and  in  every 
known  region  of  the  earth,  "  done  the  things  which  it 
ought  not  to  have  done,  and  left  undone  the  things 
which  it  ought  to  have  done."  With  regard  to  man's 
nature,  we  shall  enter  into  no  disputation  ;  but,  with  re- 
gard to  men's  actions,  we  view  them  through  the  com- 
mon medium  of  history,  and  we  hesitate  not  to  see  the 
practice  of  injustice  more  or  less  prevalent  in  every 
country  of  the  earth,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  accept 
that  explanation  of  the  fact  which  is  furnished  in  such 
plain  terms  by  the  words  of  divine  revelation.  Histo- 
ry informs  us  that  the  actions  of  men  are  wicked ;  and 
surely  there  can  be  no  absurdity  in  giving  credence  to 
Scripture,  when  it  informs  us  that  their  hearts  are  so 
likewise.  With  the  depravity  of  the  heart,  politics 
has  no  concern ;  but  so  soon  as  that  depravity  comes 
to  manifest  itself  in  action,  and  to  appear  in  the  form 
of  fraud  or  violence,  the  necessity  of  a  system  of  pol- 
itics is  immediately  substantiated.  Men  are  wicked, 
and  therefore  inclined  to  do  wrong ;  but  they  are  also 
rational,  and  may  combine  systematically  to  prevent 
the  wrong  from  being  done. 

Among  the  evils  that  prey  upon  humanity,  there  are 
some  which  men  inflict  upon  each  other.     These  may 

error  on  almost  all  other  subjects  flows  as  naturally  as  water  from  a 
fountain.  There  cannot  possibly  be  any  hope  of  political  regenera- 
tion so  long  as  a  nation  adheres  to  a  false  religion. 


128  EVILS    OF    INJUSTICE. 

generally  be  reduced  to  the  class  of  violence  or  of 
fraud  ;  and  the  prevention  of  violence  and  fraud  is  the 
first  great  end  of  political  association.  The  possibil- 
ity of  violence  and  fraud  naturally  originates  some 
kind  of  government,  the  character  of  which  appears  to 
be  determined  much  more  by  the  condition  of  the  pop- 
ulation as  regards  knowledge,  than  by  any  direct  in- 
tention on  the  part  of  the  rulers,  or  of  any  body  of 
men  whatever. 

The  evils  that  would  arise  from  the  unrestrained 
passions  of  mankind  form  the  general  groundwork  or 
reason  for  the  establishment  of  some  rule,  order,  or 
government,  which  the  mass  of  the  population,  for  the 
most  part,  acquiesce  in,  whatever  be  its  character. 
"When  a  government  is  established,  we  have  the  more 
or  less  perfect  formation  of  a  state ;  that  is,  of  an  as- 
sociation of  individuals  supposed  to  be  acting  together 
for  their  common  advantage.  [It  will  be  altogether 
unnecessary  for  us  to  go  back  to  the  formation  of  gov- 
ernments amongst  nations  scarcely  emerging  from 
barbarism.  The  character  of  such  governments  is  a 
matter  of  little  or  no  importance,  neither  would  any 
change  merely  in  the  form  of  government  be  attended 
with  any  particular  advantage.  The  first  great  neces- 
sity for  such  nations  is  the  acquisition  of  knowledge. 
Give  knowledge,  and  civilization  will  follow  of  its  own 
accord,  just  in  proportion  as  that  knowledge  is  more 
or  less  complete,  and  more  or  less  generally  dissemi- 
nated. We  confine  our  remarks  to  those  nations  that 
have  undergone  some  considerable  process  of  consoli- 
dation, and  arrived  at  some  definite  form  of  constitu- 
tion, such  as  the  nations  of  modern   Europe ;  in  each 


THE    PROGRESS    OF    SOCIETY.  129 

of  which  we  have  a  government  varying  in  character, 
according  to  the  moral  and  intellectual  condition  of 
the  population.] 

The  ostensible  reason  for  the  existence  of  a  govern- 
ment, we  suppose  to  be  "  the  necessity  of  preventing 
individual  fraud  or  violence."  Were  there  no  tendency 
in  the  individual  to  fraud  and  violence,  the  first  great 
end  of  political  association  would  cease  to  exist. 

If,  then,  the  government  be  established  for  the  pre- 
vention of  fraud  and  violence,  —  that  is,  for  the  pre- 
vention of  injustice,  —  what  is  the  use  of  that  other 
combination  of  which  we  have  spoken,  namely,  the 
combination  of  knowledge  and  reason  ? 

1st.  The  progress  of  mankind  is  a  progress  from 
ignorance,  error,  and  superstition,  towards  knowledge. 

2d.  Governments  being  established  in  the  earlier 
stages  of  society, — that  is,  during  the  reign  of  igno- 
rance, error,  and  superstition,  —  have  always,  and  in 
every  known  case,  been  more  or  less  despotic ;  that  is, 
have  systematically  assumed  powers  to  which  they 
were  not  justly  entitled. 

3d.  The  progress  of  political  society  is  a  progress  in 
which  these  unjust  powers  have  been  gradually  cur- 
tailed and  abolished,  in  proportion  as  the  nation  has 
progressed  from  ignorance  and  superstition,  and  ad- 
vanced towards  knowledge. 

The  use,  then,  of  the  combination  of  knowledge  and 
reason  is  (not  to  combine  against  individual  injustice, 
this  being  the  province  of  the  government,  but)  to  re- 
duce the  powers  of  the  government  and  the  laws  of 
the  country  within  those  bounds  of  justice  beyond 
which  they  cannot  be  other  than  despotic. 


130  USE    OF    COMBINATION. 

The  first  great  fact  that  we  learn  from  history  with 
regard  to  governments  is,  that  they  are  all  (whatever 
be  their  form)  despotic  in  their  character  during  the 
earlier  periods  of  society,  and  that  they  lose  their  des- 
potic character  only  when  the  nation  progresses  in 
knowledge,  and  combines  for  the  advancement  of  its 
liberties. 

In  all  the  countries  of  Europe  we  may  observe  the 
powers  of  the  government  undergoing  a  gradual  but 
sure  process  of  curtailment ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  liberties  of  the  people  are  expanding  in  a  corre- 
sponding ratio,  and  becoming  systematically  estab- 
lished by  law.  In  Russia,  the  process  exhibits  only 
the  first  faint  symptoms  of  commencement ;  while  in 
England  the  process  is  tolerably  complete,  (as  regards 
personal  liberty ;)  the  interval  between  these  two  being 
filled  up  by  the  other  European  countries.  The  prog- 
ress of  liberty,  then,  is  an  internal  progress,  by  which 
the  internal  constitution  of  the  country  is  altered  and 
amended. 

What,  then,  is  the  combination  of  which  we  have 
spoken,  as  if  it  were  capable  of  working  out  the  great 
evolution  of  liberty  and  justice  ? 

It  is  the  combination  of  the  nation,  or  of  the  en- 
lightened portion  of  the  nation,  against  the  laws  of  the 
nation,  and  against  the  unjust  powers  of  the  rulers. 

Liberty  is  advanced  not  by  the  warfare  of  one  na- 
tion against  another  nation,  but  by  the  warfare  (physi- 
cal or  moral)  of  the  unprivileged  classes  against  the 
unjust  laws,  and  against  the  unjust  privileges  that  pre- 
vail within  the  nation  itself;  and  this  warfare  can  only 
be  carried  on  efficiently  by  the  mass  of  the  population 


CHANGE    OF    CREDENCE.  131 

combining  to  extort  those  measures  that  have  been 
theoretically  shown  to  be  right,  or  those  measures  that 
on  good  grounds  are  presumed  to  be  beneficial. 

The  common  notion  almost  universally  adopted  in 
the  earlier  stages  of  society,  and  still  prevalent  in  some 
of  the  countries  of  Europe,  is,  that  the  ruler  rules  by 
his  own  will,  as  if  he  were  the  lord  or  supreme  director 
of  the  nation.  Instead  of  laws  being  made  on  an 
objective  reason  that  establishes  their  equity,  they  are 
the  expressions  of  the  will  of  those  who  happen  to  be 
in  power ;  and  the  gradual  destruction  of  this  doctrine, 
with  its  evil  consequences,  is  the  result  of  knowledge 
disseminated  throughout  the  population. 

When  we  look  back  on  the  history  of  England,  or 
of  any  other  country  that  has  made,  considerable  prog- 
ress, we  see  that  all  the  great  changes  that  have  taken 
place  in  the  political  condition  of  the  population  have 
been  preceded  by  changes  in  the  theoretic  credence  of 
the  population,  and  that  the  amended  order  of  society 
has  resulted  directly  from  a  new  and  more  correct  or- 
der of  thought.  And  we  may  also  see  that  these  ben- 
eficial changes  have  seldom,  if  ever,  originated  with 
the  rulers  themselves,  but  have  been  extorted  from 
them,  sometimes  by  force,  and  sometimes  by  the  moral 
influence  that  the  man  in  the  right  has  over  the  man 
in  the  wrong. 

Without  alluding  to  the  explosion  of  the  "  divine 
right  of  kings,"  &c,  (which  enabled  the  rulers  to  prac- 
tise flagrant  iniquities  without  being  brought  to  judi- 
cial trial,)  we  may  refer  to  two  modern  instances  of 
the  combination  of  knowledge  and  reason,  by  which 
the  people  of   Britain  obtained  changes   of  vast  ex- 


132  NEGRO    SLAVERY. 

tent,  by  a  moral  power  which  overcame  the  will  of  the 
rulers  and  of  the  privileged  orders,  who  were  linked  to 
support  the  abuses.  We  refer  to  the  emancipation  of 
the  negroes,  and  to  the  repeal  of  the  corn  laws. 

We  have  selected  these  two  instances  because  they 
represent  two  great  classes  —  of  evils  on  the  one  hand, 
and  of  argument  on  the  other. 

The  laws  of  Great  Britain  declared  that  it  was  law- 
ful for  one  man  to  possess  another  man  as  his  prop- 
erty ;  and  this  principle  was  carried  into  practical  oper- 
ation by  the  seizure  and  reduction  to  slavery  of  vast 
numbers  of  Africans,  who  were  thenceforward  viewed 
as  mere  laboring  animals,  denied  education,  denied 
religion,  and  denied  those  rights  of  family  which  Na- 
ture has  established  as  the  first  of  her  social  laws. 

In  this  negro  slavery  we  have  a  vast  system  of  fraud 
and  violence,  established  and  continued  by  authority 
of  the  British  government ;  that  is,  we  have  the  power 
which  had  been  conferred  on  the  government  for  the 
purpose  of  preventing  violence  and  fraud,  turned  alto- 
gether away  from  its  legitimate  exercise,  and  made 
the  instrument  of  supporting  a  system  of  glaring  in- 
justice and  flagrant  iniquity.  We  have  that  greatest 
of  all  political  evils,  injustice,  established  and  main- 
tained by  law;  that  is,  in  fact,  the  despotism  of 
false  law. 

Here,  instead  of  the  government  and  the  law  being 
the  means  of  protection,  they  give  systematic  counte- 
nance to  the  injustice;  and,  by  legalizing  crime,  1  be y 
deprive  the  man  who  is  oppressed  (the  negro)  from 
endeavoring  to  recover  by  his  own  effort  the  natural 
rights  with  which  the  Almighty  had  endowed  him. 


EMANCIPATION  OF  THE  NEGROES.        133 

And  how  was  slavery  abolished  ?  "What  were  the 
efficient  means  that  led  first  to  the  abolition  of  the 
traffic,  and  afterwards  to  the  authoritative  declaration, 
that  slavery  should  no  longer  be  countenanced  by  law  ; 
that  is,  that  the  system  itself  must  cease  in  the  British 
dominions?  Was  it  by  the  natural  mode?  by  the 
method  which  Nature  teaches,  when  she  tells  us  to 
resist  every  attack  upon  our  liberty  ?  Alas !  the  negro 
knew  little  about  liberty,  and  his  ignorance  was,  per- 
haps, as  much  the  true  cause  of  his  slavery  as  was  the 
color  of  his  skin.  What  was  it  that  abolished  negro 
slavery?  It  was  the  moral  influence  of  knowledge, 
reason,  and  religion.  The  trade  had  been  sanctioned 
by  long  use ;  the  interests  of  the  wealthy  and  powerful 
were  linked  to  maintain  it ;  the  laws  of  the  empire  had 
declared  it  legitimate,  and  the  government  was  op- 
posed to  its  abolition.  More  than  this,  not  one  single 
man  who  had  the  means  and  the  opportunity  to  make 
himself  heard  on  behalf  of  the  negro,  had  one  farthing 
of  pecuniary  interest  in  procuring  the  negro's  emanci- 
pation. Those  who  argued  had  no  suffering  to  impel 
them,  save  the  suffering  of  just  and  generous  hearts ; 
no  interest  to  lead  them  on,  save  the  interests  of  hu- 
manity and  the  good  of  the  oppressed. 

What,  then,  were  the  motives  and  the  means  that 
led  to  so  great  a  political  change  as  the  emancipation 
of  a  race  from  slavery  ? 

First.  Certain  individuals  learnt  to  think  aright  on 
the  subject,  and  to  give  utterance  to  their  thoughts. 
The  battle  was  then  commenced.  On  the  one  hand 
was  reason,  involving  the  principles  of  natural  equity  ; 
and  on  the  other  was  the  despotism  of  the  law,  the 
11 


134  EMANCIPATION    OF    THE    NEGROES. 

power  of  the  government,  and  the  pecuniary  interests 
of  the  wealthy  and  influential. 

Sooner  or  later,  correct  thought  makes  its  way,  and 
the  more  rapidly  and  surely,  the  more  a  nation  has 
abandoned  superstition. 

The  theoretic  argument  or  credence  adopted  by  the 
advocates  of  liberty  was,  "  That  man  is  made  free  by 
God,  and  can  never  be  made  rightfully  a  slave  by 
man."  The  argument  in  its  most  essential  character 
was  one  of  mere  justice,  not  of  economical  benefit  or 
prejudice,  profit  or  loss.  A  moral  agitation  was  com- 
menced, the  few  were  transformed  into  the  many,  and 
the  progress  of  opinion  (of  credence)  was  such,  that 
every  possible  argument  that  could  be  adduced  on  the 
opposite  side  was  brought  forth  from  the  lying  cham- 
bers of  selfishness.  Every  thing  in  the  shape  of  an 
argument  —  every  thing  that  could  be  made  to  pass 
for  one,  though  halt,  lame,  or  blind,  was  pressed  into 
the  service  of  casuistry,  for  the  purpose  of  perpetuating 
injustice.* 

*  "  The  question  now  is  only  the  continuance  of  this  abominable 
traffic,  which  even  its  friends  think  so  intolerable  that  it  ought  to 
be  crushed.  Jamaica  has  imported  150,000  negroes  in  the  course 
of  twenty  years,  and  this  is  admitted  to  be  only  one  tenth  of 
the  trade.  Was  there  ever,  can  there  be,  any  thing  beyond  the 
enormity  of  this  infamous  traffic  ?  The  very  thought  of  it  is  be- 
yond human  endurance.  It  is  allowed,  however,  that  the  trade  is 
infamous,  but  the  abolition  of  it  is  resolvable  to  a  question  of  expe- 
diency ;  and  then,  when  the  trade  is  argued  as  a  commercial  case, 
its  advocates,  in  order  to  continue  it,  desert  even  the  principles  of 
commerce ;  so  that  a  traffic  in  the  liberty,  the  bloody  the  life  of  human 
beings,  is  not  to  have  even  the  advantages  of  the  common  rules  of 
arithmetic  which  govern  all  other  commercial  dealings."  —  Pitt's 
Speech,  April,  1702. 


ANTI-SLAVERY    COMBINATION.  135 

The  theoretic  credence,  however,  gained  ground,  and 
was  powerfully  aided  by  a  more  accurate  knowledge 
of  the  enormities  that  Britons  practised  on  Africans 
under  shelter  of  British  law.  Authentic  information 
was  obtained  and  disseminated,  and  at  last  a  great 
combination  of  knowledge  and  reason  was  brought  to 
bear  against  the  iniquity.  Political  justice,  however, 
is  a  plant  of  slow  growth ;  and  years  of  debate,  of 
contest  between  truth  and  falsehood,  were  necessary, 
before  even  the  trading  in  human  blood,  the  buying 
and  selling  of  man,  who  was  made  in  the  image  of 
the  Creator,  ceased  to  receive  the  sanction  of  the  most 
enlightened  and  freest  state  in  the  world.  And  here 
we  cannot  fail  to  remark  one  circumstance  that  has 
almost  invariably  accompanied  every  political  change 
which  had  for  its  object  the  destruction  of  an  injustice. 
We  mean  the  outcry  about  the  evils  that  would  folloio 
No  sooner  has  any  one,  more  enlightened  or  more  im- 
partial than  his  neighbors,  insisted  on  an  act  of  justice, 
(which,  after  all,  let  it  never  be  forgotten,  is  only  the 
refraining  from  injustice,)  than  all  the  evils  in  the  cat- 
egory are  immediately  prognosticated,  as  if  the  doing 
of  God's  will  were  to  let  loose  hell  to  ravage  the 
earth.* 

#  To  Mr.  Alderman  Watson  belongs  the  unenviable  honor  of 
having  presented  this  kind  of  argument  in  a  form  that  may  serve  as 
a  model  for  those  who  seek  to  prevent  change,  and  as  a  type  of  the 
argument  by  which  economists  have  so  often  endeavored  to  evade 
justice,  by  advancing  the  most  glaring  absurdities  and  the  most 
unblushing  lies.  "  Mr.  Alderman  Watson  said,  that  the  natives 
were  taken  from  a  worse  state  of  slavery  in  their  own  country  to 
one  more  mild.    The  abolition  of  the  trade  would  ruin  the  West 


136  PREDICTED    EVILS. 

When  the  emancipation  of  the  African  was  spoken 
of.  and  when  the  nation  of  Britain  appeared  to  be 
taking  into  serious  consideration  the  rightfulness  of 
abolishing  slavery,  what  tremendous  evils  were  to  fol- 
low !  Trade  was  to  be  ruined,  commerce  was  almost 
to  cease,  and  manufacturers  were  to  be  bankrupts. 
Worse  than  all,  private  property  was  to  be  invaded, 
(property  in  human  flesh,)  the  rights  of  planters  sacri- 
ficed to  the  speculative  notions  of  fanatics,  and  the 
British  government  was  to  commit  an  act  that  would 
forever  deprive  it  of  the  confidence  of  British  subjects. 
These  evils  at  home  were,  of  course,  to  be  accompa- 
nied by  others  abroad  much  more  tremendous.  The 
West  India  islands  were,  of  course,  to  be  ruined  past 
all  possible  hope  of  recovery ;  the  blacks  were  to  in- 
surge  and  to  destroy  the  white  population ;  a  moral 
hurricane,  ten  times  more  dreadful  than  the  winds  of 
heaven,  was  to  sweep  across  the  Caribbean  Sea; 
blood  was  to  flow  like  water ;  the  emancipated  slave 
was  to  celebrate  the  first  moment  of  his  liberty  with 
rape,  rapine,  and  murder ;  evils  unheard  of  and  incon- 
ceivable were  to  astonish  the  earth ;  the  very  heavens 
were   to   fall.     And  why?     Because  British  subjects 


Indies,  destroy  our  Newfoundland  fishery,  which  the  slaves  of  the 
West  Indies  supported,  by  consuming  that  part  of  the  fish  which 
was  fit  for  no  other  consumption  (!) ;  and  consequently,  by  cutting 
off  the  great  source  of  seamen,  annihilate  our  marine."  —  Debate, 
H.  C,  1791.  Such  were  the  arguments  used,  and  successfully 
used,  in  the  British  House  of  Commons,  for  perpetuating  a  system, 
the  cruelties  of  which  have  probably  never  been  surpassed,  whether 
we  consider  their  severity,  their  extent,  or  the  length  of  their 
duration. 


TRUE  CHARACTER  OF  NEGRO  EMANCIPATION.   337 

were  no  longer  to  be  permitted  by  British  law  to  bold 
their  fellow-men  in  slavery  on  British  ground.* 

With  regard  to  the  emancipation  of  the  negroes,  we 
have  two  remarks  to  offer. 

First  The  legalizing  of  slavery  was  positive,  the 
emancipation  negative. 

This  distinction  we  hold  to  be  of  importance,  as  it 
helps  to  point  out  how  far  legislation  is  legitimate. 

To  emancipate  a  slave  is  merely  to  refrain  from  ex- 
ercising that  power  which  keeps  him  in  bondage ;  and 
when  the  question  of  emancipation  arises,  the  question 

*  To  show  how  correct  credence  progresses,  even  where  we  least 
suspect  it,  we  have  only  to  turn  to  Fox's  speech,  April,  179.1.  After 
a  noble  appeal  for  the  suppression  of  the  trade,  and  a  full  declara- 
tion of  the  natural  rights  of  man  —  after  citing  the  doctrine  of 
Christianity,  that  "  high  and  low,  rich  and  poor,  are  equal  in  the 
sight  of  God,"  and  the  fact  that  slavery  has  ever  disappeared  before 
the  progress  of  Christ's  religion  —  after  bursts  of  noble  and  gener- 
ous eloquence  on  behalf  of  the  negro  —  he  concludes  by  falling 
into  the  common  snare,  and  stumbles  at  the  evils  that  would  follow 
the  emancipation.  The  trade  he  would  suppress ;  and  so  far  his 
credence  was  correct ;  but  he  had  not  progressed  so  far  in  correct 
credence  (although  necessarily  flowing  from  his  own  principles)  as 
to  advocate  the  suppression  of  slavery  in  the  West  India  islands. 
Mr.  Fox  said,  "  that  if  it  were  asked  whether  they  meant  also  to 
abolish  slavery  in  the  West  Indies,  he  would  candidly  say  he  was 
sorry  he  could  not  go  so  far.  It  was  possible  for  men  to  be  slaves 
so  long  as  to  make  it  dangerous  all  at  once  to  give  them  liberty," 
&c.  —  that  is,  dangerous  to  refrain  from  oppressing  them  by  force ; 
for  the  moment  the  positive  and  forcible  oppression  is  withdrawn, 
the  man  becomes  free.  What  Fox,  however,  could  not  see  to  be 
correct,  the  religious  community  of  England  saw  more  clearly ;  and 
for  half  a  century  a  great  combination  of  knowledge,  reason,  and 
religion  maintained  a  contest  that  finally  resulted  in  the  purchase 
of  the  emancipation  at  the  expense  of  £20,000,000. 
11* 


138   TRUE  CHARACTER  OF  NEGRO  EMANCIPATION. 

is  not  one  of  performing  a  positive  act,  but  of  refrain- 
ing from  performing  a  series  of  positive  acts,  by  which 
another  is  deprived  of  his  natural  liberty. 

Every  moment  that  a  negro  is  kept  a  slave,  he  was 
so  kept  by  the  positive  power  of  the  British  law,  backed 
by  the  British  arms ;  for  had  the  negro  said,  (as  he  had 
an  undoubted  right  to  say,)  "  You  wish  to  oppress  me, 
therefore  I  stand  on  my  defence,"  the  strong  arm  of 
the  law  would  immediately  have  appeared  against 
him,  and  reduced  him  again  to  slavery. 

The  law  was  a  positive  enactment  armed  with 
power,  and  the  moment  the  law  ceased  to  exist,  the 
negro  was  emancipated,  not  by  the  law,  but  by  nature. 
The  law  may  make  a  slave  ;  but  it  is  beyond  the  power 
of  the  law  to  make  a  freeman.  These  laws  were  of 
course  made  by  human  legislators,  and  the  question 
arises,  "  Has  any  human  legislator,  or  body  of  legislat- 
ors a  right  to  reduce  any  individual  whatever  to  sla- 
very ?  "  "  Clearly  not,"  is  the  answer  now  given  by 
Britons ;  and  if  so,  then  could  there  never  be  justly  a 
question  of  gradual  abolition,  for  gradual  abolition 
only  means,  u  Shall  we  continue  positively  to  exercise 
our  power  for  so  many  years  to  come  for  the  purpose 
of  keeping  men  in  slavery?"  The  only  question  that 
can  ever  be  legitimately  taken  into  consideration,  with 
regard  to  slavery,  is  immediate  and  total  abolition,  and 
so  of  all  similar  cases  where  injustice  is  established  or 
systematically  perpetuated  by  law. 

Second.  The  people  of  Great  Britain  were  taxed  by 
force  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  planters  for  their 
slaves.  Theoretically,  the  Commons  imposed  the  tax- 
ation on  themselves ;  but  nine  tenths  of  the  population 


THE    TAX    OP    THE    TWENTY    MILLIONS.  139 

have  nothing  to  do  with  the  election  of  members  of 
Parliament,  and,  so  far  as  they  were  concerned,  the 
taxation  was  ab  extra  —  forced  on  them  by  a  govern- 
ment which  they  had  no  voice  in  electing.  We 
maintain  that  this  act  was  one  of  downright  injus- 
tice and  oppression,  whatever  may  be  said  of  its 
magnanimity. 

The  planters  knew  perfectly  well  that  they  never 
had  a  moral  right  to  the  slaves,  and  consequently  they 
could  have  no  moral  claim  to  compensation.  Now, 
the  slave  laws  were  not  enacted  by  this  generation, 
and  it  is  admitted  that  those  who  enacted  them  had 
no  possible  right  to  do  so.  The  payment  of  the 
twenty  millions,  therefore,  resolves  itself  into  this, 
"  The  law  of  Britain  will  not  cease  to  lend  its  aid  and 
its  arm  to  perpetuate  slavery,  unless  the  people  of 
Britain  pay  an  immense  sum  to  the  planters."  The 
only  course  that  was  really  legitimate  was  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  Britain  to  declare  that  it  had  no  possible 
right  to  make  or  keep  men  slaves,  and  at  once  to  ex- 
punge the  statutes,  letting  the  planters  take  their 
chance,  at  the  same  time  protecting  the  negroes,  as 
British  subjects,  born  on  British  ground.  A  few  years, 
ago,  the  French  law  authorized  gambling  houses. 
Now,  will  it  be  maintained  that  the  keepers  of  those 
"  hells  "  had  any  just  claim  for  compensation  against 
the  laboring  population  of  France  ?  (Or  the  keepers 
of  those  other  houses  which  the  law  still  sanctions  ?) 
It  was  a  just,  and,  as  the  world  goes,  a  glorious  thing 
for  Britain  1  o  abolish  slavery  as  it  did ;  but  most  cer- 
tainly the  laboring  man  of  England,  who  pays  five  per 


140  THE    CORN    LAWS. 

cent,  on  his  tea,  sugar,  and  tobacco,  to  pay  the  planters, 
is  as  surely  oppressed  and  defrauded  as  was  the  negro, 
although  not  to  the  same  extent.  No  man  in  the 
world,  and  no  association  in  the  world,  could  ever  have 
an  equitable  right  to  tax  a  laborer  for  the  purpose  of 
remunerating  a  man-robber ;  and,  although  the  meas- 
ure is  now  passed  and  done  with,  we  very  much  ques- 
tion whether  some  analogous  cases  will  not  be  cleared 
up  by  the  mass  of  the  nation  ere  many  years  pass  over 
the  heads  of  Englishmen.  When  the  question  of 
landed  property  comes  to  a  definite  discussion,  there 
may  be  little  thought  of  compensation. 

The  other  instance  of  a  great  and  successful  combi- 
nation, in  which  knowledge  and  reason  triumphed  over 
the  law,  the  government,  and  the  privileged  classes  of 
the  country,  was  recently  exhibited  in  the  repeal  of 
the  corn  laws. 

The  case  of  the  corn  laws  appears  to  have  been  this. 
The  seller  of  the  raw  material  being  the  official  gov- 
ernor of  the  country,  enacted  a  statute  to  enhance  the 
price  of  the  manufactured  product,  thereby  obtaining 
for  himself,  in  his  private  capacity,  a  higher  price  from 
the  manufacturer  for  his  raw  material.* 

The  seller  of  the  raw  material  was  the  land  owner, 
and  the  raw  material  sold  (or  rented  for  a  longer  or 
shorter  period)  was  the  productive  power  of  the  land. 

The  manufacturer  and  retail  merchant  was  the 
farmer,  the  article  manufactured  and  sold  was  corn, 
and  the  consumer  was  the  mass  of  the  population. 

The  farmer,  in  taking  a  farm,  has  three  great  sub- 

*  See  note  A,  Appendix. 


THE    CORN    LAWS.  141 

jects  to  consider:  1st.  The  quantity  of  produce.  2d. 
The  probable  price  of  produce.  3d.  Amount  of  rent.* 
The  first  question  which  the  would-be  farmer  has  to 
answer  is,  "  Can  he  make  a  profit  by  taking  land  from 
the  land  owner,  and  selling  corn  to  the  consumer  ? " 
This  question  he  has  to  answer  by  a  comparison  of 
the  whole  expense  with  the  whole  value  of  produce. 
And  first,  in  current  agriculture,  (that  is,  agriculture 
divested  of  the  extraneous  expense  of  draining,  build- 
ing, &c.,  which  come  under  the  head  of  improvement 
of  the  farm,  and  not  mere  cultivation,)  a  given  farm  is 
estimated  to  produce  a  certain  average  quantity  of 
grain.  This  quantity  is  the  first  item  to  be  considered, 
as  it  is  the  basis  of  all  future  calculation.  A  certain 
portion  of  this  quantity  is  requisite  for  consumption, 
and  the  remainder  is  marketable.  The  marketable  por- 
tion, being  the  real  merchandise  which  the  farmer  buys 
and  retails  again,  must  always  be  assumed  at  a  cer- 
tain value  in  the  terms  of  the  price  paid  for  it.  What- 
ever price  the  farmer  pays  for  his  marketable  corn,  he 
must  expect,  on  the  first  principle  of  commerce,  to 
receive  a  larger  price  (in  the  same  terms)  from  the 
consumer.     This   larger  price  is  the  whole   ultimate 

*  The  expense  of  producing  (exclusive  of  rent)  we  do  not  take 
into  consideration,  as  that  on  any  given  farm  is  not  subject  to  such 
fluctuation  as  either  to  "  make  or  break  "  the  farmer.  Experimental 
farmers  may,  of  course,  ruin  themselves  by  a  bad  investment  in 
labor,  &c. ;  but  the  expense  of  improvement  should  be  distinguished 
from  the  expense  of  current  cultivation ;  and  we  believe  that  the 
latter  expense  may,  in  the  matter  of  the  com  laws,  be  assumed  as 
a  fixed  quantity,  although,  in  reality,  varying  with  the  value  of 
money  where  money  wages  are  paid,  and  with  the  value  of  produce 
where  the  laborers  are  fed. 


142  Till:    CORN    LAWS. 

object  of  the  farmer,  and,  provided  it  is  sufficient,  he 
is  satisfied.  To  him  it  makes  no  possible  difference 
what  the  real  price  paid  or  obtained  is,  provided  the 
proportion  between  them  be  such  as  to  leave  a  suffi- 
cient balance  in  his  favor.  "What  he  wants  is  profit, 
and,  provided  he  makes  a  sufficient  profit,  it  matters 
little  to  him  how  that  profit  comes. 

Our  object  in  making  these  remarks  is  to  show  that 
the  absolute  amount  of  rent  paid  by  the  farmer  is 
really  a  matter  of  indifference  to  him.  If  all  the  rents 
in  the  country  were  suddenly  to  be  doubled,  or  in- 
creased tenfold,  it  would  not  injure  the  farmer,  pro- 
vided the  price  of  his  marketable  grain  were  to  increase 
in  such  a  proportion  as  to  leave  him  the  same  real 
profit.  His  condition  would  be  exactly  the  same  as  at 
present;  he  would  be  neither  richer  nor  poorer,  nor 
would  he  know  the  difference,  except  in  the  nominal 
value  of  his  rent  and  produce. 

The  fluctuating  quantities  on  which  the  farmer  de- 
pends are  price  of  grain  and  rent.  Assuming  that  he 
has  calculated  or  estimated  the  average  marketable 
quantity  of  corn  for  the  currency  of  his  lease,  he  then 
depends  on  the  relation  between  his  rent  and  the  price 
of  grain.  If  the  price  of  grain  be  high,  his  rent  may 
be  high ;  if  low,  his  rent  must  be  low,  to  leave  him  a 
sufficient  profit,  which  is  all  he  has  to  contend  for. 

This,  then,  appears  to  have  been  the  essence  of  the 
corn  laws.  At  the  price  at  which  corn  would  be  sold 
in  the  English  market,  provided  that  market  were  open 
to  all  the  world,  the  farmer  could  only  pay  a  certain 
rent  for  land  ;  hut,  provided  all  foreign  competition 
was  excluded  up  to  a  given  point,  the  farmer  could 


THE    CORN    LAWS.  143 

afford  to  pay  a  much  higher  rent  for  land,  and  yet  de- 
rive the  same  real  profit. 

To  a  country,  however,  that  produces  quite  suffi- 
cient corn  for  the  consumption  of  its  inhabitants,  a 
tax  on  foreign  corn  is  of  little  moment ;  and  it  is  only 
when  the  home  produce  is  insufficient,  or  barely  suffi- 
cient for  the  demand,  that  the  influence  of  the  tax  is 
felt,  and  then  its  operation  is  neither  more  nor  less 
than  starving  the  inhabitants  into  paying  a  higher 
price  than  Nature  would  have  supplied  them  at. 

When,  however,  we  turn  to  the  class  by  whom  the 
corn  tax  was  imposed,  and  find  that,  so  far  from  being 
disinterested  legislators,  they  were  in  reality  the  land 
owners  —  the  wholesale  merchants  of  the  raw  material 
—  the  tax  assumes  another  form,  and  becomes,  in  fact, 
a  tax  to  produce  more  rent  through  the  pressure  of 
starvation.  Not  that  people  would  in  reality  starve, 
but  that  they  would  escape  the  pressure  of  starvation 
by  giving  more  for  food,  which  more  would  pass 
through  the  pocket  of  the  farmer  into  that  of  the  land 
owner. 

The  ostensible  reason  advanced  (and  perhaps  sin- 
cerely by  some)  for  the  imposition  of  the  corn  laws, 
was  the  encouragement  of  agriculture;  that  is,  the 
putting  money  into  the  pockets  of  agriculturists.  But 
the  laws  were  found  at  last  to  be  eminently  detri- 
mental to  the  farmer,  (on  account  of  the  fluctuations  of 
price,)  as  well  as  ruinous  to  another  class  of  which  we 
have  not  spoken;  namely,  the  manufacturers  and 
manufacturing  artisans  of  the  country,  who  now  form 
the  largest  portion  of  the  population.  The  farmer  was 
deluded  into  the  idea  of  obtaining  a  high  price  for 


144  THE    CORN    LAWS. 

corn,  and  naturally  gave,  or  stipulated  to  give,  a  high 
price  for  land.  The  evil  was  unseen  in  its  real  malig- 
nity, until  it  pleased  God,  in  the  bounty  of  his  provi- 
dence, to  send  such  abundant  harvests,  (1835,  1836,) 
that  the  corn  tax  was  defeated.  The  farmers  were 
then  reduced  to  sell  at  a  natural  price,  while  they  had 
to  pay  a  taxation  rent,  and  of  course  they  felt  the 
weight  of  that  system  of  legislation  which  attempted 
to  amend  the  order  of  Providence,  and  on  which,  with 
all  its  nice  adjustments,  the  landed  legislators  had  des- 
canted so  wisely. 

The  low  price  of  corn  at  that  period  let  the  manu- 
facturers into  a  secret ;  they  obtained  great  sums  of 
money,  and  with  the  money  obtained  what  was  of 
more  value  to  the  country  —  they  obtained  knowledge. 
They  were  taught  that  their  commercial  prosperity 
depended,  in  a  great  measure,  on  the  low  price  of  corn 
in  Britain ;  and  a  very  cursory  consideration  may  ex- 
plain how  this  happens.  Let  us  suppose  that  there 
are  five  millions  of  the  laboring  population,  who  have 
a  gross  income  of  from  10s.  or  12s.  to  30s.  or  40s.  per 
week.  The  laborer,  out  of  his  income,  has  to  provide 
the  three  great  requisites  —  food,  shelter,  and  raiment; 
and,  even  at  the  best  and  most  prosperous  of  times, 
his  earnings  are  not  much  more  than  sufficient  to  pro- 
cure these  in  decent  abundance.  Now,  let  any  suppo- 
sition whatever  be  made  with  regard  to  the  rise  or  fall 
of  wages,  and  the  rise  or  fall  of  the  price  of  corn,  it  is 
evident  that  the  manufacturers  of  Great  Britain  must 
be  injured  by  a  high  price  of  corn.  For,  first,  let  it  be 
granted  that  wages  rise  with  the  price  of  corn,  (which 
is  certainly  not  the  case,)  then  the  expense  of  manu- 


THE    CORN    LAWS.  145 

facturing  increases  on  account  of  the  increase  of 
wages,  and  the  foreign  market  is  supplied  with  dear 
goods  —  that  is,  (for  in  commerce  it  is  much  the  same 
thing,)  the  foreign  sales  must  decrease  on  account  of 
the  rise  in  price.  The  difference  of  a  few  pence  may- 
stop  the  sale  of  a  certain  description  of  goods ;  and 
stopping  the  sale  stops  the  manufacture,  the  manufac- 
turer's profit,  and  the  employment  of  the  artisans. 
But,  second,  let  us  ask  how  the  home  market  is  af- 
fected by  a  great  rise  or  fall  in  the  price  of  corn,  while 
wages  remain  nearly  the  same,  as  in  reality  they  do, 
with  the  majority  of  the  laboring  population.  Let  us 
suppose  that  wheat  is  at  40s.  per  quarter,  and  that  a 
laborer's  family  consumes  4s.  worth  of  bread  per  week. 
He  then  has  the  remainder  of  his  week's  income  to 
dispose  of  in  the  purchase  of  his  other  requisites. 
But  let  wheat  rise  to  80s.  per  quarter,  and  he  must 
then  expend  8s.  per  week  for  the  same  quantity  of 
bread  that  he  previously  purchased  for  4s.  We  have 
here  a  difference  of  4s.  per  week ;  and  the  question  is, 
What  does  the  laborer  do  with  those  4s.  when  bread 
is  cheap  ?  The  answer  is  very  simple  —  he  spends  it 
with  the  manufacturer.  He  wants  a  coat,  and  a  hat, 
and  shoes,  and  hose,  and  shirts ;  and  his  wife  wants  a 
gown  and  a  bonnet ;  and  the  children  want  frocks  and 
pinafores ;  and  the  bed  would  be  the  better  for  an  ex- 
tra blanket  or  two,  and  some  sheets.  Nor  is  this  all : 
the  little  furniture  of  his  home  wants  replenishing; 
the  knives  and  forks  are  too  few,  and  the  children 
exceed  the  spoons.  The  plates  and  dishes  which  were 
broken  in  the  dear  times  could  not  then  be  replaced ; 
but  now,  when  corn  is  cheap,  visions  of  a  new  set  flit 
13 


146  THE    CORN    LAWS. 

before  the  imagination  of  the  thrifty  housewife.  Per- 
haps even  a  clock  is  purchased,  and  it  is  most  likely 
that  some  addition  will  be  made  to  the  little  stock  of 
books.  The  laborer  is  at  ease  in  his  circumstances, 
because  he  has  this  little  revenue  of  4s.  a  week  to 
come  and  go  on.  It  is  true,  he  must  lay  it  out  care- 
fully ;  but  then  how  different  to  have  it  to  think  about, 
instead  of  having  it  screwed  out  of  him  by  a  crying 
pressure  for  food !  "When  he  has  it,  he  feels  himself  a 
free  man  ;  he  has  a  new  social  and  domestic  existence ; 
he  is  a  buyer  from  choice,  not  from  necessity  ;  and  the 
family  deliberations  as  to  how  it  shall  be  spent,  give  a 
new  interest  to  the  hours  he  spends  at  home.  All  goes 
on  merrily,  and  old  England  is  worth  all  the  countries 
under  the  sun. 

Let  us  take  even  a  moderate  estimate  of  this  4s.  a 
week,  and  we  shall  see  how  vast  a  sum  it  amounts  to 
in  the  course  of  a  year.  Suppose  that  five  millions 
have  it  to  spend,  and  that  those  five  millions  spend  £10 
with  the  manufacturers.  Fifty  millions  sterling  arising 
from  the  difference  in  the  price  of  corn !  Had  the  corn 
laws  operated  according  to  the  intentions  of  land  pro- 
prietors, and  kept  wheat  at  80s.  in  the  year  1836,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  they  would  have  de- 
prived the  laboring  population  of  fifty  millions'  worth 
of  goods,  and  the  manufacturers  of  fifty  millions'  worth 
of  sales,  as  directly  as  if  those  fifty  millions  had  been 
wrested  by  violence  from  the  laborer ;  but  this  is  one 
of  the  facts  which  the  indirect  system  of  taxation  is 
employed  to  conceal.* 

*  Since  writing  the  above,  we  have  seen  the  following  notice  of 


REPEAL  OF  THE  CORN  LAWS.  147 

The  repeal  of  the  corn  laws  was  effected  by  a  great 
combination  of  knowledge  and  reason  —  such,  perhaps, 
as  we  might  look  for  in  vain  in  the  history  of  any  other 
European  country.  Certain  individuals  found  that 
their  lawful  interests  were  seriously  injured  by  the  in- 
terference of  the  enactments,  and  they  resolved  to 
make  an  effort  for  the  abolition  of  those  enactments. 
Of  themselves  they  were  utterly  powerless,  and  all 
their  individual  exertions  would  have  been  ineffectual 
to  achieve  their  end.  They  had,  however,  knowledge 
and  reason  on  their  side ;  that  is,  they  were  in  posses- 
sion of  certain  facts,  which  led  by  necessary  inference 
to  the  conclusion,  that  the  corn  laws  were  eminently 
prejudicial  in  their  operation,  and  that,  therefore,  the 
corn  laws  should  no  longer  be  allowed  to  exist.     Con- 

the  "  prosperous  state  of  the  kingdom,"  A.  D.  1836,  in  Wade's  ex- 
cellent "  British  History,  chronologically  arranged : "  — 

"  At  the  close  of  the  past,  and  commencement  of  the  present 
year,  the  United  Kingdom  exhibited  unusual  signs  of  internal  con- 
tentment and  general  prosperity.  With  the  exception  of  partial 
depression  of  agriculture,  all  the  great  branches  of  national  indus- 
try were  unusually  prosperous.  In  the  great  clothing  districts  of 
Yorkshire  and  Lancashire,  the  times  were  never  known  to  be  more 
favorable.  In  spite  of  the  great  development  of  the  cotton  trade, 
it  still  continued  to  expand,  and  its  utmost  bounds  seemed  illimita- 
ble. It  was  the  same  with  the  woollen  manufacturers  of  Leeds  and 
Huddersfield,  the  stuff  manufacture  of  Bradford  and  Halifax,  the 
linen  manufacture  of  Barnsley  and  Knaresborough,  the  blanket  and 
flannel  manufactures  of  Dewsbury  and  Rochdale ;  they  were  all 
thriving.  Even  in  the  silk  trade  of  Macclesfield,  Coventry,  and 
Spitalfield  there  were  no  complaints,  no  more  than  in  the  lace 
trades  of  Nottingham,  Derby,  and  Leicester.  The  potteries  of 
Staffordshire  continued  prosperous,  and  the  iron  trade  in  all  its 
branches  was  unusually  flourishing." 


148  RBfBAL    or    Till:    COHN    LAWS. 

scious  that  they  had  truth  on  their  side,  they  came 
fearlessly  before  the  nation,  and  staked  their  cause  on 
the  power  of  truth  to  convince  the  mass  of  the  popu- 
lation. They  lectured,  and  published,  and  spoke,  and 
argued,  all  for  one  specific  end ;  namely,  to  communi- 
cate knowledge  to  the  nation,  and  thereby  to  make  the 
nation  change  its  credence  on  the  subject  of  the  corn 
laws.  The  truth  gradually  prevailed  ;  that  is,  was  gen- 
erally disseminated  ;  that  is,  the  same  knowledge  was 
received  by  a  larger  number  of  individuals,  who  natu- 
rally drew  the  same  necessary  inference.  A  great 
combination  was  formed,  such  as  must  ever  remajn 
one  of  the  historic  glories  of  Britain  and  of  Britons. 
It  was  essentially  a  combination  of  knowledge  and 
reason  ;  and  well-grounded  argument  was  the  only 
weapon  with  which  it  maintained  the  contest.  Far 
more  was  involved  than  a  mere  change  in  the  econom- 
ical laws  of  the  kingdom ;  it  was  a  contest  between 
the  two  great  classes  of  British  society  —  the  unpriv- 
ileged laborers  and  the  privileged  land  owners.  The 
privileged  classes,  almost  to  a  man,  were  against  the 
change;  and  they  also,  on  their  side,  endeavored  to 
establish  a  combination — a  combination  of  class  in- 
terest, in  which  the  only  available  argument  was  the 
pecuniary  interest  of  the  order.  The  exertions  made 
by  the  anti-corn-law  party  to  convince  the  judgment 
of  the  nation  were  prodigious;  and  never  had  any 
political  agitation  so  much  the  appearance  of  instruct- 
ing, and  so  little  the  appearance  of  exciting  the  pas- 
sions. Instead  of  the  vague  harangues  of  noisy  and 
designing  demagogues,  there  was  the  sober  communi- 
cation of  information  which  would  have  been  interest- 


THE    SLAVE    LAWS    AND    THE    CORN    LAWS.  149 

Ing  and  instructive,  even  had  it  been  altogether  uncon- 
nected with  the  great  practical  consequence.  The 
nation  was  convinced  at  last ;  and  notwithstanding  all 
the  influence  of  the  aristocracy,  and  all  the  unwilling- 
ness of  the  government,  the  laws  were  repealed,  and 
as  there  is  every  reason  to  suppose,  abolished  forever. 

In  these  two  cases  (the  abolition  of  negro  slavery 
and  the  repeal  of  the  corn  laws)  we  have  an  illustra- 
tion of  some  of  the  great  principles  which  are  called 
into  operation,  whenever  the  social  condition  of  the 
community  is  ameliorated  and  rendered  more  consis- 
tent with  the  dictates  of  reason  and  religion. 

1st.  The  only  action  that  is  a  political  crime,  is  a 
forcible,  fraudulent,  or  licentious  interference  of  one 
man  with  another.  Such  actions,  and  such  actions 
alone,  is  it  competent  for  any  legislature  to  prohibit, 
unless  with  the  free  consent  of  all  who  are  to  be  af- 
fected by  the  law.  Where  there  is  no  interference 
there  is  no  political  crime,  and  consequently  nothing 
which  the  legislature  can  justly  prohibit. 

2d.  Both  the  slave  laws  and  the  corn  laws  were 
a  priori  enactments,  to  prevent  men  from  doing  actions 
which  were  in  nowise  criminal.  They  were  positive 
enactments  to  restrain  and  diminish  the  natural  liberty 
of  men  who  had  infringed  no  law  of  equity,  and  who 
had  in  no  respect  injured  their  fellow-men  by  force, 
fraud,  or  licentiousness. 

3d.  The  legislators  of  the  country  were,  in  their  pri- 
vate capacity,  extensively  interested  in  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  unjust  laws ;  and  thus,  in  opposing  their 
repeal,  were  using  their  official  influence  for  their  own 
personal  advantage,  to  the  eminent  detriment  of  their 
13* 


150  THE    SLAVK    LAWS    AND    THK    CORN    LAWS. 

fellow-subjects.  Those,  therefore,  who  were  interested, 
either  as  slave  owners  or  landed  proprietors,  were 
(according  to  the  principle  that  a  man  ought  not  to 
be  judge  in  his  own  cause)  incompetent  to  sit  in  de- 
liberation on  their  repeal. 

4th.  The  institutes  of  nature,  as  established  by 
God's  providence  in  the  world,  teach  us  that  a  man 
should  labor  for  the  advantage  of  himself  and  of  his 
family ;  but  all  slave  laws  are  attempts  to  controvert 
this  principle,  and  blasphemously  to  overrule  the  order 
of  nature,  as  established  by  the  divine  Being.  All 
slave  laws  make  freedom  criminal,  and  thus  establish 
an  artificial  rule  of  morality,  which  gives  entrance  to 
every  kind  of  political  error,  and  consequently  to  every 
kind  of  political  licentiousness. 

5th.  To  transfer  corn  from  one  part  of  the  world  to 
another,  according  to  the  necessities  of  the  inhabitants, 
so  far  from  being  an  act  which  requires  restriction  or 
prohibition,  is  an  act  which  every  man  has  a  natural 
right  to  perform  for  his  own  commercial  advantage, 
and  which  no  legislature  is  competent  to  restrict  or 
prohibit,  unless  it  be  admitted  that  the  legislature 
stands  in  the  place  of  the  divine  Being,  and  that  all 
the  ordinary  acts  of  life  are  to  be  performed  only  on 
its  supreme  permission. 

6th.  Both  the  slave  and  corn  laws  were  enactments 
to  restrict  or  prohibit  men  from  performing  actions 
which  were  naturally  proper,  profitable,  and  legitimate ; 
that  is,  to  prevent  the  negro  from  laboring  for  his  own 
advantage,  and  the  trader  from  engaging  in  legitimate 
commerce ;  the  repeal  of  those  laws,  therefore,  did  not 
consist  o{  any  positive  enactment,  but  of  the  removal 


THE  SLAVE  LAWS  AND  THE  CORN  LAWS.     151 

of  legislative  interference  from  actions  which  in  them- 
selves were  naturally  legitimate.  The  abolition  of 
those  laws,  therefore,  was  only  to  allow  things  to  remain 
as  they  were  established  by  nature  ;  and  when  the  world 
discovers  that  God  has  constituted  nature  aright,  men 
will  have  arrived  at  the  first  and  greatest  principle  of 
social  science. 

7th.  The  abolition  of  the  slave  and  corn  laws  was 
only  attained  after  a  long  and  arduous  struggle ;  and 
though  horrible  iniquities  were  committed  under  the 
sanction  of  the  former,  and  great  national  detriment 
was  produced  by  the  latter;  and  though  the  nation 
was  long  convinced  of  the  propriety  of  repealing  the 
unjust  and  injurious  enactments,  the  country  was  for 
years  compelled  to  bear  the  sin  of  the  injustice,  and  to 
suffer  the  national  detriment,  because  the  legislators 
refused  to  remove  restrictions  whose  nature  was  in- 
famous, and  whose  fruits  were  evil  continually. 

8th.  The  legislature  of  Great  Britain,  so  far  from 
taking  the  initiative  in  the  repeal  of  the  slave  and 
corn  laws,  offered  every  possible  opposition  to  the 
wishes  of  the  nation ;  and  it  was  only  when  the  pres- 
sure from  without  became  so  imperative  that  further 
resistance  might  have  been  dangerous,  that  the  delib- 
erative assembly  of  the  freest  state  in  the  world 
declared  that  it  was  not  a  crime  for  a  man  with  a 
dark  skin  to  enjoy  natural  freedom,  or  for  a  trader 
to  import  corn  without  being  subject  to  a  tax  so 
enormous,  that  it  usually  operated  as  a  prohibition. 

9th.  The  slave  and  corn  laws  were  at  last  repealed, 
by  a  process  which,  we  doubt  not,  will  ultimately 
achieve  the  repeal   of  every  law   which   restricts   or 


152  THE    ARGUMENT    OF    JUSTICE. 

prohibits  actions  not  naturally  criminal  —  the  wiser  and 
better  part  of  the  nation  combined  against  the  legisla- 
ture ;  on  the  one  hand  were  knowledge,  reason,  and 
religion;  on  the  other,  prescriptive  privilege  and  the 
will  of  the  legislator. 

10th.  The  two  cases  which  we  have  adduced  repre- 
sent two  great  classes  of  cases,  against  each  of  which 
a  particular  argument  is  employed.  The  abolition 
of  slavery  was  a  question  of  justice,  (equity;)  the 
abolition  of  the  corn  laws  a  question  of  benefit, 
(economy.) 

The  argument  of  justice,  however  it  may  be  ex- 
tended and  illustrated,  may  always  be  summed  up  in 
this,  "  Refrain  from  interfering  by  fraud  or  force  with 
another;"  and,  although  no  precept  can  be  more  in 
harmony  with  the  dictates  of  natural  reason  and 
with  the  injunctions  of  divine  revelation,  it  must  be 
confessed  that  this  argument  is  among  the  least 
powerful  to  influence  men,  or  to  induce  them  to 
form  their  conduct  aright.  History  teaches  us,  that 
it  is  not  sufficient  for  men  to  know  that  an  action  or 
an  enactment  is  unjust  to  induce  them  to  abandon 
the  action,  or  to  abolish  the  enactment ;  for  this  they 
seldom  do  until  the  evidence  of  the  evil  fruits  of  the 
injustice  are  so  superabundant,  that  no  mere  sophism 
can  be  longer  held  as  an  excuse.  The  argument  of 
justice,  instead  of  being  the  most  practically  influen- 
tial, as  it  is  the  most  morally  valid,  is  seldom  of 
avail  until  backed  by  a  knowledge  of  the  economical 
evils  that  never  in  any  one  case  fail  to  accompany 
injustice;  and  though  the  voice  of  God  and  the  voice 
of  universal  reason  may  ever  be   heard  proclaiming, 


THE    ARGUMENT    OF    JUSTICE.  153 

"  Do  not  unto  others  as  ye  would  not  that  others 
should  do  unto  .you,"  it  is  not  until  some  summation 
of  evil  consequences  has  convinced  men  of  their  error, 
that  they  abandon  their  course  of  lawless  selfishness, 
and  allow  the  constitution  of  society  to  remain  on 
the  natural  footing  established  by  the  Creator.  And 
in  this  we  may  see  the  reason  why  the  political  prog- 
ress of  mankind  has  been  so  slow,  and  why  an  ex- 
tensive knowledge  of  facts  must  accompany  an 
admission  of  principles,  before  society  awakes  to  the 
necessity  of  remodelling  their  constitution,  and  re- 
turning from  the  systems  established  in  barbarous 
ages,  to  the  more  simple  and  equitable  system  which 
the  eye  of  reason  may  read  in  the  constitution  of 
harmonious  nature.  It  is  ever  immutably  and  irrevo- 
cably wrong,  that  any  man,  or  any  body  of  men 
whatever,  should  constrain  another  man,  not  a  crimi- 
nal, to  labor  for  the  advantage  of  any  save  himself 
and  his  kindred ;  yet  half  a  century  of  agitation  was 
necessary  before  England  withdrew  her  oppressing 
arm  from  the  negro;  and  then  the  negro  was  only 
emancipated  by  wresting  his  price  from  the  popula- 
tion of  Britain. 

The  argument  of  justice  may  thus  be  pure  or 
mixed ;  pure,  when  it  confines  itself  to  the  dogma, 
"  Refrain  from  interference,"  —  mixed,  when  it  col- 
lects and  exhibits  the  evil  consequences  of  interference. 
For  the  operation  of  the  pure  argument,  all  that  is 
necessary  is,  to  ascertain,  on  good  evidence,  that 
there  is  interference  (constraint,  restraint,  compulsion, 
or  evasion)  by  force  or  fraud,  and  the  dogma  is  in 
itself,  taken  alone,  a  good  and  valid  reason  for  the 


154  THE    ARGUMENT    OF    JUSTICE. 

cessation  of  the  injustice ;  for  no  man,  and  no  ma- 
jority of  men,  can  possibly,  under  ar\y  circumstances 
whatever,  have  a  right  to  interfere  by  force  or  fraud 
with  another.  But  though  the  pure  argument  is 
morally  valid,  it  is  seldom  or  never  effectual ;  knowl- 
edge as  well  as  reason  must  be  brought  to  bear  on 
society,  and  the  practical  consequences  of  injustice 
must  be  made  apparent,  before  the  mass  of  men  are 
stimulated  to  clamor  for  change.  Thus,  though  the 
reduction  of  man  to  slavery,  next  to  judicial  murder, 
be  the  highest  political  crime,  the  population  of 
Britain  —  perhaps  the  most  religious,  the  most  hu- 
mane, and  the  most  just  population  ever  assembled 
together  —  could  not  be  brought  to  emancipate  the 
negro,  until  the  horrors  of  West  Indian  iniquity  had 
been  portrayed  in  all  their  blackness,  and  until  the 
detestable  nature  of  the  system  had  been  so  exhibited 
that  men's  feelings  of  humanity  revolted,  and  the 
abolition  became  a  matter  of  moral  necessity  to  the 
nation.  The  argument  of  benefit  is  of  another  kind. 
The  argument  of  justice  proceeds  upon  the  principle 
that  certain  actions  may  not  be  done,  whatever  be 
their  consequences.  Grant  that  slavery  was  bene- 
ficial, in  a  commercial  sense,  to  Great  Britain ;  that 
the  negroes  were  better  fed  and  better  clothed,  &c,  in 
their  state  of  slavery  than  in  their  state  of  freedom,  (if 
such  a  state  be  entitled  to  that  name ;)  grant  that  all 
the  physical  advantages  were  in  favor  of  slavery ;  yet 
can  slavery  never  be  otherwise  than  contrary  to  the 
law  of  God,  a  system  of  injustice  detestable  to  all 
good  men.  Let  the  consequences  be  what  they  may, 
no  man  can  justly  make  or  keep  another  man  a  slave; 


THE  ARGUMENT  OF  BENEFIT.  155 

neither  would  any  consequences  whatever  justify  the 
deprivation  of  that  natural  liberty  with  which  the 
Creator  endows  all  men  alike.  The  argument  of 
benefit,  however,  assumes  that  the  action  itself  is  in- 
different ;  that  is,  that  it  has  not  in  itself  any  such 
moral  character  as  will  enable  us  to  pronounce  at 
once  whether  it  ought  or  ought  not  to  be  done.  Let 
us  grant  that  a  tax  upon  the  importation  of  corn  were 
beneficial  to  Great  Britain,  and  that  all  the  inhabitants 
freely  consented  to  the  imposition  of  the  tax,  there  is 
nothing  in  the  tax  itself  to  prevent  such  imposition, 
(morally,)  but  it  must  stand  or  fall  entirely  and  ex- 
clusively according  to  the  consequences  that  are  found 
to  follow  in  its  train. 

The  main  argument  advanced  against  slavery  was, 
that  it  was  unjust ;  and  this  argument  was  impressed 
on  the  population  by  a  relation  of  the  many  abomi- 
nations that  accompanied  the  system.  The  main 
argument  against  the  corn  laws  was,  that  they  were 
prejudicial  to  the  country.  They  had  been  established 
ostensibly  for  the  benefit  of  the  agriculturists ;  and  it 
was  proven,  by  a  superabundance  of  facts,  that  they 
were  in  no  wise  beneficial  to  the  cultivators  of  the 
soil,  while  they  were  notoriously  prejudicial  to  all 
the  rest  of  the  population,  except  the  thirty  or  forty 
thousand  individuals  who  hold  the  nation's  land.  As 
a  measure  of  national  economy,  they  had  wrought 
only  mischief;  they  had  embarrassed  trade,  impeded 
manufacture,  repressed  industry,  and  made  the  laborer 
pay  dear  for  his  food,  while  they  operated  at  the  same 
time  to  diminish  his  employment.  In  every  respect 
they  were  bad ;  and  because  the  nation  was  convinced 


156  MORAL    FORCE. 

they  were  bad,  the  legislators,  who  are  ever  the  last 
to  promote  beneficial  changes,  were  ultimately  obliged 
to  abolish  them,  and  to  leave  the  supply  of  the  na- 
tional food  to  that  natural  course  which  is  ever  found 
the  most  beneficial  in  the  end. 

Such  were  two  modern  instances  of  the  combina- 
tion of  knowledge  and  reason  —  spirit-stirring  ex- 
hibitions of  the  energies  of  a  noble  people  warring  for 
the  abolition  of  injustice,  and  for  the  emancipation  of 
legitimate  industry.  Nor,  however  invidious  may  be 
deemed  the  comparison,  can  we  refrain  from  asking, 
what  form  these  agitations  would  have  assumed  in 
any  other  European  country  ?  What  country  in 
Europe  could  have  presented  the  spectacle  of  a  calm 
and  resolute  combination  of  a  large  portion  of  the 
inhabitants  against  the  laws  of  the  land?  What 
country  in  Europe  could  have  carried  on  so  much 
agitation  without  a  breach  of  the  public  peace,  or 
without  riot  and  confusion  ?  In  France,  there  might 
have  been  a  revolution ;  in  Italy,  a  secret  combination, 
bound  with  oaths  on  death's-heads  and  cross-bones; 
in  Russia,  an  assassination  of  the  autocrat ;  in  Spain, 
an  insurrection  only  more  wicked  than  contemptible  ; 
but  in  no  country,  except  Great  Britain,  could  such 
great  changes  in  the  law  be  procured,  by  the  mass  of 
the  population  first  ascertaining  what  was  correct, 
and  then  patiently  waiting  till  the  power  of  truth  had 
convinced  the  legislators  that  the  desired  change  was 
good,  and  for  the  benefit  of  mankind.  France,  not- 
withstanding all  her  revolutions,  has  yet  to  learn  the 
practical  operation  of  a  moral  power;  and  until  she 
masters   this   most    essential    element    of    peaceal>l<* 


THE    END    OF    PROGRESSION.  157 

progression,  the  sword  must  be  the  umpire  between 
the  rulers  and  the  ruled. 

Notwithstanding  the  length  of  our  argument  con- 
cerning the  combination  of  knowledge  and  reason,  we 
shall  not  consider  it  too  lengthened,  if  it  in  any  wise 
contributes  to  elucidate  those  means  that  must  be  put 
ifi  operation  for  advancing  the  political  progress  of 
mankind.  It  is  the  greatest  possible  absurdity  to  sup- 
pose that  all  the  changes  that  take  place  in  the  politi- 
cal condition  of  societies  are  only  portions  of  a  rou- 
tine which,  when  fulfilled,  is  to  commence  again,  and 
again  to  present  the  same  phases,  and  the  same  or 
analogous  phenomena.  No  ;  the  political  progress  of 
mankind  is  a  passage  to  one  definite  end,  to  an  ulti- 
matum, to  a  condition  that  requires  no  further  change, 
to  a  stable  system  of  law  that  does  not  demand  per- 
petual deliberation,  but  only  perpetual  administration  ; 
and  the  great  question  for  the  political  world  is,  "  What 
is  that  end  ?  What  is  that  system  ?  What  is  that 
ultimatum  ?  "  What,  in  fact,  is  the  political  condition 
of  society  that  controverts  no  principle  of  reason,  and 
sins  against  no  precept  of  religion  ?  for  this,  we  may 
rest  assured,  is  the  ultimate  end  towards  which  all  civ- 
ilized societies  must  progress. 

No  man  for  a  moment  can  hesitate  to  pronounce,  or 
to  prophesy  with  unlimited  assurance,  that  the  negroes 
in  the  slave  states  of  America  will  ultimately  obtain 
their  freedom,  and  that  the  serfs  of  Russia  will  ulti- 
mately be  emancipated.  The  future  history  of  Russia 
may  be  read  in  the  present  history  of  France  and  Eng- 
land ;  and  this,  not  on  account  of  the  propagation  of 
14 


158  ORIGIN    OF    PROGRESS. 

French  or  English  ideas,  but  because  the  substantive 
element  —  man  —  is  the  same  in  both  cases,  and  his 
progress  in  every  country  in  the  world  must  be  charac- 
terized by  the  same  abstract  phenomena,  whatever 
may  be  the  concrete  or  real  occurrences  under  which 
the  abstract  principles  happen  to  be  developed. 

The  progress  of  the  European  nations  is  a  progress 
from  serfdom  and  lordship  towards  freedom ;  that  is, 
a  progress  from  inequality  towards  equality.  And 
although  some  of  the  newer  states  appear  to  overleap 
many  of  the  intermediate  steps  through  which  the 
older  societies  have  passed,  it  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  the  newer  states  have  merely  borrowed  from  the 
older,  and  adopted  such  improvements  as  the  new 
foundation  of  a  state  rendered  possible  under  the 
given  circumstances.  Thus  the  North  Americans  did 
not,  by  their  declaration  of  independence,  advance 
themselves  from  a  condition  of  semi-barbarism  to  a 
highly  equitable  system  of  political  rule ;  but  having 
to  found  a  new  state,  they  adopted  the  best  principles 
which  had  been  gradually,  and  during  the  course  of 
many  centuries,  developing  in  Europe ;  at  the  same 
time  making  such  further  progress  towards  equality  as 
the  occasion  of  commencing  a  state  naturally  afforded 
opportunity  for. 

The  real  history  of  political  progress  commences 
only  at  that  period  where  the  maximum  of  disparity 
between  the  various  orders  or  classes  begins  to  be  sys- 
tematically diminished.  From  this  point  (which  is 
chronologically  different  in  the  various  countries)  there 
is  a  natural  course  of  progress,  different  in  the  out- 


MEANS    OF    PROGRESS.  159 

ward  circumstances  of  its  manifestation,  but  essen- 
tially the  same  in  its  abstract  characters,  in  every 
country  that  achieves  civilization.  The  essence  of  this 
progress  is  the  gradual  emancipation  of  the  rights  of 
the  serf  or  unprivileged  laborer,  and  the  corresponding 
diminution  of  the  privileges  of  the  lord.  Now  it  may 
be  observed,  that  the  great  revolutions  which  take 
place  in  the  earlier  portions  of  this  progress  are  phys- 
ical force  revolutions,  —  changes  brought  about  by  the 
sword,  because  there  are  no  other  means  sufficiently 
powerful  to  effect  them.  Nor  is  it  difficult  to  see  why 
this  must  be  the  case.  In  the  earlier  stages  of  society, 
force  and  privilege  rule  —  not  reason  and  equity  ;  and 
as  those  who  have  the  privileges  will  not  abandon 
them,  those  who  suffer  the  oppression  must  resort  to 
the  only  influence  whose  authority  is  acknowledged. 
Were  the  privileged  classes  to  admit  reason  as  the 
umpire,  there  would  be  no  necessity  for  force  revolu- 
tions ;  but  as  the  changes  come  to  be  necessary,  they 
must  be  achieved  by  such  means  as  will  affect  them, 
however  undesirable  it  may  be  that  such  means  should 
be  necessary.  We  can  have  little  hesitation  in  assert- 
ing, that  the  changes  brought  about  in  the  political 
condition  of  the  people  of  France  by  the  first  French 
revolution,  were  imperatively  necessary;  that  is,  that 
the  condition  of  France  was  such  that  those  changes 
must  take  place,  independently  of  the  mere  will  of  any 
individual,  because  such  changes  were  the  necessary 
consequences  of  such  a  condition.  The  means,  to  a 
certain  extent,  might  be  within  the  control  of  the  act- 
ors;  but  the  end  —  the  change  in  the  political  condi- 
tion of  the  people  —  must   have   followed   from   the 


160  PROPOSITIONS    ON 

operation  of  those  general  laws  that  regulate  the  polit- 
ical progress  of  mankind.* 

When,  however,  a  nation  has  made  some  political 
progress,  and  its  despotism  has  become  relaxed ;  or,  in 
other  words,  when  some  degree  of  liberty  has  been 
attained  by  the  mass  of  the  population  —  a  revolution 
by  physical  force  (which  is  always  attended  with  lam- 
entable evils)  may  be  obviated  or  rendered  unneces- 
sary. Where  liberty  has  made  a  real  progress,  knowl- 
edge must  have  made  a  real  progress;  and  where 
knowledge  has  progressed,  reason  becomes  as  powerful 
an  agent  as  force,  and  one  which  ought  ever  to  be 
chosen,  if  the  alternative  be  in  our  choice. 

To  conclude  our  argument  with  regard  to  the  com- 
bination of  knowledge  and  reason,  we  lay  down  the 
following  propositions  :  — 

1st.  On  the  sure  word  of  divine  prophecy,  we  antici- 
pate a  reign  of  justice  on  the  earth. 

2d.  That  a  reign  of  justice  necessarily  implies  that 
every  man  in  the  world  shall,  at  some  future  time,  be 
put  in  possession  of  all  his  rights. 

3d.  That  the  history  of  civilized  communities  shows 
us,  that  the  progression  of  mankind  in  a  political  as- 
pect is,  from  a  diversity  of  privileges  towards  an  equal- 
ity of  rights. 

4th.  That  one  man  can  have  a  privilege  only  by 
depriving  another  man,  or  many  other  men,  of  a  por- 
tion of  their  rights.  Consequently,  that  a  reign  of 
justice  will  consist  in  the  destruction  of  every  privi- 
lege, and  in  the  restitution  of  every  right. 

*  See  note  B,  Appendix. 


THE    OPERATION    OF    KNOWLEDGE.     '  161 

5th.  That,  under  the  supreme  direction  of  divine 
Providence,  man  is  the  agent  employed  in  working  out 
his  own  political  well-being. 

6th.  That  man  cannot  work  out  his  political  well- 
being  unless  he  knows  wherein  that  well-being 
consists. 

Knowledge,  therefore,  is  necessary  to  enable  man  to 
work  out  his  political  well-being. 

7th.  That  men  must  know  correctly  before  they  can 
act  correctly. 

8th.  That  the  political  well-being  of  mankind  in- 
volves two  things  —  correct  knowledge  and  correct 
action.  Correct  action  is  knowledge  carried  into  prac- 
tical operation. 

9th.  That  the  political  regeneration  of  mankind  is 
dependent  on  the  acquisition  and  promulgation  of 
political  knowledge. 

10th.  That  in  the  laws  which  should  regulate  man's 
political  action,  there  is  a  truth  and  a  falsehood,  as 
much  as  there  is  a  truth  and  a  falsehood  in  matters  of 
geometric  or  astronomic  science. 

11th.  That  the  political  condition  of  men  can  never 
be  what  it  ought  to  be,  until  men  have  acquired  the 
requisite  knowledge  ;  that  is,  until  they  have  perfected 
political  science,  and  reduced  it  to  the  same  form  and 
ordination  as  any  of  the  other  sciences. 

12th.  That,  with  the  perfection  of  political  science, 
there  will  necessarily  follow  an  amended  order  of  po- 
litical action,  and  consequently  an  amended  condition 
of  society. 

13th.  That  political  knowledge  is  divided  into  two 
distinct  branches.  First  A  sensational  branch  which 
14* 


162  PROPOSITIONS    ON 

furnishes  us  with  the  facts  of  man's  condition,  and  the 
actual  results  of  human  action.  Second.  A  rational 
branch,  which  furnishes  us  with  the  principles  that 
ought  to  regulate  human  action. 

The  first  is  political  economy ;  the  second  is  politics, 
or  the  science  of  equity. 

14th.  That  the  actual  political  condition  of  no 
country  in  the  world  is  the  practical  illustration  of  the 
propositions  of  political  truth.  Consequently,  that  the 
actual  political  condition  of  every  country  in  the  world 
requires  to  be  revised  and  amended. 

15th.  That  improvements  in  the  political  condition 
of  a  country  are  made  exactly  in  proportion  as  the 
truths  of  political  economy  and  political  science  are 
reduced  to  practice. 

16th.  That  in  every  country  there  are  privileged 
classes  who  have  more  power  or  more  property  than 
they  are  justly  entitled  to,  and  unprivileged  classes 
who  have  less  power  or  less  property  than  they  are 
justly  entitled  to.  That  the  difference  between  these 
two  classes  has  been  undergoing  a  gradual  but  sure 
process  of  diminution.  This  fact  we  learn  from 
history. 

17th.  That  the  further  progress  of  the  diminution  in 
the  difference  between  the  privileged  and  unprivileged 
classes,  may  be  surely  anticipated  as  the  continuation 
of  a  process  that  has  already  been  going  on  for 
centuries. 

18th.  That  the  absolute  equality  of  men  in  all  po- 
litical rights  is  the  ultimate  end  of  political  progres- 
sion. That  so  long  as  there  is  not  absolute  equality 
of  political   rights,  there   is  the  constant  element  of 


THE    OPERATION    OF    KNOWLEDGE.  163 

further  change,  and  consequently  good  reason  for  an- 
ticipating further  change. 

19th.  That  while  a  single  individual  may  or  may 
not  determine  his  actions  according  to  his  knowledge, 
(for  man  is  erring,)  the  constitution  of  humanity  in 
the  mass  necessarily  determines,  that  wherever  knowl- 
edge is  obtained,  systematically  ordinated,  and  gen- 
erally diffused,  an  amended  order  of  action  will  inva- 
riably result. 

20th.  That  the  theory  of  political  progress  is,  — 

1.  The  present  condition  is  felt  to  be  grievous,  and 
seen  by  the  intellect  to  be  partial  and  unjust. 

2.  The  present  condition,  wThen  translated  into  lan- 
guage, furnishes  a  proposition  which  will  not  bear  the 
investigation  of  the  reason,  and  which  is  consequently 
rejected  as  superstitious  or  erroneous. 

3.  With  the  condemnation  of  the  proposition,  of 
which  the  present  condition  of  society  (at  any  given 
period)  is  only  a  real  exemplification,  there  necessarily 
follows  the  condemnation  of  that  condition,  and  a 
desire  for  change  is  necessarily  generated. 

4.  But,  in  course  of  time,  a  new  proposition  is  dis- 
covered or  suggested,  and  this  proposition,  if  it  will 
stand  the  investigation  of  the  reason,  is  posited  as  true, 
that  is,  classed  as  a  portion  of  knowledge. 

5.  The  proposition  which  is  true,  is  then  translated 
into  a  practical  rule  of  action,  and  from  this  practical 
rule  of  action  there  would  necessarily  result  a  certain 
condition  of  society  different  from  that  condition  which 
had  been  condemned  as  erroneous. 

6.  The  new  condition  of  society  is  then  posited  as 
an  end  to  be  attained,  as  a  thing  to  be  striven  for,  in  a 
free  country  by  the  power  of  well-grounded  argument 


164  PROPOSITIONS    ON 

and  social  combination,  and  under  a  despotism  by  the 
power  of  the  sword  and  the  convulsion  of  revolution. 

7.  But  as  the  old  condition  necessarily  involves  the 
interests  of  some  parties,  (placemen,  slave  owners, 
land  owners,  for  instance,)  the  transition  from  the  old 
condition,  which  was  erroneous,  to  the  new  and 
amended  condition,  is  always  the  cause  of  a  social 
struggle  between  the  partisans  of  the  old  condition 
and  the  partisans  of  the  new. 

8.  This  social  struggle  may  assume  two  forms,  ac- 
cording to  the  nature  of  the  question  in  dispute,  and 
according  to  the  character  of  the  political  institutions 
of  the  country  where  it  takes  place.  (1.)  If  change 
be  sought  in  a  country  where  there  are  no  legal  and 
constitutional  means  whereby  the  masses  of  the  pop- 
ulation may  obtain  that  change,  the  sword  must  ne- 
cessarily be  resorted  to,  and  a  physical  force  revolution, 
so  far  from  being  a  crime,  is  one  of  the  highest  politi- 
cal duties  of  man.*     (2.)  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  change 


#  We  must  distinctly  reiterate  that  we  speak  only  of  political 
duty,  whose  only  rule  is  the  law  of  justice,  as  developed  in  the 
propositions  of  political  science.  Man's  religious  duty  we  do  not 
profess  to  teach.  Politics  has  this  world,  and  this  world  alone,  for 
its  sphere  of  action ;  and  the  sword  (that  is,  compulsion)  is  the  in- 
strument whereby  all  should  be  compelled  to  adhere  to  the  strictest 
rules  of  equal  and  even-handed  justice.  Justice  neither  gives  nor 
forgives,  bears  nor  forbears.  Religion,  on  the  contrary,  introduces 
a  higher  and  a  divine  principle  of  action,  which  may  enjoin  a  man 
to  refrain  from  the  forcible  assertion  of  his  rights,  and  rather  to 
bear  an  ill  than  to  redress  it  by  the  sword.  Man,  as  man,  is  uni- 
versally bound  by  the  laws  of  justice,  and  may  universally  carry 
those  laws  into  operation ;  but  man,  as  a  Christian,  is  bound  by  the 
laws  of  Scripture,  and  must  regulate  his  conduct  by  the  precepts 
of  divine  revelation. 


THE    OPERATION    OF    KNOWLEDGE.  165 

be  sought  iii  a  country  that  has  attained  to  liberty  of 
discussion,  a  free  press,  a  tolerably  extensive  represen- 
tation, &c,  (that  is,  where  deliberative  judgment  and 
not  mere  will  rules,)  the  sword  (always  an  evil,  though 
sometimes  necessary)  may  be  superseded  by  the  moral 
force  of  truth.  Knowledge  disseminated  will  convince 
the  masses,  and  when  the  masses  are  convinced,  they 
will  combine,  and  when  they  combine,  the  change, 
sooner  or  later,  will  follow  as  a  necessary  consequence. 

9.  We  have  said,  however,  that  the  nature  of  the 
question,  as  well  as  the  character  of  the  political  institU' 
tions,  may  determine  the  character  of  the  social  strug- 
gle. A  country  may  be  possessed  of  much  freedom, 
and  yet  there  may  remain  some  questions  which  moral 
force  is  incapable  of  deciding.  The  interests  involved 
may  be  of  such  magnitude,  or  the  questions  may  en- 
tail such  radical  changes  in  the  very  constitution  of 
the  state,  that  no  legal  means  whatever  may  exist  for 
bringing  about  the  change.  When,  therefore,  the  mass 
of  the  population  have  resolved  that  the  change  shall 
take  place,  and  there  exist  no  legal  means  for  effecting 
it,  or  when  those  in  official  authority  positively  refuse 
to  make  the  change,  even  when  its  necessity  is  appar- 
ent to  the  nation,  the  sword  must  be  the  umpire  as 
between  two  parties  who  have  severed  all  political 
connection,  and  are  openly  at  war. 

10.  But  even  where  a  temporary  appeal  to  the  sword 
may  be  requisite,  because  there  are  no  other  means 
capable  of  removing  the  barriers  that  stand  in  the  way 
of  political  progress,  the  sword  is  the  mere  instrument 
employed  to  effect  a  change  which  could  not  be 
effected  without  its  aid.     Where  knowledge  has  ex 


166 


PROPOSITIONS    ON 


hibited  the  malignant  character  of  the  present  condi- 
tion, and  reason  has  shown  how  that  condition  may- 
be amended,  the  change  must  come  as  a  necessary 
consequence  of  man's  constitution.  It  is  not  in  the 
power  of  man  to  prevent  it ;  for  he  is  as  much  bound 
by  the  laws  which  regulate  his  intellect  and  his  ac- 
tions as  he  is  by  the  laws  which  regulate  the  condition 
of  his  bodily  frame.  Knowledge  does  necessarily  pro- 
duce change,  as  much  as  heat  necessarily  produces 
change;  and  where  knowledge  becomes  more  and 
more  accurate,  more  and  more  extensive,  and  more 
and  more  generally  diffused,  change  must  necessarily 
take  place  in  the  same  ratio,  and  entail  with  it  a  new 
order  of  society,  and  an  amended  condition  of  man 
upon  the  globe.  Wherever,  then,  the  unjust  interests 
of  the  ruling  classes  are  required  to  give  way  before 
the  progress  of  knowledge,  and  those  ruling  classes 
peremptorily  refuse  to  allow  the  condition  of  society  to 
be  amended,  the  sword  is  the  instrument  which  knowl- 
edge and  reason  may  be  compelled  to  use ;  for  it  is 
not  possible,  it  is  not  within  the  limits  of  man's  choice, 
that  the  progress  of  society  can  be  permanently  ar- 
rested when  the  intellect  of  the  masses  has  advanced 
in  knowledge  beyond  those  propositions,  of  which  the 
present  condition  is  only  the  realization. 

21st.  We  posit,  finally,  that  the  acquisition,  scien- 
tific ordination,  and  general  diffusion  of  knowledge, 
will  necessarily  obliterate  error  and  superstition,  and 
continually  amend  the  condition  of  man  upon  the 
globe,  until  his  ultimate  condition  shall  be  the  best  the 
circumstances  of  the  earth  permit  of.  On  this  ground 
we  take  up  (what  might  in  other  and  abler  hands  be 


THE    OPERATION    OF    KNOWLEDGE.  167 

an  argument  of  no  small  interest,  namely)  the  natural 
probability  of  a  millennium,  based  on  the  classification 
of  the  sciences,  on  the  past  progress  of  mankind,  and 
on  the  computed  evolution  of  man's  future  progress. 
The  outline  alone  of  this  argument  we  shall  indicate ; 
and  we  have  no  hesitation  in  believing,  that  every  one 
who  sees  it  in  its  true  light  will  at  once  see  how  the 
combination  of  knowledge  and  reason  must  regenerate 
the  earth,  and  evolve  a  period  of  universal  prosperity, 
which  the  divine  Creator  has  graciously  promised,  and 
whose  natural  probability  we  maintain  to  be  within 
the  calculation  of  the  human  reason. 


Library* 

°f  C%HfotnV*j 


CHAPTER  II. 

ON  THE  THEORY  OF  MAN'S  INTELLECTUAL 
PROGRESSION. 


SECTION    I. THE    ORDER    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

1st.  The  sum  of  all  things  which  man  can  know  is 
circumscribed  in  quality,  although  in  each  quality  there 
may  be  combinations  of  indefinite  extent.  That  is, 
there  are  only  so  many  possible  sciences,  although  each 
science,  in  its  own  department,  may  be  pursued  in- 
definitely. 

2d.  The  sciences  are  capable  of  being  classed  on  a 
system  which  is  not  arbitrary. 

3d.  The  discovery  of  the  sciences  as  an  historical  fact 
is  correlative  with  the  scheme  of  classification.  The 
classification  is  a  mere  process  of  the  intellect,  whereby 
the  sciences  are  arranged  in  a  certain  order,  according 
to  a  principle.  The  discovery  of  the  sciences  is  an 
historical  fact,  extending  over  many  centuries.  We 
assert  that  the  order  of  discovery  has  been  correlative 
with  the  order  of  classification. 

4th.  In  the  order  of  discovery,  we  are  at  a  certain 


THE    SCIENCES.  169 

point,  or  at  a  certain  number  in  the  series,  according 
to  the  scheme  of  classification. 

5th.  There  is,  therefore,  the  strongest  ground  for 
believing  that  the  future  sciences  will  be  discovered 
and  reduced  to  ordination  in  the  same  order  that  they 
stand  in  the  scheme  of  classification. 

6th.  Correlative  with  the  sciences  are  the  arts. 

The  sciences  are  knowledge,  the  arts  are  action. 

7th.  With  the  discovery  of  the  sciences,  there  fol- 
lows invariably  a  new  and  amended  order  of  action; 
that  is,  the  arts,  or  the  products  of  human  activity,  con- 
tinually improve  with  the  progression  of  the  sciences. 
[The  word  art  we  use  not  in  its  restricted  and  partial 
sense,  as  applying  more  particularly  to  the  fine  arts, 
but  in  its  general  sense,  as  signifying  the  systematic 
products  of  human  activity.  The  fine  arts  are,  to  a 
great  extent,  the  gift  of  the  individual,  and  conse- 
quently are  so  far  independent  of  science.] 

8th.  The  sciences  are  classed  on  their  complexity. 
To  determine  the  position  of  a  science  in  the  scheme 
of  classification,  we  have  only  to  ask  how  many  sub- 
stantive concepts  does  it  necessarily  involve ;  that  is, 
with  how  many  nouns-substantive  can  it  be  made  and 
expressed. 

9th.  The  order  of  the  sciences  is  as  follows  :  — 

1.  The  mathematical  sciences. 

2.  The  force  sciences. 

3.  The  inorganic  physical  sciences. 

4.  The  sciences  that  treat  of  vegetable  organization. 

5.  The  sciences  that  treat  of  animal  organization. 

6.  The  sciences  that  treat  of  man  and  his  functions. 
I^et  it  be  remembered  that  science  is  not  a  reality, 


170  THE    CATEGORIES. 

but  only  a  form  of  thought.  Science  exists  in  the 
mind,  and  in  the  mind  alone ;  it  is  the  mind's  mode 
of  viewing  reality. 

The  realities  are  matter  and  mind. 

Let  any  portion  of  matter  be  subjected  to  our  in- 
vestigation, and  the  mind,  from  the  necessary  laws  of 
its  constitution,  abstracts  the  qualities  of  that  portion 
of  matter,  the  one  from  the  other,  and  then  investi- 
gates the  laws  of  those  abstractions. 

The  laws  of  those  abstractions  constitute  the  math- 
ematical sciences. 

These  abstractions  form  the  much-decried  (and 
much  less  understood)  categories,  under  which  all 
scientific  knowledge  must  range  itself. 

These  categories  are  for  the  mathematical  sciences  — 

1.  Identity.     What  w  A? 

2.  Equality.     What  is  A  part  of? 

3.  Number.     How  many  parts  ? 

4.  Quantity.     How  much  is  each  part  ? 

5.  Space,  (position,  extent,  direction.) 

6.  Force,  (classed  especially  hereafter.) 

And  each  of  these  primary  and  indefinable  abstrac- 
tions, or  substantive  concepts,  furnish  us  with  a  dis- 
tinct science. 

The  rational  process  of  thought  in  every  science  is 
subjective,  and  does  not  require  to  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration. The  abstract  sciences  arise  from  the  ap- 
plication of  the  rational  process  of  thought  (subjective) 
to  the  above  concepts,  which  are  the  objects  of  the 
sciences.* 

*  Anterior  to  all  reasoning  whatever,  there  is  the  ontological 
necessity,  or  necessary  form  of  thoitght,  which  precedes  all  science. 


THE    MODES.  171 

Every  object  in  every  department  of  human  thought 
may  and  must  be  considered  under  three  aspects. 

1st.  Existence.     2d.  Relation.     3d.  Function. 

All  that  man  can  know  of  any  thing  whatever 
comes  under  one  of  these  heads. 

1st.  The  thing ;  2d,  its  condition ;  3d,  its  function ; 
and  to  these  three  answer  the  three  processes  of  the 
mind. 

1st.  Apprehension.  2d.  Classification.  3d.  Rea- 
soning. 

When,  therefore,  the  categorical  concepts  are  appre- 
hended by  abstraction,  the  second  process  is  the  classi- 
fication of  the  forms  of  the  concept,  and  the  third  pro- 
cess is  reasoning.  In  every  science,  therefore,  we 
have  classification  and  reasoning ;  and  we  have  only 

The  most  universal  form  of  science  is  logic,  or  syllogistic,  in  which 
we  have  the  blank  form  into  which  the  mathematical  sciences  place 
numbers,  quantities,  and  spaces.  Logic  is  the  first  form  of  rea- 
soning ;  which  reasoning1  in  the  mathematical  sciences  is  called 
calculating.  But  anterior  to  reasoning,  there  is  the  mode  of  the 
substantive  terms,  and  the  mode  of  the  propositions  which  are  to 
enter  into  reasoning ;  and  these  modes  are  determined  by  ontology 
or  metaphysic,  which  furnishes  the  axioms  or  self-evident  truths. 
These  axioms  are  taken  as  subjectively  true  in  the  sciences,  but 
ontology  considers  them  first  as  objective.  Thus  ontology  pro- 
nounces nothing  whatever  on  the  reality  of  being,  but  on  the 
mode  of  being  in  thought.  Ontology,  then,  divides  substantive 
thought  into  substance,  attribute,  cause,  effect,  necessary  existence, 
contingent  existence,  power,  function,  &c. ;  and  when  the  mode 
of  these  has  been  determined,  these  substantives  are  transformed 
from  objective  consideration  into  subjective  use.  Science  exists 
in  the  mind,  and  thus  when  forces,  for  instance,  function  in  the 
mind,  they  function  through  the  laws  of  ontological  classification : 
without  ontology  there  could  be  no  science  whatever. 


172  NATURE,    KNOWLEDGE,    LANGUAGE. 

to  ask  what  do  we  classify,  and  with  what  do  we  rea- 
son, to  determine  the  name  and  the  nature  of  the 
science.  The  most  ultimate  abstraction  which  the 
human  intellect  can  form,  is  the  noun-substantive  in 
its  generic  character  without  attribute.  It  therefore 
is  the  primary  and  fundamental  element  of  science, 
which,  by  the  addition  of  attributes  or  predicates, 
shall  become  the  substantive  element  of  any  science 
whatever.  We  assert,  then,  that  the  first  possible 
predicate  that  we  can  attach  to  the  noun-substantive, 
in  its  generic  character,  is  Identity ;  the  second,  Equali- 
ty;  1he  third,  Number;  and  so  on. 

Correlative  with  the  course  of  nature  and  of  thought 
(or  knowledge)  is  the  course  of  language;  and  here 
we  have  the  same  exhaustive  triplicity,  beyond  wThich 
it  is  impossible  for  us  to  go. 

Apprehension  furnishes  us  with  the  name,  classifica- 
tion with  the  proposition,  and  reasoning  with  the  syllo- 
gism. The  name,  the  proposition,  and  the  syllogism 
include  every  thing  that  can  be  expressed  as  science. 

We  have,  then, — 

The  course  of  nature. 

1st.  The  thing.    2d,  Its  condition.    3d.  Its  function. 

The  course  of  knowledge. 

1st.  The  concept.  2d.  Its  classification.  3d.  Rea- 
soning. 

The  course  of  language. 

1st.  The  name.  2d.  The  proposition.  3d.  The 
syllogism. 

The  concept  is  the  thing  (ens)  apprehended  by  the 
intellect. 

The  name  is  the  expression,  in  language,  of  the 
concept,  and  consequently  of  the  thing. 


THE    FORMS    OF    REASONING.  173 

Classification  is  the  apprehension  of  the  condition 
of  the  thing,  in  which  are  included  all  its  quiescent 
relations;  and  the  proposition  is  the  expression,  in 
language,  of  that  classification. 

Reasoning  is  subsequent  to  propositional  knowl- 
edge, and  is  the  process  whereby  a  new  proposition  is 
made  to  evolve  from  two  anterior  propositions. 

The  syllogism  is  the  complete  expression,  in  lan- 
guage, of  reasoning ;  and  both  are  correlative  with  all 
the  active  functions  of  real  nature. 

Were  man  incapable  of  reasoning,  he  might  appre- 
hend all  the  realities  of  nature,  and  classify  all  on  the 
most  perfect  system  of  ordination ;  but  never,  by  any 
possibility,  could  he  explain  and  calculate  the  functions 
of  realities.  Every  function  is  active,  and  every  action 
involves  an  agent,  (or  cause;)  and  were  man  not 
endowed  with  the  intuitive  principle  of  causation, 
all  motions,  combinations,  functions,  in  a  word,  all 
changes,  would  immediately  become  inexplicable,  and 
the  universe  would  forever  remain  a  vast  enigma. 

The  actual  constitution  of  the  human  intellect  is  as 
absolutely  necessary  to  all  science,  as  is  the  existence 
of  the  realities  of  which  the  sciences  respectively  treat. 

Such,  then,  are  the  general  characteristics  of  all  the 
sciences,  that  is,  of  all  the  true  sciences  that  involve 
functions  and  reasoning;  for  the  so-called  sciences 
that  do  not  involve  functions  and  reasoning  (descrip- 
tive botany,  zoology,  &c.)  are  mere  classification,  and 
not  sciences.  The  general  form  of  scientific  knowl- 
edge, then,  is  A,  —  the  name,  the  concept,  the  thing. 

A  is  B,  —  the  proposition,  the  classification,  con- 
dition, or  relation  of  A. 
15* 


174  THE    FORMS    OF    REASONING. 

B  is  C,  —  the  classification,  condition,  or  relation 
of  B. 

Ergo,  A  is  C,  —  the  consequent  of  the  two  anterior 
propositions.  The  whole  forms  the  syllogism  or  rea- 
soning, which  is  the  expression  of  the  function  of 
realities. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  formation  and  growth  of 
the  abstract  sciences. 

Let  A,  B,  and  C  be  called  terms;  and,  as  nomen- 
clature is  at  first  purely  arbitrary,  these  terms  may  be 
made  to  stand  for  any  thing  we  please. 

The  first,  most  simple,  and  most  elementary  form 
of  reasoning,  is  reasoning  in  identity,  or  with  terms 
of  which  identity  (or  its  opposite,  non-identity)  is 
predicated. 

A  is  B ;  B  is  C ;  ergo,  A  is  C. 

A  is  B ;  B  is  not  C ;  ergo,  A  is  not  C ; 
where   the   terms   are   singular,  is  the  very  simplest 
form  of  all  reasoning,  and  consequently  the  most  gen- 
eral and  least  specific  form  of  all  science  whatever. 

The  second  form  of  reasoning  is  reasoning  in 
equality,  or  ivith  terms  declared  to  be  equal  (or  its 
opposite,  unequal)  to  each  other. 

When  we  reasoned  in  identity,  the  terms  were  in- 
capable of  division  ;  but  when  we  reason  in  equality, 
the  most  general  form  of  division  is  introduced,  and 
our  terms  are  now  divided  into  ivhole  or  parts.  We 
have  therefore  become  more  specific,  and  can  say,  the 
whole  of  A,  part  of  A;  the  whole  of  B,  part  of 
B;  e.g.,— 

The  whole  of  A  is  equal  to  part  of  B. 

The  whole  of  B  is  equal  to  part  of  C ;  ergo,  the 
whole  of  A  is  equal  to  part  of  C. 


THE    FORMS    OF    REASONING.  175 

The  third  form  of  reasoning  is  reasoning  in  number, 
or  reasoning  with  terms,  which  are  not  merely  divided 
generally  into  whole  or  parts,  but  into  parts  that  have 
been  specifically  numbered.  A  is  now  divided,  not 
merely  into  whole  or  parts,  but  into  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6, 
&c,  parts. 

Reasoning  in  identity  and  in  equality  is  what  is 
termed  logic,  although  in  logic  there  are  two  sciences ; 
the  one  the  science  of  identity,  the  other  the  science 
of  equality.  The  science  of  number  is  called  arith- 
metic, and  is  nothing  more  than  logic  with  the  terms 
divided  into  numbers. 

The  fourth  form  of  reasoning  is  reasoning  in  quan- 
tity, or  reasoning  with  terms  which  are  not  only  num- 
bered, but  which  have  a  quantity  attached  to  each  of 
their  parts.  In  arithmetic,  all  the  units  are  supposed 
to  be  absolutely  equal  to  each  other;  in  algebra,  on 
the  contrary,  the  units  are  capable  of  various  mag- 
nitudes.* 

Our  terms  are  now  divided  into  numbered  parts, 
which  have  quantity  attached  to  them ;  let  us  now 
add  a  new  predicate  to  the  quantities,  and  a  new  sci- 
ence arises. 

The,  fifth  form  of  reasoning  is  reasoning  in  space  — 

*  Quantity  and  number  are  frequently  confounded  with  each 
other,  and  algebra  has  been  termed  universal  arithmetic.  They  are 
essentially  distinct,  inasmuch  as  arithmetic  starts  from  the  unit, 
which  is  indivisible,  and  the  number  continually  increases  with  the 
repetition  of  the  unit.  Quantity,  on  the  contrary,  starts  from  infin- 
ity, which  is  divisible  ad  infinitum,  the  quantity  diminishing  contin- 
ually as  we  increase  the  number  of  the  parts.  Number  and  quan- 
tity are  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  each  other. 


176  THE    FORMS    OF    REASONING. 

geometry.  What  were  before  only  quantities,  have 
now  become  quantities  of  space;  and  the  laws  of 
position,  direction,  and  extent  constitute  the  fifth 
science. 

The  sixth  form  of  reasoning  is  reasoning  in  force  ; 
and  our  terms,  becoming  more  and  more  specific  with 
the  addition  of  each  new  concept,  have  now  become 
forces. 

Such  is  the  necessary  order  of  the  mathematical 
sciences. 

1st.  Logic ;  which  really  includes  two  sciences. 

3d.  Arithmetic;  that  is,  logic  applied  to  units  or 
number. 

4th.  Algebra ;  that  is,  arithmetic  applied  to  quan- 
tities. 

5th.  Geometry  ;  that  is,  algebra  applied  to  space. 

6th.  Statics  ;  that  is,  geometry  applied  to  force. 

In  this  order,  the  mathematical  sciences  must  ne- 
cessarily be  classed,  and  in  this  order  the  mathematical 
sciences  must  necessarily  be  discovered.  Ten  thou- 
sand men  originating  the  mathematical  sciences  by  a 
process  of  independent  investigation,  would  necessa- 
rily discover  them  in  this  order ;  and  were  ten  thou- 
sand worlds,  peopled  with  human  beings,  to  go  through 
the  process  of  making  anew  the  mathematical  sciences, 
every  one  of  those  human  races  would  pass  through 
the  same  intellectual  course,  and  evolve  the  abstract 
sciences  exactly  in  the  same  necessary  order.  The 
constitution  of  human  reason  forbids  that  it  should  be 
otherwise ;  one  science  being  impossible  until  its  ante- 
cedent is  so  well  known  as  to  be  capable  of  subjective 
operation.      Thus,   unless   the   laws   of    identity   are 


THE    GROWTH    OF    THE    SCIENCES,  177 

known,  there  can  be  no  investigation  of  the  laws  of 
equality  ;  and  until  the  laws  of  equality  are  known, 
there  can  be  no  investigation  of  the  laws  of  number ; 
and  until  arithmetic  is  known,  there  can  be  no  investi- 
gation of  the  laws  of  quantity ;  and  until  the  laws  of 
quantity  are  known,  there  can  be  no  investigation  into 
the  relations  of  spaces ;  and  until  geometry  is  known, 
there  can  be  no  statics. 

But  the  mathematical  sciences  are  abstract,  a  priori, 
and  deductive  ;  their  principles  are  riot  principles  of 
observed  truth,  but  of  rational  necessity ;  they  ema- 
nate, in  their  scientific  character,  not  from  the  opera- 
tions of  nature,  but  from  the  operations  of  mind ; 
sense,  at  the  utmost,  furnishes  only  the  subject  matter 
from  which  the  intellect  derives  the  element,  —  the  one 
noun-substantive,  of  the  science  ;  while  all  the  propo- 
sitions, and  all  the  reasonings,  and  all  the  far-off  con- 
clusions, are  furnished  by  man's  rational  mind,  as 
exclusively  as  if  matter  had  no  existence.  And  these 
mathematical  sciences  form  the  abstract  preparation 
of  man  for  the  acquisition  of  real  or  physical  knowl- 
edge. Without  the  mathematical  sciences,  there  can 
be  no  physical  science  —  there  may  be  classifications, 
facts,  propositions  innumerable;  but  science,  which 
involves  the  syllogism,  there  never  can  be  till  the 
abstract  sciences  are  so  far  advanced  as  to  be  capable 
of  subjective  application  to  the  real  facts  of  nature. 

Let  us  now  make  an  observation  on  the  method  by 
which  one  science  grows  out  of  another,  by  the  intro- 
duction of  only  one  single  new  concept  or  substan- 
tive idea. 

For  want  of  better  names,  (at  present,)  we  shall 


178  THE    GROWTH    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

call  the  sciences  of  identity  and  equality  simple  and 
compound  logic. 

In  simple  logic  the  rational  process  of  the  intellect 
is  subjective,  and  the  terms  (of  which  nothing  is  predi- 
cated except  identity ;  for  instance,  A  is  B,  B  is  C)  are 
objective. 

In  compound  logic  the  terms  have  a  new  predicate ; 
they  are  no  longer  identicals,  but  equivalents,  and  sim- 
ple logic  is  now  subjective,  (that  is,  in  operation,)  while 
the  equivalents  are  objective,  that  is,  operated  upon. 

Logic  being  the  first,  most  general,  and  most  ab- 
stract of  all  the  sciences,  is  universally  applicable  ;  it 
may  be  applied  to  every  subject  of  human  thought. 

Logic  is  the  universal  form  of  all  science  ;  it  is  the 
general  formula  or  expression  of  science.  The  math- 
ematical sciences  are  only  logic,  with  numbers,  quan- 
tities, spaces,  or  forces  for  the  terms ;  and  the  physical 
sciences  are  only  logic,  with  physical  realities  for  the 
terms.  The  form  remains  universally  the  same ;  and 
the  progression  of  the  sciences,  or  the  advance  from  one 
science  to  another,  consists  in  adding  predicate  after 
predicate  to  the  terms,  and  thereby  rendering  them  con- 
tinually more  complex.  The  form  remains  exactly  the 
same ;  but  in  the  mathematical  sciences  we  commence 
with  the  major  and  minor  propositions,  and  thence 
deduce  the  consequent.  In  the  physical  sciences,  we 
first  commence  with  the  consequent  and  minor  propo- 
sition, and  thence  infer  the  major.  When  the  major 
is  inferred,  we  can  then  reason  deductively,  as  in  the 
mathematical  sciences. 

Let  us  therefore  apply  logic  to  numbers;  that  is, 
instead  of  our  terms  being  merely  equivalents^  let  us 


THE    GROWTH    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  179 

make  them  numbers,  and  every  proposition  that  was 
true  in  logic  is  now  true  with  regard  to  numbers ;  that 
is,  we  create  arithmetic,  which  is  nothing  more  than 
logic  applied  to  numbers,  and  in  which  logic  is  sub- 
jective, and  number  objective.  Having  made  arith- 
metic, let  us  apply  it  to  quantities,  and  we  have  alge- 
bra where  arithmetic  is  subjective,  and  quantities  are 
objective;  arithmetic  being  the  process  of  operation, 
and  quantities  being  the  substantives  operated  upon. 
Let  us  now  apply  algebra  to  space,  that  is,  to  positions, 
directions,  extents,  and  geometry  is  originated.  In 
geometry,  algebra  is  subjective,  and  the  forms  of  space 
are  objective. 

Let  us  now  apply  geometry  to  force,  and  statics  is 
originated  where  geometry  is  subjective,  and  forces  are 
objective. 

In  the  above  sciences,  not  one  single  idea  has  been 
introduced  that  requires  sensual  observation,  and  all 
the  operations  have  been  operations  of  the  mind. 

Let  us  now  apply  the  above  sciences  to  the  sub- 
stantives and  operations  of  real  nature,  and  the  physi- 
cal sciences  arise  one  after  another  in  a  similar  order 
of  complexity. 

In  statics,  the  whole  question  was,  whether  the 
forces  did  or  did  not  neutralize  each  other  at  a  given 
point;  but  nothing  was  said  as  to  the  consequences  if 
they  did  not  neutralize  each  other. 

Let  a  new  substantive  concept  be  introduced,  and 
let  the  consequence  of  force,  which  has  not  been  neu- 
tralized, be  motion. 

Let  us  remember,  that  in  every  department  of 
knowledge  we  have  to  consider,  1st.  The  thing.  2d. 
Its  condition  and  relations.     3d.  Its  function. 


180  THE    GROWTH    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

The  six  sciences  of  which  we  have  spoken,  treat 
only  of  quiescent  conditions  and  relations ;  and  when 
applied  to  the  realities  of  nature,  they  apply  only  to 
the  quiescent  conditions  and  relations  of  those  reali- 
ties. But  the  realities  of  nature  have  functions,  and 
those  functions  form  the  groundwork  of  the  physical 
sciences. 

In  the  transition  from  the  abstract  sciences  to  the 
physical  sciences,  it  is  usually  supposed  that  we  over- 
step a  broad  line  of  demarcation,  about  which  there 
can  be  no  possible  mistake.  It  is  usually  advanced, 
that  in  the  one  class  of  sciences  we  have  nothing  but 
abstractions  and  their  necessary  relations ;  while  in  the 
other  class  we  have  tangible  or  visible  realities  —  good 
solid  matter. 

Such  a  mode  of  viewing  the  sciences  is  as  clumsy 
as  it  is  empirical,  and  calculated  only  to  satisfy  those 
who  (however  deeply  versed  in  the  specialities  of  any 
one  particular  science)  have  never  turned  their  atten- 
tion to  the  relations  of  the  sciences  among  themselves. 

The  transition  from  the  abstract  sciences  to  the 
physical  sciences  is  not  the  abrupt  leap  so  commonly 
supposed ;  it  is  a  gradual  transition,  that  is,  a  tran- 
sition step  by  step,  in  which  the  step  that  lands  us  on 
the  real  universe  is  neither  greater  nor  less  than  any 
of  the  previous  steps  that  had  conducted  us  from  one 
science  to  another;  or  if,  indeed,  it  can  be  called 
greater,  it  is  only  greater  in  a  gradual  ratio  of  increase, 
which  might  be  already  observed  to  pervade  the  ab- 
stract sciences.  The  difference  between  the  sciences 
may  be  viewed  as  gradually  increasing ;  but  we 
maintain  that,  if  this  view  be  taken,  the  increase  of 


THE    GROWTH    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  181 

the  difference  is  in  a  progressive  ratio,  and  that  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  stepping  out  of  one  region  (the 
region  of  the  mathematical  sciences)  into  another 
region,  (the  region  of  the  physical  sciences,)  by  a 
passage  that  brings  us  into  a  sphere  altogether  dis- 
similar. So  long  as  mere  classifications  are  called 
sciences,  there  can  be  no  just  views  of  science,  and 
consequently  no  just  views  of  the  relations  of  the 
sciences  to  each  other.  Classification,  wherever  it 
may  be  found,  and  to  whatever  it  may  refer,  is  only 
one  of  the  preliminaries  of  science ;  and  it  is  only 
when  we  can  reason,  that  is,  deduce  a  new  propo- 
sition from  propositions  already  ascertained,  that 
science  has  properly  commenced. 

Let  us,  then,  inquire  what  is  the  step  by  which  we 
pass  from  the  mathematical  sciences  to  the  physical 
sciences.  Our  terms  from  equivalents  become  num- 
bers, and  from  numbers  become  quantities,  and  from 
quantities  become  spaces,  and  from  spaces  become 
forces.  Force  involves  space,  quantity,  number,  equal- 
ity, and  identity;  but  it  does  not  involve  matter. 
As  a  real  fact,  we  may  have  no  force  without  matter ; 
but  in  logical  analysis  force  may  be  considered,  and 
may  be  reasoned  with  quite  independently  of  matter. 
In  statics,  then,  our  terms  were  forces,  and  the  ques- 
tion was,  Do  the  forces  neutralize  each  other,  or  do 
they  not  ? 

Now,  every  portion  of  matter  must  be  considered, 
like  every  thing  else,  under  the  three  phases.  1st. 
Existence;  2d.  Condition  and  relation;  3d.  Func- 
tion. And  the  physical  sciences,  properly  so  called, 
treat  of  the  functions  of  matter. 
16 


182  THE    GROWTH    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

What,  then,  is  the  simplest  and  most  universal 
function  of  matter  ?  for  this  is  the  criterion  by  which 
we  recognize  the  first  physical  science. 

The  simplest  and  most  universal  function  of  matter 
is  motion;  the  science  of  motion,  therefore,  is  the  first, 
the  simplest,  and  the  least  specific  of  all  the  physical 
sciences. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  step  that  leads  from  force 
to  motion. 

It  is  evident  that  all  the  physical  sciences  must  be 
based  on  the  observation  of  the  existence,  condition, 
and  function  of  the  real  matter  with  which  man  is 
acquainted ;  and  that  every  real  motion  must  be  the 
motion  of  some  one  particular  portion  of  matter. 
But  every  portion  of  matter  has  a  certain  number  of 
accidents  attached  to  it;  that  is,  has  a  number  of 
predicates,  which  are  quite  superfluous  in  treating  of 
motion,  and  which,  consequently,  must  be  abstracted. 
Color,  density,  chemical  composition,  &c.,  &c.,  must 
all  be  reserved  for  future  consideration,  until  the  most 
general  laws  of  motion  are  discovered. 

In  statics  our  terms  were  forces,  and  the  question 
was,  Did  or  did  not  the  forces  neutralize  each  other  ? 

Let  us  consider  the  simplest  form  of  motion ;  and 
as  a  physical  body  would  involve  a  number  of  predi- 
cates, let  us  take  only  the  essential  one,  namely,  the 
one  that  is  absolutely  necessary  to  the  formation  of  a 
new  science.  In  statics  we  had  no  motion ;  and  as 
every  motion  requires  a  something  that  shall  move, 
let  that  something  be  (not  a  planet  nor  a  portion  of 
real  matter,  both  of  which  are  as  yet  much  too  com- 
plex) but  a  point,  with  no  other  physical  predicate 
than  that  it  is  movable. 


THE    GROWTH    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  183 

Our  term  has  now  become  a  movable  point,  and 
the  forces  which  in  the  previous  science  were  objec- 
tive, now  become  subjective;  that  is,  the  laws  of 
force  which  were  to  be  discovered  in  the  previous 
science,  are  now  to  be  called  into  actual  operation 
for  the  purpose  of  evolving  a  new  science,  which,  in  its 
turn,  will  again  be  called  into  subjective  operation  for 
the  purpose  of  evolving  another  new  science,  and  so  on 
till  the  whole  series  of  the  real  sciences  is  completed. 

With  forces  acting  on  a  movable  point,  all  that 
we  can  treat  of  is  the  direction  and  extent  of  the 
motion,  with  the  position  of  departure,  the  positions 
of  transit,  and  the  position  of  arrival;  that  is,  the 
three  substantives  of  geometry,  position,  direction,  and 
extent,  exhaust  all  that  can  be  discovered  until  a  new 
concept  is  introduced. 

Hitherto  the  concept  time  has  not  been  taken  into 
consideration.  As  space  is  the  necessary  condition 
of  the  existence  of  matter,  so  is  time  the  necessary 
condition  of  the  functions  of  matter.  Space  is  the 
necessary  condition  of  statical  science ;  time  is  the 
necessary  condition  of  dynamical  science. 

Let  us,  therefore,  add  time  to  the  motions  whose 
directions  and  extent  have  been  previously  treated 
of,  and  we  immediately  add  the  laws  of  velocity; 
that  is,  the  relation  between  time  and  space. 

The  science  of  motion  (dynamics)  brings  us  to  the 
verge  of  the  physical  sciences. 

We  have  said  that  the  functions  of  realities  con- 
stitute the  bases  of  the  physical  sciences.  Let  us, 
then,  ask,  What  is  involved  in  a  function? 

We  hold  the  principle  to  be  absolutely  universal, 


184  THE    PROCESS    OF    SCIENCE. 

that,  "  wherever  man  observes  a  change,  there  he 
infers  a  cause."  A  function,  then,  is  necessarily  com- 
posed of  three  items.  1st.  A  cause ;  2d.  An  object ; 
3d.  An  operation,  or  phenomenon.  The  cause  is  the 
agent,  the  object  is  the  thing  operated  upon,  and  the 
phenomenon  is  the  change  in  the  condition  or  relation 
of  the  object. 

But  we  have  stated  that  reasoning  is  correlative 
with  function,  and  reasoning  is  expressed  in  language 
by  the  syllogism.  In  the  syllogism,  therefore,  we  must 
find  a  correlative  triplicity  answering  to  the  component 
items  of  the  function. 

The  function  gives  us  the  cause,  the  object,  and  the 
phenomenon ;  and,  answering  to  these,  the  syllogism 
gives  us, — 

1st.  The  major  premiss ;  2d.  The  minor  premiss ; 
and,  3d.  The  conclusion,  or  consequent. 

In  the  mathematical  sciences  we  have,  given  the 
major  and  minor  premises  to  find  the  conclusion ;  in 
the  physical  sciences  (while  they  are  in  process  of  dis- 
covery) we  have,  given  the  minor  premiss  and  conclu- 
sion to  find  the  major  premiss.  But  when  a  physical 
science  is  discovered,  that  is,  when  its  facts  have 
been  generalized  in  such  a  mode  as  to  cast  aside  dis- 
pute, we  are  then  enabled  to  reason  deductively,  in  the 
same  manner  as  in  the  mathematical  sciences ;  and  so 
long  as  a  science  is  incapable  of  this  deductive  rea- 
soning, it  is  only  undergoing  the  process  of  discovery. 

In  the  physical  sciences,  all  that  we  can  observe  is, 
1st.  The  condition  of  the  object;  and,  2d.  The  phe- 
nomenon. The  cause  is  forever  hidden  from  sensual 
observation,  and  is  only  apprehended  by  the  reason. 


THE    PROCESS    OF    SCIENCE.  185 

The  condition  of  the  object,  when  expressed  in  lan- 
guage, furnishes  us  with  a  proposition;  and  the  phe- 
nomenon, when  expressed  in  language,  furnishes  us 
with  another  proposition  relating  to  the  same  object. 

Now,  let  any  two  propositions  of  a  complete  syllo- 
gism be  given,  the  third  can  be  inferred ;  and  in  the 
physical  sciences,  observation  gives  us  the  condition  of 
the  object  (namely,  the  minor  premiss)  and  the  phe- 
nomenon (namely,  the  conclusion)  to  find  the  major 
premiss.  But,  although  the  cause  in  a  function  is  hid- 
den from  our  senses,  it  is  absolutely  required  by  our 
reason ;  and  every  observed  phenomenon  *  is  consid- 
ered by  the  human  mind  as  the  effect  of  some  unseen 
agent  or  cause.f 

We  have  already  stated  that  science  is  only  a  form 
of  thought;  the  physical  sciences  may  be  termed,  na- 
ture seen  by  the  reason,  and  not  merely  by  the  senses. 

We  must  consider,  then,  how  the  facts  of  sensa- 
tional observation  are  transformed  into  the  propositions 
of  rational  science.  For  this  purpose,  let  us  consider 
what  is  furnished  by  observation  and  what  by  reason. 

Observation  gives  us,  1st.  The  condition  of  the 
object ;  and,  2d.  The  phenomenon.  And  reason,  un- 
der all  circumstances,  views  a  function  as  composed 
of,  1st.  The  cause ;  2d.  The  occasion ;  3d.  The  effect. 
The  condition  of  the  object  given  by  observation,  is 
what  the  reason  terms  the  occasion ;  and  the  phenom- 

*  We  apply  the  term  phenomenon  exclusively  to  the  action  or 
operation,  not  to  the  object. 

f  We  are  aware  that  the  sensationalists  deny  this ;  but  until  they 
have  abolished  force,  the  cause  of  motion,  and  demolished  dynamics, 
they  can  advance  nothing  on  this  subject  worthy  of  attention. 
16* 


186  THE    PROCESS    OF    SCIENCE. 

enon  given  by  observation,  is  what  the  reason  terms 
the  effect;  and  these  in  the  syllogism  are  represented 
by  the  minor  premiss  and  the  conclusion.  Conse- 
quently the  problem  of  the  physical  sciences  is,  to  in- 
fer such  a  major  premiss  as  would  make  the  observed 
phenomenon  (when  stated  in  language)  follow  syllo- 
gistically  from  that  major,  and  from  the  observed  con- 
dition of  the  object,  when  stated  in  language. 

To  express  this  technically,  let  A  be  the  object,  and 
A  is  B,  its  condition ;  and  let  A  is  C  be  the  expres- 
sion, in  language,  of  the  phenomenon. 

Observation  then  gives  us,  — 

A  is  B,  and  A  is  C. 

But  (A  is  C,)  being  the  phenomenon,  is  regarded 
by  the  reason  as  an  effect,  and  is  consequently  the  con- 
clusion of  a  syllogism,  one  of  whose  premises  is  want- 
ing. The  problem  then  is,  to  supply  the  wanting 
proposition  of  the  syllogism ;  that  is,  such  a  proposi- 
tion as  shall  make  the  conclusion  follow  from  the  two 
premises,  according  to  the  laws  of  logic.  The  required 
proposition  is,  B  is  C.  [B  being  of  course  distributed 
when  we  reason  with  whole  and  parts.] 

Such  is  the  general  problem  of  the  physical  sciences 
expressed  in  the  most  abstract  form;  but  when  we 
turn  to  realities,  our  terms,  A,  B,  C,  must  be  written 
out;  that  is,  instead  of  abstract  terms,  they  must  be 
descriptions  of  the  physical  realities  and  phenomena, 
and,  instead  of  presenting  themselves  under  the  form 
of  alphabetic  letters,  as  they  do  in  logic,  they  present 
themselves  under  the  form  of  propositions,  (perhaps 
very  numerous  and  very  extensive,)  containing  a  mass 
of  real   observation.     Every  single  term   may   be   a 


THE    PROCESS    OF    SCIENCE.  187 

proposition,  or  a  series  of  propositions,  or  even  a  syl- 
logism ;  but  the  final  result  in  every  case  is,  that  the 
whole  are  at  last  assembled  into  one  syllogism,  how- 
ever extensive,  and  however  complex  may  be  the 
character  of  the  premises. 

Those  who  are  familiar  with  logic,  (and  every  one 
ought  to  be  so,)  will  at  once  observe  that  B  is  the  mid- 
dle term  of  the  syllogism ;  and  consequently  the  prob- 
lem of  the  physical  sciences  is  to  discover  the  nature 
of  that  middle  term  that  will  connect  the  condition  of 
matter,  or  the  circumstances  of  matter,  with  the  phe- 
nomena manifested  in  those  circumstances. 

Now,  it  will  be  observed,  that  in  nature  we  find  no 
proportions,  ratios,  squares,  roots,  forces,  &c,  &c. ; 
these  are  all  mental  abstractions ;  yet  these  are  the 
great  middle  terms  of  the  physical  sciences  that  ena- 
ble men  to  reason  of  the  effects  of  new  combinations. 
No  man,,  for  instance,  ever  observes  "  the  inverse  ratio 
of  the  square  of  the  distance ; "  all  that  he  can  pos- 
sibly observe  is  actual  distance  —  so  many  inches,  feet, 
miles ;  but  the  ratio  he  discovers  by  his  reason,  gen- 
eralizing from  particular  facts  to  the  general  expression 
of  those  facts.  And  when  he  has  discovered  such  a 
ratio  as  shall  coincide  with  all  his  observed  measure- 
ments, he  is  then  enabled  to  reason  deductively,  hav- 
ing found  the  middle  term  of  his  syllogism.  This 
middle  term  may  be  a  generalized  fact  or  general  prop- 
osition, or  it  may  be  a  force  or  cause ;  and  the  differ- 
ence between  these  is,  that  the  general  fact  or  proposi- 
tion produces  the  logical  consequent,  and  the  force  is 
conceived  as  external  to  the  mind,  existing  in  real 
nature,  and  producing  the  real  consequent,  or  effect,  or 


188  THE    PROCESS    OF    SCIENCE. 

phenomenon.  In  the  physical  sciences,  therefore,  two 
distinct  classes  of  problems  present  themselves,  —  the 
problems  of  inference,  and  the  problems  of  deduction, 
expressed  logically  as,  — 

1st.  Given  the  minor  premiss  and  consequent,  to 
find  the  major  premiss. 

2d.  Given  the  major  and  minor  premises,  to  find  the 
consequent. 

In  the  process  of  discovering  the  physical  sciences 
we  have  the  first  problem ;  namely,  given  the  observed 
conditions  of  matter,  and  the  observed  phenomena,  to 
infer  the  force,  or  forces,  that  in  those  conditions  would 
produce  those  phenomena.  And  when  such  forces 
have  been  suggested  as  would,  by  acting  regularly, 
produce  the  phenomena  in  the  given  conditions,  the 
facts  are  said  to  be  explained,  and  a  vast  power  of 
future  calculation  (reasoning)  is  immediately  acquired 
by  man.  For  immediately  the  middle  term  has  been 
discovered,  we  are  enabled  to  reason  deductively,  that 
is,  from  the  two  premises  to  the  consequent ;  and  this 
middle  term  being  a  constant,  we  have  only  to  ascer- 
tain any  new  conditions  to  enable  us  to  predict  future 
phenomena.  If  the  real  phenomena  coincide  with  the 
predicted  phenomena,  (that  is,  if  the  effect  in  nature 
coincide  with  the  consequent  of  the  syllogism,)  a  veri- 
fication is  afforded  that  the  inferred  major  premiss  was 
correct ;  but  if  they  do  not  coincide,  we  are  immedi- 
ately led  to  the  conclusion,  either  that  the  inferred 
major  was"  erroneous,  or  that  in  the  minor  some  condi- 
tion had  been  overlooked,  which  has  tended  to  alter 
the  character  of  the  phenomena. 

Between  the  syllogism,  the  intellectual  reason  of 


THE    PROCESS    OF    SCIENCE,  189 

mankind,  and  the  operations  of  external  nature,  there 
is  the  most  perfect  parallelism ;  and  this  parallelism 
affords  a  most  undoubted  proof  of  the  objective  ve- 
racity of  the  subjective  convictions  of  the  human  mind. 
Were  the  general  convictions  of  the  human  reason 
(its  axioms)  not  true  objectively,  as  well  as  necessarily 
true  subjectively,  the  prediction  of  physical  phenomena 
would  be  absolutely  impossible.  And  although  the 
philosophic  sceptic  may  by  ingenious  ambiguities  in- 
volve that  question  in  doubts  and  sophisms,  surely  we 
may  rest  satisfied  that  the  same  hand  that  made  the 
heavens  and  the  earth  in  so  wonderful  a  harmony  of 
order,  has  not  made  the  human  reason  only  a  mockery 
and  a  delusion. 

Having  indicated  the  general  process  by  which  the 
sciences  evolve  one  after  the  other,  thereby  giving  a 
necessary  order  of  classification,  and  a  necessary  ordei 
of  chronological  discovery,  we  shall  not  attempt  the 
particular  classification  of  the  physical  sciences,  but 
confine  ourselves  to  a  few  remarks  bearing  on  the  defi- 
nite meaning  of  our  argument. 

In  dynamics,  as  an  abstract  science,  our  term  was  a 
movable  point.  Let  that  point  be  endowed  with 
physical  characteristics  one  after  another,  and  the 
physical  sciences  arise.  From  a  point  let  it  be  trans- 
formed into  a  body  possessing  weight,  or  resistance, 
and  we  have  general  mechanics  —  a  science  partly 
physical,  partly  mathematical. 

But  here  we  must  guard  against  being  imposed  on 
by  a  system,  however  simple  that  system  may  appear. 

In  the  mathematical  sciences  we  found  that  there 
was  but  one  series,  and  that  all  were  coordinated  upon 


190  THE  PROCESS  OF  SCIENCE. 

one  single  line.  We  must  not  thence  infer  that  we 
shall  find  exactly  the  same  simplicity  in  the  physical 
sciences.  Man  has  only  one  reason,  but  he  has  several 
senses  ;  and  those  senses  may  furnish  us  with  elements 
independent  of  each  other,  although  in  the  order  of  the 
sciences  depending  both  on  the  mathematical  sciences, 
and  both  requisite  before  we  can  proceed  to  other  and 
more  complex  sciences. 

Such  we  presume  light,  sound,  and  heat  to  be. 
Now,  although  we  can  have  no  hesitation  in  affirming 
that  optics  is  impossible  until  the  mathematical  sci- 
ences have  been  evolved  and  are  capable  of  applica- 
tion, and  although  we  must  necessarily  have  optics 
before  we  can  possibly  have  the  physiology  of  the  eye ; 
yet  there  may  be  no  such  mutual  dependence  between 
optics  and  acoustics,  and  we  may  therefore  be  obliged 
to  group  these  together  as  holding  the  same  rank  in 
the  classification,  and  consequently  as  likely  to  be  dis- 
covered about  the  same  time. 

And  here  another  question  is  necessary,  of  consid- 
erable importance  to  the  true  understanding  of  the 
character  of  science.  "  How  far  are  the  real  physical 
sciences  (astronomy,  for  instance)  to  be  considered  as 
true  sciences  ?  " 

All  the  phenomena  of  nature  are  operations  — 
things  done.  Now,  science  consists  of  knowledge,  and 
knowledge  exists  in  the  mind.  How,  then,  are  we  to 
view  the  real  operations  of  nature,  considered  as  ex- 
ternal to  the  mind  ? 

The  real  operations  of  nature  are  to  be  viewed  as 
arts  —  as  divine  arts  —  and  their  comprehension  alone 
can  be  called  science.     The  universe  is   God's  great 


THE    PROCESS    OF    SCIENCE.  191 

workshop,  and  man  is  the  rational  spectator,  whose 
office  it  is  to  comprehend  the  processes  that  are  there 
carried  on.  The  motions  of  the  planets  do  not  con- 
stitute  science ;  it  is  the  rational  apprehension  of  those 
motions  in  the  human  mind  that  constitutes  science. 
But  the  principles  of  mechanics  are  far  more  general 
than  all  the  facts  of  astronomy ;  they  apply  not  only 
to  the  real  sun  and  the  real  planets,  but  to  all  possible 
suns,  and  to  all  possible  matter  constituted  in  a  man- 
ner similar  to  the  matter  with  which  we  are  acquainted. 

Consequently  astronomy,  vast  as  it  is,  must  be 
viewed  only  as  a  real  illustration  of  the  principles  of 
mechanics,  as  an  exemplification  of  dynamics ;  which 
exemplification  in  every  real  item  might  have  been 
totally  different,  and  yet  have  exhibited  the  very  same 
principles.  The  heavenly  bodies  might  have  been 
twice  as  numerous  or  twice  as  few,  and  yet  have  ex- 
hibited exactly  the  same  principles  of  construction ;  in 
which  case  the  science  of  mechanics  would  have  re- 
mained exactly  as  it  is,  while  actual  astronomy  would 
have  been  totally  dissimilar. 

From  the  more  simple  motions  of  matter  we  turn 
naturally  to  those  that  are  more  complex ;  that  is,  from 
those  that  are  more  general  to  those  that  are  more 
specific.  When  the  mere  motion  of  a  body  is  consid- 
ered, it  is  evident  that  this  motion  is  subject  to  the 
same  laws,  whether  the  body  be  a  stone,  an  apple,  or 
an  animal.  But  when  matter  is  subdivided  and  clas- 
sified, it  is  found  that  some  motions  and  some  phe- 
nomena are  altogether  distinct  from  the  general  mo- 
tions of  matter.  The  phenomena  of  magnetism, 
electricity,  and   chemistry,  therefore,  take   their  rank 


192  THE    PROCESS    OF    SCIENCE. 

after  mechanics,  and  these  in  their  turn  are  the  neces- 
sary preparations  for  a  new  order  of  sciences. 

We  have  said  that  the  classification  of  the  sciences, 
and  their  chronological  discovery,  (or  reduction  to  or- 
dination,) must  follow  the  order  of  their  complexity. 
From  the  more  simple  we  pass  to  the  more  complex  ; 
from  the  more  general  to  the  more  specific. 

Let  us  then  ask,  What  is  necessary  to  the  complete 
understanding  of  a  single  portion  of  inorganic  matter 
—  a  pint  of  water,  for  instance?  (Speculations  on 
things  which  cannot  be  known  respecting  matter,  of 
course  we  altogether  exclude.)  This  matter  may  pre- 
sent itself  in  three  forms  ;  vapor,  liquid,  and  solid  — 
the  phenomena  of  heat,  therefore,  are  involved.  It 
may  be  decomposed ;  chemistry,  therefore,  is  involved ; 
Electricity  may  be  generated  in  its  passage  from  a 
liquid  to  a  vapor  ;  electricity,  therefore,  is  involved ;  it 
may  move  as  a  solid,  or  as  a  liquid,  or  as  a  gas  ;  the 
motions  of  solids,  liquids,  and  gases,  therefore,  fall 
under  separate  consideration.  It  may  sound  —  acou- 
stics ;  may  transmit  or  reflect  light  —  optics ;  it  may 
appear  in  the  form  of  rain,  hail,  or  snow ;  as  a  solid, 
its  sides  may  be  numbered,  their  angles  and  their  area 
measured ;  and  that  measurement  involves  the  theory 
of  quantities ;  and  finally,  without  logic,  we  could  not 
reason  about  it  at  all.  It  will  be  found,  on  close  ex- 
amination, that  the  complete  understanding  of  this  pint 
of  water  involves  all  the  physical  and  all  the  mathe- 
matical sciences.  But  this  pint  of  water  does  not  as 
yet  involve  organization.  Let  it,  however,  be  presented 
as  a  constituent  part  of  a  plant,  and  a  new  series  of 
phenomena  immediately  present  themselves ;  and,  for 


MAN    SCIENCE.  193 

the  understanding  of  these  new  phenomena,  every  one 
of  the  previous  sciences  is  absolutely  requisite.  After 
the  inorganic  sciences,  therefore,  come  the  sciences  of 
organization,  of  vegetable  and  animal  physiology, 
showing  a  continual  increase  of  complexity  until  we 
arrive  at  man,  the  most  complex  and  most  highly  or- 
ganized of  all  the  earth's  inhabitants. 

To  consider  man,  however,  merely  in  his  physiology, 
is  to  regard  him  only  as  an  animal  made  up  of  certain 
organs,  each  of  which  has  its  function.  Physiology 
teaches  us  of  vjhat  the  human  body  is  composed,  and 
how  the  mechanism  of  life  is  carried  on.  It  teaches 
us  what  man  is  in  his  bodily  frame,  and  it  endeavors 
to  give  us  a  rational  view  of  the  functions  and  uses 
of  his  parts.  It  points  out  the  relation  of  those  parts 
to  the  whole,  and  it  shows  us  how  the  living  man  — 
the  active,  thinking,  and  sentient  agent  —  is  a  com- 
pound of  wondrous  and  varied  mechanisms.  But 
still,  though  physiology  be  the  highest  and  most  com- 
plex of  all  the  physical  sciences,  there  is  something 
beyond  it,  something  that  comes  after  it  in  the  logical 
order  of  classification.  Man  himself  has  his  functions ; 
and  when  we  have  considered  what  man  is,  we  may 
turn  to  what  man  does. 

Man  is  by  nature  a  social  being,  made  to  live  in 
society,  and  his  social  acts  have  their  laws,  which, 
when  understood,  give  us  a  new  order  of  knowledge, 
altogether  distinct  from  the  knowledge  contained  in 
the  previous  sciences. 

Men  must  buy  and  sell,  cultivate  and  navigate, 
trade  and  manufacture;  in  a  word,  men  must  act; 
and,  as  there  is  no  necessary  power  determining  them 
17 


194  MAN    SCIENCE. 

to  act  in  any  one  particular  direction,  there  is  ever 
before  them  a  right  course  and  a  wrong  course ;  the 
one  tending  to  a  good  and  beneficial  condition  of 
society,  the  other  to  a  bad  and  detrimental  condition 
of  society.  And  again,  men  may  trespass  on  each 
other;  may  inflict  pain  on  each  other;  may  do  evil 
to  each  other.     Men,  therefore,  must  legislate. 

And  here  an  evident  distinction  presents  itself, 
which  enables  us  to  classify  human  action.  We  may 
ask,  "  What  means  will  lead  to  a  certain  end  ?  "  and 
"  What  is  the  end  that  ought  to  be  produced  ?  " 

We  have  here  two  social  sciences,  in  each  of  which 
there  is  the  same  stable  truth  that  prevails  in  all  the 
other  sciences,  if  man  can  only  discover  it  and  reduce 
it  to  scientific  ordination.  It  must  be  within  the  reach 
of  man,  or  else  we  must  admit  that  all  rules  of  social 
action  are  purely  arbitrary  ;  that  is,  in  fact,  that  there 
are  no  rules.  Such  a  supposition,  however,  is  perfectly 
absurd,  and  can  never  be  consistently  maintained. 

On  the  above  distinction  is  grounded  the  division 
of  social  science  into  non-moral  and  moral;  the  one 
treating  exclusively  on  the  relation  of  means  to  an 
end,  and  the  other  exclusively  on  the  end  that  ought 
to  be  the  object  of  pursuit. 

In  these  new  sciences,  human  action  is  the  element 
with  which  we  have  to  reason  ;  and  the  conditions  of 
men  are  the  phenomena  that  result  directly  from  that 
action.     We  have,  therefore,  — 

1st.  An  inductive  science  of  human  action,  which 
presents  itself  in  the  following  form  :  — 

1.  Given  the  actual  actions  of  men  in  their  social 
capacity.  This  is  the  minor  proposition  of  the  syllo- 
gism. 


Library. 


MAN    SCIENCE. 


2.  Given  the  actual  conditions  of  men. 

This  is  the  consequent  or  conclusion  of  the  syllo- 
gism, the  conditions  of  men  being  the  effects  of  then- 
actions.* 

And  the  problem  is  to  find  "  the  general  expression 
of  the  relation  between  the  actions  of  men  and  their 
social  condition."  When  this  general  expression  is 
found,  it  supplies  the  major  proposition  of  the  syllo- 
gism ;  and  the  criterion  of  this  major  being  correct,  is, 
that  the  observed  phenomena  contained  in  the  conse- 
quent of  the  syllogism  would  follow  logically  from 
the  major  and  minor  premises.  If  such  a  major  can- 
not be  found  as  would  logically  produce  all  the  ob- 
served phenomena  from  all  the  observed  conditions, 
we  must  seek  further  until  a  satisfactory  major  is 
discovered. 

2d.  A  deductive  science  of  human  action.f 

It  is  evident  that,  anterior  to  all  induction  what- 
ever, there  are  certain  acts  which  ought  not  to  be 
done.     The  first  man  who  committed  murder  was  as 

*  The  conditions  of  men  here  spoken  of  must  not  be  confounded 
with  the  conditions  of  the  syllogism.  The  syllogistic  conditions 
are  the  conditions  of  the  subject  with  which  we  reason,  and  here 
we  reason  with  human  actions.  Were  we,  however,  to  reason 
inversely  from  the  conditions  of  men  to  the  probable  actions  of 
men  in  those  conditions  or  circumstances,  (quite  a  legitimate  and  a 
most  important  syllogism,)  then  those  conditions  would  really  be- 
come the  logical  conditions,  or  minor  proposition;  whereas,  here 
they  are  the  consequent,  or  conclusion. 

f  This  science  is  perfectly  distinct  from  any  deductions  that 
might  be  made  in  the  previous  science  when  the  major  proposition 
was  discovered.  And  yet  there  cannot  be  the  slightest  doubt  that 
the  two  sciences,  perfectly  understood,  would  lead  to  the  same 
identical  conclusion. 


196  MAN    SCIENCE. 

guilty  of  committing  a  crime  as  the  last  man  who 
shall  raise  the  unhappy  hand  of  violence  against  his 
brother.  He  could,  however,  have  no  inductive  evi- 
dence of  the  effects  of  his  action ;  and  the  same  holds 
true  of  robbery,  fraud,  and  every  other  crime.  Con- 
sequently we  may  inquire,  What  was  it  that  made 
the  first  murder  a  crime,  and  how  could  man  know 
that  such  an  act  ought  not  to  be  performed  ? 

The  mind  of  man  views  actions  not  merely  in  their 
physical  characteristics,  but  as  being  equitable  or  un- 
equitable, just  or  unjust;  and  this  equity  gives  an  a 
priori  boundary  to  action,  and  lays  a  moral  restriction 
on  man,  which  will  prevent  him  from  injuring  his 
fellow,  even  where  he  has  no  inductive  evidence 
whatever. 

The  principles  of  this  equity  are  abstract  and  uni- 
versal convictions  of  the  reason,  and  the  problem 
presents  itself  in  the  following  manner :  — 

1st.  Given  the  general  axioms  of  equity.  (This  is 
the  major  proposition  ;)  and, — 

2d.  Given  the  physical  or  non-moral  characteristics 
of  an  action.  (This  is  the  minor  proposition  of  the 
syllogism.) 

To  find  the  moral  character  of  that  action,  namely, 
whether  it  be  a  duty  or  a  crime.  (This  is  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  syllogism.) 

The  first  of  these  sciences  is  political  economy, 
which  is  purely  inductive,  and  treats  of  the  physical 
effects  of  human  action  so  far  as  those  effects  are  to 
be  discovered  in  the  condition  of  societies.  The  sec- 
ond is  politics,  the  science  of  equity  which  is  purely 
abstract,  and  treats  of  the   universal  principles  that 


MAN    SCIENCE.  197 

ought  to  regulate  human  action,  so  far  as  men  can 
affect  each  other  by  their  actions. 

The  fundamental  noun-substantive  of  political 
economy  is  utility,  of  which  value  is  the  measure* 
The  fundamental  noun-substantive  of  politics  is  equi- 
ty, which,  having  its  abstract  laws  in  the  very  consti- 
tution of  the  human  mind,  gives  us  the  moral  measure 
of  human  action. 

We  now  turn  to  the  practical  bearing  of  our  argu- 
ment, for  which  the  rough  sketch  we  have  given  of 
the  classification  of  the  sciences  was  only  the  requi- 
site preliminary. 

We  maintain,  then,  — 

First.  That  the  sciences,  classed  on  their  complex- 
ity, must  be  classed  in  the  following  order:  — 

1st.  The  mathematical  and  force  sciences. 

2d.  The  inorganic  physical  sciences,  beginning 
with  the  most  general,  and  terminating  with  the 
most  specific. 

3d.  The  organic  physical  sciences,  composed  of 
vegetable  and  animal  physiology. 

4th.  The  sciences  that  relate  exclusively  to  man, 
and  that  treat  of  human  action.  These  are,  (1)  non- 
moral,  political  economy,  which  treats  of  the  beneficial 
or  prejudicial  effects  of  human  action ;  (2)  moral, 
politics,  which  treats  of  the  moral  character  of  human 
action,  whether  that  action  be  the  action  of  a  single 
individual  towards  another  individual,  or  whether   it 

*  And  value  (the  abstraction)  is  itself  measured  by  the  outward 
fact  of  exchangeability,  and  exchangeability  is  again  measured 
by  the  middle  term  money  ;  in  Britain,  for  instance,  by  gold. 
which  is  called  the  standard. 

17* 


198  MILLENNIUM. 

be  the  action  of  a  whole  society,  or  portion  of  a  socie- 
ty, with  all  the  formality  of  legislation,  &c.  Politics 
is,  in  fact,  nothing  more  than  the  moral  law  which 
ought  to  regulate  the  actions  of  the  individual,  ex- 
tended to  the  actions  of  men  when  associated  as  a 
political  society,  the  same  moral  law  being  obligatory 
on  multitudes  that  is  obligatory  on  the  individual. 

Our  argument  then  is,  that  "there  is  a  natural 
probability  in  favor  of  a  millennium ; "  and  this  natu- 
ral probability  is  based,  — - 

1st.  On  the  division  and  classification  of  human 
knowledge. 

2d.  On  the  fact  that  the  chronological  order  of  the 
discovery  of  the  sciences  is  the  same  as  the  order  of 
classification. 

3d.  On  the  power  of  correct  credence  (knowledge) 
to  produce  correct  action. 

Let  us,  in  the  first  place,  endeavor  to  settle  defi- 
nitely what  we  mean  by  a  millennium. 

1st.  We  do  not  mean  any  particular  portion  of  time. 

2d.  We  do  not  mean  a  miraculous  condition  of 
society,  produced  by  the  power  of  Almighty  God 
working  supernatural  changes  in  the  nature  of  man. 
It  may  be  true  that  God,  in  his  infinite  goodness,  shall, 
ere  the  world's  end,  so  enlighten  mankind  by  the 
divine  spirit  of  grace  and  wisdom,  that  it  may  almost 
be  no  metaphor  to  say  that  man  has  become  a  new 
creature.  This  may  be  true ;  but  this  is  not  what  we 
refer  to. 

3d.  We  do  not  mean  a  personal  reign  of  the  Son 
of  God,  the  Savior  of  the  world.  On  this  subject  we 
can  offer  no  possible  opinion.     That  the  Lord  Jesus 


A    MILLENNIUM.  199 

Christ  shall  reign  in  power,  and  that  his  will  shall  be 
done  on  earth  ere  the  earth's  history  closes,  we  believe 
with  the  most  undoubted  assurance.  But  that  the 
Redeemer  of  mankind  shall  again  appear  in  person 
before  he  cometh  to  judge  the  world,  this  is  a  question 
which  we  must  leave  unanswered. 

4th.  By  a  millennium  we  mean  a  period  of  univer- 
sal peace  and  prosperity  —  a  reign  of  knowledge,  jus- 
tice, and  benevolence  —  a  period  when  the  condition 
of  man  upon  the  globe  shall  be  the  best  the  circum- 
stances of  the  earth  permit  of — when  the  systematic 
arrangements  of  society  shall  be  in  perfect  accordance 
with  the  dictates  of  man's  reason  —  and  when  socie- 
ties shall  act  correctly,  and  thereby  evolve  the  max- 
imum of  happiness  possible  on  earth. 

A  millennium,  therefore,  is  for  us  a  period  when 
truth  shall  be  discovered  and  carried  into  practical 
operation.  This  is  the  essence  of  human  welfare, — 
truth  discovered  and  carried  into  practical  operation. 

Let  it  be  remembered  that  the  progress  of  mankind, 
in  the  evolution  of  civilization,  is  a  progress  from  su- 
perstition and  error  towards  knowledge.  Superstition 
and  error  present  themselves  under  the  form  of  diver- 
sity of  credence ;  knowledge  presents  itself  under  the 
form  of  unity  of  credence.  Wherever  there  is  knowl- 
edge, that  knowledge  is  the  same  in  all  parts  of  the 
earth,  and  the  same  in  substance  whatever  language 
it  may  use  as  the  instrument  of  expression.  The 
progress  of  mankind,  therefore,  is  a  progress  from  di- 
versity of  credence  towards  unity  of  credence.  There 
is  but  one  truth,  one  scheme  of  knowledge ;  and  con- 
sequently, wherever  knowledge  is  really  attained,  di- 


200  A    MILLENNIUM. 

versity  of  credence  is  impossible.  Where  men  differ 
in  credence,  they  differ  because  one  or  all  have  not 
knowledge. 

We  have,  then,  to  ask,  "  Into  what  branches  is 
knowledge  divided  ?  "  "  What  is  the  logical  order  of 
those  branches  in  a  scheme  of  classification  ?  "  "  In 
what  chronological  order  have  the  various  branches 
been  reduced  to  scientific  ordination?"  "At  which 
branch  are  the  most  advanced  nations  now  in  the  nine- 
teenth century?"  and,  "What  are  the  branches  that 
yet  remain  to  be  reduced  to  scientific  ordination,  and 
in  what  order  may  we  expect  those  future  branches  to 
be  reduced  to  the  form  of  science,  which  excludes  di- 
versity of  credence  ?  " 

The  natural  probability  of  a  future  reign  of  justice 
is  based  on  the  answers  to  these  questions.  If  there 
be  a  scheme  of  knowledge,  and  if  the  past  history  of 
science  proves  that  the  sciences  have  been  evolved  one 
after  the  other  in  accordance  with  that  scheme,  we  as- 
sert that  there  is  nothing  unreasonable  in  anticipating 
that  the  future  progress  of  discovery  will  continue  to 
go  on  in  the  same  direction.  On  the  contrary,  we 
maintain  that  such  anticipation  is  a  fair,  legitimate, 
and  impartial  inference  from  the  facts  before  us.  We 
are  well  aware  of  the  ridicule  which  practical  politi- 
cians endeavor  to"  throw  on  the  anticipation  of  a 
political  millennium,  and  too  often  with  a  levity  which 
we  cannot  esteem  other  than  unbecoming,  when  we 
know  that  the  Creator  of  mankind  has  distinctly  prom- 
ised a  period  of  peace  and  prosperity  to  our  race.  It 
may  not  be  given  to  man  to  know  the  times  and  the 
seasons,  but  most  certainly  it  is  given  to  man  to  know 


ORDER    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  201 

the  fact ;  and  surely  it  would  be  as  wise  to  speak  of 
that  fact  with  modest  reverence,  instead  of  associating 
it,  or  even  a  wrong  anticipation  of  it,  with  the  scoff, 
and  the  jeer,  and  the  gibe  of  ridicule. 

To  the  above  questions,  then,  we  give  the  following 
answers :  — 

1st.  Into  what  branches  is  knowledge  divided  ?  Into 
the  facts  of  sensational  and  psychological  observation, 
rational  science,  and  history.  Savage  nations  may 
see  the  sun  rise  and  set,  and  the  moon  wax  and  wane, 
and  they  may  see  for  centuries  these  and  the  other 
phenomena  of  nature  without  advancing  in  intelli- 
gence. The  son,  like  the  father,  may  live  and  die  a 
savage.  It  is  not  till  man  begins  to  reason  —  that  is, 
to  make  rational  science  —  that  the  foundation  of 
natural  civilization  is  laid,  and  the  first  step  taken  in 
that  course  which  continually  tends  to  distinguish 
man  more  and  more  from  the  animals,  and  to  make 
the  intellectual  portion  of  his  nature  predominate 
over  the  instincts  of  his  bodily  frame. 

History,  again,  is  a  branch  of  knowledge  common  to 
every  reality  with  which  we  are  acquainted.  In  it, 
therefore,  we  must  not  look  for  the  great  element  of 
human  progression.  That  element  is  found  in  rational 
science,  and  rational  science  is  divided  into  the  follow- 
ing branches : — 

1.  The  mathematical  and  force  sciences,  beginning 
at  logic,  and  ending  with  dynamics. 

2.  The  inorganic  physical  sciences,  beginning  with 
the  most  general,  and  ending  with  the  most  specific. 

These  we  have  attempted  to  arrange  generally  in 
the   table   in   the   Appendix.*     What   are   called  the 


202  ORDER    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

mixed  sciences  are  only  general  physical  sciences ; 
and  these,  of  course,  would  come  first,  while  chemistry 
and  galvanism  probably  would  occupy  the  most  ad- 
vanced station  in  the  series. 

3.  The  organic  physical  sciences,  including  (1) 
vegetable  physiology,  and  (2)  animal  physiology. 

Anatomy  is  not  a  science,  it  is  a  mere  classification 
forming  a  portion  of  physiology.  Physiology  is  the 
architecture,  (anatomy,)  dynamics,  and  chemistry  of 
organized  bodies  ;  that  is,  architecture,  dynamics,  and 
chemistry  applied  to  the  functions  of  vitality. 

4.  Man  science. 

The  sciences  of  human  action  are, — 

(1.)  A  sensational  and  inductive  science,  called  po- 
litical economy. 

(2.)  A  moral  and  deductive  science,  which  we  call 
politics. 

The  order  in  which  we  have  given  the  sciences 
answers  the  second  question,  namely,  "  "What  is  the 
logical  order  of  the  branches  of  knowledge  in  a 
scheme  of  classification  ?  " 

The  third  question  is,  "  In  what  chronological  order 
have  the  various  branches  been  reduced  to  scientific 
ordination  ?  "  The  chronological  order  in  which  the 
sciences  have  been  discovered,  or  reduced  to  ordina- 
tion, is  correlative  with  the  logical  scheme  of  classifi- 
cation. As  a  history  of  the  actual  evolution  of  the 
sciences  would  be  out  of  place  in  the  present  volume, 
we  must  be  content  with  stating  the  fact,  that  the 
mathematical  sciences  were  first  evolved,  then  the 
more  simple  of  the  physical  sciences;  and  that  the 
progress  of  discovery,  since  the  time  of  Newton  down 


DEPENDENCE    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  203 

to  the  present  day,  has  been,  as  nearly  as  we  could 
possibly  expect,  on  the  very  same  principle  of  com- 
plexity that  forms  the  ground  of  classification.  And 
it  would  not  be  difficult,  we  think,  to  prove  not  only 
that  it  has  been  so,  but  that  it  could  not  possibly  have 
been  otherwise.  Without  geometry,  statics  and  dy- 
namics are  impossible ;  without  statics  and  dynamics, 
hydrostatics  and  hydrodynamics  are  impossible;  and 
without  hydrostatics  and  hydrodynamics,  that  portion 
of  physiology  which  treats  of  the  phenomena  of  vege- 
table and  animal  circulation  is  also  impossible.  Here 
the  one  science  must  precede  the  other  in  chronologi- 
cal discovery,  because  it  is  requisite  to  render  that 
other  science  discoverable.  The  one  is  the  means 
whereby  we  attain  to  the  other,  just  as,  in  a  single 
science,  one  problem  must  be  solved  before  we  can,  by 
any  possibility,  attain  to  the  solution  of  another  prob- 
lem. And  the  law  of  this  dependence  of  one  science 
on  another  is,  that  the  truths  of  the  antecedent  science, 
which  are  the  objects  of  research  when  we  study  that 
science,  become  subjective  —  that  is,  means  of  opera- 
tion—  when  we  study  the  consequent  science. 

It  is  impossible,  therefore,  that  the  sciences  should 
be  discovered  in  any  other  than  a  certain  order ;  that 
is,  man  must  acquire  knowledge  on  a  scheme  which 
has  laws  as  fixed  and  definite  as  the  very  laws  of  the 
sciences  themselves. 

We  may  remark,  however,  in  the  evolution  of  the 
sciences,  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  whole  (all 
that  can  be  known)  of  an  antecedent  science  should 
be  evolved  before  the  elementary  portion  of  the  conse- 
quent science  is  commenced.     When   geometry  has 


204  EVOLUTION    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

made  a  certain  progress,  statics  may  be  commenced ; 
and  thus  the  earlier  portion  of  statics  may  be  evolved 
coincidently  with  the  more  advanced  portion  of  geom- 
etry. Again,  when  inorganic  chemistry  has  made 
a  certain  progress,  organic  chemistry  may  be  com- 
menced ;  and  its  more  elementary  truths  will  be  un- 
dergoing a  process  of  evolution  coincidently  with  the 
more  advanced  truths  of  inorganic  chemistry. 

Thus,  although  the  sciences  are  necessarily  antece- 
dent and  consequent  to  each  other,  they  interweave  or 
overlap  each  other  in  their  chronological  evolution  ; 
just  as  father  and  son  may  be  alive  at  the  same  time, 
yet  the  father  is  necessarily  older  than  the  son.  And 
in  the  evolution  of  the  sciences  we  may  have  several 
generations  on  foot  at  a  given  period ;  we  may  have 
three,  four,  five,  or  six  sciences  all  undergoing  the 
process  of  evolution,  but  all  at  different  stages  of 
progress.  The  first  may  be  tolerably  complete  ;  the 
second  less  so ;  the  third  still  less  so ;  the  fourth  may 
be  but  beginning  to  assume  the  form  of  a  teachable 
branch  of  knowledge ;  the  fifth  only  settling  its  no- 
menclature and  classification ;  while  the  sixth  only 
shows  symptoms  of  commencement,  attracting  per- 
haps a  large  share  of  attention,  but  being  replete  with 
arbitrary  opinion,  superstitious  credence,  and  general 
diversity  of  statement.  When  geometry  was  a  sci- 
ence, astronomy  was  a  superstition ;  and  when  me- 
chanics and  astronomy  were  sciences,  chemistry  was 
a  superstition  ;  and  when  chemistry  had  assumed  the 
form  of  science,  political  economy  was  a  superstition ; 
and  now  that  political  economy  begins  to  assume 
somewhat  of  scientific  ordination,  politics  is  little  bet- 
ter than  a  superstition. 


THE    MARKS    OF    A    SCIENCE.  205 

We  may,  therefore,  have  several  sciences  on  foot  at 
the  same  period,  yet  all  at  different  stages  of  progress. 
And  this  brings  us  to  the  next  question,  — 

"  At  which  branch  or  branches  of  knowledge  are 
the  most  advanced  nations  now  in  the  nineteenth 
century  ?  " 

There  are  several  tests  which  we  may  apply  to  a 
branch  of  knowledge  to  ascertain  whether  it  is  or  is 
not  a  science ;  that  is,  whether  it  is  as  yet  reduced  to 
scientific  ordination. 

1st.  It  must  have  a  definite  province,  so  that  we 
distinctly  understand  what  we  are  reasoning  about.* 

#  The  great  error  of  philosophy  has  been  the  want  of  a  definition. 
Philosophers  have  forgotten  to  tell  us  what  it  really  was  that  they 
were  going  to  treat  of.  It  is  quite  evident  that  thought,  and  the 
laws  of  thought,  are  perfectly  distinct  from  realities,  and  the  laws  of 
realities ;  and  no  science  under  the  same  name  can  be  allowed  to 
treat  of  both.  Philosophers  have  jumbled  the  two  together  in  a 
most  illegitimate  manner;  and  the  consequence  was,  that  when 
they  encountered  something  connected  with  thought  which  they 
could  not  explain,  they  astounded  the  world  with  inconceivable 
assertions  with  regard  to  realities.  Some,  by  this  rather  curious 
process,  discovered  that  there  was  no  matter ;  others,  that  there  was 
no  mind ;  and  some,  though  we  almost  hesitate  to  affirm  it,  dared 
to  call  in  question  the  existence  of  our  divine  Maker,  and  to  de- 
throne the  Lord  of  heaven  and  earth. 

If  philosophy  will  treat  of  thought,  let  it  confine  itself  to  thought ; 
and  if  it  will  treat  of  realities,  let  it  confine  itself  to  realities,  and 
become  theology,  or  any  other  branch  of  knowledge ;  but  we  main- 
tain that  it  is  quite  illegitimate  for  philosophy  to  jump  backwards 
and  forwards,  from  thought  to  reality,  and  from  reality  to  thought. 
Such  a  method  necessarily  produces  inextricable  confusion,  and  the 
very  foundations  of  human  credence  become  shaken  in  the  minds 
of  those  whose  intellectual  constitution  enables  them  to  see  only 
as  far  as  the  difficulty  without  seeing  through  it.  Hume,  perhaps, 
18 


206  PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

2d.  It  must  be  teachable  as  a  branch  of  knowledge. 
For  this  purpose,  its  propositions  must  be  coordinat- 
ed, so  that  we  can  know  whether  we  are  at  the  com- 
mencement, or  how  far  we  have  progressed  beyond 
the  commencement.  Philosophy,  as  yet,  has  scarcely 
a  commencement,  middle,  or  end ;  although  symptoms 
are  beginning  to  show  themselves  that,  ere  long,  we 
may  expect  something  very  much  more  satisfactory. 

3d.  It  must  be  capable  of  subjective  application. 
This  we  consider  to  be  the  proper  criterion  of  the 
state  of  a  science.  If  it  is  incapable  of  application,  it  is 
only  undergoing  the  process  of  discovery;  if  it  is  capa- 
ble of  application,  it  is  so  far  complete.  It  is  then  the 
same  for  all  men  alike,  (there  is  but  one  truth,)  and  it 
becomes  a  means  of  operation  whereby  things  are 
done  which  could  not  otherwise  have  been  done. 

We  ask,  then,  at  what  sciences  are  the  most  ad- 
vanced nations  now  in  the  nineteenth  century  ? 

It  is  evident  that  the  mathematical  sciences,  and 
the  more  general  physical  sciences,  fulfil  the  above 

only  intended  to  puzzle  people ;  and  his  amazing  acuteness  enabled 
him  to  baffle  and  to  mystify  many  an  honest  head.  But  it  was  a 
fearful  amusement :  it  might  be  a  mere  game,  but  it  was  a  fiend's 
game ;  and  although  we  cannot  but  admire  the  clearness  and  purity 
of  Hume's  intellect,  we  have  often  thought  —  and  not  without  re- 
gret—  how  much  greater  and  how  much  better  a  man  he  would 
have  been,  had  he  endeavored,  in  honest  sincerity  of  heart,  to  solve 
tlir  difficulties  as  well  as  to  propound  them.  We  have  no  doubt 
whatever  that  Hume  knew  that  his  sophisms  were  sophisms,  and  in 
his  own  mind  saw  much  farther  through  them  than  he  liked  to 
acknowledge.  Had  Hume  not  been  a  sceptic,  he  might  probably 
have  been  at  the  head  of  all  modern  writers  on  philosophy ;  for  he 
undoubtedly  possessed  that  exquisitely  subtile  intellect,  without 
which  a  man  —  however  great  his  other  acquirements  —  can  never 
be  more  than  a  second-rate  philosopher. 


PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  207 

conditions.  The  question,  then,  is  with  the  advanced 
physical  sciences,  and  with  those  that  follow  them  in 
the  scheme  of  classification. 

Let  us  take  chemistry  as  the  most  advanced  inor- 
ganic physical  science,  and  classify  the  sciences  that 
follow  chemistry  in  the  natural  scheme  of  classifica- 
tion.    We  have  then 

Chemistry. 

Vegetable  physiology. 
Animal  physiology. 
Man  science. 

The  new  term  acquired  in  the  passage  from  the  in- 
organic to  the  organic  sciences,  is  vitality  —  life. 

Vegetable  physiology  presents  itself  under  two  as- 
pects, which  give  us  two  sciences ;  the  one  treating  of 
the  structure  and  functions  of  the  organs  of  plants,  the 
other  of  the  structure  and  functions  of  the  whole  vege- 
table kingdom,  considered  as  one  of  the  great  organs 
of  the  terrestrial  economy. 

A  science,  we  have  said,  contains,  — 

1st.  A  nomenclature.  2d.  A  classification.  3d. 
Reasoning. 

And  the  correlatives  of  these  in  nature  are,  — 

1st.  The  objects.  2d.  Their  conditions.  3d.  Then 
functions. 

Vegetable  physiology,  then,  has  two  forms;  thai 
which  relates  to  the  life,  growth,  and  propagation  of  a 
single  plant,  composed  of  many  organs,  and  that 
which  relates  to  the  vegetable  kingdom,  composed  of 
many  species  of  plants. 

Let  us  designate  these  as  internal  and  external  phys- 
iology, and  we  shall  then  be  able  to  classify  the  various 
branches  of  botany. 


208  PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

A  SCIENCE  IN  GENERAL. 


1.  Nomenclature. 

2.  Classification. 

3.  Reasoning. 

The  objects  described 
and  named. 

Statement  of  the  con- 
ditions and  relations 
of  the  objects. 

Syllogistic   scheme  of 
the  functions  of  the 
objects. 

GENERAL    FORMULA    APPLIED    TO, 

1st.  Internal  Physiology. 


Nomenclature    of   the 
various  parts,  or  or- 
gans, of  the  single 
plants.     Description 
of  the  organs. 

Classification  of  those 
parts,          including 
their         mechanical 
and   chemical  adap- 
tation. 

Function  of  those 
parts  in  the  phe- 
nomena of  life, 
growth,  and  propa- 
gation. 

2d.  External  Physiology. 

Comparative     nomen- 
clature of  the  vari- 
ous  plants    that  in- 
habit     the      globe. 
Comparative      anat- 
omy. 

Classification  of  those 
plants,     and     their 
arrangement. 

Function  of  plants  in 
the  terrestrial  econ- 
omy. 

The  support  of  the  animal  kingdom  is  the  great 
practical  function  of  the  vegetable  kingdom. 

The  same  principles  of  classification  apply  to  ani- 
mal physiology,  where  we  have,  — 

First. 


Nomenclature  and  de- 
scription of  organs. 
Descriptive  anat- 
omy. 


Classification ;  that  is, 
the  organs  assem- 
bled into  apparatus 
—  e.  g.,  digestive  ap- 
paratus, respiratory 
apparatus,  &c. 


Function  of  those 
parts  in  the  phe- 
nomena of  animal 
life. 


Second. 


Comparative  nomen- 
clature of  the  vari- 
ous animals  that 
inhabit  the  globe. 
Comparative  anat- 
omy, and  descrip- 
tion. 


Classification  of  those 
animals,  and  their 
arrangement  into 
groups. 


Function  of  the  ani- 
mal kingdom  in  the 
terrestrial  economy. 


PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  209 

The  individual  nomenclature  of  the  various  plants 
and  animals  is  in  the  first  place  arbitrary,  and  subject 
to  no  rules ;  comparison,  however,  introduces  the  ele- 
ment of  coordination,  and  a  systematic  nomenclature 
is  adopted,  constituting  the  scheme  of  species,  genera, 
classes,  &c. 

It  will  be  observed  that  chemistry,  hydrodynamics, 
&c,  are  absolutely  requisite  before  internal  vegetable 
physiology  can  make  a  scientific  progress.  The  func- 
tions of  the  organs  of  plants  are  explicable  only  in 
and  through  the  perfection  of  the  inorganic  sciences, 
and  the  latter  must  necessarily  be  so  far  advanced  as 
to  be  capable  of  subjective  application  before  the  for- 
mer can  by  any  possibility  be  explained. 

But  if  the  immediate  use  of  plants  in  the  physical 
economy  of  the  earth  be  the  maintenance  of  animal 
life,  external  vegetable  physiology,  which  treats  of  the 
functions  of  the  vegetable  kingdom,  is  the  necessary 
preparation  for  internal  animal  physiology;  no  theory 
of  the  nutrition  of  animals  being  possible  without  first 
of  all  arriving  at  a  knowledge  of  the  nutriment. 
Hence,  also,  the  chemistry  of  inorganic  matter,  and 
the  chemistry  of  vegetable  substances  and  products, 
must  be  evolved  before  there  can  be  a  theory  of  vege- 
table nutrition. 

The  maintenance  of  animal  life  is  the  physical  ulti- 
matum of  the  earth  —  the  last  final  function  of  mat- 
ter. When  we  proceed  beyond  this,  we  arrive  at  a 
region  where  the  functions  are  no  longer  purely  physi- 
cal ;  for  although  man  in  his  political  economy  may 
partly  be  viewed  as  a  higher  kind  of  animal,  yet  his 
functions,  even  in  that  region,  are  essentially  distin- 
18* 


210  PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

guished  from  those  of  animals  by  the  introduction  of 
intellectual  computation.  The  physical  world  may,  it 
is  true,  sustain  mankind  —  may  feed,  clothe,  and  shel- 
ter man's  animal  frame;  but  in  the  production  of  food, 
and  in  its  distribution,  there  is  a  function  of  intelli- 
gence which  prevents  the  maintenance  of  man  from 
being  classed  as  a  mere  physical  phenomenon. 

When,  therefore,  we  turn  to  the  sustentation  of  men 
associated  together  in  society,  we  have  passed  from 
the  region  of  mere  organization,  and  have  entered  the 
sphere  of  rational  intelligence. 

The  science  that  treats  of  the  production  and  distri- 
bution of  food,  and  the  other  physical  requirements  of 
man,  is  termed  political  economy ;  and  the  ultimatum 
of  that  science  is,  "  How  may  the  greatest  physical 
good  be  procured  for  the  greatest  number? "  * 

This  ultimatum  is  not  arbitrary,  as  some  would 
almost  have  us  suppose ;  it  is  the  necessary  end  of  the 
science,  if  that  science  have  any  existence.  Just  as 
we  are  necessarily  led  to  view  the  surface  of  the  earth 
in  its  function  of  sustaining  vegetable  life,  and  the 
vegetable  kingdom  in  its  function  of  sustaining  ani- 
mal life ;  so  are  we  led  by  the  very  laws  of  our  intelli- 
gence to  posit  the  physical  benefit  of  mankind  as  the 

*  It  is  usual  in  Britain  to  confine  the  province  of  political  econ- 
omy to  the  production  of  wealth ;  and  this  view  is  correct  and  con- 
venient, if  the  name  political  economy  be  reserved  for  the  first 
and  simplest  embranchment  of  social  science.  But  as  the  distribu- 
tion must  have  its  laws,  as  well  as  the  production,  those  laws  require 
investigation,  and  a  special  name  must  be  accorded  to  this  portion 
of  social  science,  which  is,  in  fact,  of  greater  practical  importance 
than  the  other. 


PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  211 

ultimatum  to  which  all  economical  arrangements 
should  tend,  if  they  do  not  depart  from  the  very  inten- 
tion which  is  the  ground  and  origin  of  their  existence. 

But  political  economy  is  a  mere  computation  of 
antecedences  and  sequences :  it  tells  what  results  fol- 
low certain  conditions ;  and,  generalizing  its  facts,  it 
at  last  arrives  at  the  laws  which  regulate  the  physical 
condition  of  man,  so  far  as  that  condition  is  the  con- 
sequence of  human  action.  The  utmost  that  it  can 
tell  is,  "  what  means  lead  to  a  certain  end ; "  but  being 
based  purely  on  observation,  it  can  never  lay  on  us  a 
duty,  nor  deter  us  from  a  crime.  Even  in  its  ultima- 
tum, it  can  only  say  that,  if  men  do  not  pursue  their 
advantage,  they  act  irrationally,  but  never  can  it  say 
that  they  act  criminally.  It  computes  the  mechanism 
of  human  action,  but  never  can  determine  the  end  of 
human  action.  Duty  and  crime  are  terms  with  which 
it  has  no  concern,  and  to  which  it  can  attach  no  mean- 
ing. It  is  merely  observational,  and  must  confine  it- 
self as  a  science  to  the  generalization  of  facts,  while, 
when  taken  as  a  practical  rule  of  action,  its  sphere 
extends  no  further  than  the  physical  well-being  of 
mankind ;  and  the  "  benefit  of  the  greatest  number  "  is 
fixed  on,  not  from  any  idea  of  moral  duty,  but  merely 
because  that  ultimatum  exhibits  the  greatest  quantity. 
In  no  sense  is  this  science  one  iota  more  moral  than 
astronomy,  which  furnishes  the  practical  rule  of  navi- 
gation ;  or  geometry,  which  furnishes  the  practical  rule 
of  mensuration.  To  confound  it  with  duty,  is  essen- 
tially to  destroy  its  character  as  an  inductive  science. 

In  answer  to  the  question,  then,  "  At  what  sciences 
are  the  most  advanced  nations  now  in  the  nineteenth 
century  ?  "  we  reply,  — 


212  PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

The  marks  by  which  we  recognize  the  condition  of 
a  science,  and  its  relative  perfection,  are,  — 

1st.  It  must  have  a  definite  province. 

2d.  It  must  be  teachable  as  a  system. 

3d.  It  must  be  capable  of  subjective  application. 
And  a  science  consists  of  a  nomenclature,  classifica- 
tion, and  reasoning.  The  genuine  criterion  of  the 
perfection  of  a  science  is,  that  it  is  capable  of  subjec- 
tive application,  and  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  thus  capable 
can  it  be  considered  perfect. 

A  slight  attention  to  the  recent  labors  of  scientific 
men  will  convince  us  that  chemistry  fulfils  the  above 
conditions ;  that  not  only  have  its  nomenclature  and 
classification  been  tolerably  well  perfected,  but  that  its 
reasoning  is  so  far  advanced  as  to  render  it  capable  of 
application  to  the  regions  that  lie  beyond  it.  Here  it 
is  only  necessary  to  refer  to  the  researches  of  Liebig 
and  his  fellow-laborers  in  the  region  of  chemico- 
physiology. 

Vegetable  physiology  is,  and  must  ever  be,  conse- 
quent on  chemistry  and  electricity  ;  and,  being  logically 
consequent,  must  also  be  chronologically  subsequent 
in  the  order  of  its  discovery ;  that  is,  of  its  reduction 
to  scientific  ordination.  If  chemistry,  therefore,  have 
only  been  recently  rendered  capable  of  subjective  ap- 
plication, We  must  naturally  expect  that  vegetable 
physiology  shall  present  a  less  degree  of  perfection ; 
and  that,  at  all  events,  some  years  must  elapse  before 
it  shall  be  so  completely  developed  as  to  change  from 
an  object  of  study  to  an  instrument  of  operation. 

But  vegetable  physiology,  although  necessarily  pos- 
terior to   chemistry,   and    in    the    present  day   only 


PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  213 

undergoing  its  process  of  evolution,  is  already  further 
advanced  than  chemistry  was  one  hundred  years  since. 
As  the  various  sciences  are  necessarily  antecedent  and 
subsequent  to  each  other,  so  are  the  various  parts  of  the 
same  science  necessarily  antecedent  and  subsequent ; 
and  when  we  analyze  vegetable  physiology  into  its 
various  parts,  we  find  that  the  earlier  portions  have 
already  assumed  the  form  of  scientific  ordination. 

Vegetable  physiology  consists  of  mechanics,  (in- 
cluding architecture,  statics,  dynamics,)  chemistry, 
and  electricity,  applied  to  the  objects  endowed  with 
vegetable  life ;  and  the  ultimate  object  of  research  is, 
the  explanation  of  the  process  by  which  the  functions 
of  life,  growth,  and  propagation  are  carried  on.  In  the 
architecture  we  have  the  enumeration,  nomenclature, 
and  description  of  the  organs ;  in  the  mechanics  we 
have  their  adaptation  for  the  performance  of  certain 
functions;  and  in  the  chemistry  and  electricity  we 
have  a  physical  explanation  of  certain  phenomena 
which  take  place  under  the  influence  of  life,  but  by 
means  of  the  laws  which  regulate  the  world  of  inor- 
ganic matter. 

In  determining,  therefore,  the  position  occupied  by 
vegetable  physiology  at  the  present  time,  we  must 
bear  in  mind  that  the  portions  of  that  science  stand 
logically  in  the  following  order :  — 

Nomenclature  of  organs. 

Description  of  organs. 

Mechanical  functions. 

Chemical  and  Electrical  functions. 
Of  these,  the  first  three  are  so  far  advanced,  that 
although  formal  improvements  may  be  expected,  yet 


214  PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

the  knowledge  may,  for  the  most  part,  be  said  to  be 
obtained;  and  the  question  that  remains  is,  rather 
how  that  knowledge  should  be  reduced  to  the  most 
simple  and  most  convenient  expression.  The  fourth 
is  now  occupying  the  attention  of  many  eminent 
men,  and  the  progress  already  made  is  sufficient  to 
assure  us,  not  only  that  the  right  track  has  been  dis- 
covered, but  that  ere  long  the  chemistry  of  vegetation 
will  be  so  far  advanced  as  to  form  the  instrument  of 
investigation  into  the  chemistry  of  animal  organiza- 
tion. In  fact,  very  considerable  progress  has  already 
been  made  in  the  latter  direction. 

External  vegetable  physiojogy  consists  of  compara- 
tive nomenclature  of  all  known  plants. 

Classification  of  plants. 

Function  of  plants  in  the  terrestrial  economy. 

The  two  former  of  these  are  achieved,  although 
probably  susceptible  of  formal  improvement.  The 
latter  is  undergoing  a  process  of  evolution. 

As  we  have  only  proposed  to  ourselves  to  indicate 
the  outline  of  an  argument  without  insisting  on  its 
details,  we  need  scarcely  advert  to  the  prodigious 
labor  expended  on  a  knowledge  of  the  structure  of 
animal  bodies,  or  to  the  astonishing  accuracy  with 
which  some  men  have  made  themselves  acquainted 
with  anatomy,  both  human  and  comparative.  Anat- 
omy, as  we  have  already  said,  is  not  a  science ;  it  is 
merely  the  nomenclature  and  classification  of  the  sci- 
ence of  physiology;  and  as  such  it  would  probably 
have  been  considered,  had  it  not  received  an  acci- 
dental character  from  its  connection  with  the  medical 
art.     Had  anatomy  been  studied  for  purely  scientific 


PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  215 

purposes,  (and  not,  as  now,  for  the  purpose  of  alleviat- 
ing human  suffering,  or  preventing  human  dissolution,) 
its  entire  subserviency  to  what  is  termed  physiology- 
would  probably  have  been  acknowledged,  and  it 
would  no  more  have  been  called  a  science  than  the 
description  of  the  lines  and  figures  of  geometry.  It  is 
merely  the  description  of  the  substantives  whose 
functions  form  the  subject  of  future  investigation. 

At  what  point,  then,  is  the  present  generation  in 
its  knowledge  of  animal  physiology  ? 

The  distinction  we  have  drawn  between  internal 
and  external  physiology,  will  enable  us  to  allocate 
the  various  portions  of  zoology.  Internal  physiology 
discourses  of, — 

1st.  The  constituent  organs  of  animal  bodies. 

2d.  The  conditions  of  those  organs. 

3d.  Their  function. 

And  the  science  presents  these  under  the  form  of,  — 

1st.  Nomenclature  and  description  of  the  organs. 

2d.  Classification  of  the  organs. 

3d.  Reasoning.  That  is,  the  syllogistic  statement  of 
a  scheme  whereby  the  actually  observed  phenomena 
would,  when  stated  in  language,  follow  logically  from 
the  premises.  One  premiss  being  the  expression  of  a 
cause,  force,  or  generalized  fact;  and  the  other,  the 
expression  of  the  conditions  of  the  organs  functioning. 

It  might,  perhaps,  be  too  much  to  assert  that  the 
nomenclature,  description,  and  classification  of  the 
organs  of  animal  bodies  had  arrived  at  a  state  of 
perfection ;  but  these  branches  have  undoubtedly  ar- 
rived at  a  state  of  ordination  which  is  likely  to  remain 
permanent,  unless,  indeed,  a  general  revolution  of 
scientific  nomenclature  should  at  some  future  period 


216  PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

be  agreed  upon.  The  knowledge  is  obtained;  and 
when  we  consider  the  manner  in  which  a  nomencla- 
ture necessarily  grows  out  of  a  mass  of  the  most  het- 
erogeneous materials,  derived,  perhaps,  from  a  multi- 
tude of  languages,  it  may  fairly  be  asserted  that  that 
knowledge  is  presented  in  as  perfect  a  form  as  could 
reasonably  have  been  expected. 

When  we  turn  to  the  functions  of  the  organs  of 
animal  bodies,  we  find  that  the  principle  of  progressive 
complexity,  which  we  have  assumed  as  the  basis  of  our 
argument,  still  aids  us  in  allocating  the  various  por- 
tions of  the  same  science,  and  enables  us  to  under- 
stand how  one  portion  of  physiology  happens  to 
evolve  chronologically  before  another.  Thus  geometry 
is  necessarily  anterior  to  optics,  and  optics  necessarily 
anterior  to  the  physiology  of  the  eye,  both  logically 
and  chronologically.  Again,  the  general  principles  of 
mechanics  must  first  be  ascertained  before  an  explana- 
tion can  be  given  of  the  action  of  the  muscles  on  the 
bones,  and  of  the  motions  that  result  from  that  action. 

But  optics  can  explain  only  a  portion  of  the  func- 
tions of  the  eye.  The  eye  contains  solid  and  liquid 
parts,  which  not  only  refract  light,  but  which  have  a 
chemical  composition.  And  mechanics  can  explain 
only  a  portion  of  the  phenomena  of  muscular  action. 
And  thus,  although  the  geometry  of  vision  may  be 
tolerably  perfect,  and  a  satisfactory  explanation  is 
given  of  the  result  of  muscular  action,  there  is  a 
course  of  inquiry  that  lies  beyond  both  optics  and 
mechanics,  in  which  those  sciences  can  afford  no  in- 
formation. When  the  muscular  force  is  generated, 
and  acts  in  a  particular  direction,  its  results  may  be 
explicable  on  the  same  principles  that  apply  to  non- 


PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  217 

vital  forces  acting  on  non-organic  portions  of  matter. 
But  according  to  what  laws  is  the  muscular  force  itself 
generated  ?  And,  when  generated,  does  it  act  in  any- 
such  similar  manner  to  voltaic  electricity,  as  would 
enable  us  to  conclude  that  the  motion  resulted  from  a 
galvanic  power  acting  on  nervous  cords  and  muscular 
fibres,  as  they  are  shown  to  be  disposed  by  the  scalpel 
and  the  microscope  ? 

As  we  do  not  pretend,  in  the  slightest  degree  what- 
ever, to  discourse  upon  science,  but  only  on  the  prin- 
ciples that  must  pervade  the  classification  of  the 
sciences,  and  the  theory  of  the  order  in  which  they 
must  chronologically  evolve,  we  need  only  refer  to  the 
fact,  that  within  these  few  years  the  dynamics  of  the 
blood  and  the  chemistry  of  the  blood  have  been  made 
subjects  of  special  research,  and  that  they  are  now 
undergoing  their  process  of  evolution  and  reduction 
to  scientific  ordination.* 


*  Among  other  labors,  we  may  refer  to  those  of  Magendie  on 
the  dynamics  of  the  blood,  and  to  those  of  Andral  and  Gavarret  f 
on  its  chemistry.  But,  in  addition  to  these,  we  have  only  to  turn 
over  the  advertising  pages  of  the  medical  journals  to  be  convinced 
that  physiology  is,  as  it  were,  laboring  to  assume  a  more  definite 
and  more  satisfactory  form.  As  straws  are  said  to  indicate  the  di- 
rection of  the  current,  so  we  may  infer  some  notion  of  the  direction 
in  which  physiological  science  is  progressing,  from  the  titles  of  the 
works  that  daily  issue  from  the  press.  Works  are  now  produced 
whose  very  titles  would  have  been  unintelligible  half  a  century 
since.  Such  titles  as  "  Electro-Biology  "  are  at  all  events  indica- 
tions ;  they  show  us,  however  insignificant  might  be  their  real  mer- 
its, that  the  human  mind  is  directing  its  efforts  towards  a  region 
altogether  unknown  to  our  ancestors. 

f  J.  L.  Gavarret,  author  of  the  "  General  Principles  of  Medical  Statistics." 

19 


218  PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 

The  general  principle  which  we  conceive  to  pervade 
the  evolution  of  the  various  portions  of  physiology  is 
this  :  "  In  the  same  order  that  the  non-organic  sciences 
have  themselves  been  reduced  to  ordination,  will  they 
be  applied  to  the  phenomena  of  animal  life." 

And  in  endeavoring  to  determine  the  present  posi- 
tion of  animal  physiology,  we  shall,  perhaps,  not  be 
far  from  the  truth  if  we  reckon  the  nomenclature  of 
the  organs  and  the  description  of  the  organs  to  be 
tolerably  complete,  the  explanation  of  the  mechanical 
functions  to  have  made  very  considerable  progress,  and 
the  chemical  and  electrical  functions  to  be  now  attract- 
ing a  large  share  of  the  attention  of  scientific  men. 

We  now  turn  for  a  moment  to  what  we  have  termed 
external  animal  physiology,  which  consists  of 

Comparative  nomenclature  of  all  known  animals. 

Comparative  description  and  classification  of  ani- 
mals. 

Function  of  animals  in  the  terrestrial  economy. 

And  here,  perhaps,  it  would  be  unsafe  to  assert  that 
more  has  been  achieved  than  the  nomenclature;  for, 
although  there  is  no  doubt  a  classification,  that  classifi- 
cation is  open  to  such  serious  objections,  that  naturalists 
themselves  are  beginning  to  acknowledge  the  necessity 
of  revising  it,  and  constructing  it  on  principles  more 
sound,  because  more  in  accordance  with  the  great 
analogies  of  nature. 

To  take  one  instance,  which  will  suffice  for  our 
purpose. 

If,  among  the  birds,  the  first  rank  be  accorded  to  the 
birds  of  prey,  (the  eagles,  vultures,  hawks,  &c.,)  and 
not  to  those  birds  in  which  the  nervous  system  is  most 


PRESENT    POSITION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  219 

highly  developed,  and  the  manifestation  of  intelligence 
most  apparent,  (the  parrots,  &c.,)  why,  on  the  same 
principle  of  classification,  is  not  the  first  rank  among 
the  mammifers  accorded  to  the  beasts  of  prey,  (the 
lions,  tigers,  wolves,  &c.,)  which,  among  quadrupeds, 
are  the  undoubted  representatives  or  correlatives  of  the 
eagles  and  vultures  ? 

If  the  relative  development  of  the  nervous  system 
determine  the  rank  among  the  mammifers,  no  good 
reason  can  be  alleged  why  it  should  not  also  do  so 
among  the  birds ;  and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the 
anomaly  that  now  prevails  must  give  way  to  a  more 
consistent  system,  which  shall  take  the  analogies  of 
nature  as  its  basis,  instead  of  any  fanciful  notions 
about  the  nobility  of  the  eagle. 

Were  we  to  hazard  an  opinion  on  this  head,  which 
we  can  only  do  as  looking  at  these  subjects  from  a 
distance,  we  might  express  a  conviction  that  the  prin- 
ciples of  classification  proposed  by  that  amiable  and 
accomplished  naturalist,  Dr.  Kaup  of  Darmstadt,  are 
those  which  must  ultimately  prevail. 

Human  physiology  is  the  last,  the  highest,  and  the 
most  complex  of  all  the  physical  sciences.  It  is  the 
termination  of  man's  intellectual  labors,  so  far  as 
regards  the  universe  of  matter.  It  is  the  ultimatum 
of  material  manifestation,  the  final  type  of  complex 
arrangement,  the  summit  beyond  which  we  leave  the 
material  world,  and  enter  into  a  new  region  of  thought. 
Nor  is  it  merely  a  metaphor  to  say,  that  "  man  is  the 
epitome  of  the  world."  Every  science  that  precedes 
human  physiology  is  necessary  to  the  complete  under- 
standing of  the  human  frame.     That  frame  has  parts 


220  POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

—  number  is  involved ;  those  parts  have  quantity  and 
extent  —  algebra  and  geometry  are  involved ;  the  body 
may  move  or  be  at  rest  —  dynamics  and  statics  are 
involved ;  the  motions  of  solids,  liquids,  and  aeriform 
fluids  are  involved ;  optics,  acoustics,  chemistry,  elec- 
tricity, and  galvanism  all  play  their  parts  in  elucidat- 
ing the  phenomena  of  the  wondrous  mechanism.  But, 
granting  that  human  physiology  is  the  last  and  most 
complex  of  all  the  physical  sciences,  has  man  no  fur- 
ther region  into  which  he  may  push  his  inquiries,  and 
extend  the  field  of  intellectual  research  ? 

Man  has  his  functions  —  What  are  their  laws  ? 


SECTION    II. —  DETERMINATION    OF    THE    CHARACTER,  PO- 
SITION,   AND    BOUNDARIES    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

§  I.  General  Observations.  —  The  most  simple 
functions  of  man,  and  those  which  naturally  fall  to 
be  considered  first,  are  those  in  which  he  acts  on  the 
external  world. 

First.  Man  may  act  on  the  physical  world  that  sur- 
rounds him.  These  actions,  when  systematized,  con- 
stitute the  mechanical  arts,  chemical  arts,  &c.  Under 
this  head  are  assembled  agriculture,  navigation,  man- 
ufactures, trade,  commerce,  systems  of  locomotion, 
fisheries,  mines,  &c. ;  in  fact,  all  those  occupations  in 
which  man  is  employed  for  the  purpose  of  extracting 
from  the  earth  the  objects  he  requires,  or  of  distrib- 
uting or  transforming  them  for  his  legitimate  remu- 
neration. 


POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  221 

[Some  of  the  French  writers  have  most  appositely- 
termed  this  "  l'exploitation  de  la  terre  par  Pindustrie," 
in  opposition  to  "l'exploitation  de  l'homme  par 
l'homme,"  When  such  expressions  come  to  be  placed 
in  opposition  to  each  other,  it  needs  no  prophet  to  tell 
us  that  the  present  social  systems  must  soon  undergo 
a  radical  revision.] 

Second.  Man  may  act  on  man. 

This  he  may  do  either  mediately  or  immediately. 
Mediately,  when,  at  the  same  time  that  he  is  engaged 
in  the  above  occupations,  he  reacts  on  his  fellow-men 
through  those  occupations,  either  to  their  benefit  or 
prejudice.  Immediately,  when  he  acts  on  his  fellow- 
men  by  constraint,  restraint,  compulsion,  violence, 
fraud,  or  defamation. 

The  principles  involved  in  man's  action  on  man  are 
included  under  the  term  social  science  or  politics,  when 
those  terms  are  taken  in  a  general  signification. 

Social  science  is  divided  into  two  embranchments  ; 
namely,  political  economy,  the  object-noun  of  which 
is  social  utility ;  and  politics  proper,  the  object-noun 
of  which  is  equity. 

The  problem  of  political  economy  is  to  discover  the 
laws  (generalized  facts)  which  preside  over  human 
actions,  where  there  is  no  direct  interference  between 
man  and  man. 

The  problem  of  politics  is  to  discover  the  laws 
(principles  of  the  reason)  which  ought  to  preside  over 
human  actions  in  the  matter  of  interference. 

In  both  sciences,  human  actions  are  the  substan- 
tives with  which  we  reason.     In  endeavoring  to  deter- 
mine the  present  position  of  man  in  his  knowledge  of 
19* 


222  POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

political  economy  and  politics,  we  must  premise  that 
we  here  approach  the  region  where  superstition,  and 
not  science,  prevails. 

Knowledge  is  credence  based  on  sufficient  evidence, 
and  superstition  is  credence  without  sufficient  evidence. 

No  truth  can  be  more  satisfactorily  established  by 
history  than  that  man  is  gradually  emerging  from 
superstition  —  gradually  emancipating  himself  from 
those  unfounded  credences  which  have,  in  every  de- 
partment of  science,  enslaved  his  intellect  and  misdi- 
rected his  actions.  It  is  too  much  the  practice,  how- 
ever, of  this  age  to  indulge  in  self-adulation,  and  to 
imagine  fondly,  that  the  light  which  has  begun  to 
dawn  has  dispelled  all  the  darkness  from  the  atmos- 
phere of  knowledge.  Men  seem  to  think  that,  because 
they  can  now  look  rationally  at  the  phenomena  of 
nature,  they  have  read  the  whole  riddle  of  the  uni- 
verse ;  that  they  are  the  wise  men ;  that  superstition 
no  longer  enfolds  them;  and  that,  from  their  high 
monument  of  wisdom,  they  can  look  back  on  their 
credulous  fathers,  and  smile  complacently  in  the  vast- 
ness  of  their  own  superiority. 

Great,  no  doubt,  has  been  the  emancipation  of  mind 
from  religious  and  natural  superstition ;  but  we  should, 
indeed,  be  sitting  down  in  contented  ignorance,  were 
we  to  imagine  that  superstition  does  not  now  enslave 
us  in  the  same  manner  that  it  enslaved  our  forefathers, 
except  that  her  domain  has  been  removed  a  little  far- 
ther onward.  Supers!  it  ion  has  retired  just  as  the  sci- 
ences have  been  reduced  to  ordination — just  as  they 
have  emerged  from  the  chaos,  and  been  moulded  into 
form  by  the  intellect  of  man.     In  the  very  same  order, 


POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  223 

and  to  the  very  same  extent,  and  at  the  same  chrono- 
logical period  that  the  sciences  have  appeared,  has 
superstition  gradually  retired,  and  taken  her  new  stand 
in  those  fields  of  thought  where  the  reason  of  man- 
kind had  not  yet  beheld  the  divine  light  of  truth. 
"When  the  mathematical  sciences  had  made  some  good 
progress,  the  physical  sciences  were  yet  in  the  womb 
of  futurity,  and  their  place  was  occupied  by  a  series 
of  superstitions.  These  superstitions  retired,  but  re- 
tired only  gradually  as  science  lit  her  peaceful  lamp  in 
the  various  chambers  of  nature.  And  now  is  it  at  all 
difficult  to  find  superstition  ?  to  point  out  the  region 
she  still  occupies  ?  to  show  where  vast  systems  of  cre- 
dence are  as  baseless  as  the  credence  of  the  alchemist, 
and  vast  systems  of  action  are  founded  on  the  base- 
less credence  ? 

The  whole  realm  of  political  science  is  as  yet  little 
better  than  a  superstition ;  and  though  humanity  is 
perpetually  making  convulsive  throes  to  escape  from 
the  evils  entailed  by  the  erroneous  credence,  we  may 
rest  surely  convinced  that  those  evils  will  never  be 
obliterated  until  the  human  intellect  has  fairly  mastered 
the  theory  of  man's  political  relations,  and  reduced  that 
theory  to  universal  application. 

Nor  do  we  here  refer  to  any  theory  which  we  our- 
selves may  advance.  Our  views  may  be  true,  or  they 
may  be  false.  We,  of  course,  believe  them  true ;  but, 
be  they  true  or  false,  we  lay  down  the  proposition  in 
the  most  general  signification,  that  the  evils  that 
afflict  the  large  masses  of  the  population  never  can  be 
obliterated  until  man's  reason  has  mastered  the  theory 
of  man's  relation  to  man,  and  until  he  has  reduced 


224  POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

the  principles  of  political  science  to  practical  realiza- 
tion in  the  constitution  of  society. 

To  observe  the  manner  in  which  men  legislate, — 
and  legislators,  be  they  who  they  may,  are  only  men, 
—  we  should  naturally  be  led  to  the  conclusion,  that 
there  was  no  truth  and  no  falsehood  in  political  science. 
How  otherwise  can  we  explain  the  circumstance,  that 
laws  are  perpetually  undergoing  a  process  of  change  ? 
A  law  enacted  only  a  few  years  since,  is  now  found 
to  be  incorrect  —  so  bad,  in  fact,  that  it  must  be  abol- 
ished. In  that  law,  perhaps,  the  interests  of  millions 
were  involved;  yet,  notwithstanding,  legislators  are 
allowed  to  make  these  vast  experiments  with  the 
property  and  the  liberties  of  their  fellow-men  on  no 
surer  ground  than  opinion,  which,  in  the  great  majority 
of  cases,  is  mere  presumptuous  superstition.* 

Truth,  in  fact,  has  almost  as  little  to  do  with  legis- 
lation as  it  had  with  alchemy  or  astrology ;  and  this 
is  the  case,  whatever  may  be  the  real  matter  of  truth. 
According  to  law  in  England,  the  Episcopalian  church 
is  the  true  church ;  truth,  according  to  law,  is  in  the 
Thirty-nine  Articles ;  the  bishop  is  not  only  a  church- 
man, but  a  legislator  —  a  member  of  the  supreme  Par- 
liament, and  a  ruler  of  the  state.  But  in  another  part 
of  Britain  the  church  of  England  is  not  the  true 
church,  it  is  a  scandalous  hierarchy,  because  in  the 
northern  part  of  Britain  the  Presbyterian  church  is  the 
true  church ;  truth,  according  to  law,  is  in  the  Con- 
fession of  Faith ;  and  the  bishop,  so  far  from  even 

*  Since  the  beginning  of  the  present  century,  there  have  been 
passed  between  Jive  ami  mx  thousand  public  acts  of  Parliament 


POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  225 

being  entitled  to  reverence,  is  a  vile  intruder  on  the 
equal  rights  of  his  brethren.  He  would  not  be  al- 
lowed to  address  his  fellow- Christians  from  the  legal 
pulpits  of  the  legal  church ;  he  is  a  "  dumbe  dogge," 
a  small  pope,  a  hireling  shepherd ;  he  is,  in  fact,  that 
incarnation  of  Presbyterian  abhorrence  —  a  prelate. 

In  Ireland,  again,  (unfortunate  Ireland!)  Popery  — 
which  is,  root  and  branch,  totally  false  in  England 
and  Scotland  —  is  partially  legally  true ;  and  perhaps, 
by  and  by,  it  is  going  to  be  more  true.  Not  that 
it  can  be  true  in  England,  because  the  law  cannot 
allow  that;  but  that  it  may  be  true  in  Ireland  —  or 
true  enough,  at  all  events,  for  Ireland  —  as  any  thing 
does  for  Ireland.* 

Now,  is  it  any  thing  else  than  mere  superstition 
that  allows  any  legislature  whatever  to  establish  sys- 
tems of  propositions  which  are  legally  true  in  one  part 
of  the  kingdom,  legally  false  in  another?  Whatever 
is  true,  it  is  quite  evident  that  truth  did  not  preside  at 
the  legislation  —  that  truth  was  not  the  basis,  the 
ground,  the  reason  of  the  legislation.  But  if  truth 
did  not  preside  at  the  legislation,  what  did  preside? 
Superstition. 

Again :  God  gave  the  earth  to  the  children  of  men. 
Now,  is  it  true  that  the  gift  of  a  king  (a  man,  with  a 
different  name)  is  a  good  title  to  as  much  land  as 
would  support  a  thousand  families;  that  the  legisla- 

*  "  The  quantity  of  specie  coined  in  the  reign  of  James  I.  was 
about  £5,432,000 ;  of  which  £3,666,000  was  in  gold,  and  £1,765,000 
in  silver.  It  still  continued  the  practice  to  issue  some  base  money  for 
the  use  of  Ireland." — Wade,  p  173.  Yes,  truly;  and  it  has  long 
continued  the  practice  to  issue  base  money  for  the  use  of  Ireland* 


226  POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

ture  (other  men)  should  enact  a  law  to  secure  that 
land  in  perpetuity  to  the  descendants  of  the  person 
who  received  the  gift ;  that  this  person  and  his  heirs 
should  be  called  proprietors  of  that  land,  and  should, 
by  the  law,  be  treated  as  such ;  that  from  that  portion 
of  the  earth's  surface  all  other  persons  are  excluded  by 
the  law,  save  only  those  who  have  the  permission  of 
the  proprietor;  that  this  proprietor  may  be  always 
absent  from  that  land,  and  yet  that  he  is  to  receive 
from  the  cultivators  of  the  land  the  rent  —  that  is,  the 
profit  that  God  has  graciously  been  pleased  to  ac- 
cord to  human  industry  employed  in  the  cultivation 
of  the  soil  ?  Is  this  true,  or  is  it  only  a  mere  ground- 
less superstition  that  lies  at  the  bottom  of  nine  tenths 
of  the  evils  of  society?  It  cannot  be  right,  unless 
there  is  a  principle  of  truth  on  which  the  system  is 
based ;  yet  where,  either  in  the  study  of  external  na- 
ture, or  of  man,  or  of  revelation,  can  we  find  true 
propositions  on  which  to  base  so  iniquitous  a  system  ? 
Again :  Is  it  true  that  a  deliberative  assembly, 
chosen  by  a  small  part  of  the  population,  has  a  right 
—  in  morals,  or  religion,  or  any  other  measure  of  right 
and  wrong  —  to  determine  that  the  legislators  of  the 
country  shall  be  chosen  by  certain  individuals,  whose 
number,  at  the  utmost,  does  not  amount  to  more  than 
one  fourth  of  the  adult  male  population  of  the  coun- 
try ?  Is  it  true  that  this  deliberative  assembly  has  an 
equitable  right  to  prevent  the  other  three  fourths  of  the 
adult  male  population  from  having  any  voice  in  the 
election  of  those  who  are  to  tax  their  labor?  Is  it 
true  that  those  three  fourths  of  the  adult  male  popula- 
tion are,  in  any  way  whatever,  morally  bound  to  obey 


POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  227 

a  deliberative  assembly  chosen  and  elected  in  this 
manner  ?  Is  this  true,  or  is  it  only  a  portion  of  that 
more  general  superstition  which  once  pervaded  all  the 
physical  sciences,  but  which  has  now  been  driven  be- 
fore the  advance  of  knowledge,  and  obliged  to  take 
refuge  in  the  regions  of  politics  and  religion  ? 

Again :  the  present  age  is  one  in  which  we  hear 
much  of  a  "  surplus  population,"  a  "  redundant  popu- 
lation," &c,  while  it  seems  to  be  forgotten  that  the 
man  who  can  earn  his  daily  bread  can  never  be  redun- 
dant, while  the  man  who  consumes  vast  revenues, 
without  working  for  them,  must  necessarily  be  so. 
This  redundant  population,  finding  the  difficulties  and 
miseries  of  a  residence  in  their  native  country  more 
painful  than  even  expatriation  and  removal  to  another 
hemisphere,  begin  to  emigrate  to  Australia.  A  Solon 
of  a  political  economist,  theorizing  on  the  terms  labor, 
capital,  supply,  demand,  &c,  arrives  at  the  conclusion 
that  one  square  mile  of  the  earth's  surface  is  the  exact 
quantity  that  should  be  sold  to  the  emigrant,  and  that 
the  best  of  all  possible  prices  for  that  land  is  exactly 
one  pound  sterling  per  English  statute  acre.  The 
governors  of  this  country,  convinced  of  their  own 
ignorance,  and  happy  to  listen  to  a  man  who  can  dis- 
course fluently  on  such  mysterious  matters  as  labor 
and  capital,  determine  to  apply  the  magic  formula; 
and  thenceforth  no  man  who  cannot  purchase  one 
square  mile  of  land,  at  one  pound  per  English  stat- 
ute acre,  is  allowed  to  settle  down  and  earn  his  liveli- 
hood in  one  vast  district  of  the  southern  hemisphere. 
Is  it  true,  or  is  it  false,  that  a  few  men  in  England 
have  the  right  to  impose  such  a  restriction   on  the 


228  POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

liberties  of  mankind  ?  Is  any  other  evidence  required 
than  that  furnished  by  the  Wakefield  system,  that  polit- 
ical economy,  in  its  practical  application,  is  at  present 
only  a  superstition  —  a  mere  tissue  of  the  most  arbi- 
trary and  groundless  propositions,  not  one  iota  better 
than  the  propositions  of  judicial  astrology? 

Again :  the  legislators  of  Britain  (who  at  that 
period  represented  a  very  small  fragment  of  the  pop- 
ulation) enacted  laws  against  the  supply  of  food  from 
foreign  countries.  Millions  of  pounds  sterling  were 
involved  in  the  operation  of  the  laws,  and  millions 
of  persons  were  affected  in  the  price  of  their  daily 
food.  Some  years  later,  the  population  discovered  the 
effect  of  the  enactments,  and  the  governors  were 
obliged  to  abolish  them,  because  the  masses  would  no 
longer  tolerate  their  existence.  Now,  is  it  true,  or 
false,  that  any  men,  call  them  what  you  will,  have 
the  right  to  make  these  vast  experiments  ?  Are  not 
these  cases,  and  many  others,  exactly  similar  to  the 
cases  in  which  rulers  have  attempted  to  make  a  true 
or  a  false  theology,  —  a  true  or  a  false  system  of 
astronomy,  —  or  a  true  or  a  false  system  of  nature, 
when  they  persecuted  sorcerers,  and  devoted  the  vic- 
tim to  the  fagot  and  the  flames  ? 

Again  :  What  is  the  whole  system  of  criminal  legis- 
lation now  carried  into  force  in  Great  Britain  ?  What 
is  it  but  a  great  superstition,  an  arbitrary  superstition, 
where  there  is  no  regulative  principle  for  the  intellect 
to  rest  upon  ?  Why  should  one  criminal  be  fined, 
another  imprisoned,  another  transported,  and  another 
hanged  ?  Is  there  any  connection,  either  inductive  or 
deductive,  between  the  crimes  and  the  punishments  ? 


POLITICAL    ECONOMY.  229 

Is  the  allocation  of  the  punishment  based  upon  any 
principle  that  connects  just  such  a  kind,  and  such  a 
quantity,  with  the  offence  ?  Is  not  the  selection  of 
the  punishment  arbitrary;  that  is,  dependent  not  on 
any  principle  discoverable  in  nature,  but  dependent  on 
vague  and  groundless  opinion  —  that  is,  superstition  ? 
Crimes  are  the  maladies  of  society,  and  punish- 
ments are  the  medicines  which  laws  administer  for 
their  correction.  Now,  are  the  recipes  at  present  in 
use  in  politics  one  atom  less  arbitrary,  less  supersti- 
tious, or  less  absurd,  than  were  the  recipes  of  medicine 
two  hundred  years  since  ?  Could  we  see  things  pres- 
ent in  the  same  light  that  we  see  things  past,  we 
should  regard  the  affected  wisdom  of  legislators  and 
lawyers  with  the  same  ridicule  and  contempt  so  lav- 
ishly bestowed  on  the  quacks,  diviners,  and  necro- 
mancers of  a  former  age.  Where  there  is  no  truth  to 
rest  upon,  there  can  only  be  error  or  superstition. 

§  II.  The  Province  and  Position  of  Political  Econ- 
omy.—  Entering  our  protest,  therefore,  that  the  regions 
of  political  economy  and  politics  are  at  present  per- 
vaded by  endless  superstitions,  we  shall  endeavor  to 
point  out  the  position  of  the  present  generation  in  its 
attempts  to  evolve  those  sciences. 

First.  The  object-noun  of  political  economy  has 
been  ascertained,  and  definitions  have  been  attempted 
of  the  substantives  of  the  science ;  that  is,  attempts 
have  been  made  to  describe  and  classify  the  objects 
with  which  men  must  reason  when  they  reason  in 
political  economy. 

Second.  Large  masses  of  facts  have  been  collected 
20 


230  POLITICAL    ECONOMY. 

relating  to  a  variety  of  subjects.  These  have  been 
collected  with  more  or  less  accuracy,  and  arranged 
with  more  or  less  judgment.  In  some  cases,  tabulated 
forms  have  been  produced  which  leave  little  or  noth- 
ing to  be  desired  on  the  score  of  accuracy,  purity,*  and 
facility  of  manipulation.  In  other  cases,  immense 
records  of  facts  have  been  accumulated,  of  so  hetero- 
geneous a  character,  or  involving  so  many  separate 
considerations,  that  conclusions  altogether  incompati- 
ble with  each  other  are  drawn  from  them  to  serve  the 
purposes  of  the  political  reasoners. 

Third.  In  some  cases,  the  aid  of  mathematics  has 
been  called  in  to  methodize  the  facts,  and  to  determine 
the  general  value  of  the  inferences  that  we  are  entitled 
to  draw  from  them. 

1st.  Of  the  object-noun  of  political  economy. 

Every  proper  science  has  an  object-noun,  and  the 
exclusive  end  and  intention  of  the  science  is  to  dis- 
cover and  reduce  to  logical  order  the  relations  that 
exist  between  the  substantives  of  the  science  in  that 
object-noun.  Thus,  arithmetic  treats  of  relations  in 
number;  geometry,  of  relations  in  space,  (position, 
direction,  and  extent ;)  dynamics,  of  relations  in 
force,  &c. 

Political  economy  then  treats  of  relations  in  social 
utility,  and  we  ask,  "  What  are  the  relations  of  this, 
that,  and  the  other  action,  or  system  of  action,  in  so- 
cial utility?"  The  answer  to  this  question  belongs 
exclusively  to  the  science  of  political  economy.     [The 

*  By  purity,  we  mean  that  the  facts  are  strictly  comparable  ;  th  it 
improper  facts  have  been  left  out. 


POLITICAL    ECONOMY.  231 

same  action  may  be  judged  in  social  utility,  or  in 
equity;  in  the  former  case  we  are  engaged  with  a 
question  of  political  economy;  in  the  latter,  with  a 
question  of  politics.  Endless  ambiguities  and  discus- 
sions arise  from  confounding  the  one  science  with 
the  other.] 

2d.  We  now  ask,  "  With  what  do  we  reason  ? 
What  are  the  substantives  of  the  science  ?  " 

Political  economy  is  entirely  and  exclusively  con- 
versant with  human  actions. 

We  reason  with  human  actions  in  social  utility. 
Social  utility  is  the  object-noun  of  the  science,  and  the 
forms  of  human  action  are  the  subject-nouns,  which 
are  to  be  named,  classed,  and  reasoned  with* 

Wherever  human  action  is  not  involved,  there  is  no 

*  Thus,  the  cultivation  of  the  earth  is  a  form  of  human  action ; 
trading  is  a  form  of  human  action ;  restrictive  laws  and  prohibitory 
laws,  when  carried  into  execution,  are  forms  of  human  action. 
These  forms  have  to  be  classified ;  and  science  is  achieved  when 
the  classified  forms  are  made  to  function  in  a  rational  scheme  — 
that  is,  when  the  premises  expressed  in  language  will  produce, 
logically,  such  consequents  as  are  actually  observed  to  take  place 
in  the  real  world. 

In  the  external  world  we  observe  antecedence,  coincidence,  and 
subsequence,  (or  antecedent  events,  coincident  events,  and  subse- 
quent events  ;)  but  the  mind  alone  furnishes  the  idea  of  consequence, 
(causation,)  and,  as  the  stream  of  time  rolls  on,  with  the  whole 
functions  of  nature  going  on  coincidently,  we  require  to  observe 
what  antecedents  are  invariably  followed  (and  in  all  circumstances) 
by  certain  subsequents,  and  thus  to  arrive  at  particular  causes  and 
particular  effects.  For  this,  the  classification  of  events  is  requisite, 
and  when  they  are  arranged  into  species  and  genera,  they  become 
capable  of  functioning  in  a  logical  scheme,  which  scheme  consti- 
tutes science. 


232  POLITICAL    ECONOMY. 

political  economy.  Whatever  results  from  the  general 
action  of  the  laws  of  the  non-human  universe,  does 
not  belong  to  political  economy.  The  goodness  or 
badness  of  a  climate,  the  fertility  or  non-fertility  of  the 
soil,  the  existence  of  coal,  iron,  or  other  minerals  — 
these  in  no  respect  whatever  enter  the  science  of  polit- 
ical economy,  except  just  in  so  far  as  they  are  affected 
by  human  action.  The  fertility  of  the  soil  produced  by 
human  industry,  the  production  of  iron,  the  cultivation, 
manufacture,  and  commerce  of  cotton,  wheat,  tea, 
sugar,  sheep,  cattle,  wool,  &c.,  &c,  —  all  these  enter 
into  political  economy,  because  they  represent  certain 
forms  of  human  action,  which  have  an  appreciable 
value  in  social  utility. 

The  destruction  of  all  the  sheep,  for  instance,  and 
all  the  people  in  a  highland  district,  by  a  storm  or  by 
a  dreadful  convulsion  of  the  elements,  would  in  no 
respect  enter  into  the  science  of  political  economy. 
But  the  abolition  of  the  sheep,  and  the  abolition  of 
the  population,  by  the  so-called  proprietor,  under  the 
sanction  of  British  law,  and  the  conversion  of  the  dis- 
trict into  a  game  desert,  does  enter  into  political  econ- 
omy ;  and  when  we  ask  the  questions,  "  Is  this  act 
socially  beneficial  or  prejudicial  ?  "  and,  "  Are  the  laws 
that  grant  a  legal  power  to  perform  such  acts  by  force 
socially  beneficial  or  prejudicial  ?  "  we  reason  in  politi- 
cal economy. 

These  same  acts  and  laws  may  also  be  judged  of 
in  equity ;  but  in  that  case  we  have  passed  from  politi- 
cal economy  to  true  politics. 

Political  economy,  then,  is  the  science  that  treats  of 
human  function.     Where  human  function  is  not  in- 


POLITICAL    ECONOMY.  233 

volved,  we  are  not  engaged  with  political  economy. 
But  then  there  is  a  limitation  on  the  other  hand. 
Political  economy  is  a  non-moral  science,  and  in  no 
case  can  be  allowed  to  pronounce  a  moral  judgment. 
All  that  it  can  ever  tell  us  is,  whether  certain  actions 
or  systems  of  action  are  beneficial,  indifferent,  or  preju- 
dicial ;  and  when  the  terms  right  and  wrong,  (adjec- 
tives,) ought,  &c,  are  employed,  they  are  used  to  indi- 
cate correctness  or  incorrectness  in  social  utility. 

Acts  of  interference,  whether  by  law,  or  merely  by 
the  individual,  belong  properly  to  the  science  of  poli- 
tics, but  they  may  also  be  legitimately  judged  of 
through  the  medium  of  political  economy.  In  the  one 
mode,  however,  we  reason  synthetically,  as  in  geome- 
try ;  in  the  other  mode  we  reason  empirically,  as  if  we 
were  to  infer  the  general  properties  of  figures  from  an 
induction  of  the  actual  properties  presented  by  an  in- 
definite multitude  of  individual  figures.  The  practical 
difference  is  this.  By  treating  a  question  of  interfer- 
ence by  the  rules  of  equity,  we  arrive  at  once  at  a 
conclusion ;  whereas,  when  it  is  treated  by  the  rules 
of  utility,  it  may  require  many  years,  many  observa- 
tions, and  many  disputations  as  to  facts,  before  a  con- 
clusion can  be  drawn.  The  equity  of  the  slave  trade 
is  a  question  so  simple,  that  few  intelligent  men  could 
fail  to  settle  it  satisfactorily  in  a  few  minutes ;  but  the 
economy  of  the  trade  would  require,  and  did  require, 
many  years  to  settle  it ;  and  even  now  there  are  not 
wanting  hundreds  who,  on  economical  principles,  would 
defend  both  the  trade  and  the  condition  of  slavery. 
Although  perfect  knowledge  in  both  sciences  would, 
no  doubt,  lead  to  exactly  the  same  practical  conclu- 
20* 


234  POLITICAL    ECONOMY ITS    POSITION. 

sion,  the  argument  of  economy  is  sometimes  set  up 
against  the  argument  of  equity.  The  concise  reply  to 
such  a  mode  of  proceeding  is  this,  "  If  equity  have  any 
existence  at  all,  its  rules  are  necessarily  imperative" 
Deny  the  imperative  nature  of  equity,  and  you  obliter- 
ate all  morals.* 

Now,  where  there  is  no  interference  between  man 
and  man,  no  judgment  in  equity  can  possibly  be  pro- 
nounced. Where  there  is  no  interference,  (and  nothing 
that  enters  religion,)  economy  gives  the  canon ;  she 
holds  the  balance,  and  pronounces  judgment,  because 
the  question  belongs  to  the  jurisdiction  of  her  court. 
But  where  there  is  interference,  we  can  have  a  judg- 
ment in  equity ;  and  where  we  can  have  a  judgment 
in  equity,  no  economical  considerations  whatever  (even 
if  it  were  not  true  that  the  just  coincides  with  the  ben- 
eficial) can  ever  relieve  man  from  the  imperative  obli- 
gation. The  moment  it  was  admitted  that  economical 
considerations  should  outweigh  the  judgment  in  equity, 
that  moment  is  man's  moral  nature  obliterated,  and  he 
becomes  an  animal  a  little  superior  to  the  orang- 
outang. 

We  now  turn  to  the  mode  in  which  political  econ- 
omy is  usually  presented.  Utility  is,  no  doubt,  the 
object  of  investigation ;  but  what  is  its  measure,  what 
is  its  criterion,  what  are  the  marks  by  which  we  know 
an  action  to  be  beneficial  or  prejudicial  ? 

*  It  is  true,  however,  that  the  argument  of  economy  has  a  far 
more  powerful  influence  on  the  world  than  the  argument  of  equity. 
Men  are  not  satisfied  with  the  logical  determination  of  right  and 
wrong ;  they  must  have  a  picture  as  well  as  a  specification ;  they 
must  have  the  evils  portrayed  in  all  their  malignity  before  they  res- 
olutely determine  to  amend  them. 


POLITICAL    ECONOMY ITS    OBJECT.  235 

According  to  some  writers,  we  should  imagine  that 
utility  was  measured  according  to  the  wealth  produced. 
Value,  labor,  capital,  wages,  profit,  rent,  &c,  are  the 
substantives  of  their  science;  and  the  production  of 
wealth  appears  to  be  the  end,  the  sum  and  substance, 
the  object  of  their  desires. 

We  deny,  from  beginning  to  end,  this  view  of  polit- 
ical economy.  It  has  some  truth  in  it  —  the  begin- 
nings of  truth  ;  but  such,  in  the  general,  is  no  more 
the  end  of  political  economy,  than  the  determination 
of  the  chances  in  gambling  was  the  end  of  the  calcu- 
lation of  probabilities. 

We  assert  —  and  we  have  no  doubt  whatever  that 
this  view  will  ultimately  obtain  the  suffrages  of  all  — 
that  the  welfare  of  man  is  the  end  of  political  economy. 

To  this  it  may  be  replied,  that  the  production  of 
wealth  is  the  means ;  and  that  all  economists  intend 
to  include  the  welfare  of  man  as  a  matter  of  course. 

We  deny  the  whole  theory  from  beginning  to  end. 

We  assert  that  the  production  of  man,  and  man  in 
a  continually  higher  condition,  is  the  object,  the  end, 
the  ultimatum  of  the  science. 

Let  us  suppose  that  one  thousand  families  were 
employed  in  the  cultivation  of  one  hundred  thousand 
acres  of  land  ;  that  they  lived,  maintained  themselves 
in  decent  plenty,  reared  their  families  in  health,  indus- 
try, honesty,  and  those  manly  qualities  which,  among 
the  agricultural  population  of  Great  Britain,  have 
assumed  a  higher  character  than  in  any  other  portion 
of  the  earth's  inhabitants.  Suppose  that  this  popula- 
tion produce  only  as  much  as  suffices  for  the  plentiful 
support  of  all  the  individuals.     Good.     There  is  not, 


236  POLITICAL    ECONOMY ITS    OBJECT. 

on  the  average  of  twenty  years,  any  superabundance 
that  can  be  called  accumulated  profit. 

This  population,  according  to  some  political  econo- 
mists, would  be  a  most  unproductive,  most  useless 
portion  of  society.* 

*  "  In  1709,  an  application  was  made  to  Parliament  for  an  act 
to  divide  and  enclose  the  common  fields  and  wastes  belonging  to 
the  parish  of  Ropley.  This  served  as  an  encouragement  and 
example ;  and  applications  of  the  same  kind  became  annually  more 
frequent.  It  appears  that,  since  that  period,  very  nearly  four  thou- 
sand bills  of  enclosure  have  been  passed ;  and  it  is  also  well  known 
that,  in  numerous  instances,  the  same  end  has  been  reached  without 
legislative  interference,  by  private  agreement  among  the  parties 
interested.  In  a  word,  we  have  scarcely  a  doubt  that  about  five 
thousand  parishes  (a  moiety  of  the  whole  territory  of  England)  have 
been  subjected  to  the  operation  of  these  measures  in  the  space  of 
about  one  hundred  and  twenty  years ;  and  as  little  (however  bene- 
ficial the  division  and  consequent  improvement  of  this  vast  territory 
may  have  proved  to  the  owners,  and  to  some  other  classes)  that  the 
change  has  been  a  woful  one  for  our  peasantry.  We  believe  that 
the  final  extinction  of  the  class  of  small  occupiers  and  crofters  has, 
in  almost  every  instance,  followed  the  division  of  common-field 
parishes.  Several  small  farms  have  been  consolidated  into  one ; 
and  the  little  farmer  has  been  either  metamorphosed  into  a  cotton 
spinner,  or,  continuing  perhaps  to  occupy  his  old  farm-house  with- 
out any  land  attached  to  it,  lingers  as  a  day  laborer  on  the  soil 
which  he  once  rented.  Similar  in  character  has  been  the  effect  of 
this  change  upon  the  condition  of  the  cottager.  Before  the  division 
and  enclosure  of  the  district,  every  cottager  possessed  a  common 
right  of  some  extent  —  a  right,  for  instance,  to  turn  out  a  cow,  a 
pig,  a  few  sheep  and  geese,  upon  the  wastes  of  the  parish :  most 
of  them  were  in  possession  of  small  crofts,  which  supplied  the  cow 
with  winter  fodder;  where  this  did  not  happen  to  be  the  case,  the 
cottager  either  purchased  hay  for  her  keep,  or  paid  for  her  run  in 
the  straw  yard  of  some  neighboring  farmer.  Hence  it  is  clear  that, 
under  the  above  system,  not  only  the  little  farmer,  but  also  the 


POLITICAL    ECONOMY —  ITS    OBJECT.  237 

We  deny  the  fact.  This  population  has  reared  and 
produced  men. 

Suppose,  again,  the  great  body  of  this  population 
should  be  set  to  spin  cotton,  smelt  iron,  grind  cutlery, 
and  weave  stockings;  that  at  these  occupations,  by 
incessant  toil,  they  should  produce  not  only  as  much 
as  support  them,  but  one  half  more ;  according  to 
political  economists,  these  occupations  would  be  in- 
comparably more  profitable  than  the  agricultural  occu- 
pations, and  consequently  much  better  for  society. 

We  deny  the  fact,  and  scout  the  inference.  The 
production  of  man,  and  of  man  in  his  best  condition, 
is  the  physical  ultimatum  of  the  earth ;  and  any  sys- 
tem whatever  that  sacrifices  the  workman  to  the 
work  —  the  man  who  produces  the  wealth  to  the 
wealth  produced  —  is  a  monstrous  system  of  mis- 
directed intention,  based  on  a  blasphemy  against 
man's  spiritual  nature. 

The  whole  system  of  modern  manufacture,  with 
its  factory  slavery ;  its  gaunt  and   sallow  faces ;  its 

humblest  cottager,  drew  a  very  considerable  portion  of  his  sub- 
sistence directly  from  the  land.  His  cow  furnished  him  with  what 
is  invaluable  to  a  laborer  —  a  store  of  milk  in  the  summer  months ; 
his  pig,  fattened  upon  the  common  and  with  the  refuse  vegetables 
of  his  garden,  supplied  him  with  bacon  for  his  winter  consumption ; 
and  there  were  poultry  besides.  It  has  been  very  much  the  fashion 
to  decry  the  advantages  which  accrued  from  the  enjoyment  of 
common  rights ;  but  to  him  who  has,  and  who  fortunately  wants, 
but  little,  a  trifle  is  of  importance.  This  trifle  amounted,  probably 
to  half  the  subsistence  of  the  man's  family. 

•  And  buirdly  chields  and  clever  hizzies 
Were  bred  in  sic  a  way  as  this  is.'  " 

quart.  Rev.  July,  1829. 


238  THE    WELFARE    OF    MAN. 

half-clad  hunger;  its  female  degradation;  its  abor- 
tions and  rickety  children ;  its  dens  of  pestilence  and 
abomination  ;  its  ignorance,  brutality,  and  drunken- 
ness; its  vice,  in  all  the  hideous  forms  of  infidelity, 
hopeless  poverty,  and  mad  despair,  —  these,  and,  if  it 
were  possible,  worse  than  these,  are  the  sure  fruits  of 
making  man  the  workman  of  mammon,  instead  of 
making  wealth  the  servant  of  humanity  for  the  relief 
of  man's  estate. 

The  day  is  not  far  distant  when  the  labor  of 
England  will  hold  her  court  of  justice;  let  those  who 
may  await  the  sentence  of  the  tribunal. 

That  system  of  political  economy  which  makes 
wealth,  and  not  man,  the  ultimatum,  is  based  on  a 
monstrous  fallacy  —  on  a  fallacy  so  slavish  and  so  de- 
testable, that  the  wonder  is,  how  accomplished  and 
personally  amiable  men  can  be  found  as  its  abettors. 

The  fallacy  is,  in  taking  the  rents  of  the  land- 
lords, and  the  profits  of  the  capitalists,  as  the  meas- 
ures of  good  and  evil,  instead  of  taking  the  condition 
of  the  cultivators,  and  the  condition  of  the  laborers, 
(the  many,)  as  the  sure  index  of  the  character  of  a 
system. 

Whatever  tends  to  debase  man,  to  make  him  physi- 
cally, intellectually,  or  morally  a  lower  being,  is  bad, 
however  much  or  however  little  the  wealth  produced 
may  be.*     The  wealth  is  not  the  stable  element;  it 

*  The  distribution  of  wealth  is  a  question  of  incomparably  more 
importance  than  even  its  production.  This  appears  a  paradox. 
It  is  not  so,  however.  Place  man  on  the  earth,  and  it  is  his  nature 
to  produce  wealth.  Hunger  and  want  will  impel  him ;  and  as  his 
intellect  becomes  more  and  more  enlightened,  and  his  ingenuity 


GROWTH    OF    ECONOMY.  239 

is  an  accidental,  and  by  no  means  the  most  important, 
adjunct.  Man  is  the  stable  element.  His  condition 
is  the  standard ;  his  improvement  is  a  good  ;  his  dete- 
rioration is  an  evil. .  And  this,  independently  of  all 
other  considerations.  All  other  considerations  are 
secondary,  dependent,  subsidiary  to  the  great  intention. 
Man  is  not  useful  as  he  produces  wealth,  but  wealth 
is  useful  as  it  sustains  man,  ameliorates  his  condition, 
improves  his  capacities,  gives  opportunities  for  his 
further  cultivation,  and  aids  his  progress  in  the  great 
scheme  of  human  regeneration. 

Such  views,  then,  of  political  economy  as  make 
wrealth  the  ultimatum,  (and  this  wealth,  be  it  always 
remembered,  is  the  wealth  of  the  land  owner,  the  mill 
owner,  the  iron  master,  &c,  and  not  the  wealth  of  the 

becomes  greater  under  the  influence  of  the  enlightened  intellect, 
his  arrangements  will  be  more  complex,  more  far-sighted,  more  in- 
dependent of  any  sudden  shocks  or  derangements  that  might  accrue 
from  accident.  Great  advantage,  of  course,  attends  the  study  of 
the  best  mode  of  producing  wealth.  In  the  distribution,  however, 
another  circumstance  has  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  All  histo- 
ry proves  man  to  be  a  fallen  creature.  No  theory  of  human  nature 
can  stand  for  a  moment,  that  does  not  admit  man's  fallen  condition. 
Such  theories  invariably  lead  to  endless  contradictions,  because 
they  cannot  explain  the  facts  and  phases  of  human  manifestation. 
Now  man  as  a.  fallen  creature,  though  necessarily  impelled  to  pro- 
duce wealth,  more  or  less,  is  also  tempted  to  commit  injustice.  The 
strong  individual  appropriates  more  than  his  equitable  share  at  the 
expense  of  the  weak  individual ;  and  all  privileged  classes  are 
merely  classes  of  individuals  who  have  obtained  more  land,  or  more 
power,  or  more  license  than  equitably  could  have  been  assigned  to 
them.  The  laws  of  distiibution  are  of  incomparably  more  practical 
importance  than  the  laws  of  production,  and  the  public  mind  will 
not  allow  many  years  to  elapse  without  bringing  them  to  vehement 
discussion. 


240  A  NATURAL  SYSTEM  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMf. 

multitude  of  human  laborers,)  are  merely  the  begin- 
nings of  the  science  of  political  economy.  This  sci- 
ence, like  every  other,  must  pass  through  its  stages; 
it  must  have  its  errors,  its  superstitions,  its  partial 
truths,  its  truths  misunderstood,  before  it  comes  forth 
as  a  system  over  which  man  has  no  power  of  control, 
but  which  he  must  contemplate  as  a  system  of  truth 
designed  by  the  Creator  of  the  world  for  the  instruc- 
tion of  his  intellect,  and  the  improvement  of  his 
condition. 

Political  economy  is  now  struggling  to  assume  a 
position  among  the  sciences.  It  is  daily  growing, 
daily  assuming  a  more  definite  form,  and  daily  shaking 
off  those  questions  that  do  not  belong  to  it,  although 
so  intimately  allied  with  it  that  they  are  sure  to  occur, 
over  and  over  again,  to  its  cultivators. 

That  it  i3  a  science  in  the  same  sense  in  which 
chemistry  is  a  science,  no  person  can  for  a  moment 
maintain.  But  so  much  has  already  been  done,  that 
any  day  might  see  it  transformed  by  the  hand  of 
some  master,  and  presented  to  the  world  in  the  aspect 
of  a  teachable  branch  of  knowledge,  capable  of  appli- 
cation to  the  great  problems  of  legislation. 

At  the  same  time  we  must  remark,  that  the  natural 
science  of  political  economy  has  labored  under  the 
immense  disadvantage  of  collecting  facts  which  were 
not  the  result  of  nature's  operations,  but  which  were, 
in  a  great  measure,  the  result  of  human  legislation, 
which  varied  from  time  to  time,  and  from  country  to 
country.  The  statistics  of  the  corn  trade,  for  instance, 
and  consequently  the  statistics  of  the  price  of  corn 
throughout   Britain,   were    encumbered   with   sliding 


A  NATURAL    SYSTEM    OF    POLITICAL    ECONOMY.     241 

scales,  fixed  duties,  and  all  the  other  concomitants 
which  the  aristocratic  rulers  of  the  country  have  in- 
vented for  the  purpose  of  taxing  labor  instead  of  land. 
Now,  nature  has  no  sliding  scales  to-day,  and  fixed 
duties  to-morrow.  She  acts  harmoniously ;  and  the 
study  of  her  facts  is  not  disturbed  by  the  considera- 
tion of  causes  which  may  vary  indefinitely.  Had 
matter  gravitated  towards  matter  according  to  a 
sliding  scale  at  one  period,  and  according  to  a  fixed 
scale  at  another,  and  according  to  no  scale  at  all  at  a 
third,  it  is  at  all  events  questionable  whether  even 
Newton  would  have  been  able  to  unravel  the  intricacy 
of  her  laws.  Consequently  we  must  regard  the  labors 
of  political  economists  with  lenity,  nor  must  we  de- 
mand from  them  the  same  unity  of  credence  which 
we  expect  from  the  chemist,  the  anatomist,  or  the 
physiologist,  because  a  disturbing  force  of  variable 
character  has  interfered  with  the  objects  of  their  inves- 
tigation. At  a  future  period,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  political  economy  will  assume  exactly  the  same 
form  and  ordination  as  the  other  sciences,  and  that 
the  economist  will,  to  a  great  extent,  drive  from  the 
field  both  the  demagogue  and  the  legislator  who 
makes  laws  on  opinion. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  political  economy, 
however,  we  have  one  remark  to  offer.  God  has 
given  to  man,  and  to  the  world,  a  certain  constitution. 
By  the  laws  which  God  has  established  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  world,  certain  consequences  follow 
certain  antecedents.  All  human  laws  whatever  are 
attempts  to  alter  the  natural  arrangement,  and  to  sub- 
stitute some  other  consequent,  which,  according  to 
21 


242     A    NATURAL    SYSTEM    OF    POLITICAL    ECONOMY. 

the  ordinary  course  of  nature,  would  not  have  followed. 
It  is  therefore  evident  that  man,  in  making  laws,  must 
have  the  most  clear  and  perfectly  justifying  reason  for 
so  doing ;  or  otherwise  he  is  attempting  to  controvert 
the  arrangements  of  the  Almighty,  and  to  substitute 
human  arrangements  for  those  that  are  divine.  Many 
of  the  evils  of  society  are  mainly  to  be  traced  to  the 
disturbing  influence  which  human  laws  have  exercised 
on  the  natural  arrangements  of  Providence. 

On  the  conveyance  of  the  productions  of  one  coun- 
try to  another,  for  instance,  God  has  placed  certain 
restrictions.  Distance  must  be  overcome,  storms  must 
be  encountered,  and  risks  of  various  kinds  must  be 
incurred.  Suppose  that  the  whole  of  the  natural  risks 
amount  to  one  fifth  of  the  cost  price  of  the  articles. 
[God,  in  giving  man  ingenuity,  has  given  him  a  power, 
not  of  diminishing  distance  or  abolishing  storms,  but 
of  continually  improving  the  means  of  transport,  and 
thereby  diminishing  the  natural  risk.  But  let  us  sup- 
pose that,  at  a  given  period,  the  risk  did  amount  to  a 
fifth  of  the  cost  price  of  the  article.] 

Now,  what  has  man  done  ?  Has  he  accepted  the 
conditions  under  which  God  allowed  him  to  exercise 
his  ingenuity?  Has  he  thankfully  taken  the  good, 
and  endeavored  to  diminish  its  cost  as  much  as  the 
circumstances  of  the  earth  allow  ?  Or  has  he,  on  the 
contrary,  taken  the  conditions  such  as  they  were  pre- 
sented in  nature,  and  vastly  increased  that  part  of  the 
liability  which  it  was  man's  constant  interest  to  dimin- 
ish ?  According  to  the  laws  of  nature,  (or  of  God,  the 
author  of  nature,)  the  condition  annexed  to  the  supply 
of  the  foreign  goods  was  the  payment  of  one  fifth  of 


LAWS  OF  NATURE  DERANGED  BY  MAN.      243 

the  cost ;  but  man,  by  restrictive  laws,  customs,  duties, 
&c,  increases  the  cost  of  supply  to  two  fifths,  or  a 
half,  or  a  whole,  or  perhaps  double,  the  cost  price  of 
the  articles* 

We  are  fully  aware  that,  to  many,  this  mode  of 
viewing  restrictive  laws  will  appear,  at  all  events,  irrel- 
evant ;  at  the  same  time,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that, 
so  long  as  restrictive  laws  of  this  character  are  allowed 
to  exist,  man  must  suffer.  We  do  not  say  that  the 
persons  who  make  the  laws  will  suffer,  that  they  will 
be  poorer,  or  that  they  will  reap  the  inconvenience  of 
the  arrangements.  Their  pecuniary  interests  are  often 
diametrically  opposed  to  the  welfare  of  the  great  body 
of  the  population.  But  so  long  as  any  legislators 
whatever  are  allowed  to  originate  restrictions,  and 
thereby  vastly  to  increase  the  cost  of  those  natural 
productions  which  the  population  requires,  the  great 
body  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  country  must  be  in  a 

*  The  mode  in  which  the  taxation  of  articles  of  consumption 
operates,  is  thus  set  forth  by  the  Liverpool  Financial  Reform 
Association :  — 

Cost  of  tea,  per  pound,  - 

Add  profit,  25  per  cent.,  - 
Duty,  per  pound,        - 

Add  profit  on  the  duty,  - 

Price  to  consumer,  instead  of  Is.  3d.,  -  -  4  0 
Those  who  are  interested  in  the  facts  of  politics  (and  who  is  not?) 
will  find  the  best  account  of  the  present  political  condition  of  Brit- 
ain in  Wade's  "  Unreformed  Abuses  in  Church  and  State."  Lon- 
don :  E.  Wilson.  Price  2s.  6d.  This  is,  perhaps,  the  best  exposi- 
tion of  the  fruits  of  aristocratic  government  that  has  issued  from 
the  press. 


s. 

d. 

1 

0 

0 

3 

2 

2* 

0 

6* 

244      LAWS  OF  NATURE  DERANGED  BY  MAN. 

worse  condition  than  Providence  intended,  in  a  worse 
condition  than  they  would  have  been  had  there  been 
no  such  laws,  and  in  a  worse  condition  than  they 
would  have  been  had  the  arrangements  of  nature  been 
left  to  themselves,  and  not  interfered  with  by  the  enact- 
ments of  the  legislators. 

There  is  the  greatest  possible  difference  between 
taking  advantage  of  the  laws  of  nature,  and  originat- 
ing- laws.  It  is  not  man's  office  to  originate  laws. 
God  has  made  the  laws,  and  given  man  an  intellect  to 
discover  and  apply  them.  As  well  may  man  make 
laws  in  the  physical  sciences,  or  in  theology,  as  in  po- 
litical economy.  It  is  true  he  may  make  laws  and 
enforce  them  ;  but  what  he  never  can  do  is,  to  make 
the  operation  of  those  laws  beneficial  to  the  world. 
This  is  beyond  his  power ;  and,  though  the  laws  may 
be  for  the  pecuniary  advantage  of  the  privileged  classes 
of  a  country,  they  are  necessarily  followed  by  a*  con- 
comitant series  of  evils,  which  bear  on  the  masses  of 
the  population. 

The  great  truth  which  political  economy  will  ulti- 
mately teach  is  this :  "  That  God  has  constituted  na- 
ture aright ;  that  it  is  man's  interest  to  take  advantage 
of  the  arrangements  of  nature  according  to  the  laws 
which  God  has  established  in  the  world ;  that  all  hu- 
man laws  originating  in  man  are  prejudicial  arrange- 
ments, which  interfere  with  the  course  of  nature ;  that 
all  such  laws  ought  universally  to  be  abolished,  so  that 
man  may  have  free  scope  to  extract  the  maximum  of 
benefit  from  the  earth."  Social  arrangements  for  the 
benefit  of  all  are  not  laws  —  they  are  adaptations  of 
the  laws  of  nature.     These  are  requisite  for  society ; 


THE    ULTIMATUM    OF    POLITICAL    ECONOMY.         245 

and  to  these  arrangements,  legislation,  in  its  economi- 
cal aspect,  ought  to  be  exclusively  confined.  When 
men  persecute  each  other  on  account  of  their  religious 
tenets,  (either  by  positive  infliction  or  by  exclusion 
from  civil  rights,)  they  make  laws  —  they  originate 
laws ;  when  they  make  it  a  crime  to  kill  a  wild  animal, 
they  originate  laws ;  when  they  tax  the  population  for 
the  support  of  a  national  creed  and  national  ceremo- 
nial, they  originate  laws ;  when  they  allow  the  king  to 
grant  fifty  or  a  hundred  thousand  acres  of  the  nation's 
land  to  an  individual,  they  originate  laws.  There  are 
no  such  laws  as  these  in  nature ;  no  such  laws  in  rea- 
son ;  no  such  laws  in  Scripture.  They  are  mere  hu- 
man inventions,  having  no  truth  to  rest  upon ;  they 
are  the  productions  of  man  during  the  era  of  su- 
perstition. 

But,  on  the  contrary,  when  men  make  light-houses 
for  the  protection  of  maritime  commerce  —  public  har- 
bors /or  the  safety  of  ships,  seamen,  and  cargoes  — 
when  they  make  a  police  to  watch  —  when  they  pave, 
light,  and  clean  towns  —  when  they  make  roads  and 
arrangements  for  communication  —  when  they  support 
such  national  defences  as  are  judged  requisite  at  any 
given  time  —  when  they  support  judges  and  other  offi- 
cers to  administer  the  laws  of  justice  —  when  they  do 
these,  and  many  other  similar  acts,  at  the  common 
expense,  and  enforce  the  payment,  they  do  not  make 
laws.  They  make  only  such  arrangements,  based  on 
the  laws  of  nature  or  equity,  as  are  deemed  fitting  at 
a  given  period;  they  take  advantage  of  the  world, 
such  as  they  find  it,  and  endeavor  to  evolve  from  it  a 
greater  amount  of  good  than  they  could  do  individu- 
21* 


246  POLITICS    PROPER. 

ally,  were  there  no  such  social  arrangements.  Men 
may  make  laws,  if  they  will ;  but  what  they  cannot  do 
is,  to  make  good  to  follow  them. 

§  III.  The  Province  and  Position  of  Politics  Proper, 
—  From  political  economy  we  turn  to  politics.  Here 
we  approach  the  argument  that  a  millennium,  or  reign 
of  justice  on  the  earth,  is  a  natural  event ;  that  it  be- 
longs to  the  course  of  human  evolution  ;  that  it  is  com- 
putable on  the  very  same  principles  that  men  employ 
to  compute  other  events  ;  that  it  may  be  inferred  from 
the  past  history  of  human  progression,  which  gives  us 
the  actual  line  of  progress,  and  from  the  logical  ordi- 
nation of  the  sciences,  which  gives  us  the  abstract  line 
of  progress. 

First,  then,  we  have  to  determine  the  position  of 
politics  in  the  scheme  of  classification.  Before  doing 
so,  however,  we  must  remark  that  no  science  of  poli- 
tics, whatever  be  its  form,  or  whatever  be  its  matter, 
can  hope  to  meet  with  impartial  investigation.  What- 
ever may  be  the  real  system  of  truth,  (and  a  truth 
there  must  be  somewhere,)  that  system  cannot  fail  to 
controvert  the  opinions  of  multitudes,  and  to  be  favor- 
able or  unfavorable  to  the  pecuniary  interests  of  mul- 
titudes. A  few  there,  may  be  who  are  able  to  look 
calmly ;  but  the  minds  of  the  vast  majority  are  occu- 
pied by  habitual  prepossessions,  which,  in  spite  of 
every  effort  of  the  will,  prevent  the  intellect  from  shak- 
ing off  its  fetters.  What  they  have  been  accustomed 
to,  or  one  short  step  beyond  what  they  have  been  ac- 
customed to,  is  the  extent  of  their  intellectual  horizon. 
All  beyond  is  a  fabulous  region  of  mysterious  portent  — 


TRUTH    PROGRESSIVE.  247 

an  Ultima  Thule,  whose  thick  waters  are  unnaviga- 
ble  —  a  land  of  darkness,  which  perhaps  some  of  our 
far-off  descendants  may  possibly  visit,  but  which  we 
can  never  hope  to  explore. 

Admit  the  fact  of  human  progression,  however,  (nor 
can  it  reasonably  be  denied,*)  and  all  the  objections, 
and  all  the  difficulties  connected  with  the  habitual  cre- 
dence of  a  present  generation,  vanish  into  air.  Let 
political  truth  be  what  it  may,  it  cannot  receive  general 
adoption  at  any  period.  It  must  grow;  it  must  be 
suggested,  misunderstood,  denied,  discussed,  adopted 
in  part,  rejected  in  part,  re-discussed,  further  adopted, 
and  so  on.  Were  any  generation  of  men  (constituted 
as  men  now  are,  and  manifesting  similar  tendencies  to 
what  may  every  where  be  observed)  to  continue  to  live 
on  instead  of  being  replaced  by  successive  generations, 
it  appears  highly  probable  that  the  progression  of  man 
would  be  for  the  most  part  arrested,  or,  at  all  events,  it 
would  be  much  less  rapid  than  at  present.  In  general, 
men  form  their  opinions  young,  and  adhere  to  them  for 
the  remainder  of  their  lives.  New  intellect  must  be 
brought  forward,  with  its  elasticity,  its  inquisitive 
scepticism,  and   its   ardent  desire  to  form   a   system 

#  It  may  be  necessary  distinctly  to  reiterate,  that  by  human  pro- 
gression we  do  not  mean  the  progression  of  man's  nature,  but  the 
progression  of  man's  knowledge,  and  the  progression  of  his  system- 
atic arrangements.  We  are  well  aware  that  there  is  a  doctrine 
which  teaches  the  progressive  improvement  of  human  nature.  And 
even  this  latter  doctrine  appears  to  be  so  far  correct,  that  the  higher 
sentiments  of  human  nature  come  more  and  more  into  general 
action  the  more  men  depart  from  barbarism.  But  that  any  amount 
of  natural  improvement  will  make  man  other  than  a  fallen  creature, 
is  out  of  the  question. 


248  TRUTH    PROGRESSIVE. 

satisfactory  to  itself.  It  also,  in  time,  fixes  its  cre- 
dence, and  a  new  generation  is  required  to  continue 
the  onward  progress,  and  to  pioneer  the  way  into  new 
regions  of  thought.  Truths,  which  the  last  generation 
regarded  as  wild  romances,  or  as  destructive  instiga- 
tions of  the  devil,  are  by  the  next  adopted  in  sober 
earnest,  and  beheld  as  links  in  the  vast  chain  of  natu- 
ral revelation,*  which,  century  after  century,  goes  on 
unfolding  itself. 

Doubts,  disputes,  denials,  and  diversity  of  opinion, 
therefore,  are  of  little  importance.  They  are  natural ; 
they  must  come.     They  are  the  modes  in  which  man 

#  We  use  the  term  natural  revelation  intentionally,  not  for  the 
purpose  of  putting  science  on  an  equality  with  Scripture  revelation, 
but  for  the  purpose  of  redeeming  it  from  sensational  degradation- 
The  grand  question  of  philosophy  is,  whether  the  material  world 
furnishes  only  a  summation  of  sensual  impressions,  or  whether  it 
is  really  and  truly  a  revelation.  That  is,  can  we,  or  can  we  not, 
see  through  material  phenomena  into  a  region  which  is  not  appre- 
ciable by  sense  ?  If  we  say  no,  we  are  sceptics ;  if  yes,  we  are 
idealists,  or  (a  much  better  name)  intellectualists*  To  put  the  ques- 
tion in  a  clear  light,  we  ask,  "  Is  the  material  world  a  final  object, 
which  conveys  only  sensual  impression?"  or,  "Is  the  material 
world  a  book,  that  affords  sensual  impression,  (the  letters,  figures, 
pages,  &c.,)  and  which,  over  and  above  the  sensual  impression,  con- 
veys an  intellectual  meaning  intended  by  the  Author*)™  A  dog, 
looking  at  a  book,  sees  the  same  that  a  man  sees ;  but  he  under- 
stands not  the  intellectual  meaning  intended  to  be  conveyed  to  the 
reader  by  the  aid  of  the  symbols.  Now,  is  the  universe  an  object 
final,  or  a  book  ?  This  is  the  great  question  of  philosophy.  If  we 
admit  it  to  be  a  book,  as  St.  Paul  does,  (Rom.  i.  20,)  we  thereby 
admit  science  to  be  truly  a  revelation.  Even  if  the  question  were 
doubtful,  which  we  do  not  believe,  we  esteem  St  Paul's  declaration 
a  settlement  of  it,  as  here  St.  Paul  has  pronounced  divine  judgment 
on  a  question  of  philosophy. 


POLITICS    PROPER ITS    POSITION.  249 

expresses  his  ignorance,  and  frequently  the  means 
he  uses  to  acquire  knowledge  and  determine  truth. 
Where  there  is  diversity  of  opinion,  there  must  be 
ignorance  on  one  side  or  on  both ;  and  bold  would  be 
the  man  who,  in  politics,  should  assert  that  he  had  so 
completely  mastered  all  truth,  that  all  other  men 
ought  to  come  over  to  his  side.  And  yet  there  must 
be  a  truth  somewhere;  and,  as  knowledge  does  not 
admit  of  diversity  of  opinion,  if  ever  man  can  have  a 
system  of  politics  other  than  empirical,  other  than  su- 
perstitious, diversity  of  opinion  must  disappear  from 
politics,  just  as  it  has  disappeared  from  the  sciences 
which  man  has  already  mastered. 

First,  of  the  position  of  politics  as  a  science. 

1st    Man  may  act  on  the  external  world  of  matter, 

and  we  may  consider  the  laws  of  such  actions 

without  taking  into  consideration  the  reflex  effect 

on  man. 
2d.  We  take  into  consideration  the  reflex  effects  on 

man,  and  in  them  we  find  the  laws  of  political 

economy* 
3d.    Man  may  act  on  man  directly,  by  interference. 

The  laws  which  prohibit,  limit,  or  regulate  these 

actions  of  interference,  constitute  the  science  of 

politics. 

*  Political  economy  may  have  a  restricted  or  an  extended  signi- 
fication. It  may  mean  an  exposition  of  the  laws  according  to 
which  man  creates  or  produces  wealth.  In  this  sense  it  is  the 
science  of  value.  Or  it  may  mean  an  exposition  of  the  laws  which 
regulate  social  welfare,  including  the  distribution  of  wealth,  the 
public  health,  the  public  education,  &c.  In  this  sense  it  is  the 
science  of  social  utility,  of  which  the  production  of  wealth  is  only 


250  SOCIALISM    AND    COMMUNISM. 

We  here  proceed  according  to  a  regular  progression,* 
beginning  at  the  most  simple  forms  of  human  action, 
and  passing  to  those  which  are  more  and  more  com- 
plex. 

Politics  has  to  do  exclusively  with  the  relations 
between  men,  and  to  determine  the  principles  that 
should  regulate  their  actions  towards  each  other. 
Where  interference  is  not  concerned,  there  is  no  ques- 
tion in  politics.  This,  then,  is  the  anterior  limitation 
of  the  science  —  that  where  there  is  no  interference 
between  man  and  man,  there  is  no  question  of  politics. 

We  have,  then,  to  determine  the  posterior  boun- 
dary —  that  which  separates  it  from  any  science  that 
might  lie  beyond  it. 

This  posterior  limit  is  likely,  from  the  prevalence 
of  socialist  and  communist  doctrines,  to  become  the 
great  desideratum  of  political  theory.  Those  doc- 
trines, whatever  may  be  the  contempt  heaped  on  them 
in  England,  are  far  more  generally  diffused  than  most 
Englishmen  are  aware  of.  They  are  now  revolu- 
tionizing Europe ;  and  no  one  can  predict  the  extent 
of  the  changes  that  must  follow  them,  if  once  they 
gain  the  complete  mastery  of  the  public  mind.  In- 
stead of  railing  at  them,  however,  it  is  much  more 
profitable  to  endeavor  to  understand  them,  and  to 
seize  the  fallacy  on  which  they  are  based.  Those 
doctrines  contain  a  profound  truth ;  and  more  than 
this,  they  are  the  convulsive  cries  of  man's  spiritual 

the  first  and  simplest  embranchment.  The  economists  of  England 
have  strenuously  adhered  to  the  first  meaning;  but  their  place 
must  soon  be  taken  by  men  of  a  different  stamp,  who  take  a  wider 
range  of  investigation. 


SOCIALISM    AND    COMMUNISM.  251 

nature,  seeking  after  a  better  and  a  holier  world  than 
is  found  in  the  present  condition  of  society.  It  is  true 
that  men  are  brethren  —  the  children  of  one  Father; 
it  is  true  that  universal  benevolence  is  a  virtue ;  it  is 
true  that  man  ought  not  to  seek  his  own  advantage  at 
the  expense  of  his  fellow ;  it  is  true  that  in  the  present 
system  of  society  there  are  stupendous  abuses  which 
cannot  be  justified ;  and  it  is  also  true  that  socialism 
and  communism  are  based  on  fallacies,  although  the 
above  truths  are  ostensibly  at  the  bottom  of  those 
systems. 

There  is  a  true  communism  and  a  false  commu- 
nism. Christianity  itself  teaches  us  that  men  are 
brethren ;  and  no  dogmas  that  have  ever  been  uttered 
are  more  communist  than  some  precepts  of  the  New 
Testament.  It  is  a  fact,  also,  be  it  explained  as  it 
may,  that  the  early  Christians  were  de  facto  commu- 
nists, —  that  they  held  all  things  in  common,  and  that 
no  man  called  any  thing  his  own.  These  very  doc- 
trines have  revived  in  our  day,  and  they  are  now  play- 
ing havoc  with  the  institutions  of  Europe.  They  are 
revived  in  the  world  of  politics,  however,  and  not  in  the 
world  of  religion ;  and,  as  a  phenomenon  in  the  his- 
tory of  man,  this  circumstance  is  well  worthy  of 
attention. 

All  that  we  have  here  to  do  with  communism  is  to 
point  out  the  fallacy  on  which  it  rests,  when  advanced, 
as  it  is,  into  the  region  of  politics.*     This  fallacy  will 

*  Of  course,  we  speak  here  only  of  that  communism  that  would 
obliterate  private  property  altogether.  The  abolition  of  private 
property  in  land,  and  the  restitution  of  the  soil  to  the  state,  is  an 


252  CHARACTER    OF    POLITICAL    RELATIONS. 

be  found  the  moment  we  can  determine  the  posterior 
limitation  of  the  science  of  politics.  And  if  that  pos- 
terior limitation  cannot  be  determined,  if  it  cannot  be 
settled  satisfactorily  by  the  fairest  principles  of  reason, 
then  no  man  is  entitled  to  say  that  communism  may 
not,  after  all,  be  the  correct  theory  of  politics;  and 
though  he  may  asseverate  as  he  will,  or  rail,  or  abuse, 
he  has  no  right  to  do  so  till  he  can  point  out  the  line 
of  demarcation  that  separates  political  questions  from 
those  that  lie  altogether  beyond  the  sphere  of  politics. 
Nor  would  any  thing  that  could  be  said  be  of  much 
avail  to  stem  the  torrent  of  credence  that  has  set  in. 
Stem  it  we  cannot ;  but  it  may  be  possible  to  give  it 
a  right  direction. 

Political  relations  are  not  relations  of  fraternity. 
Love,  charity,  benevolence,  and  generosity  have  noth- 
ing whatever  to  do  with  politics.  These  substantives, 
and  the  principles  of  action  to  which  they  give  rise, 
lie  beyond  the  region  of  politics.  This  they  do  neces- 
sarily— just  as  necessarily  as  light  and  sound,  optics 
and  acoustics,  lie  necessarily  beyond  the  region  of 
geometry.  Unless  this  truth  is  fairly  apprehended, 
and  unless  the  line  of  demarcation  between  politics 
and  the  regions  that  lie  beyond  it  is  logically  deter- 
mined and  clearly  perceived,  there  is  a  continual  dan- 
ger of  sliding  imperceptibly  into  socialism.  Whatever 
may  be  true,  or  whatever  may  be  false,  in  socialism, 
(using  that  term  in  the  most  unobjectionable  sense  — 

entirely  different  question.  Every  political  state  is  a  communist 
association ;  and  its  common  property,  the  taxation,  must  be  taken 
either  from  land  or  labor.  In  Britain,  the  common  property,  the 
revenue,  already  exceeds  the  rental  of  the  soil. 


CHARACTER    OF    POLITICAL    RELATIONS.  253 

Christian  socialism,  for  instance,)  the  principles  of 
equity  must  first  be  taken  into  consideration  before  we 
can,  by  any  possibility,  proceed  to  the  consideration 
of  those  higher  principles  of  action  which  may  come 
into  play,  when  once  the  principles  of  justice  are 
acknowledged  and  carried  into  general  operation. 

This  question  is,  perhaps  practically,  the  most  im- 
portant in  modern  politics.  Insurged  millions  let 
loose  on  the  world,  with  vague  ideas  of  fraternity  in 
their  heads,  with  the  courage  of  enthusiasm  in  their 
hearts,  and  with  bayonets  in  their  hands,  are,  at  all 
events,  formidable  expositors  of  doctrine.  Their  en- 
ergy is  exactly  what  the  continent  of  Europe  has  so 
long  required ;  but  their  ignorance  may  transform  what 
would  otherwise  have  been  a  most  useful  reformation 
into  a  terrible  hurricane  of  vengeance,  and  a  blind 
exercise  of  destructive  power.  Now  that  the  theorist 
and  the  orator  can  raise  armed  millions,  the  game  of 
politics  has  assumed  a  new  character.  Theories  are 
no  longer  barren  speculations,  nor  is  oratory  mere 
declamation.  It  is,  therefore,  of  the  first  importance 
that  the  most  careful,  impartial,  and  honest  endeavor 
should  be  made  to  perfect  the  theory  of  politics  —  to 
base  first  on  the  immutable  foundations  of  justice  — 
to  satisfy  the  reason  before  setting  the  passions  in  a 
flame  —  to  evolve  principles  which  can  be  calmly  and 
soberly  maintained  by  the  intellect,  before  they  are 
given  as  rules  of  action  to  enthusiastic  populations, 
ready  to  march  in  any  direction  that  is  plausibly 
pointed  out  as  the  right  one. 

We  have  no  intention,  however,  to  attempt  the 
correction  of  wrong  theories.  Wrong  theories  may 
22 


254  JUSTICE    THE    FOUNDATION 

be  supplanted,  but  it  is  questionable  whether  they  are 
ever  corrected.  The  development  of  the  right  theory- 
is  the  great  object.  It  will  do  the  work  if  once  it  can 
be  finally  cleared  of  logical  objection.  Men  want  po- 
litical truth,  and  they  are  making  desperate  efforts  to 
obtain  it ;  and  obtain  it  they  will,  ultimately,  there  can 
be  no  possible  doubt. 

Political  relations,  so  far  from  being  relations  of 
fraternity,  or  of  love,  or  of  any  of  those  sentiments 
that  teach  us  to  bear  or  to  /orbear,  or  to  give  or  to 
forgive,  are  relations  of  equity.  They  are  relations 
of  justice,  which  gives  nothing,  and  forgives  nothing. 
They  are  jural  relations,  and  political  society  is  a 
jural  society.* 

The  moment  this  truth  is  forgotten,  the  door  is 
opened  for  the  wildest  and  most  impracticable 
schemes.  We  have,  in  fact,  broken  down  the  barriers 
of  reason,  and  admitted  a  flood  of  wild  imagination. 
While,  on  the  other  hand,  we  repudiate  every  thing 
that  assumes  the  form  of  authority,  (as  dispensing 
with  reason ;)  so,  on  the  other  hand,  must  we  as  care- 
fully deny  admission   to   any   propositions  whatever 

#  This  truth  has  been  clearly  apprehended,  and  very  distinctly 
announced,  by  Francis  Lieber,  in  his  able  "Manual  of  Political 
Ethics."  [London :  William  Smith,  Fleet  Street.]  That  work  is 
well  worthy  the  perusal  of  those  who  take  an  interest  in  political 
science.  It  is  far  from  being  a  formal  treatise,  but  a  most  admira- 
ble preparation  for  the  gradual  introduction  of  scientific  form.  "  The 
state,  I  said,  is  founded  on  the  relations  of  right;  it  is  &  jural  soci- 
ety, as  a  church  is  a  religious  society,  or  an  assurance  company  a 
financial  association.  The  idea  of  the  just,  and  the  action  founded 
on  this  idea,  called  justice,  is  the  broad  foundation  and  great  object 
of  the  state."  — P.  160. 


OF    POLITICAL    SOCIETY.  255 

which  cannot  show  a  rational  foundation,  because 
they  pretend  to  derive  from  the  higher  and  more 
expansive  sentiments  of  the  heart.  Nothing  can  be 
more  delusive,  nothing  more  certainly  dangerous. 
Justice  is  stable,  permanent,  and  strictly  regulative. 
Its  rules  must  determine  the  form  of  society,  a  form 
which  may  at  all  times  be  enforced.  And  if,  as  is  the 
case  in  all  known  countries,  that  form  shall  have  been 
departed  from,  then  force  may  be  legitimately  used 
for  its  restoration. 

The  moment,  however,  that  we  attempt  to  substi- 
tute the  relations  of  benevolence  for  those  of  justice, 
both  the  scales  and  the  sword  fall  from  the  hands  of 
the  image.  Benevolence  can  regulate  nothing,  and 
enforce  nothing.  First  let  me  know  what  is  mine,  and 
then  inculcate  the  duties  and  the  pleasures  of  benevo- 
lence. But  if  nothing  is  mine,  then  is  there  not  only 
no  justice,  but  no  possibility  of  benevolence ;  and  those 
who  advocate  the  absolute  abolition  of  property, 
would  do  well  to  consider  that  the  moment  property 
is  abolished,  that  moment  is  the  practice  of  benevo- 
lence (such,  at  all  events,  as  involves  the  objects  of 
property)  abolished  also.  The  foundation,  therefore, 
of  political  society  on  benevolence  is  suicidal;  the 
only  possibility  of  benevolence  being  the  admission 
that  something  is  mine  (service  or  property)  which  I 
may  lawfully  give,  lawfully  withhold,  but  which  I 
may  choose  to  give  if  I  please,  when  actuated  by 
benevolence.* 

*  The  question,  whether  there  ought  to  be  any  property  at  all, 
is  essentially  distinguished  from  the  question,  What  ought  to  be 
property,  and  whose  property  ought  it  to  be?    The  abolition  of 


256  JUSTICE    THE    FOUNDATION 

Love,  benevolence,  charity,  fraternity,  therefore,  can- 
not enter  a  system  of  politics.  No  human  society 
could  be  founded  on  them  that  attempts  to  regulate 
the  distribution  of  natural  property,  and  the  allocation 
of  that  increased  value  which  is  created  by  the  labor 
of  individuals.  Love  may,  to  a  certain  extent,  reign 
in  a  family ;  but  in  a  state  composed  of  a  multitude 
of  independent  (although  social)  individuals,  each  pro- 
ducing according  to  his  skill,  energy,  perseverance, 
and  accidental  opportunities,  justice  must  be  the  regu- 
lative principle,  without  which  the  society  falls  either 
under  the  hand  of  tyranny,  or  falls  into  the  equally 
destructive  condition  of  anarchy  and  confusion. 

slavery  is  a  question  of  the  destruction  of  property.  Destroy  the 
property,  and  the  slave  is  a  freeman.  This  circumstance  shows 
that  there  is  nothing  so  very  alarming  in  the  terrible  phrase,  "  de- 
struction of  property."  It  is  one  question,  whether  there  ought  to 
be  property  in  the  abstract ;  and  another  and  a  very  different  ques- 
tion, whether  the  present  distribution,  enforced  by  law,  is  the  cor- 
rect one.  For  instance,  Does  the  county  of  Sutherland  belong  to 
one  man,  and  can  he  exclude  all  the  rest  of  the  inhabitants,  except 
from  the  sea-beach  and  the  king's  highway?  The  law  says  so. 
Now,  suppose  the  nation  were  to  revise  these  laws,  and  to  affirm 
that  the  cultivators,  from  time  immemorial,  had  quite  as  good  a  right 
to  cultivate,  by  prescription,  as  the  landlord  to  receive  rent  for 
which  he  does  not,  and  never  did,  labor.  Suppose  the  nation  were 
to  go  further  in  their  revision,  and  to  say,  The  king's  grants  of 
former  times,  or  any  arrangements  of  former  times,  do  not  deprive 
us  of  our  right  to  our  native  soil.  Suppose  questions  of  this  kind 
to  occur.  These  are  all  questions  of  the  "  destruction  of  proper- 
ty!" but  yet  they  are  essentially  different  from  the  abolition  of 
property.  The  abolition  of  property  is  a  chimera ;  but  the  revision, 
and,  to  a  very  large  extent,  the  destruction  —  that  is,  the  transfer- 
ence —  is  a  tolerable  certainty.  [Some,  perhaps,  might  prefer  the 
term  intolerable.] 


OF    POLITICAL    SOCIETY.  257 

We  posit,  therefore,  that  political  society  is  a  socie- 
ty whose  essence,  end,  and  intention  is  to  exhibit,  in 
realization,  the  principles  of  equity  or  justice.  And 
that  benevolence  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with 
political  society,  as  such,  may  be  proven  by  the  follow- 
ing consideration :  — 

We  can  conceive  that  intellect  should  exist,  sepa- 
rated from  sentiment  or  passion.  Let  us  suppose  a 
nation  of  intellectual  beings,  of  pure  intelligences.  It 
is  evident  that  these  might  contemplate  and  reason, 
and  that  they  might  attain  to  truth,  but  that  action 
is  impossible  for  them,  further  than  the  mere  action 
of  the  intellect.  Let  us  now  endow  them  with  the 
power  of  action,  with  will,  passions,  and  with  the 
sentiment  of  justice,  but  without  the  sentiment  of  love 
or  benevolence.  It  is  evident  that  they  would  be  able 
to  perceive,  and  to  carry  into  practice,  the  rules  of 
equity  for  the  regulation  of  their  conduct.  They 
would  be  able  to  determine  that  one  member  had 
infringed  the  rights  of  another ;  they  would  be  able  to 
enforce  restitution  where  an  injustice  had  been  com- 
mitted; but  they  would  be  unable  even  to  compre- 
hend what  benevolence  was,  and  the  giving'  of  prop- 
erty would  be  absolutely  unknown  and  unintelligible. 
This  society,  nevertheless,  would  be  a  political  society, 
fully  and  completely.  Without  even  the  thought  of 
benevolence,  they  could  carry  justice  into  universal 
operation,  and  weigh  acts  with  the  utmost  impartiali- 
ty ;  and  also  they  could  carry  out  the  laws  of  justice 
with  the  most  scrupulous  exactness,  neither  abating 
an  atom  nor  superadding  an  atom.  Political  society, 
therefore,  could  exist,  and  be  regulated  by  the  most 
22* 


258  CHARACTER    OF    POLITICAL    SOCIETY. 

strict  rules  of  justice,  even  where  there  was  not  the 
idea  or  the  sentiment  of  benevolence ;  and  conse- 
quently benevolence  is  not  the  basis  of  political  soci- 
ety, and  ought  not  to  be  taken  into  consideration 
when  we  profess  to  reason  in  politics.  It  lies  beyond 
politics,  and  falls  to  be  considered  when  the  laws  of 
justice  have  been  fully  and  completely  determined. 

Although,  however,  benevolence  has  nothing  to  do 
with  politics,  it  has  much  to  do  with  man.  And  as  it 
does  lie  beyond  politics,  its  laws,  whatever  they  are, 
or  wherever  they  may  be  derived  from,  will  fall  to  be 
considered  at  some  period  or  other.  Towards  them 
the  world  is  progressing,  and  after  a  reign  of  justice 
there  will  fall,  in  necessary  order,  a  reign  of  benevo- 
lence. This  is  logically  necessary.  Wlien  such  a 
happy  period  may  come,  or  whether  it  may  come  in 
this  world,  is  another  question.  But  that  it  follows 
as  logically  as  animal  physiology  follows  vegetable 
physiology,  we  believe  to  be  perfectly  clear.  In  former 
ages,  when  love  and  war  were  esteemed  the  highest 
pursuits  of  man  by  the  ignorant  and  semi-barbarous, 
an  age  of  political  economy,  like  the  present,  would 
have  been  looked  upon  with  the  most  unmeasured 
contempt  as  to  its  character,  and  the  most  unmeas- 
ured scepticism  as  to  the  probability  of  its  occurrence. 
From  a  reign  of  political  economy,  however,  to  a  reign 
of  justice,  there  is  incomparably  less  distance  than 
from  a  reign  of  barbarous  power  to  a  reign  of  political 
economy.  May  we  not  learn  from  this  fact  to  expand 
our  minds,  and  to  anticipate,  with  bright  hope,  that 
the  phases  of  human*  evolution,  passing  upwards 
through  the  sentiments  of  man,  and  exhibiting  those 


POSTERIOR    LIMIT    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  259 

sentiments  one  after  another  as  they  are  of  a  higher 
and  a  higher  character,  shall  at  last  present  man  as 
realizing  the  highest  principles  of  his  nature,  and  exhib- 
iting in  the  outward  figure  of  society  the  manifestation 
of  those  inward  principles  which  make  man  a  denizen 
of  a  spiritual  world,  and  link  him  with  the  unseen 
region  of  light,  and  love,  and  immortality  ? 

But  if  politics  be  the  science  of  justice,  and  justice 
does  not  admit  the  idea  of  benevolence,  that  idea 
being  necessarily  posterior  to  justice,  what  is  the  radi- 
cal distinction  between  justice  and  benevolence,  and 
where  is  the  line  of  demarcation  that  separates  them  ? 

That  line  of  demarcation  is  found  in  the  distinction 
between  the  negative  and  the  positive.  All  the  rules 
of  justice  are  radically  negative  or  restrictive,  and  pre- 
sent themselves  in  the  form,  "  Thou  shalt  not  do."  All 
the  rules  of  benevolence  are  positive  or  expansive,  and 
present  themselves  under  the  form,  "  Thou  shalt  do,  or 
thou  oughtest  to  do." 

Certain  difficulties  of  language  here  present  them- 
selves, as  they  do  wherever  the  theory  of  positive  and 
negative  is  involved.  A  negative  proposition  may 
present  itself  with  the  same  valid  signification  under 
the  form  of  a  positive  proposition,  and  a  positive  prop- 
osition may  present  itself  under  the  form  of  a  negative 
proposition.  This  is  universal.  It  applies  no  more  to 
politics  than  it  does  to  logic  or  mathematics;  and 
though  in  those  sciences  it  may  cause  little  practical 
difficulty,  in  politics  it  may  be  made  the  basis  of  much 
unnecessary  misunderstanding. 

A  very  simple  consideration,  however,  will  place  in 
a  clear  enough  light  the  difference  between  the  nega- 


260  POSTERIOR    LIMIT    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE. 

tive  character  of  justice,  and  the  positive  character  of 
benevolence. 

If  all  men  were  socially  passive,  and  did  not  in  any 
wise  interfere  with  each  other,  there  would  be  the  per- 
fection of  justice,  while  there  might  be  the  total  absence 
of  benevolence. 

No  rule  of  justice  can  ever  originate  an  interference. 
All  interference  based  on  justice  is  consequential;  that 
is,  the  consequence  of  a  prior  act  of  interference,  which 
requires  to  be  corrected.  All  primary  interference, 
contrary  to  the  will  of  the  person  interfered  with,  (he 
being  of  sound  mind,  sober,  &c.,)  is  an  injustice  ;  and 
though  injustice  is  usually  made  to  imply  also  some 
matter  of  detriment,  pain,  or  loss,  yet  this  detriment  is 
not  its  essential  character.  The  essential  character  of 
injustice  consists  in  the  forcible  interference  of  one 
man  with  another;  nor  is  any  man  justified  in  con- 
straining another  to  receive  even  a  benefit  (or  what 
nine  hundred  and  ninety  men  out  of  a  thousand  would 
pronounce  a  benefit)  against  his  will.  The  essential 
character  of  injustice  is,  the  overbearing  of  one  man's 
will  by  another  man's  force  or  fraud.  And  no  rule  or 
principle  of  equity  can  ever  originate  such  an  in- 
terference. 

The  whole  scheme  of  justice,  therefore,  is  essentially 
and  radically  restrictive,  and  all  its  positive  rules,  or 
rules  which  justify  or  command  interference,  will  be 
found  to  consist  of  those  which  justify  the  restoration 
of  things  to  that  condition  in  which  they  would  have 
been,  had  there  been  no  interference.  That  is,  whenever 
the  negative  state  of  non-interference  has  been  de- 
parted from,  and  the  equilibrium  of  equity  destroyed, 


POSTERIOR    LIMIT    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.  261 

justice  furnishes  rules  for  positive  interference,  whereby 
the  negative  state  may  be  restored,  and  the  equilibrium 
of  equity  reestablished.  But  this  in  no  wise  affects 
the  assertion,  that  the  principles  of  justice,  and  the 
scheme  of  the  science,  are  entirely  restrictive ;  because, 
let  all  society  be  in  the  negative  state  of  non-interfer- 
ence, and  it  would  remain  so  forever,  were  the  rules 
of  justice  attended  to. 

Benevolence,  on  the  contrary,  supposes  that  men 
shall  be  socially  active ;  not  that  they  shall  interfere 
with  each  other  without  consent,  but  that  they  shall 
take  a  constant  interest  in  each  other's  welfare,  and  be 
ready  to  offer  the  helping  hand  of  sympathy  when  sor- 
rows fall  upon  their  brethren.  Benevolence  cannot 
infringe  justice ;  it  only  superadds  more  than  justice 
could  require. 

Such  a  condition  of  society,  then,  as  would  be  com- 
patible with  the  perfection  of  justice,  might  exclude 
benevolence  altogether.  Consequently,  justice  and 
benevolence  are  radically  distinguished  from  each 
other ;  and  politics,  which  is  the  science  of  justice,  is 
independent  of  benevolence. 

Here,  then,  we  learn  the  posterior  limit  of  the  sci- 
ence of  politics. 

Where  there  is  no  question  of  interference  between 
man  and  man,  there  is  no  question  of  politics.  This 
is  the  anterior  limit  —  that  which  separates  it  from  all 
that  comes  before  it ;  from  political  economy,  the 
physical  sciences,  and  the  mathematical  sciences. 

And  the  posterior  limit  is  found  in  the  fact,  that  the 
science  is  confined  exclusively  to  the  exhibition  of  the 
laws  relating  to  such  interference  as  is  consequent  on 


262  POSITION    OF    POLITICS    PROPER. 

a  departure  from  the  state  of  non-interference,  and  to 
the  exhibition  of  the  laws  (intuitions  of  the  reason) 
which  prohibit  all  primary  interference.  [The  latter, 
of  course,  come  logically  first  in  the  exposition  of  the 
science.] 

Having,  then,  determined  the  limits  of  the  science 
of  politics,  we  affirm  (from  the  preceding  data)  that 
its  position  is  immediately  after  the  science  of  political 
economy,  and  that  it  is  followed  by  the  laws  of  benev- 
olence, wherever  these  may  be  derived  from. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ON  THE  THEORY  OF  MAN'S  PRACTICAL 
PROGRESSION. 


SECTION    I. OUTLINE    OF  THE    ARGUMENT,  THAT  THERE 

IS  A  NATURAL    PROBABILITY   IN    FAVOR    OF    THE    REIGN 
OF    JUSTICE. 

[This  argument,  the  outline  of  which  is  given  in 
the  present  section,  is  continued  to  the  end  of  the  vol- 
ume.    It  is  based  upon, — 

1.  The  analysis  of  the  forms  of  scientific  truth,  and 
the  order  of  the  evolution  of  the  sciences. 

2.  On  the  abstract  forms  of  man's  historic  mani- 
festations. 

3.  On  the  general  arrangement  of  the  component 
faculties  of  man,  and  the  order  in  which  these 
come  into  exercise.] 

We  have  now  to  make  good  our  argument,  that 
there  is  a  natural  probability  in  favor  of  a  millennium, 
or  reign  of  justice.  We  assume  from  Scripture  the 
fact  that  there  shall  be  a  millennium ;  and  all  we  have 


264  A    REIGN    OF    JUSTICE 


to  do  is  to  point  out  the  natural  probability  of  its  oc- 
curence, and  the  probable  mechanism  by  which  that 
condition  is  to  be  brought  about.  We  treat,  therefore, 
not  of  a  theological  millennium,  which  may  involve 
spiritual  elements  only  to  be  known  by  the  light  of 
holy  Scripture,  but  of  the  second  causes  which,  operat- 
ing in  the  world,  shall  at  last  bring  man  into  the  state 
most  favorable  for  the  operation  of  Scripture  truth.  A 
scriptural  millennium  is  much  more  than  a  mere  reign 
of  justice,  although  that  is  a  main  element ;  but  here 
we  touch  only  on  that  part  of  the  scriptural  millen- 
nium which  involves  the  improvement  of  the  human 
race  in  those  qualities  and  conditions  with  which  we 
are  naturally  cognizant. 

And  we  affirm  that,  beyond  a  doubt,  a  reign  of  jus- 
tice is  to  be  anticipated  on  the  fairest  principles  of 
computation ;  and  that  the  argument  by  which  it  is 
established  will  bear  the  closest  scrutiny  of  the  impar- 
tial reason.  Setting  aside  Scripture  altogether,  (if  the 
expression  may  be  allowed,)  we  maintain  that  man 
has,  within  the  range  of  his  natural  knowledge,  suffi- 
cient means  for  determining,  that  if  the  course  of 
human  history  continue  ordinated  on  the  same  princi- 
ples that  may  be  inferred  from  a  consideration  of  the 
past  and  present,  then  in  the  future  there  must  come  a 
time  when  justice  shall  be  the  regulative  principle  of 
the  earth,  and  man  shall  carry  it  into  systematic  and 
universal  operation. 

And  though  we  advance  this  argument  for  political 
purposes  alone,  we  esteem  it  no  mean  thing  that  the 
good  times  of  prosperity,  graciously  revealed  in  Scrip- 
ture, are  actuallv  borne  out  to  the  natural  reason  of 


OR    POLITICAL    MILLENNIUM.  265 

mankind.  After  all  that  has  been  said  of  the  millen- 
nium, we  cannot  help  thinking  that  there  is  a  peculiar 
satisfaction  in  finding  that  nature,  history,  and  reason 
contribute  to  authenticate  the  promise.  That  the  more 
closely  the  intellect  shall  search,  and  the  more  widely 
it  shall  extend  its  views,  it  shall  yet  learn  more  and 
more  to  bow  in  simple  faith  before  the  divine  Word, 
which,  with  all  its  mysteries,  does  continue  to  justify 
itself  in  each  new  view  we  gain  of  nature,  and  to  un- 
fold perpetual  witness  of  its  own  divinity.  Amid  the 
wreck  of  empires,  the  turmoils  of  society,  and  the  dark 
labyrinths  of  deceiving  doctrines,  it  is  pleasant  to  lay 
hold  on  a  clew  of  hope  which  leads  to  better  and  hap- 
pier times,  and  ends  at  last  in  a  kingdom  of  righteous- 
ness, where  they  "  shall  sit  under  their  own  vine  and 
their  own  fig-tree,  none  making  them  afraid." 

Let  us  now  endeavor  to  condense  the  argument,  and 
to  place  it  fairly  before  the  understanding.  We  be- 
lieve it  valid,  and  do  not  fear  to  present  it  in  its  most 
naked  form. 

1st.  The  progression  of  humanity  is  in  proportion 
to  the  acquisition  of  rational  knowledge,  and  the  re- 
duction of  that  knowledge  to  practical  operation. 

2d.  Rational  knowledge  is  divided  into  the  various 
sciences. 

3d.  A  science  is  composed  of  nomenclature,  (the 
name,)  description  and  classification,  (the  proposition,) 
and  reasoning,  (the  syllogism.) 

4th.  The  sciences  have  among  themselves  a  neces- 
sary coordination. 

5th.  The  measure  of  this  coordination  is  the  relative 
23 


266  ORDER    OF    KNOWLEDGE. 

simplicity  or  complexity  of  the  objects  involved  in  the 
science. 

6th.  In  classifying  the  sciences,  the  most  simple 
sciences  are  necessarily  placed  first,  then  those  that  are 
more  complex,  and  so  forth. 

7th.  The  sciences  have  a  necessary  order  of  chrono- 
logical discovery. 

8th.  The  order  of  chronological  discovery  is  coinci- 
dent with  the  order  of  logical  classification. 

9th.  Consequently,  if  the  logical  classification  be 
satisfactorily  achieved,  and  the  whole  of  the  sciences 
are  not  yet  evolved,  we  can  predict  what  the  future 
order  of  discovery  will  be. 

10th.  The  general  groundwork  of  the  classification 
of  the  sciences  is  as  follows  :  — 

I.  The  abstract  sciences,  which  give  the  universal 
forms  of  rational  necessity.  These  are  called  the 
mathematical  sciences,  and  they  occur  necessarily  in 
the  following  order :  — 

1.  Logic*  The  universal  form  of  all  science 
whatever. 

#  Logic  and  statics  may  or  may  not  be  considered  as  mathematical 
sciences,  according  to  the  signification  given  to  that  term.  But  this 
is  a  mere  question  of  the  use  of  a  name.  Logic  is  purely  abstract, 
and  being  the  most  general  form  of  science,  is  necessarily  anterior 
to  arithmetic ;  so  that,  if  the  term  mathemalic  be  applied  to  all  the 
sciences  involved  in  the  rational  investigation  of  numbers,  quanti- 
ties, and  spaces,  logic  (or  syllogistic)  is  a  mathematical  science. 
Again,  statics  superadds  to  space  the  concept  force,  and  there  are 
d  priori  propositions  with  regard  to  force,  of  a  character  exactly 
similar  to  the  axioms  of  mathematics ;  e.  g.,  two  equal  forces  actma; 


ORDER    OF    KNOWLEDGE.  267 

2.  Arithmetic.     Logic  applied  to  numbers. 

3.  Algebra.     Arithmetic  applied  to  quantities. 

4.  Geometry.    Algebra  applied  to  the  forms  of  space. 

5.  Statics.     Geometry  applied  to  forces. 

Intermediate  Science. 
Dynamics.     Subject,  force.     Product,  motion. 

II.  The  inorganic  physical  sciences. 
Mechanics.     Phenomena,  equilibrium,  motion. 

The  phenomena  of  solids. 
"  "  "    liquids. 

"  "  "    gaseous  fluids. 

"  "  "    imponderable  fluids. 

Magnetism,  chemistry,  and  electricity.  Phenomena, 
motion,  polarization,  formation,  combination,  and  de- 
composition, &c. 

III.  The  organic  sciences. 

1st.  Botany.    )  Phenomena,    life,   growth,    propaga- 
2d.  Zoology.*  \  tion,  &c. 

in  the  same  straight  line,  hut  in  opposite  directions,  urUl  neutralize 
each  other.  Thus,  statics  may  be  considered  as  that  portion  of  the 
general  doctrine  of  force  which  has  an  intimate  connection  with  the 
sciences  of  space  and  quantity  ;  while  dynamics  may  be  considered 
as  more  nearly  related  to  the  matter  sciences.  Or  a  genus  may  be 
made  for  statics  and  dynamics,  as  in  the  table  in  the  Appendix. 
To  this  genus  there  can  be  no  objection,  when  we  remember  that 
science  reads  nature  backwards,  and  takes  the  fundamental  catego- 
ries in  an  inverted  order,  so  that  force  may  be  abstracted  in  thought 
from  matter. 

*  These  we  have  previously  termed  vegetable  and  animal  physi- 
ology, for  the  purpose  of  insisting  on  the  fact,  that  descriptive  bot- 
any, descriptive  zoology,  anatomy,  &c,  are  not  sciences.  They  are 
mere  classifications  and  descriptions  of  objects  whose  functions  must 
be  studied  before  we  have  science,  properly  so  called. 


268  CORRECT    KNOWLEDGE 

IV.  Man  science. 

Functions.     Action  on  the  external  world. 

"  Action  on  man,  without  interference. 

"  Action  on  man  by  interference. 

"  Actions  towards  the  divine  Being. 

The  principles  of  correct  action,  for  the  first  class  of 
these  functions,  are  derived  from  the  sciences  that  pre- 
cede man  science. 

The  second  class  of  functions  gives  rise  to  political 
economy,  which  furnishes  the  rule  of  correct  action. 

The  third  class  to  politics. 

The  fourth  class  to  religion,  the  scientific  ground- 
work of  which  is  theology. 

We  posit,  then,  that  human  progression  is  from 
logic  and  the  mathematical  sciences,  through  the  phys- 
ical sciences,  and  up  to  man  science. 

In  estimating  human  progression  as  a  fact,  we  can 
only  study  it  as  it  has  manifested  itself  since  the 
schoolmen,  by  the  adoption  of  a  rational  organon, 
began  to  lay  anew  the  foundation  principles  of  human 
credence,  and  to  develop  the  general  doctrine  of 
method.  The  schoolmen  (notwithstanding  the  con- 
tempt so  superfluously  heaped  on  their  memory)  are 
undoubtedly  the  genuine  founders  of  modern  science ; 
and  Aristotle  is  the  grand  master  of  that  association, 
whose  object  is  to  achieve  a  scheme  of  rational  truth 
which  shall  be  the  same  for  all  human  intellect, 
wherever  that  intellect  can  comprehend  it.  Ontology 
and  logic  are  necessarily  anterior  to  the  sciences  of 
number,  quantity,  and  space ;  and  though  the  school- 
men  attempted  to   carry  their  method   into  regions 


PRODUCES    CORRECT    ACTION.  269 

where  it  was  not  applicable,  they  went  no  farther 
astray  in  so  doing  than  the  sensationalists,  who  apply 
the  method  of  matter  to  the  phenomena  of  mind,  and 
thereby  attempt  to  obliterate  all  morals. 

We  ask,  then,  in  what  way  knowledge  tends  to 
improve  the  condition  of  man  upon  the  globe? 

Correct  knoiuledge  is  the  only  means  whereby  cor- 
rect action  can  be  performed.  In  advancing,  therefore, 
the  probability  of  a  millennium  in  politics,  we  must, 
of  course,  imply  that  a  millennium  in  other  depart- 
ments has  actually  taken  place,  or  is  now  taking  place. 
And  this  we  do.  The  definition  of  a  millennium  is, 
for  us,  not  any  period  of  time,  but  a  period  of  truth 
discovered  and  reduced  to  practice.  And  consequently, 
when  we  speak  of  a  political  millennium,  we  speak  of 
a  period  when  political  truth  shall  be  discovered  and 
be  reduced  to  practice ;  and  such  a  period  we  main- 
tain to  be  within  the  bounds  of  rational  anticipation. 

Let  us  reflect  that  the  constitution  of  man,  and  the 
earth  on  which  he  is  placed,  permits  of  possible  condi- 
tions. Some  conditions  are  bad,  some  better,  and 
some  are  the  best  that  can  exist  with  such  an  earth 
and  such  inhabitants.  No  person  can,  for  a  moment, 
maintain  that  man  has  achieved  the  best  conditions  of 
which  the  terrestrial  economy  (including  the  inhabit- 
ants of  the  globe)  is  capable.  No  country,  no  tribe, 
no  nation,  can  lay  claim  to  the  honor  of  having  placed 
itself  in  the  best  conditions  which  Providence  had 
allowed  it  to  enjoy.  Now,  in  speaking  of  a  millen- 
nium, we  pronounce  nothing  whatever  on  the  absolute 
amount  of  evil  that  is  or  is  not  inseparable  from  man. 
All  we  contend  for  is,  that  man  is  continually  pro- 
23* 


270  CORRECT    ACTION 

gressing  towards  the  best  conditions  that  the  terrestrial 
economy  renders  possible,  and  that  the  day  will  come 
when  his  political  condition  shall  be  perfected,  on  the 
same  principles  that  he  perfects  his  other  conditions. 

Knowledge  is  the  only  means  given  to  man  to  evolve 
correct  action,  and  correct  action  is  the  only  means 
whereby  the  best  condition  can  be  attained.  And  this 
principle  is  common  to  every  branch  of  knowledge. 

Let  a  political  millennium  then  mean,  the  best  po- 
litical condition  to  which  man  can  attain.  A  political 
millennium  cannot  mean  more  than  this. 

A  political  millennium,  then,  will  take  place  when- 
ever political  truth  is  discovered  and  reduced  to  prac- 
tice. We  do  not  say  what  is  political  truth,  or  what 
is  not  political  truth  ;  but  merely  determine  the  general 
conditions  of  what  we  mean  by  a  political  millennium. 

And  we  affirm  that,  according  to  the  past  progres- 
sion of  mankind  in  other  departments  of  knowledge 
and  of  action,  there  are  good  grounds  for  believing  that 
political  truth  shall  be  discovered  and  reduced  to  prac- 
tice. In  so  doing,  we  treat  political  science,  not  as  a 
mystery  which  refuses  to  be  reduced  to  system,  and 
which  would  thereby  justify  those  who  appeal  to  ne- 
cessity, (whatever  course  they  take,*)  but  as  one  of  the 

#  When  an  action  is  so  utterly  defenceless  that  no  reason  can  be 
alleged  in  its  favor,  its  abettors  usually  fall  back  on  necessity.  "  It 
is  true  the  thing  might  not  be  quite  right ;  but,  after  all,  you  must 
allow  it  to  have  been  necessary."  Such  is  a  concise  summary  of  the 
political  reasonings  of  a  class.  As  if  any  thing  could  be  necessary 
\\  hereby  we  interfered  with  others,  unless  it  were  based  on  the  most 
clear  and  indisputable  rational  truth.  As  an  instance,  we  give  the 
following  paragraph :  — 


PRODUCES    THE    BENEFICIAL    CONDITION.  271 

sciences  which  it  behoves  man  to  study,  exactly  in  the 
same  manner  that  he  would  study  dynamics,  or  any 
other  branch  of  knowledge. 

Whatever  may  be  the  matter  of  political  truth,  and 
whatever  may  be  the  condition  of  society  that  ex- 
presses that  truth  in  outward  manifestation,  we  have 
only  to  consider  the  sphere  of  political  truth  to  deter- 
mine that  it  is  as  much  within  man's  reach  as  truth  in 
any  other  department. 

What,  in  fact,  is  the  problem  of  politics  ?  To  dis- 
cover the  laws  which  should  regulate  men  in  the 
matter  of  interference.  When  those  laws  are  discov- 
ered, political  truth  is  discovered.  Now,  notwith- 
standing the  perpetual  misconception  of  the  nature 
of  political  science,  arising  from  the  fact  that  it  is 
almost  invariably  confounded  with  government,  the 
right  to  govern,  the  king's  majesty,  the  authority  of  the 
sovereign,    and    the    other   superstitious    devices    by 

"  The  Solas  Removals.  —  It  was  previously  stated  that  Lord 
Macdonald  had  desired  the  removal  of  his  smaller  tenantry  from 
the  Solas  district.  We  have  since  learned  that  the  people  are  to 
remain  over  the  winter,  on  condition  of  emigrating  in  the  spring 
of  next  year.  They  have  given  up  their  stock,  and  Lord  Mac- 
donald allows  them  to  remain  in  their  houses,  retaining  also  their 
grain  and  potato  crops,  a  cow  to  supply  milk,  and  a  garron  or  horse 
to  convey  their  winter  peats.  The  destitute  are  to  be  supplied 
with  meal  and  clothes,  and  all  arrears  of  rent  are  abandoned. 
We  have  no  wish  in  any  way  to  encourage  wholesale  clearances, 
and  sincerely  regret  that  Lord  Macdonald  should  find  it  necessary 
to  remove  large  bodies  of  an  attached  tenantry;  but  where  the 
means  of  emigration  are  provided  for  a  depressed,  poverty-stricken, 
and  almost  starving  community,  the  true  philanthropist  will  not 
be  in  haste  to  censure.  This  is  the  case  in  Solas."  —  Inverness 
Courier. 


272      ANTICIPATION    OF    A    POLITICAL    MILLENNIUM. 

which  men  impose  on  themselves  from  the  force  of 
habit,  what  reason  can  possibly  be  alleged  for  assert- 
ing that  the  laws  which  should  regulate  men  in  the 
matter  of  interference,  are  not  as  much  within  the 
reach  of  the  human  intellect  as  the  laws  which  should 
regulate  the  merchant  in  carrying  on  his  commercial 
transactions  ? 

But  while  we  anticipate  that  the  day  will  come 
when  political  truth  shall  be  discovered,  and  be  as 
generally  acknowledged  as  truth  in  any  other  science, 
it  is  important  to  apprehend  the  reason  why  political 
truth  has  not  yet  assumed  a  systematic  form. 

If  man  progress  in  knowledge  from  the  more  simple 
to  the  more  complex,  —  and  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  he  does  progress  according  to  this  law,  —  it  is 
plainly  evident  that  man,  being  the  most  complex  of 
all  the  objects  that  inhabit  the  earth,  must  be  the  last 
whose  phenomena  are  subjected  to  analysis.  Let  the 
sciences  be  classed  as  they  may,  man,  and  marts  func- 
tions, must  always  be  placed  at  the  extreme  end  of  the 
scale  of  natural  knowedge ;  and,  consequently,  it  is  no 
wonder  that  man  science  is  not  completed,  when  men 
are  only  approaching  the  completion  of  matter  science. 

Man  first  evolves  logic  and  the  mathematical  sci- 
ences, then  the  inorganic  physical  sciences,  then  the 
organic  physical  sciences,  and,  last  of  all,  he  makes 
man  his  intellectual  object,  and  endeavors  to  discover 
the  laws  of  his  functions.  No  matter  how  long  or 
low  short  a  time  may  be  employed  in  the  evolution, 
this  is  the  necessary  order  in  which  the  discovery  of 
science  must  take  place.  And  it  would  be  quite  as  ab- 
surd for  us  now  to  affirm  that  politics  cannot  assume 


ANTICIPATION    OF    A    POLITICAL    MILLENNIUM.     273 

exactly  the  same  form  and  certainty  as  the  other 
sciences,  as  it  would  have  been  for  men  to  affirm  that 
chemistry  could  not  reach  its  present  perfection  when 
their  attention  was  devoted  to  mechanics,  and  the 
region  of  chemistry  was  occupied  by  groundless 
superstition. 

But  while  we  affirm  that  political  science  cannot 
fail  to  be  reduced  to  such  an  unobjectionable  system 
as  shall  command  the  assent  of  the  unprejudiced 
intellect,  we  have  yet  to  look  back  on  the  operation 
of  scientific  truth,  and  to  observe  how  the  mere  dogma 
becomes  transformed  into  an  external  reality  —  how 
the  mere  proposition,  which  the  intellect  apprehends, 
becomes  the  means  of  vast  achievement,  and  of  vast 
benefit  to  the  race  of  man. 

It  has  been  well  said  that  "error  is  the  cause  of 
human  misery;"  and  as  surely  may  it  be  said  that 
knowledge  is  the  antidote  of  error,  and  the  means  of 
man's  redemption  from  misery.  And  though  it  is 
true  that  religion  is  the  cause  of  individual  regenera- 
tion, and  the  true  and  main  cause  of  man's  progres- 
sion towards  good,  we  must  not,  on  that  account, 
neglect  the  study  of  the  mechanism  of  progression,  or 
fail  to  note  the  route  by  which  man  must  pass  in  his 
upward  and  onward  progress.  It  is  true  that  the 
Christian  religion  is  what  makes  men  progress ;  it 
gives  the  impulse,  but  it  does  not  describe  the  various 
steps  of  the  course  which  the  human  race  must  take 
in  its  passage  to  an  equitable  condition  of  society. 

The  steps  of  that  course,  so  far  as  the  race  is  con- 
cerned, must  be  looked  for  in  the  evolution  of  the 
sciences  one  after  another.     And  each  new  science  is 


274      ANTICIPATION    OF    A    POLITICAL    MILLENNIUM. 

not  only  a  revelation  to  the  intellect,  but  a  new  power 
for  performing  things  which  could  not  otherwise  have 
been  done ;  in  fact,  a  new  sceptre  for  man  to  rule  the 
world,  and  to  bend  its  elements  in  obedience  to  his 
will.* 

*  "  It  is  never  expected,  and  indeed  it  is  not  possible,  that  the 
mass  of  mankind  should  be  acquainted  with  the  process  by  which 
any  kind  of  investigation  whatever  is  carried  on.  The  search  after 
truth  —  even  the  truths  of  the  phenomenal  world  —  is  a  process  to 
them  completely  enveloped  in  darkness ;  all  they  have  to  do  is  to 
reap  the  practical  fruits  of  any  discovery  when  it  is  made,  without 
casting  one  single  thought  upon  the  steps  by  which  others  have 
arrived  at  it.  If  we  look  for  a  moment  at  the  law  by  which  thought 
is  propagated,  we  find  that  it  always  descends  from  the  highest 
order  of  thinkers  to  those  who  are  one  degree  below  them.  From 
these,  again,  it  descends  another  degree,  losing,  at  each  step  of  the 
descent,  something  more  of  the  scientific  form,  until  it  reaches  the 
mass  in  the  shape  of  some  admitted  fact,  of  which  they  feel  there 
is  not  a  shadow  of  doubt ;  —  a  fact  which  rests  on  the  authority  of 
what  all  the  world  above  them  says,  and  which,  therefore,  they 
receive,  totally  regardless  of  the  method  of  its  elucidation.  Take, 
for  example,  any  great  fact,  or  law  of  nature,  ascertained  by  means 
of  physical  science.  Such  a  fact  is,  first  of  all,  perchance,  wrung 
from  the  most  close  and  laborious  mathematical  analysis.  A  few, 
perhaps,  may  take  the  trouble  to  follow  every  step  of  this  process ; 
but  the  mass,  even  of  natural  philosophers  themselves,  are  content 
to  see  what  is  the  method  of  investigation,  to  copy  the  formulas  in 
which  it  results,  and  then  put  it  down  as  so  much  further  accession 
to  their  physical  science.  The  mass  of  intelligent,  educated  minds, 
again,  with  a  general  idea  only  of  mathematical  analysis,  accept 
the  fact  or  law  we  are  now  supposing,  as  one  of  the  many  beautiful 
results  of  investigations  which  they  acknowledge  to  be  far  beyond 
the  reach  of  their  own  powers  ;  and  from  them,  lastly,  it  descends 
to  the  rest  of  the  community  as  a  bare  fact,  which  they  appropriate 
to  their  own  use,  simply  as  being  a  universally  acknowledged 
truth." — Morell's  Hist.  Mod.  Philosophy  —  Introduction. 


INFLUENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  275 

Let  us  again  repeat,  that  knowledge  is  the  only- 
means  given  to  man  to  evolve  correct  action;  and 
that  correct  action  is  the  only  means  whereby  man 
can  evolve  a  correct,  and  consequently  beneficial,  con- 
dition. Let  us  also  note  well,  that  knowledge  does 
not  admit  of  diversity  of  opinion ;  that  where  knowl- 
edge is  really  attained  and  properly  substantiated, 
uniformity  of  credence  is  its  constant  and  necessary 
result ;  and,  consequently,  wherever  we  find  diversity 
of  opinion,  we  have  a  region  where  knowledge  is  not 
yet  attained,  or  where  it  has  not  yet  met  with  general 
acceptance. 

Let  us  now  ask,  What  is  the  essence  of  that  ulti- 
mate condition  of  man,  expressed  for  brevity's  sake  by 
the  word  millennium  ?  A  period  when  truth  is  discov- 
ered, acknowledged,  and  carried  into  practical  operation. 
In  so  far  as  the  millennium  is  a  religious  millennium, 
it  is  a  period  when  religious  truth  shall  be  discovered, 
acknowledged,  and  carried  into  practical  operation. 
And  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  political  millennium,  it  is 
a  period  when  political  truth  shall  be  discovered,  ac- 
knowledged, and  carried  into  practical  operation.  And 
so  forth  for  every  other  branch  of  knoudedge  that  is 
capable  of  being  reduced  to  practice. 

The  Sacred  Scriptures,  it  is  well  known,  do  not 
teach  man  science,  nor  do  they  even  advert  to  some 
of  the  very  greatest  earthly  consequences  that  flow 
from  their  acceptance.  The  Scriptures,  in  a  most 
remarkable  manner,  confine  themselves  to  religion. 
Their  tendency  is  moral,  not  intellectual.  As  much  as 
is  required  to  convey  the  moral  teaching  is  explicitly 
declared ;    but   the    most   remarkable   silence   is   pre- 


276  INFLUENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY. 

served  on  many  questions  of  the  most  intense  interest, 
apparently  for  the  very  purpose  of  never  allowing 
man's  attention  to  be  diverted,  even  for  a  moment, 
from  the  mighty  purpose  for  which  they  were  sent. 
Their  province  is  eternity ;  and  the  things  of  time  are 
apparently  referred  to  only  as  they  stand  connected 
with  man's  eternal  welfare.  Let  us  take  two  circum- 
stances alone  to  illustrate  our  position.  In  every 
region  of  the  earth  where  Christianity  has  not  pre- 
vailed, woman  has  more  or  less  been  looked  upon  as 
inferior  to  man,  and  in  some  regions  has  been  reduced 
to  absolute  degradation.  Christianity  has  everywhere 
restored  woman  to  her  moral  equality  with  man ;  and 
it  is  questionable  whether  man  has  not  been  even  the 
greatest  gainer  by  the  change.  Again  :  slavery  —  or 
the  subjugation  of  man  to  man,  and  the  transforma- 
tion of  man  from  a  being  into  a  thing  —  has  been 
almost  universal.  Wherever  Christianity  has  pre- 
vailed, slavery  has  gradually  disappeared^  and  there 
cannot  be  the  slightest  doubt  that  the  prevalence  of 
Bible  religion  will  ultimately  obliterate  every  remnant 
of  slavery  from  the  face  of  the  earth.  Enough  has 
been  already  done  to  assure  us  of  this  unmistakable 
tendency  of  Bible  religion ;  and  though  a  corrupted 
Christianity  may  yet  tolerate  the  abomination,  there 
need  be  no  hesitation  in  regarding  the  freedom  of  man 
and  the  emancipation  of  the  slave  as  the  necessary 
attendants  which,  sooner  or  later,  will  every  where 
follow  the  acceptance  of  the  gospel.* 

*  For  a  character  of  slaveholding  religion,  see  "  The  Life  of 
Frederick  Douglass,"  written  by  himself. 


THE    MILLENNIUM    OF    SCRIPTURE.  277 

And  if  we  calmly  consider  the  magnitude  of  these 
two  social  changes,  can  we  estimate  their  importance, 
or  match  them  by  any  other  two  changes  which  have 
taken  place  in  the  condition  of  mankind  ?  Take  the 
first  alone  —  the  emancipation  of  woman,  and  her 
restoration  to  that  place  which  the  divine  Being  de- 
signed her  to  occupy  as  the  companion  and  helpmeet 
for  man.  And  all  this  man  owes  to  Christianity. 
It  was  not  marts  doing.  It  was  God's  Word  that 
wrought  the  change.  And  yet,  where  in  the  whole 
record  of  revelation  can  we  point  to  a  single  passage 
that  affirms  that  such  a  change  would  follow  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  gospel?  It  is,  in  fact,  the  greatest 
change  that  has  ever  taken  place  in  man's  domestic 
condition.  If  it  were  possible  to  allow  man  to  remain 
as  he  is,  and  to  return  woman  to  her  inferiority  and 
degradation,  how  long  could  society  remain  ?  Virtue 
would  forsake  mankind,  and  Heaven  would  hide  its 
face  and  its  favor  from  the  injustice.  The  good  ele- 
ments of  society  would  at  once  disappear,  and  the 
corrupted  mass,  putrefying,  would  return  to  its  base 
and  earthly  elements.  And  yet,  if  we  search  Scrip- 
ture, we  shall  find  only  the  principles  of  the  great 
change,  and  not  one  single  prediction  of  its  occurrence. 
And  so  with  slavery.  So  little  does  the  letter  of 
Scripture  pronounce  judgment  on  the  iniquity,  that 
churches  have  not  been  wanting  which  dared  to  ad- 
vance Scripture  arguments  for  its  justification.*  And 
yet  who  can  doubt  that  the  spirit  of  Christ's  holy 
religion  is  certain,  wherever  it  prevails,  to  emancipate 

*  See  "  Chambers's  Tract  on  Slavery."     Edinburgh. 

24 


278  THE    MILLENNIUM    OF    SCRIPTURE. 

the  slave,  arid  to  reinstate  him  in  all  those  natural 
rights  which,  as  a  moral,  intellectual,  and  religious 
being,  are  his  birthrights,  necessary  to  be  preserved  to 
enable  him  to  fulfil  the  destiny  of  responsibility  ? 

And  so  with  the  millennium.  Scripture  holds  out 
the  promise  of  a  religious  millennium;  but  can  we 
suppose  that  the  period  of  blessedness  will  not  involve 
much  more  than  is  apparent  on  the  page  of  Holy 
Writ?  Is  it  at  all  illegitimate  to  infer,  that  natural 
truth  shall  have  received  a  vast  expansion ;  that  there 
shall  be  a  millennium  of  the  intellect  —  a  completion 
of  the  process  of  continual  discovery;  and,  instead, 
only  a  process  of  continual  adaptation  ?  Is  the  field 
of  intellectual  research  a  field  where  continual  warfare 
must  be  waged,  where  conquest  after  conquest  leaves 
yet  as  much  to  conquer  ?  Or  is  the  march  of  human 
knowledge  not  rather  the  journey  from  the  land  of 
darkness?  Is  not  this  the  time  of  the  exodus?  and 
may  we  not  surely  look  forward  to  the  period  when 
the  intellect,  entering  into  the  promised  land  of  truth, 
shall  journey  no  longer  forward,  but  rest  in  the  rich 
enjoyment  of  her  sanctuary? 

Such  we  maintain  to  be  the  case  (not  from  Scrip- 
ture, for  Scripture  is  silent  on  these  points,  but)  from 
the  past  progress  of  mankind,  and  from  the  present 
elements  at  work  in  a  direction  that  cannot  be  mis- 
taken. Scripture  posits  a  religious  millennium  as  a 
fact,  and  in  Scripture  that  period  appears  isolated, 
if  we  may  so  speak.  It  appears  separated  from  the 
anterior  periods  of  history.  It  does  not  seem  to  follow 
as  a  natural  consequence  from  the  times  which  pre- 
cede it.     Its  preparation  is,  at  best,  but  slightly  alluded 


THE    MILLENNIUM    OF    SCRIPTURE.  279 

to ;  and,  though  we  are  told  that  knowledge  shall  be 
increased,  we  are  by  no  means  explicitly  informed 
what  kind  of  knowledge  that  is,  or  what  are  to  be  its 
effects.  And  why,  we  may  ask,  does  Scripture  con- 
fine itself  to  such  narrow  bounds  ?  Can  we  not  see 
the  very  same  principle  pervading  this  portion  of 
Scripture  that  pervades  so  many  others;  namely,  that 
Scripture  confines  its  declarations  to  the  religious  part 
of  the  predicted  period,  leaving  it  to  man  to  discover 
for  himself  all  the  other  concomitants,  all  the  natural 
accessories,  which  are  within  the  range  of  reason,  and 
which  man  may  estimate  with  some  good  degree  of 
probability  ? 

On  this  ground  we  maintain,  that  although  the 
millennium  in  one  sense  may  be  an  isolated  period, 
essentially  different  from  all  we  know  of  the  earth's 
past  history ;  yet,  in  another  sense,  it  is  a  period  for 
which  preparations  are  continually  going  on ;  and  if 
we  conceive  it  to  include  the  discovery  and  reduction 
to  practice  of  natural  knowledge,  as  well  as  of  religious 
knowledge,  then  the  natural  portion  of  the  millennium 
has  already  commenced,  and  we  may  expect  it  to  grow 
more  and  more  apparent  at  every  future  period  of 
the  earth's  history.  In  fact,  the  religious  millennium 
would  in  that  case  be  only  the  completion  of  a  series, 
the  perfection  of  an  evolution  that  had  been  going  on 
for  centuries,  the  final  addition  of  the  spiritual  element 
over  and  above  all  that  man  could  achieve  for  himself 
by  the  exercise  of  his  unaided  powers.*     And  when 

*  Of  course  we  speak  here,  not  of  the  nature  of  the  religious 
millennium,  not  of  its  internal  qualities,  but  of  its  external  charac- 
teristic ;  that  it  is  a  period  of  the  reign  of  religion,  following  the 


280  THE    MILLENNIUM    OF    NATURE. 

we  reflect  that  Scripture  confines  itself  to  that  spiritual 
element  alone,  we  need  not  be  surprised  that  the  mil- 
lennium, as  there  presented,  should  appear  much  more 
isolated  than  it  could  possibly  be  in  reality  from  all 
those  improvements  in  man's  terrestrial  condition, 
which  could  not  fail  to  accompany  the  universal  preva- 
lence of  Christian  piety. 

A  millennium,  then,  is  a  condition  of  society  in 
which  man  shall  evolve  the  maximum  of  good  by  act- 
ing correctly.  And  man  can  act  correctly  only  where  he 
has  acquired  knowledge.  If,  then,  we  have  a  scheme, 
according  to  which  knowledge  must  be  acquired,  we 
have  the  means  of  estimating  the  order  in  which  the 
natural  portions  of  the  millennium  must  be  succes- 
sively unfolded. 

"  Knowledge  is  power,"  power  to  turn  the  earth  to 
better  and  better  account;  and  thereby  continually 
to  improve  the  condition  of  man  upon  the  globe.     The 

development  of  natural  truth.  In  its  internal  details,  it  may  be  a 
period  when  man  shall  act  on  religious  motive  to  an  extent  alto- 
gether inconceivable  in  the  present  day.  But  in  its  character,  as  a 
fact,  it  appears  to  be  the  last  final  termination  of  the  progress  that 
man  can  make  on  earth.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  completion  of  human 
evolution.  And  the  completion  of  human  evolution  takes  place 
logically,  whenever  the  human  race  acts  systematically  under  the 
influence  of  the  highest  sentiments  of  human  nature.  Whenever 
the  highest  sentiments  of  human  nature  are  systematically  the 
springs  of  human  action,  man  has  completed  his  possible  progress, 
he  has  fulfilled  his  destiny,  (we  do  not  say  his  duty,)  he  can  rise  no 
higher,  he  can  do  no  more,  until  the  Creator,  renewing  man's 
spiritual  nature,  and  abolishing  the  evil  character  of  the  desires, 
shall  emancipate  the  soul  from  sin,  and  restore  the  freedom  that 
was  lost  by  man's  transgression,  and  repurchased  by  the  merits  of 
the  divine  Redeemer. 


THE    MILLENNIUM    OF    NATURE.  281 

moment,  then,  we  ascertain  the  order  in  which  knowl- 
edge must  be  acquired,  we  learn  the  scheme  of  human 
improvement,  and  ascertain  the  general  outline  of  his 
course,  in  his  passage  from  ignorance,  poverty,  and 
depravity,  towards  knowledge,  prosperity,  and  virtuous 
action. 

All  that  we  have  professed  to  do,  was  to  point  out 
the  probability  of  a  political  millennium ;  that  is,  we 
have  endeavored  to  show,  that  if  man  progress  in 
future,  according  to  the  scheme  that  has  regulated  his 
past  progress,  there  will  come  a  time  when  political 
truth  shall  be  discovered,  acknowledged,  and  reduced 
to  practical  operation. 

But  to  confine  ourselves  to  this  view  alone,  would 
be  to  take  a  very  limited  survey  of  the  course  and 
mechanism  of  human  improvement. 

A  political  millennium  will  come,  but  it  will  come 
only  because  it  forms  a  portion  of  the  still  greater 
scheme  of  human  improvement  —  of  the  more  general 
millennium,  that  involves  all  human  knowledge  and 
all  human  operation. 

The  natural  millennium,  whose  probability  we 
maintain  to  be  within  the  reach  of  human  computa- 
tion, although  more  especially  to  be  desired  in  the 
region  of  politics,  extends  equally  to  all  the  sciences, 
and  to  every  department  of  man's  systematic  action. 
Nor  could  a  political  millennium  take  place  without 
being  preceded  by  certain  knowledge  and  certain 
conditions,  independent,  it  is  true,  of  political  science, 
but  necessarily  anterior  and  preparatory  to  the  com- 
plete evolution  of  a  reign  of  justice. 

When  we  reflect  that  the  essence  of  a  millennium 
24* 


282  THE    REVELATION    THROUGH    NATURE. 

is,  "  truth  discovered  and  carried  into  practical  opera- 
tion," we  have  generalized  a  term  applied  in  Scripture 
to  a  period  when  religious  truth  should  be  discovered, 
acknowledged,  and  reduced  to  practical  operation. 

Consequently,  wherever  we  have  truth  discovered 
and  carried  into  practical  operation,  we  have  a  millen- 
nium in  that  department  of  knowledge. 

Therefore,  the  past  history  of  human  progress  must 
supply  us  with  the  beginnings  of  the  natural  millenr 
nium ;  and  these  beginnings  we  must  look  for  in  the 
sciences  that  have  been  already  discovered  and  reduced 
to  practice. 

Let  it  never  be  forgotten  that  there  is  but  one  truth, 
and  all  truth  is  the  expression  of  the  divine  wisdom, 
and  the  revelation  of  the  divine  character  and  will.  All 
truth  is  in  fact  divine.  There  is  not  one  Deity  of  Scrip- 
ture, and  another  Deity  of  Nature.  Nor  can  we  for  a 
moment  coincide  with  that  kind  of  separation,  which 
some  appear  anxious  to  establish,  between  the  revela- 
tion in  words  and  the  revelation  in  realities.  Both  are 
expressions  of  the  divine  intentions,  both  are  revelations 
of  our  Creator,  both  are  intended  for  our  guidance  and 
instruction,  and  both  are  capable  of  enlightening  man, 
although  not  in  the  same  department,  nor  to  the  same 
extent.  Admitting  all  that  scriptural  theology  can 
teach,  there  is  still  a  revelation  through  nature,  which 
we  may  neglect,  it  is  true,  but  which  we  can  only 
neglect  to  our  own  detriment,  as  it  is  the  expression 
of  divine  wisdom  manifesting  itself  through  actual 
works,  and  displaying  before  our  eyes  the  real  exem- 
plification of  the  abstract  principles  which,  by  the  same 
hand,  had  been  impressed  upon  our  reasoii. 


NATURAL    TRUTH,    DIVINE    EFFECTS    OF    SCIENCE.      283 

1 

All  science,  therefore,  is  divine,  and  divine,  not  in 
the  sense  of  pantheism,  but  in  the  sense  of  its  being 
the  correlative  object  created  in  harmony  with  the  hu- 
man reason.  Science  is  the  object  of  reason,  and 
reality  is  the  object  of  science ;  and  both  reason  and 
reality  are  the  productions  of  the  divine  Creator. 

Error  and  superstition  are  human ;  they  belong  to 
fallen  humanity ;  they  are  not  divine ;  they  form  no 
part  of  the  original  constitution  of  the  earth ;  they  are 
darkness,  not  light  But  true  knowledge  is  God's  in- 
tention; for  that  purpose  the  intellect  of  man  was 
made.  Reason,  on  the  one  hand,  and  reality  on  the 
other,  are  the  correlatives  of  creation,  and  science  is 
the  middle  term  that  unites  them ;  reality  giving  the 
matter  of  science,  and  reason  giving  the  form.  Knowl- 
edge, therefore,  is  the  divine  intention;  and  all  the 
sciences  may  be  viewed,  not  as  human  acquisitions, 
but  as  fulfilments  of  the  divine  purpose  in  creating  an 
intellect  to  comprehend,  and  an  object  to  be  compre- 
hended. Religion  in  the  individual  may  exist  without 
a  particle  of  science ;  but  can  it  be  maintained,  for  a 
moment,  that  the  race  of  man  can  reach  its  highest 
condition,  and  achieve  its  highest  destiny,  without  be- 
coming acquainted  with  those  natural  truths  in  which 
practical  consequences  of  the  most  important  kind  are 
necessarily  implicated  ? 

Let  us,  then,  conclude  that  all  scientific  truth  is  di- 
vine, (or,  if  that  term  appear  too  strong,  let  us  say  that 
all  scientific  truth  is  the  natural  intention  of  the  Cre- 
ator of  our  system,)  that  it  is  the  intellect  of  the  crea- 
ture apprehending  correctly  the  divine  arrangements 
of  the  created.     Natural  science  is  the  apprehension 


284  INFLUENCE    OF    SCIENCE. 

of  the  divine  wisdom  and  power,  as  St.  Paul  himself 
teaches  us,  — "  For  the  invisible  things  of  him  from 
the  creation  of  the  world  are  clearly  seen,  being  under- 
stood by  the  things  that  are  made,  even  his  eternal 
power  and  Godhead ;  so  that  they  are  without  excuse : 
because  that,  when  they  knew  God,  they  glorified  him 
not  as  God,  neither  were  thankfu] ;  but  became  vain  in 
their  imaginations,  and  their  foolish  heart  was  dark- 
ened." —  Epistle  to  Romans,  1st  chapter. 

Immediately,  then,  that  we  admit  science  to  be  not 
merely  human,  science  acquires  a  new  character.  It 
becomes  the  exponent  of  humanity,  and  points  out  the 
order  of  human  progression.  We  have  here  a  sure 
basis  of  operation,  a  foundation  on  which  the  reason 
may  at  last  rest  in  constructing  its  philosophy  of  man. 
Science  is  stable.  It  shifts  not  with  opinion,  and 
changes  not  with  lapse  of  ages.  Were  all  knowledge 
obliterated,  and  man  to  begin  to-morrow  a  new  course 
of  research,  he  could  come  only  to  the  same  truths  and 
to  the  same  sciences ;  and  those  sciences  would  evolve 
in  a  similar  order,  were  the  experiment  to  take  place  a 
hundred  or  a  thousand  times. 


SECTION    II. THE     INFLUENCE     OF     SCIENCE     ON     MAN'S 

TERRESTRIAL    CONDITION. 

Admitting,  then,  the  divinity  of  science,  in  so  far  as 
science  has  been  really  ascertained,  we  revert  to  its 
connection  with  man's  practical  function,  and  inquire 


SENSATION  AND  REASON.  285 

how  the  dogma  of  knowledge  is  efficient  to  produce 
an  amended  condition  of  man  upon  the  globe. 

Every  science  has  a  millennium ;  that  is,  a  period 
when  its  truths  are  discovered,  acknowledged,  and  car- 
ried into  practical  operation. 

First  come  the  mathematical  sciences.  These,  as 
mere  exercises  of  the  intellect,  are  by  no  means  of  a 
high  character.  They  are  little  more,  in  fact,  than 
mechanical  reasonings,  mere  methods  of  computation 
performed  by  the  aid  of  signs.  The  discovery  of  the 
methods  has,  no  doubt,  called  forth  some  of  the  high- 
est exercises  of  human  genius ;  but  genius  looks  be- 
yond the  mere  computation  of  numbers,  quantities, 
and  spaces. 

When  we  turn,  however,  to  the  application  of  the 
mathematical  sciences,  their  influence  in  enlightening 
mankind  is  of  the  very  highest  order.  Identity,  equal- 
ity, number,  quantity,  space,  and  force,  mere  abstrac- 
tions of  the  reason,  become  fundamental  elements  of 
knowledge,  by  which  the  observed  realities  of  nature 
are  made  to  function  in  man's  intelligent  apprehension. 
Sensational  observation  furnishes  only  the  very  small- 
est part  even  of  physical  science.  Strictly  speaking, 
observation  furnishes  only  a  momentary  image  or 
impression,  or  a  succession  of  momentary  images  or 
impressions.  No  man  ever  observed  motion.  He  ob- 
serves successively  in  time  material  substantives  in  suc- 
cessive positions  in  space ;  but  the  motion  he  never  did 
observe,  and  never  can  observe.  Let  materialists  or 
sensationalists  reason  as  they  may,  they  cannot  tell 
what  physical  properties  motion  has.  It  has  no  color, 
no   taste,  no   smell,  no   sound;    it  cannot  be  felt  or 


286  REASON    POSITS    POWER. 

appreciated  by  the  senses,  and  to  the  sensationalist  it 
has  no  existence.  It  is  a  word  he  has  no  right  to  use ; 
but  use  it  he  must,  and  in  so  doing  he  borrows  it  from 
the  intellectualist.*  And  so  with  force.  Force  is  in- 
appreciable by  sense.  Sense  never  saw  force,  never 
felt  it,  and  never  can  assign  one  single  sensational 
property  to  it.  It  is  posited  by  the  reason;  and  the 
moment  we  become  sensationalists,  we  should  drop 
the  word  and  the  concept  as  chimeras  of  human  inven- 
tion. And,  in  so  doing,  we  must  drop  the  science  of 
dynamics.  No  greater  absurdity  was  ever  imposed  on 
man,  nothing  was  ever  more  frantically  credulous, 
nothing  that  the  wildest  superstition  ever  raved  in  its 
most  intense  moments  of  insane  imagination,  was 
more  utterly  contrary  to  man's  universal  experience, 
and  man's  universal  reason,  than  the  attribution  of  all 
man's  knowledge  to  sense.  Nor  can  we  approve  of 
those  arguments  which  drag  the  question  into  the 
region  of  theology.  That  is  not  its  region.  The 
battle  cannot  be  fought  there  till  won  in  another  field. 
It  must  be  fought  as  a  question  of  philosophy  in  the 
region  of  dynamics  ;  for  if  once  we  substantiate  power, 
and  can  show  a  science  of  force,  and  perform  with 
that  science  of  force  rational  operations  whose  conclu- 
sions are  verified  in  nature,  and   predict  by  its   aid 

*  It  is  one  of  the  changes  which  the  reason  includes  in  the  gen- 
eral law,  (necessary  form  of  thought,)  "  Every  change  must  have  a 
cause"  This  is  the  condition  under  which  man  thinks.  He  may 
deny  the  proposition,  or  mystify  it,  from  his  inability  to  appreciate 
mental  phenomena ;  but  it  is  as  much  a  condition  of  his  thought 
i rh  lie.  engaged  in  the  denial,  as  it  is  while  engaged  in  its  admission. 
In  mechanics,  the  change  is  motion,  the  cause  is  force. 


ASTRONOMY,    GEOGRAPHY,    NAVIGATION.  287 

far-off  truths  only  to  occur  in  reality  years  after  the 
rational  calculation  has  been  made,  we  have  grounded 
the  validity  of  the  reason,  and  proven  beyond  dispute 
its  undoubted  right  to  substantiate  things  hidden  from 
sense,  and  forever  beyond  the  reach  of  sensational 
apprehension.* 

But  if  sense  furnish  so  little  in  a  science,  mind  must 
furnish  all  that  is  not  mere  momentary  impression ; 
and  the  rational  operations  of  mind,  applied  to  the 
material  realities  of  nature,  are  expressed  in  the  math- 
ematical sciences  when  they  are  brought  to  bear  on 
physical  nature,  and  to  lend  the  aid  of  their  computing 
power  to  systematize  the  impressions  of  the  senses. 
Number,  quantity,  space,  and  force,  (essentially  non- 
physical  concepts,)  are  absolutely  necessary  for  the 
formation  of  physical  science  ;  and  all  the  observations 
that  man  could  make  would  be  forever  dog's  views 
of  nature,  were  it  not  for  the  introduction  of  those 
rational  elements  which  tear  the  veil  from  the  world 
of  matter,  and  lay  bare  the  mysteries  of  its  divine 
arrangement. 

"When  man  has  evolved  the  mathematical  sciences 
and  dynamics,  he  has  acquired  a  vast  power  over  the 
world  of  matter;  not  merely  a  power  of  intellectual 
apprehension,  but,  over  and  above,  a  power  of  action 
—  a  power  to  perform  things  which  react  intensely 
on  his  own  social  condition,  and  place  him  on  an  en- 
tirely different  footing  as  regards  his  relations  to  the 

*  "  The  most  certain  method  that  can  guide  us  in  the  research 
of  truth  consists  in  rising,  by  induction,  from  phenomena  to  laws, 
and  from  laws  to  forces.11  —  Laplace,  Essai  Philosophique  sur  les 
Prohabilite's. 


288  ASTRONOMY,    GEOGRAPHY,    NAVIGATION. 

material  universe.  His  observations^  without  the  math- 
ematical sciences,  go  for  little  or  nothing.  He  can 
neither  number,  nor  measure,  nor  compute  ;  and  with- 
out measurement,  his  observations  are  mere  sensations. 
We  shall  remark  only  one  or  two  of  the  effects  of 
the  mathematical  sciences.  The  first  great  achieve- 
ment, and  one  whose  importance  to  the  world  is  be- 
yond all  human  calculation,  is  "  the  determination  of 
the  physical  character  of  man's  home  or  residence  in 
space."  Astronomy  and  general  geography  are  the 
results.  Now,  passing  over  all  that  could  be  called 
mere  knowledge,  let  us  look  to  two  practical  effects, 
which  forever  place  the  practical  influence  of  the  math- 
ematical sciences  on  man's  condition,  altogether  be- 
yond the  power  of  question  —  navigation  and  the 
measurement  of  time.  Navigation  is  possible  without 
astronomical  observation,  or  at  least  with  the  very 
rudest  elements  of  observation.  The  Northmen  were 
no  doubt  in  the  habit  of  sailing  to  America  (Vinland) 
five  hundred  years  before  Columbus ;  and  that  they 
navigated  all  the  European  seas,  from  Iceland  to  Italy, 
is  proven  by  abundant  evidence.  But  what  compar- 
ison can  be  established  between  such  navigation,  and 
that  which  now  is  one  of  the  most  powerful  of  all 
agents  for  the  civilization  of  the  earth  ?  Such  naviga- 
tion was  an  adventure,  not  an  occupation.  And  the 
wonder  is,  how  even  the  boldest,  hardiest,  and  most 
daring  of  all  races  should  have  undertaken  such  enter- 
prises. No  one  can  for  a  moment  believe  that  such 
navigation  as  now  takes  place  could  possibly  have 
arisen  without  a  knowledge  of  astronomy  and  geogra- 
phy, or  could  possibly  be  continued  were  the  astro- 


MEASUREMENT    OF    TIME.  289 

nomical  elements  to  be  dropped.  The  navigation  of 
the  Northmen  was  an  adventure,  and  it  ceased  because 
it  was  an  adventure.  It  had  no  systematic  knowledge 
at  the  bottom  of  it,  showing  how  the  thing  that  had 
been  done  once  could  be  done  again.  It  passed  away, 
and  even  the  discovery  of  the  western  continent,  with 
which  they  had  traded,  was  all  but  forgotten.  But 
can  any  one  suppose,  that  so  long  as  the  present 
knowledge  remains,  navigation  could  again  cease,  or 
be  confined  to  coasting  expeditions?  Were  all  the 
ships  in  the  world  destroyed,  a  few  years  only  could 
elapse  before  the  ensign  of  England  would  wave  in 
the  breeze  of  every  navigable  latitude ;  and  the  speedy 
reparation  of  the  great  catastrophe  would  only  show 
the  power  that  man  has  acquired  from  knowledge. 
Between  the  navigation  of  former  times  and  the  navi- 
gation of  the  present  day,  there  is  much  the  same  dif- 
ference that  there  is  between  Alexander's  expedition  to 
India  and  the  unromantic  overland  journey,  reduced  to 
a  monthly  question  of  pounds,  shillings,  and  pence. 

Closely  connected  with  navigation,  and  extending 
its  influence  throughout  all  civilized  society,  is  the 
measurement  of  time.  The  measurement  of  time  is  in 
fact  the  measurement  of  the  motions  of  the  heavenly 
bodies.  The  firmament  in  one  sense  is  a  great  clock, 
with  a  very  singular  dial,  and  a  very  curious  method 
of  notation.  Let  it  stop,  and  all  means  of  measuring 
time  accurately,  and  of  being  sure  that  our  measure- 
ments are  correct,  fade  away  forever.  And  who  can 
estimate  the  practical  influence  on  the  world  of  the 
measurement  of  time  ? 

Geography,  astronomy,  the  measurement  of  time, 
25 


290  APPLICATION    OF    MATHEMATICS. 

and  systematic  navigation,  laid  the  foundation  for  the 
general  civilization  of  the  world.  And  one  circum- 
stance we  may  remark  connected  with  ocean  locomo- 
tion—  the  most  advanced  nations  in  the  world  will 
always  be  those  who  navigate  the  most;  and,  con- 
sequently, advancement,  improvement,  civilization, 
knowledge,  and  art,  will  always  be  disseminated 
through  navigation.  No  instance  can  be  adduced  of 
barbarous  nations  navigating  to  a  great  extent,  while 
at  the  same  time  more  advanced  nations  did  not 
navigate.  Those  who  have  navigated,  in  all  ages, 
have  been  those  who  were  full  of  life,  energy,  resolu- 
tion, and  progress.  The  advanced  nations  are  the 
goers,  the  less  advanced  nations  are  the  stayers  at 
home.  Sloth  and  barbarism  are  essentially  stationary; 
energy  and  civilization  are  essentially  expansive,  cos- 
mopolitan, and  progressive.  One  circumstance  alone 
shows  us  that  navigation  is  essential  to  the  regenera- 
tion of  the  earth.  The  one  true  religion  never  could 
be  propagated  throughout  the  world,  as  there  is  no  doubt 
it  will  be  at  some  future  period,  without  navigation. 

But  to  what  does  man  owe  geography,  astronomy, 
the  measurement  of  time,  and  systematic  navigation  ? 
To  the  application  of  the  mathematical  sciences  to  the 
observed  conditions  of  material  nature. 

Now,  although  the  term  may  be  new,  and  by  some 
may  be  considered  objectionable,  we  do  not  hesitate 
to  speak  of  a  mathematical  millennium.  A  mathemat- 
ical millennium  takes  place  when  mathematical  truth 
is  discovered,  and  reduced  to  practical  operation. 
Mathematical  science  is  the  foundation  of  man's  in- 
tellectual and  practical  progress,  and  the  region  of 


MECHANICS    AND    LOCOMOTION.  291 

mathematics  is  the  first  region  in  which  a  natural 
millennium  takes  place.  Without  mathematics  we 
have  no  astronomy,  no  geography,  no  measurement 
of  time,  and  no  systematic  navigation,  worthy  of  the 
name.  That  is,  we  have  in  those  departments  igno- 
rance or  superstition,  instead  of  knowledge. 

Next  to  a  mathematical  millennium  is  a  mechanical 
millennium.  And  here  we  leave  the  knowledge,  and 
turn  only  to  the  action,  and  to  the  consequent  con- 
dition  of  man.  The  mathematical  sciences  are  abso- 
lutely essential  to  the  evolution  of  mechanics,  and 
mechanical  knowledge  is  absolutely  necessary  to  ena- 
ble man  to  turn  the  earth  to  the  best  account.  One 
of  the  first  great  spheres  of  mechanical  operation 
is  "locomotion."  The  mathematical  sciences  teach 
men  how  to  navigate,  in  what  direction  to  go,  how 
to  make  maps  and  charts,  how  to  determine  the 
locality  of  towns,  capes,  reefs,  ships,  &c,  &c.  But 
the  mathematical  sciences  do  not  teach  how  to  make 
ships.  They  help,  but  they  do  not  complete.  The 
properties  of  matter  are  involved,  and  these  must  be 
ascertained  by  observation. 

The  improvement  of  locomotion  is  one  of  the  first 
essentials  in  the  progression  of  mankind,  and  we 
might  almost  measure  the  relative  advancement  of 
nations  by  the  condition  of  their  means  of  locomotion. 
Advantages  of  the  highest  importance  to  man's  intel- 
lectual and  moral  welfare  are  involved  in  facilitating 
locomotion ;  and  every  obstacle  placed  by  governments 
in  the  way  of  perfectly  free  locomotion,  is  a  barrier 
erected  to  defer  the  advance  of  civilization.  It  is  a 
clog  placed  by  ignorant  despotism  on  the  emancipa* 


292  MECHANICS    AND    LOCOMOTION. 

tion  of  mankind,  not  merely  from  political  thraldom, 
but  also  from  natural  ignorance  and  natural  degrada- 
tion. It  is  a  crime,  not  merely  against  the  individual, 
but  against  humanity  itself.  And  whoever  has  the 
power,  has  the  most  undoubted  right  to  break  down 
every  such  barrier  as  a  duty  to  his  race.  Political 
freedom,  in  this  respect,  however,  is  not  the  only  essen- 
tial; we  must  also  have  the  mechanical  facility.* 

Let  us  consider  that  the  earth,  as  constituted,  per- 
mits only  of  locomotion  under  certain  conditions.  It 
is  possible  for  man  to  have  a  maximum  of  locomotive 
facility.  A  certain  speed  will  be  found  beyond  which 
we  lose  in  safety,  and  below  which  we  lose  in  celerity 

#  While  mentioning  locomotion,  it  is,  perhaps,  impossible  to  re- 
frain from  remembering  the  late  Mr.  Waghorn,  (with  whose  name 
the  title  of  lieutenant  appears  like  that  of  exciseman  in  connection 
with  the  name  of  one  Robert  Burns,)  as  brave  a  heart  and  as  true 
a  genius  as  England  has  seen  for  many  a  long  day.  Mr.  Waghorn 
was  the  Napoleon  of  communication  ;  and  when  those  who  did  not 
reward  him  have  been  long  forgotten,  his  name  will  appear  as  one 
of  those  heroes  to  whom  the  world  owes  its  progress.  It  is  sicken- 
ing to  think  that  Waghorn  should  have  died  as  he  did,  overborne 
by  the  material  cares  of  this  life ;  but  when  prime  ministers,  and 
first  lords  of  the  admiralty,  and  chartered  East  India  companies, 
shall  be  mere  matters  of  history,  the  name  of  Waghorn  will  appear 
with  those  of  Eric  the  Red,  and  Marco  Paolo,  and  Christopher  Co- 
lumbus, and  Richard  Chancellor,  and  La  Salle,  and  Brindley,  and 
Watt,  and  Telford,  and  those  other  heroes  who  have  bequeathed 
the  world's  good,  by  stamping  the  impress  of  their  genius  on  the 
destinies  of  humanity.  To  think  that  the  wealth  of  England  should 
have  bowed  before  a  Hudson,  and  brought  rich  offerings  to  the  shrine 
of  pampered  sycophancy,  and  yet  should  have  seen  a  brave  man 
end  as  did  Waghorn,  when  a  few  thousands  might  have  gladdened 
the  last  days  of  the  intrepid  Englishman !  But  enough  —  he  avUI 
not  be  forgotten. 


MACHINERY.  293 

without  gaining  in  safety.  And  this  applies  to  all 
systems  of  locomotion.  The  problem,  then,  is  to  dis- 
cover the  best  system ;  that  which  combines  the  maxi- 
mum of  celerity  with  the  minimum  of  danger.  And 
when  we  have  made  as  near  an  approach  to  this  as 
the  circumstances  of  the  earth  permit  of,  we  have  a 
locomotive  millennium.* 

All  engineering  is  nothing  more  than  the  applica- 
tion of  mathematics  and  mechanics  to  the  world  of 
matter.  Roads,  bridges,  canals,  ships,  harbors,  docks, 
railroads,  tunnels,  steam  engines,  steam  vessels,  steam 
locomotives,  &c.  &c.,  are  the  products  of  mathematics 
and  mechanics.  Man,  with  these,  is  man  armed  with 
the  powers  of  nature.  He  has  vanquished  his  oppo- 
nent, and  enlisted  her  forces  in  his  service.  Matter  is 
no  longer  the  object  that  opposes  him,  but  the  arsenal 
from  which  he  draws  his  weapons  and  his  stores. 
Coal  and  water  become  concentrated  forces,  whose 
powers  he  may  develop  and  control  for  the  extension 
of  his  dominion  over  nature,  and  for  the  improvement 
of  his  terrestrial  condition.  One  single  steam  engine 
constructed  by  mankind  is  of  more  real  importance 
than  all  the  powers  of  Rome,  and  one  single  printing 
press  than  all  the  arts  of  Greece.  They  are  powers, 
prodigious  powers,  placed  at  man's  disposal.  They 
are  products  of  the  reason ;  and  just  as  reason  learns 
to  see  farther  and  farther  into  the  processes  of  nature, 

#  Letters,  newspapers,  &c,  are  entirely  dependent  on  the  means 
of  locomotion;  and  who  can  possibly  estimate  the  influence  of 
postal  communications  on  the  civilization  and  advancement  of 
mankind  ?  But  even  the  prodigies  of  steam  have  been  eclipsed  by 
the  electric  telegraph. 

25* 


294  CHEMISTRY    AND   ELECTRICITY. 

so  does  man  acquire  new  power  for  extracting  welfare 
from  the  earth. 

Again :  man  makes  a  few  observations  on  the  phe- 
nomena of  light ;  these  he  geometrizes.  He  makes  a 
few  observations  on  the  power  of  various  substances 
to  modify  the  phenomena }  and  what  is  the  result  ? 
He  produces  the  telescope,  which  extends  his  vision 
to  a  distance  altogether  inconceivable  ;  and  the  micro- 
scope, which  reveals  the  minute  operations  of  organic 
nature* 

And  if  we  turn  to  chemistry,  shall  we  find  the 
practical  effects  of  science  one  atom  less  important,  or 
one  atom  less  remarkable  ?  What  are  the  metals,  and 
where  do  they  come  from  ?  What  is  gas  ?  that  great 
moralizer  of  modern  cities,  more  powerful  than  all 
police  could  be.  Mechanics  and  chemistry  furnish  us 
with  an  endless  variety  of  substances,  and  an  endless 
variety  of  productions,  all  tending  to  give  man  more 
power,  more  leisure,  more  comfort ;  to  make  him  in 
fact   more  free,  and  to  elevate   his   position    on  the 

*  "  In  order  to  enumerate  only  a  few  of  the  instruments  whose 
invention  characterizes  great  epochs  in  the  history  of  civilization, 
I  would  name  the  telescope,  and  its  too  long-delayed  connection 
with  instruments  of  measurement ;  the  compound  microscope,  which 
furnishes  us  with  the  means  of  tracing  the  conditions  of  the  process 
of  development  of  organs,  which  Aristotle  gracefully  designates  as 
*  the  formative  activity  of  the  source  of  being ; ■  the  compass,  and 
tho  different  contrivances  invented  for  moasirring  terrestrial  mag- 
netism ;  the  use  of  the  pendulum  as  a  measure  of  time ;  the  barom- 
eter ;  the  thermometer ;  hygrometric  and  electrometric  apparatuses ; 
and  the  polariscope,  in  its  application  to  the  phenomena  of  colored 
polarization  in  the  light  of  tlie  stars,  or  in  luminous  regions  of  the 
atmosphere."  —  Humboldt's  Cosfnos,  p.  473. 


THE    SOIL    AND    ITS    PRODUCTIONS.  295 

globe.  Instead  of  being  the  slave  of  physical  nature, 
science  will  make  man  its  master,  as  the  Creator 
intended  him  to  be  when  he  gave  him  an  earthly 
dominion. 

Electricity,  again,  has  already  achieved  its  won- 
ders ;  and  though  we  may  expect  many  more  practical 
effects,  we  have  enough  to  prove  that  this  science, 
which  some  years  since  was  a  plaything,  is  a  mighty 
agent  that  endows  man  with  power  which,  even  a 
century  since,  would  have  been  regarded  as  indubita- 
bly magical.  The  very  circumstance  that  man  can 
now  communicate  with  man  almost  instantaneously, 
although  separated  by  the  breadth  of  a  kingdom, 
ought  to  teach  us  that  time  and  space,  the  former 
tyrants  of  mankind,  may  be  overcome  by  means 
whose  simplicity  is,  at  least,  as  extraordinary  as  their 
power. 

Nor,  if  we  turn  to  vegetable  physiology,  are  the 
practical  effects  that  the  advance  of  knowledge  entails 
for  man's  benefit  one  hair's  breadth  less  extraordinary. 
A  few  observations  are  made  on  the  growth  of  plants, 
on  the  disposition  of  the  soils,  on  the  effect  of  moist- 
ure, and  on  the  relation  of  surface  water  to  the 
productions  of  the  agriculturist.  Certain  reasonings 
are  made,  and  certain  experiments,  to  prove  whether 
the  reasonings  are  correct.  The  practical  result,  at 
last,  is  a  general  system  of  drainage,  which  transforms 
wretched  pastures  into  fertile  cornfields,  and  in  many 
cases  doubles,  trebles,  and  quadruples  the  value  of  the 
produce.  To  countries  like  England,  Scotland,  and 
Ireland,  the  practical  importance  of  this  draining 
system   is   immense.     These   countries   have,  within 


296  TENURE    OF    LAND. 

themselves,  an  almost  indefinite  power  of  creating 
agricultural  wealth ;  and,  so  far  from  being  in  danger 
of  a  superabundant  population,  they  could,  in  ten 
years,  with  a  tenth  part  of  the  annual  expenditure  of 
the  kingdom  on  unnecessary  armaments,  so  outrun  the 
increase  of  the  population,  that  it  would  be  unneces- 
sary to  import  one  single  grain  of  corn.  Far  more 
than  this  is  within  the  limit  of  possibility,  and  it  is 
only  necessary  to  ascertain  the  progress  made  by 
Scotland  within  the  memory  of  the  present  generation 
of  agriculturists,  to  be  convinced  that  the  natural 
capabilities  of  the  soil  of  Britain  are  abundantly  suf- 
ficient for  all  its  inhabitants ;  and  that  the  true  reason 
why  the  population  increases  more  rapidly  than  the 
food  is  to  be  found,  not  in  the  laws  of  God,  but  in  the 
political  laws  which  have  made  such  a  disposition  of 
the  soil  as  absolutely  prevents  it  from  being  turned 
to  account.  Under  the  present  system  of  land  occu- 
pancy, combined  with  labor  taxation,  want  and  star- 
vation are  the  natural  consequences.  They  may 
excite  compassion,  but  they  need  excite  no  wonder. 
And  until  the  present  system  is  broken  up,  root  and 
branch,  and  buried  in  oblivion,  the  laboring  popula- 
tion of  Britain  and  Ireland  must  reap  the  fruits  of  a 
system  that  first  allocates  all  the  soil  to  thirty  or  forty 
thousand  proprietors,  and  then  places  the  heaviest 
taxation  in  the  world  on  the  mass  of  the  inhabitants. 
Let  any  man  inquire  of  the  Scottish  agriculturists  — 
the  greatest  landlord  worshippers  in  Europe  —  what  is 
the  reason  that  the  improvement  of  the  soil  does  not 
go  on  more  rapidly  and  more  generally.  The  answer, 
we   have  invariably  found,  attributes  the  evil  to  the 


TENURE    OF    LAND.  297 

political  tenure  of  land.  The  agriculturists  could  pro- 
duce more  corn.*  Every  one  of  them,  except  in  a  few 
small  districts  where  the  land  is  up  to  its  pitch  of  pro- 
duction, will  attest  to  this  fact.  They  could  make 
more  food  —  more  wheat,  more  oats,  more  turnips, 
heavier  sheep,  more  and  better  wool,  &c,  &c.  And 
they  would  do  so, — both  for  their  own  profit,  and  from 
a  spirit  of  emulation  generated  by  the  rapid  improve- 
ments already  achieved, —  but  they  cannot  do  so;  and 
the  country,  which  allowed  the  crown  to  alienate  the 
soil,  must  be  content  to  see  it  half  cultivated,  and  to 
depend  for  supplies  on  distant  lands.  They  cannot 
improve,  because,  although  the  improvements  would 
pay,  and  pay  abundantly,  in  the  first  place  they  have 
not  the  capital  to  execute  the  improvements  at  the 
commencement  of  their  lease ;  and,  in  the  second,  it  is 
absurd  for  them  to  make  permanent  improvements 
during  the  currency  of  a  lease,  the  only  effect  of  which 
would  be,  —  and,  as  a  fact,  often  is,  —  that,  at  the  end 
of  the  lease,  the  legal  landlord  would  let  the  land,  with 
its  improvements,  by  auction.  Their  improvements 
would  be  put  up  to  auction,  the  only  difference  being 
that  the  biddings  are  written  instead  of  spoken ;  and, 
unless  they  will  give  more  rent  for  their  own  improve- 
ments than  any  other  person  will  give,  they  are  turned 
out  of  the  land,  and,  in  many  instances,  carry  their 
skill  and  capital  to  far  distant  countries.  The  difficul- 
ties are  neither  with  the  soil,  nor  the  climate,  nor  the 
price  of  produce;  they  all  hinge  on  the  political  ar- 
rangement that  the  law  has  made  with  regard  to  the 
soil  and  its  tenure ;   and   until   this   arrangement   is 

*  See  Mr.  Caird's  Pamphlet  on  "  High  Farming.'* 


298  DRAINAGE. 

destroyed,  the  soil  never  can  produce  its  maximum. 
The  evil  is  immensely  aggravated,  it  is  true,  by  the 
system  of  entail ;  but  the  radical  evil,  the  grand 
masterpiece  of  mischief,  that  requires  to  be  corrected, 
is  the  alienation  of  the  soil  from  the  nation,  and  the 
taxation  of  the  labor  of  the  country. 

With  regard  to  draining  the  soil,  however,  a  new 
scheme  has  recently  been  carried  into  execution.  The 
government  taxes  the  population,  and  lends  the  money 
to  the  landlords  to  drain  the  soil.  The  landlords  are 
to  pay  a  certain  interest  and  quit  capital,  which  dis- 
charges the  debt  in  twenty-two  years.  This  per 
centage  the  farmer  finds  to  be  less  than  the  profit 
likely  to  accrue  from  the  improvement  of  the  land, 
and  he  agrees  to  pay  it  to  the  landlord.  The  conse- 
quence is,  that  the  country  has  been  taxed  for  the 
purpose  of  presenting  the  landlords  with  the  clear 
amount  of  improvement  at  the  end  of  twenty-two 
years.*  Such  is  the  wisdom  and  equity  of  British 
(landlord)  legislation. 

Notwithstanding  the  political  arrangements,  how- 
ever, the  advantages  of  draining  are  of  the  highest 
character.     The  soil  improves,  the  climate  improves,! 

#  Since  the  drainage  money  was  advanced  by  the  government, 
advertisements  have  appeared  in  the  "  North  British  Advertiser," 
in  which  the  landlord  offers  to  drain  the  lands  on  the  payment  of 
ten  per  cent,  per  annum  by  the  tenant. 

f  "  Comment  en  serait-il  autrement  quand  les  belles  recherches 
publices  par  M.  Arago  dans  Vannuaire,  ont  demontre  que  les 
defrichements  et  les  grands  travaux  agricoles  suffisaient  pour  di- 
minuer  les  chaleurs  de  l'ete  et  les  rigueurs  de  l'hiver,  et  peut  otre 
meme  influer  sur  la  temperature  moyenne  de  tout  un  royaume."  — 
Gavarret,  Principes  Generaux  de  Statistique  Medicale,  p.  182. 


IMPROVEMENT    OF    DOMESTIC    ANIMALS.  299 

the  character  and  condition  of  the  agriculturists  im- 
prove, and  the  amount  of  food  is  vastly  increased. 
And  to  what  do  we  owe  draining,  with  all  its  sterling 
advantages?  To  nothing  more  than  the  application 
of  hydrodynamics  to  vegetable  physiology.  This  is 
its  scientific  character  —  its  character  as  a  product 
of  human  ingenuity,  exercising  itself  on  the  physical 
world.* 

It  will  scarcely  be  necessary  to  remark  the  power 
of  man  to  modify  the  animal  kingdom,  and  thereby 
to  produce  those  animals  that  serve  him  better,  and 
make  his  position  more  advantageous.     The  horses, 

#  Were  the  governors  of  England  open  to  any  scheme  that 
would  permanently  improve  the  country,  without  being  made  a 
job,  a  very  simple  means  is  at  their  disposal.  Take  one  million 
a  year  from  the  army  and  navy.  This  might  be  done  without 
impairing  the  real  security  of  the  country.  Let  this  money  be 
expended  on  drainage  and  permanent  improvements.  Let  it  be 
lent  to  no  person  in  the  first  place.  But,  wherever  tenants  in 
occupancy  were  willing  to  pay  the  interest  of  the  money,  let  them 
be  judges  under  inspection  what  drains  are  requisite,  and  whether 
they  are  properly  executed.  No  person  is  so  competent  as  the 
tenant  to  see  that  the  work  is  well  done,  where  his  interest  is  so 
much  involved.  When  the  drains  are  specified,  let  their  execu- 
tion be  done  by  contract.  The  tenant  and  inspector  giving  their 
certificate  that  the  land  is  properly  drained  according  to  bargain, 
the  contractor  receives  his  money.  The  difference  between  the 
common  interest  of  money,  say  three  and  a  half  per  cent.,  and  the 
quit  per  centage,  say  six  and  a  half  per  cent.,  to  be  paid  by  the 
landlord,  who  receives  the  permanent  benefit.  The  land  itself  to 
be  accountable  for  all  the  liabilities.  This  scheme  would  pro- 
digiously increase  the  produce  of  the  country ;  and,  as  the  land  is 
so  little  taxed,  the  landlords  would  have  no  right  to  complain.  With 
a  landlord  legislature,  however,  we  fear  there  is  but  little  chance 
for  schemes  of  this  nature. 


300  IMPROVEMENT    OF    DOMESTIC    ANIMALS. 

cattle,  sheep,  &c.,  of  Britain,  are  even  now  almost 
artificial  races.  The  difference  between  those  animals 
as  they  are,  and  animals  of  the  same  species  as  they 
would  have  been  in  a  state  of  nature,  is  the  product 
of  human  ingenuity.  The  Durham  ox,  or  the  Leices- 
ter sheep,  is,  in  one  sense,  a  machine  —  a  machine  for 
the  manufacture  of  beef,  mutton,  fat,  and  wool,  out 
of  grass,  turnips,  and  oil  cakes.  The  improvement  of 
the  breed  is  exactly  a  similar  occupation  to  the  im- 
provement of  a  cotton  mill,  or  the  improvement  of  the 
soil.  If  man  wants  more  corn  than  will  grow  natu- 
rally on  the  soil,  he  must  improve  the  soil,  drain  it, 
manure  it,  lime  it,  irrigate  it,  &c.  It  is  no  longer  the 
same  soil ;  it  is  the  same  species,  but  a  different  va- 
riety from  what  it  was  originally.  Even  let  it  alone, 
and  it  will  bear  a  different  series  of  plants.  The  origi- 
nal plants  die  out,  and  their  place  is  taken  by  others 
more  useful  to  man.  And  when  man  sows  seed  of  a 
certain  requisite  character,  he  reaps  a  much  better  and 
more  abundant  crop.  And  so  it  is  with  a  sheep,  or  a 
bullock,  or  a  fowl.  Naturally  he  grows  wild,  rough, 
hardy,  and  takes  far  too  much  exercise  to  fatten.  He 
is  developed  in  those  parts  that  man  esteems  the  least, 
— that  do  not  pay.  He  is  unmanageable,  has  his  own 
way,  runs,  jumps,  tears,  flies,  and  does  many  things 
that  no  doubt  amuse  himself,  but  that  do  not  recom- 
mend him  as  an  investment.  The  improved  animal, 
on  the  contrary,  is  quiet,  solemn,  fattens  well,  appears 
to  understand  the  end  of  his  existence,  and  takes  to  it 
kindly;  bears  beef  and  fat,  or  mutton  and  wool,  to 
the  very  best  of  his  power,  and  seems  pleased  with  his 
prosperity.     He  even  learns  to  look  down  on  his  less 


EMPIRICAL    AND    SCIENTIFIC    PHYSIOLOGY.  301 

cultivated  companions,  and  seems  thoroughly  imbued 
with  a  quiet  sense  of  his  own  superiority.  He  does 
as  he  is  bid,  and  in  all  respects  is  a  man  server.  He 
does  his  work,  and  receives  his  wages. 

The  improvements  that  have  hitherto  taken  place 
in  agriculture,  in  horticulture,  and  in  the  races  of 
horses,  cattle,  sheep,  and  the  other  domestic  animals, 
are  the  direct  results  of  empirical  physiology,  which 
observes  and  records  the  resulting  fact,  without  inquir- 
ing into  the  various  steps  of  the  process  by  which  the 
fact  is  eventually  produced.  The  empirical  physiolo- 
gist inquires,  "Does  the  earth  become  more  produc- 
tive by  the  application  of  certain  substances,  (called, 
generically,  manures,)  and  if  so,  What  are  the  rela- 
tive advantages  of  these  substances,  compared  among 
themselves  ? "  The  scientific  physiologist,  on  the 
contrary,  inquires,  "In  what  manner  does  the  earth 
become  more  productive  by  the  application  of  these 
substances  ? "  The  one  fixes  his  attention  on  the 
improvement  of  his  art;  the  other,  on  the  improve- 
ment of  his  knowledge.  The  one  endeavors  to  read 
aright  the  laws  of  the  practical  world,  and  to  apply 
them  to  his  use;  the  other  endeavors  to  read  aright 
the  construction  of  the  material  world,  and  the  laws 
by  which  nature  carries  on  her  operations.  The  em- 
piric is  satisfied  when  he  has  learned  the  mode  by 
which  he  can  make  his  bullocks  fatten  in  the  shortest 
time  and  at  the  least  expense ;  the  scientific  physiolo- 
gist, on  the  contrary,  is  never  satisfied  till  he  has 
traced  the  particles  of  food  from  their  primary  prehen- 
sion, through  the  process  of  their  assimilation,  to  their 
ultimate  deposition  in  the  tissues.  The  one  manipu- 
26 


302  EMPIRICAL    AND    SCIENTIFIC    PHYSIOLOGY. 

lates  a  mass,  and  endeavors  to  induce  certain  final 
consequences ;  the  other  attempts  to  seize  a  primary 
atom,  and  to  determine  the  laws  which  regulate  its 
evolution. 

Empirical  physiology  and  scientific  physiology  rep- 
resent two  great  methods,  whose  tendency  is  to  ap- 
proach nearer  and  nearer  to  each  other,  and  finally  to 
unite  in  their  results.  The  former  commences  with 
perhaps  a  great  rude  fact,  plain  and  obvious,  and  as 
far  as  possible  removed  from  any  thing  that  would  be 
called  science.  This  fact,  perhaps,  might  be  merely 
the  division  of  the  year  into  its  two  great  seasons  — 
summer  and  winter;  and  the  observation  that  domes- 
tic cattle  thrive  better  if  housed  in  winter,  than  if  left 
exposed  to  the  inclemency  of  the  season.  This,  in 
many  cases,  is  the  first  great  practical  step,  or  first 
great  division,  which  is  gradually  to  undergo  innumer- 
able subdivisions;  and  these  subdivisions  affecting 
many  kinds  of  food,  and  many  breeds  of  animals,  at 
last  evolve  a  complete  art,  whose  principles  are  tolera- 
bly well  ascertained.  Scientific  physiology,  on  the 
contrary,  commences  with  a  fact  as  far  distant  on  the 
opposite  side  from  its  ultimate  application.  It  begins 
with  the  analysis  of  the  atmosphere,  with  the  myste- 
ries of  oxygen  and  carbon,  with  theories  of  combus- 
tion, with  what  the  air  does  in  the  fire,  and  what 
becomes  of  the  smoke.  And  while  engaged  in  these 
investigations,  it  knows  no  more  of  the  process  by 
which  bullocks  are  fattened  than  the  bullocks  know  of 
phlogiston.  In  course  of  time,  however,  it  improves 
both  its  knowledge  and  its  method ;  it  attacks  the  fat 
itself,  and  begins  to  discourse  of  Btearine,  oleine,  &c. ; 


EMPIRICAL    AND    SCIENTIFIC    PHYSIOLOGY.  303 

and  also  begins  a  series  of  investigations  on  the  pro- 
cess of  respiration,  on  the  possible  modes  by  which 
animal  tissues  may  be  consumed,  and  on  the  conditions 
that  accelerate  or  retard  the  consumption.  This  is  the 
first  fibre  of  communication  shot  across  the  interval 
which  separates  empirical  from  scientific  physiology ; 
and  though  only  a  fibre,  it  is  like  the  ice  shooting  from 
opposite  sides  of  the  stream,  the  first  frail  forerunner 
of  a  solid  communication.  Step  by  step  the  two  pro- 
cesses go  on,  the  one  descending  into  details  more  and 
more  artistically  minute  ;  the  other  departing  more 
and  more  from  its  elementary  compounds,  until  it  suc- 
ceeds at  last  in  constructing  a  scheme  of  knowledge 
which  shall  not  only  explain  the  results,  but  serve  as  a 
guide  for  the  evolution  of  a  correct  systematic  practice.* 

#  The  difference  between  the  empirical  and  the  scientific  method 
is  expressed  with  logical  accuracy,  as  follows :  — 

1.  The  empirical  method  manipulates  those  substantives  (in 
any  particular  course  of  inquiry)  which  present  the  greatest  com- 
•prehension. 

2.  The  scientific  method  manipulates  those  substances  which 
present  the  greatest  extension. 

Thus  an  animal  frame  compreliends  the  processes  of  combination, 
decomposition,  respiration,  the  development  of  heat,  &c,  &c. ; 
while  the  natural  history  of  oxygen  or  carbon  extends  to  all  the 
objects  in  which  oxygen  and  carbon  are  comprehended,  although 
that  natural  history  in  reality  comprehends  nothing  but  its  own 
series  of  phenomena. 

The  antagonism  usually  set  forth  as  existing  between  the  induc- 
tive and  the  deductive  process  of  reasoning,  is  not  only  based  on 
a  misunderstanding  of  the  methods  of  pure  syllogistic,  but  abso- 
lutely opposed  to  the  methods  which  are  pursued  in  matters  of 
induction.  There  is  really  only  one  process  of  reasoning,  although 
this  may  be  read  in  different  manners.    What  is  called  the  indue- 


304  EMPIRICAL    AND    SCIENTIFIC    PHYSIOLOGY. 

And  when  once  the  two  methods  have  come  to  an 
identity  of  result,  (as  they  have  in  some  of  the  me- 
chanical arts,  and  as  they  may  soon  in  some  branches 
of  physiology,  (a  system  of  truth  is  developed  for  the 
world,  for  the  human  race,  for  humanity ;  not  merely 
for  the  discoverers  and  improvers,  but  for  man  as  man, 
for  the  human  being  tenanting  the  world,  and  gradu- 
ally learning  to  read  aright  the  universe,  or  cosmos,  in 
which  he  finds  himself  placed.  Man  has  made  a  new 
acquisition,  and  this  new  acquisition  remains  a  per- 
manent, stable,  and  lasting  addition  to  the  wealth  of 
humanity. 

But  empirical  physiology  does  not  apply  merely  to 

tive  process  of  reasoning  is  only  the  inductive  process  of  observing  ; 
and  when  the  observations  are  made,  the  reasonings  are  all  made 
by  the  same  process. 

Let  the  logician  apply  to  any  man  in  the  practical  departments  of 
life,  and  he  will  find  him  reasoning  from  a  major  premiss ;  which 
will  be  found  to  consist  of  two  propositions,  and  not,  as  the  Baconi- 
ans affirm,  of  one,  which  has  been  inferred  from  many  observations. 

For  instance :  — 

Major.  —  In  every  case  that  I  have  given  this  food  to  my  cattle, 
they  have  thriven  well. 

Minor.  —  This  is  a  new  case,  in  which  I  give  the  same  food  to 
my  cattle. 

Consequent.  —  Therefore  they  will  thrive  well,  (the  probability 
being  greater  or  less  according  to  circumstances.) 

The  Baconians  divide  the  major  premiss  and  call  it  a  reasoning, 
whereas  it  is  no  more  than  an  observation. 

The  essential  difference,  however,  between  the  empirical  and  the 
scientific  methods  is  this  —  the  one  classifies  events,  the  other 
classifies  substances.  The  empiric  endeavors  to  find  the  law  of  the 
events ;  the  man  of  science,  the  law  of  the  substances ;  and  in  this 
light  both  pursue  exactly  the  same  method. 


EXTENSION    OF    HUMAN    LIFE. 


305 


the  organized  or  animated  objects  that  man  finds  sur- 
rounding him.  It  applies  to  himself,  and  to  the  mate- 
rial conditions  of  his  bodily  frame.  Of  all  animals, 
man  is  the  most  subject  to  disease,  the  most  liable  to 
be  cut  off  from  existence  before  his  body  has  passed 
through  its  natural  transformations,  and  at  last  sinks 
exhausted  from  the  influence  of  age.  History,  how- 
ever, proves  that  an  immense  amelioration  has  taken 
place  even  in  this  respect  —  that  man  has  extended  the 
limits  of  his  life  —  that  he  has  intelligently  constructed 
circumstances  less  fatal  to  his  organism  —  that  he  has 
diminished,  and  vastly  diminished,  his  liability  to  dis- 
solution —  in  fact,  that  he  has  to  a  certain  extent 
beaten  the  evils  of  the  physiological  world,  exactly  as 
he  has  vanquished  the  difficulties  of  the  mechanical 
world.* 


*  M.  Moreau  de  Jonnes,  in  a  notice  on  the  mortality  of  Europe, 
has  given  the  following  table,  which  tends  equally  to  prove  the  in- 
fluence of  civilization  on  the  number  of  deaths :  — 


One 

One 

Countries. 

Years. 

death  out 
of 

Years. 

death  out 
of 

Sweden, 

1754  to  17<  8 

34 

1821  to  1825 

45 

Den  nark, 

1751  to  17:4 

32 

1819 

45 

Germany, 

1788 

32 

1825 

45 

Prussia, 

1717 

30 

1821  to  1824 

39 

Austria, 

1822 

40 

1825  to  1830 

43 

Holland, 

1800 

26 

1824 

40 

England, 

1690 

33 

1821 

58 

Great  Britain, 

1785  to  1789 

43 

1800  to  1804 

47 

France, 

1776 

25-5 

1825  to  1827 

39-5 

Roman  States, 

1767 

21-5 

1829 

28 

Scotland, 

1801 

44 

1821 

60 

—  Qtjetelet's    Calculation  of  Probabilities. 
mish.     See  the  whole  note,  (v.)  p.  114. 

26* 


Notes  by  Mr.  Bea- 


306  EXTENSION    OF    HUMAN    LIFE. 

This  improvement  man  owes  to  empirical  physiol- 
ogy, partly  intentional  and  partly  unintentional  — 
partly  to  the  exercise  of  a  direct  effort,  and  partly  to 
the  general  amelioration  of  circumstances  produced  by 
the  advance  of  civilization.  Better  clothing  and  bet- 
ter food  —  better  dwellings  and  a  better  system  of 
drainage  —  cleanliness,  ventilation,  and  a  more  abun- 
dant supply  of  water  —  prompt  treatment  under  acute 
disease,  inoculation  and  vaccination — the  improve- 
ment of  jails,  workhouses,  and  all  other  prisons  and 
similar  abominations  —  a  more  simple  and  natural 
mode  of  rearing  children  —  in  fact,  a  better  and  more 
rational  system  of  treating  the  human  frame  both  indi- 
vidual and  collective,  and  placing  it  in  circumstances 
more  conducive  to  its  healthy  function,  has  at  last 
evolved  a  longer  life,  and  secured  to  the  general  man 
a  longer  tenancy  of  terrestrial  existence. 


SECTION    III. APPLICATION     OF     THE     THEORY    OF    PRO- 
GRESSION   TO    MAN'S    POLITICAL    CONDITION. 

We  have  said  enough,  however,  to  show  the  direct 
bearing  of  science  on  the  improvement  of  man's  con- 
dition on  the  globe.  Knowledge  is  obtained,  an  im- 
proved system  of  action  is  consequently  generated, 
and  from  that  improved  system  of  action  an  improved 
condition  arises  as  the  necessary  result. 

But,  then,  how  comes  it  that,  notwithstanding  man's 
vast  achievements,  his  wonderful  efforts  of  mechanical 


PAUPERISM.  307 

ingenuity,  and  the  amazing  productions  of  his  skill, 
his  own  condition  in  a  social  capacity  should  not  have 
improved  in  the  same  ratio  as  the  improvement  of  his 
condition  with  regard  to  the  material  world  ?  In  Brit- 
ain, man  has  to  a  great  extent  beaten  the  material 
world.  He  has  vanquished  it,  overpowered  it ;  he  can 
make  it  serve  him ;  he  can  use  not  merely  his  muscles, 
but  the  very  powers  of  nature,  to  affect  his  purposes ; 
his  reason  has  triumphed  over  matter;  and  matter's 
tendencies  and  powers  are  to  a  great  extent  subject  to 
his  will.  And,  notwithstanding  this,  a  large  portion 
of  the  population  is  reduced  to  pauperism,  to  that  fear- 
ful state  of  dependence  in  which  man  finds  himself  a 
blot  on  the  universe  of  God  —  a  wretch  thrown  up  by 
the  waves  of  time,  without  a  use  and  without  an  end, 
homeless  in  the  presence  of  the  firmament,  and  help- 
less in  the  face  of  the  creation.  Was  it  for  this  that 
the  Almighty  made  man  in  his  own  image,  and  gave 
him  the  earth  for  an  inheritance  ?  Was  it  for  this  that 
he  sent  his  Son  into  the  world  to  proclaim  the  divine 
benevolence,  to  preach  the  doctrine  of  human  brother- 
hood, and  to  lay  the  foundation  of  a  kingdom  that 
should  endure  forever  and  ever  ?  We  do  not  believe 
it ;  neither  do  we  believe  that  pauperism  comes  from 
God.  It  is  maris  doing,  and  man's  doing  alone. 
God  has  abundantly  supplied  man  with  all  the  requi- 
site means  of  support ;  and  where  he  cannot  find  sup- 
port, we  must  look,  not  to  the  arrangements  of  the 
Almighty,  but  to  the  arrangements  of  men,  and  to  the 
mode  in  which  they  have  portioned  out  the  earth.  To 
charge  the  poverty  of  man  on  God,  is  to  blaspheme 
the  Creator  instead  of  bowing  in  reverent  thankfulness 


308  PAUPERISM. 

for  the  profusion  of  his  goodness.  He  has  given 
enough,  abundance,  more  than  sufficient;  and  if  man 
has  not  enough,  we  must  look  to  the  mode  in  which 
God's  gifts  have  been  distributed.  There  is  enough, 
enough  for  all,  abundantly  enough ;  and  all  that  is 
requisite  is  freedom  to  labor  on  the  soil,  and  to  ex- 
tract from  it  the  produce  that  God  intended  for  man's 
support. 

But  what  is  the  cause  of  British  pauperism  ?  Why 
are  there  periodical  starvations  in  Ireland  and  the 
Highlands  ?  Why  is  there  a  crisis  every  few  years 
in  England,  when  able-bodied  men,  willing  to  work, 
can  find  no  employment  ?  Why  are  Britons  obliged 
to  be  shipped  off  to  other  countries  ?  Is  it  because 
the  natural  capabilities  of  the  soil  have  been  wrought 
up  to  the  highest  pitch,  and  yet  there  remains  a  sur- 
plus population  that  the  soil  will  neither  employ  nor 
feed  ?  Is  it  because  manufacturing  has  been  carried 
to  its  utmost  extent,  and  there  really  is  no  further 
room  for  the  employment  of  a  larger  population  ?  Is 
it,  in  fact,  because  man  has  done  his  best  with  Britain, 
made  the  most  of  it,  got  out  of  it  all  the  food  and  all 
the  wealth  that  it  is  capable  of  producing,  and  yet  it 
will  not  keep  its  own  inhabitants,  either  by  the  food  it 
produces,  or  by  articles  of  exchange  that  it  might 
give  to  other  countries  for  food  ?  Is  it  a  matter  of  ne- 
cessity that  there  shall  be  paupers  (that  vile  word)  in 
the  richest  country  in  the  world?  Is  it  true  that  Eng- 
land can  no  longer  support  Englishmen;  nor  Ireland, 
Irishmen  ;  nor  Scotland,  Scotchmen  ?  Have  we,  in 
fact,  arrived  at  the  last  term  of  population,  and  must 
all,  over  and  above,  expatriate  or  starve  ?     Is  this  true, 


PAUPERISM.  309 

or  is  it  false  ?     It  is  false  — false  from  beginning  to 
end. 

And  what  is  the  cause  of  human  pauperism  and 
human  degradation  ?  for  the  two  go  hand  in  hand. 
It  is  because  the  social  arrangements  of  men  have 
been  made  by  superstition,  and  not  by  knowledge.  The 
sciences,  we  have  shown,  lead  to  an  amended  order  of 
action,  and  an  amended  order  of  action  leads  to  an 
amended  and  improved  condition.  But  we  must  have 
knowledge  in  the  department  in  which  we  require  the 
condition  to  be  amended.  That  is,  mechanical  knowl- 
edge improves  man's  mechanical  condition,  as  regards 
his  power  over  external  nature ;  agricultural  knowledge, 
his  agricultural  condition ;  chemical  knowledge,  his 
chemical  condition,  and  so  forth.  But  social  knowl- 
edge —  that  is,  social  science  —  is  absolutely  requisite 
before  we  can  labor  intelligently  to  improve  man's 
social  condition.  These  are  the  conditions  under  which 
man  tenants  the  globe.  Every  department  of  nature, 
and  of  man's  phenomenology,  has  its  laws ;  and  if 
those  laws  are  infringed,  evil  is  the  immediate,  invari- 
able, and  necessary  result.  And  if  man's  social  con- 
dition is  evil;  if  we  find  at  one  end  of  society  a  few 
thousands  of  individuals  with  enormous  wealth,  for 
which  they  work  not,  and  never  have  worked,  and  at 
the  other  end  of  society  millions  belonging  to  the  same 
country,  and  born  on  the  same  soil,  with  barely  the 
necessaries  of  life,  and  too  often  in  abject  destitution 
—  there  is  no  other  conclusion  possible  than  that  this 
poverty  arises  from  man's  social  arrangements,  and 
that  poor  the  mass  of  the  population  must  remain 
until  those  arrangements  are  rectified  by  knowledge. 


310  CONDITION    OF    BRITAIN. 

Does  any  man  suppose  that  the  nation  will  much 
longer  believe  "that  Britain  cannot  support  its  inhab- 
itants?" Does  any  man  believe  that  the  men  who 
can  make  steam  engines,  and  cotton  mills,  and  rail- 
roads, and  ships,  and  the  largest  commerce  in  the 
world,  and  spinning  jennies,  and  steam  printing  ma- 
chines, and  Skerryvore  light-houses,  and  electric  tele- 
graphs, and  a  thousand  other  wonders,  could  not  make 
such  a  distribution  of  Britain  as  should  enable  every 
man  in  it,  and  many  more,  to  earn  an  abundant  liveli- 
hood by  their  labor  ?  Does  any  man  believe  this  ? 
And  if  he  does  not  believe  it,  does  he  suppose  that  any 
superstitious  notions  about  the  king's  right  to  grant 
the  soil  to  individuals  will  long  stand  in  the  way  of 
their  doing'  it?  If  Englishmen  discover  that  pau- 
perism and  wretchedness  are  unnecessary;  that  the 
divine  Being  never  intended  such  things ;  that  the  deg- 
radation of  the  laboring  population,  their  moral  deg- 
radation consequent  on  poverty,  is  the  curse  of  the 
laws  and  not  of  nature,  —  does  any  man  suppose  that 
Englishmen  would  not  be  justified  in  abolishing  such 
laws,  or  that  they  will  not  abolish  them  ?  Can  we 
believe  for  a  moment,  that  if  any  arrangement  would 
enable  the  population  to  find  plenty,  that  such  an  ar- 
rangement will  not  be  made  ?  If  any  man  believe  this, 
he  is  at  all  events  willing  to  be  credulous.  For  our- 
selves, we  believe  it  not. 

There  are  hundreds  of  thousands  of  persons  in  this 
country  who  cannot  earn  above  from  7s.  to  10s.  per 
week,  even  when  they  have  constant  employment 
The  wages  of  the  Scottish  agricultural  laborer  —  cer- 
tainly as  respectable  a  man  as  is  found  in  the  whole 


CONDITION    OF    BRITAIN.  311 

world  in  a  similar  situation,  although  unfortunately- 
undergoing  the  same  process  of  degradation  that  is 
undermining  society  in  the  towns — do  not  average 
£26  per  annum.  This,  in  fact,  is  a  high  estimate ; 
but,  to  place  the  question  altogether  beyond  the  reach  of 
minute  wrangling,  let  it  even  be  called  <£30  per  annum, 
and  here  we  are  quite  sure  that  we  exceed  the  highest 
remuneration  that  the  best,  steadiest,  most  sober  and 
most  skilful  laborer  —  the  man  who  works  a  pair  of 
horses  —  can  obtain  from  the  ordinary  farmer.  With 
this  sum  he  brings  up  a  family  and  educates  his 
children.  His  life  is  a  life  of  stern  economy,  and  he 
faces  it  like  a  man.  He  respects  himself,  and  feels 
that  he  has  a  right  to  be  respected.  He  does  manage 
to  live  like  a  moral  being,  and  sometimes  escapes  the 
degradation  of  the  poor  roll  in  his  old  age.*  This  is 
the  best  position  of  the  laborer,  the  maximum  that  the 
present  condition  of  Scotland  can  afford  to  the  high- 
est class  of  her  laboring  children  —  milk,  porridge,  and 
potatoes,  and  with  these  he  goes  through  his  life  of 
honest  independence. 

*  "  The  class,  perhaps,  which  suffers  most  in  agricultural  dis- 
tricts is  that  of  single  women ;  whose  wages,  when  employed  as 
out- workers  in  the  vigor  of  life,  are  not  more  than  sufficient  to 
furnish  them,  in  the  scantiest  measure  and  humblest  style,  with  the 
necessaries  of  life ;  and  who  thus,  in  the  absence  of  any  of  those 
resources,  such  as  spinning  and  knitting,  to  which  in  old  age  fe- 
males had  recourse  in  former  times,  have  no  prospect  before  them, 
if  they  remain  unmarried,  but  that  of  living  in  their  latter  days  sup- 
ported by  parochial  aid."  —  Report  on  Increase  of  Pauperism.  Edin- 
burgh :  A.  &  C.  Black. 

Such  is  the  prospect  which  Britain  holds  out  to  her  laboring 
children  —  a  life  of  semi-starvation,  and  an  old  age  of  pauperism. 
The  American  republic  is,  at  all  events,  clear  of  this  evil. 


312  CONDITION    OF    BRITAIN. 

But  what  is  the  minimum,  what  is  the  condition  of 
the  shoals  of  Irish  peasantry  who  invade  the  west 
coast,  and  the  tribes  of  Highlanders  who  have  little  or 
nothing  to  do  ?  What  can  they  earn  ?  What  food 
do  they  habitually  use,  and  what  is  their  moral  exist- 
ence ?  Let  any  one  visit  the  Western  Islands,  and 
inquire  into  the  social  condition  of  the  inhabitants, 
and  the  arrangements  that  men  have  made  for  the 
destruction  of  the  population.  See  scores  of  men, 
women,  and  children  gathering  shellfish  on  the  shore 
as  almost  their  only  food,  while  the  rent  of  the  island 
is  all  abstracted,  and  spent  in  London  or  elsewhere ; 
and  then  say  if  it  be  possible  that,  with  such  arrange- 
ment, any  soil,  or  any  climate,  or  any  profusion  of 
natural  advantages,  would  have  compensated  for  the 
evil  arrangements  that  men  have  made.*  Does  any 
one  suppose  that  those  same  Highlanders,  who  find  a 
wretched  sustenance  on  the  shore,  could  not,  and 
would  not,  extract  an  abundant  existence  out  of  the 
soil  of  their  native  island  ?  The  law  forbids  them ; 
that  is,  men  have  made  such  arrangements  with  regard 
to  God's  earth,  that   the  stable  population   must  be 

#  In  some  of  the  Western  Islands  the  people  are  little  or  no  bet- 
ter than  bondsmen  or  serfs.  In  one  island  (and  perhaps  the  practice 
is  common,  but  on  this  we  cannot  speak)  it  is  said  that  the  tenants 
are  not  allowed  to  sell  their  grain  except  to  the  landlord.  What  is 
this  but  serfdom  ?  It  was,  of  course,  proper  to  introduce  law  into 
the  Highlands  ;  but  no  principle,  either  of  natural  right,  or  religion, 
or  social  economy,  could  ever  justify  the  law  in  giving  the  property 
of  the  clan  to  the  head  of  the  house,  to  be  used  by  him  as  private 
property.  This  is  the  origin  of  all  the  Highland  distress.  No 
economical  improvements  are  worth  a  farthing  until  this  radical 
evil  is  corrected. 


ORIGIN    OF    PAUPERISM.  313 

reduced  to  destitution,  for  the  purpose  of  having  one 
man  endowed  with  a  wealth  which  he,  perhaps,  knows 
not  how  to  use,  nor  even  to  retain.* 

But  what,  after  all,  is  the  practical  conclusion  to 
which  we  come  ?  What  system  is  it  that  would  oblit- 
erate pauperism  ?  On  this  we  do  not  intend  to  enter 
in  the  present  volume.  We  must  first  show  the 
probability  (a  probability  which,  taken  altogether, 
amounts  to  a  reasonable  expectation)  that  man,  placed 
as  he  is  on  the  globe,  is  not  necessarily  condemned  to 
pauperism  and  degradation ;  but  that  a  period  will 
come,  ere  long,  when  the  natural  laws  which  govern 
society  shall  be  discovered,  and,  being  discovered, 
shall  lead  to  a  condition  of  prosperity  altogether  in- 
conceivable at  the  present  time.  Two  systems  are 
open  to  us  :  — 

Either  pauperism  and  degradation  are  the  work 
of  the  Creator  of  our  system,  the  All- 
Powerful,  who  has  placed  present  man 
in  circumstances  where  the  natural  capa- 
bilities of  the  earth  are  insufficient  for  his 
support ;  — 
Or,  pauperism  and  degradation  are  the  work  of 
fallen  man,  who  through  ignorance  has  based 

*  A  fact.  The  greater  part  of  an  island,  the  rental  of  which 
part  was  about  £20,000  a  year,  has  recently  been  found  insufficient 
to  support  a  family.  The  capital  was  spent,  and  the  estate  is  for 
sale.  On  that  same  island  we  have  seen  the  native  population  in 
numbers  gathering  their  daily  food  on  the  shore.  This  island,  in 
miniature,  is  a  very  exact  representation  of  the  social  condition  of 
Great  Britain.  It  may  take  a  little  time  for  the  mass  of  the  popu- 
lation to  see  exactly  how  things  really  do  stand ;  but  they  will  dis- 
cover the  truth  at  last. 
27 


314 


ORIGIN    OF    PAUPERISM. 


his  arrangements  of  the  earth  on  super- 
stitious propositions,  and  thereby  necessa- 
rily has  rendered  it  impossible  that  the 
amount  of  good  intended  by  the  Creator  can 
be  extracted  from  the  earth. 
Of  these  two  schemes  we  may  take  our  choice. 
We  may  blasphemously  rush  to  the  conclusion,  that 
the  earth  is  for  man  a  terrible  prison,  with  necessary 
horrors,  from  which,  do  what  we  will,  we  cannot 
escape.  Or  we  may  believe,  with  humble  reverence, 
that,  notwithstanding  man's  transgression,  the  Al- 
mighty God  has  yet,  in  the  abundance  of  his  com- 
passion, plentifully  provided  him  with  the  means  of 
terrestrial  existence.  That  marts  doings  are  the  cause 
of  man's  distress ;  that  man's  ignorance,  and  man's 
error,  and  man's  injustice,  and^man's  wrong-  arrange- 
ment of  the  world,  is  the  true  and  only  cause  why 
man  is  afflicted  with  poverty,  and  thereby  placed  in 
circumstances  almost  incompatible  with  his  proper 
existence  as  a  moral  agent  and  an  accountable  crea- 
ture. And  if  we  admit  that  moral  degradation  does, 
for  the  most  part,  accompany  physical  degradation, 
then  must  we  admit,  that  if  any  new  arrangement  of 
the  natural  world,  which  man  did  not  create,  would 
have  the  effect  of  obliterating  poverty,  and,  conse- 
quently, of  obliterating  the  necessary  evils  of  poverty, 
that  new  arrangement  is  right,  just,  and  good,  and 
ought  to  be  carried  into  execution,  whatever  the  pres- 
ent arrangements,  inherited  from  past  generations, 
may  actually  be. 

And  we   affirm,   without  the  slightest   hesitation, 
that  the  very  same  kind  of  improvements  that  have 


THE    RADICAL    EVIL.  315 

followed  the  mathematical  and  physical  sciences,  will 
follow  social  science,  and  achieve  in  the  world  of  man 
far  greater  wonders  than  have  yet  been  achieved  in 
the  world  of  matter.  It  is  not  trade  Britain  wants, 
nor  more  railroads,  nor  larger  orders  for  cotton,  nor 
new  schemes  for  alimenting  the  poor,  nor  loans  to 
landlords,  nor  any  other  mercantile  or  economical 
change.  It  is  social  change.  New  social  arrange- 
ments, made  on  the  principles  of  natural  equity.  No 
economical  measure  whatever  is  capable  of  reaching 
the  depths  of  the  social  evils.  Ameliorations  may,  no 
doubt,  be  made  for  a  time ;  but  the  radical  evil  re- 
mains, still  generating  the  poison  that  corrupts  society. 
The  evil  is  expressed  in  a  few  words  ;  and,  sooner 
or  later,  the  nation  will  appreciate  it  and  rectify  it. 
It  is  "  the  alienation  of  the  soil  from  the  state,  and  the 
consequent  taxation  of  the  industry  of  the  country." 
Britain  may  go  on  producing  with  wonderful  energy, 
and  may  accomplish  far  more  than  she  has  yet  ac- 
complished. She  may  struggle  as  Britain  only  can 
struggle.  She  may  present  to  the  world  peace  at 
home,  when  the  nations  of  Europe  are  filled  with  in- 
surrection. She  may  lead  foremost  in  the  march  of 
civilization,  and  be  first  among  the  kingdoms  of  the 
earth.  All  this  she  may  do,  and  more.  But  as  cer- 
tainly as  Britain  continues  her  present  social  arrange- 
ments, so  certainly  will  there  come  a  time  when  —  the 
other  questions  being  cleared  on  this  side  and  on  that 
side,  and  the  main  question  brought  into  the  arena  — 
the  labor  of  Britain  will  emancipate  itself  from  thral- 
dom. Gradually  and  surely  has  the  separation  been 
taking  place  between  the  privileged  land  owner  and 


316  THE    TWO    PARTIES. 

the  unprivileged  laborer.  And  the  time  will  come  at 
last  that  there  shall  be  but  two  parties  looking  each 
other  in  the  face,  and  knowing  that  the  destruction 
of  one  is  an  event  of  necessary  occurrence.  That 
event  must  come.  Nor  is  it  in  man  to  stay  it  or  to 
produce  it  It  will  come  as  the  result  of  the  laws 
that  govern  nature  and  that  govern  man.  As  in  the 
island  we  have  spoken  of,  the  population  must  be  de- 
stroyed or  the  land  must  be  open  to  their  cultivation, 
and  not  accorded  to  the  landlord.  Of  the  two  parties, 
one  must  give  way.  One  must  sink  to  rise  no  more ; 
one  must  disappear  from  the  earth.  Their  continued 
existence  is  incompatible.  Nature  cannot  support 
both.  Nature  cannot  afford  to  support  the  population 
in  plenty,  and  over  and  above  to  pay,  on  a  small 
island,  ,£  20,000  a  year  to  the  proprietor.  Such  things 
cannot  be.  We  may  as  well  attempt  mechanical  im- 
possibilities as  political  impossibilities ;  and,  notwith- 
standing the  almost  universal  prevalence  of  the  current 
superstition  about  the  rights  of  landed  property,  we 
have  no  hesitation  in  affirming  that  a  very  few  years 
will  show  that  superstition  destroyed,  and  the  main 
question  of  England's  welfare  brought  to  a  serious 
and  definite  discussion.* 

*  The  theory  of  Highland  pauperization  is  one  of  the  simplest 
things  imaginable.  Nature  has  only  so  many  sources  of  wealth ; 
and  if  these  are  taken  away,  by  the  laws,  from  the  inhabitants  of 
a  district,  it  stands  to  reason  that  the  inhabitants  must  be  poor. 
Were  the  wealth  produced  in  the  Highlands  to  remain  in  the  High- 
lands, the  inhabitants  would  be  rich  ;  but  the  annual  profits,  for  the 
most  part,  go  away  and  never  return.  There  is  a  perpetual  drain 
outwards  —  an  export  without  a  corresponding  import,  either  of 
money  or  goods.    If  the  money  produced  by  the  sheep,  cattle, 


THE    TWO    QUESTIONS.  317 

In  politics,  there  are  only  two  main  questions  —  first, 
personal  liberty;  second,  natural  property.  England 
has  been  at  work  for  centuries  in  the  endeavor  to 
settle  the  first,  and  when  that  is  definitively  settled, 
she  will  give  her  undivided  attention  to  the  second. 

grouse,  and  salmon,  actually  returned  in  any  form  to  the  districts 
producing  them,  the  inhabitants  would  receive  the  remuneration 
intended  by  nature.  As  it  is,  pauperism  is  the  natural  and  neces- 
sary result. 

"  Since  the  period  that  the  Highlands  were  brought  under  the 
dominion  of  the  law,  the  inhabitants  have  been  found  by  all  who 
have  visited  them  from  other  quarters  of  the  country  to  be  a  people 
annually  on  the  brink  of  starvation,  and  annually,  to  a  greater  or 
less  degree,  feeding  on  shellfish  or  seaware.  Their  indolence  and 
their  dirtiness  have  also  been  observed  by  all  observers  during  this 
whole  period.  Their  ignorance  of  the  arts  of  bettering  their  con- 
dition, and  of  the  comforts  enjoyed  in  other  quarters  of  the  kingdom, 
have  also  been  uniformly  taken  notice  of.  Their  destitution  was  an 
annual  thing ;  but  the  usual  and  ordinary  distress  was  every  now 
and  then  aggravated  by  a  recurrence  of  a  bad  season  for  the  crops 
on  which  they  principally  lived.  They  were  cheerful  in  the  years 
when  they  could  get  any  thing  like  a  fair  supply  of  the  coarsest 
and  meanest  food,  but  they  never  labored  for  any  thing  more  ;  and 
hence  an  unfavorable  season,  when  it  came,  found  them  with  noth- 
ing, and  reduced  them  to  starvation.  When  the  season  was  what 
might  be  called  good,  they  never  taxed  their  industry  to  devise 
measures  for  warding  off  the  fatal  effects  of  the  bad  season  which 
might  be  close  at  hand.  Such  a  season  was  that  of  1836,  in  which, 
if  the  potatoes  were  not  a  total  failure,  there  was  a  more  general 
failure  of  crops  in  the  country.  It  was  followed  by  the  destitution 
of  1836-7,  which  called  forth  the  bounty  of  the  other  parts  of  the 
kingdom,  and  directed  much  attention  to  the  state  of  the  Highlands. 
When  I  ask  the  people  here,  whether  the  present  destitution  of 
1847  or  that  of  1837  was  the  worst,  they  all  declare  that  the  pres- 
ent is  far  the  worst ;  but  when  I  inquire  how  those  people  lived  in 
1837,  I  find  good  reason  to  believe  that  it  was  about  as  bad  aa 
1847."  —  Scotsman,  February  17,  1847. 
27* 


318  LIBERTY  AND  PROPERTY. 

Before  the  discussion  of  the  question  of  property, 
(natural  property,  the  object,)  there  is,  however,  a  main 
and  principal  question  of  liberty.  Englishmen  have 
achieved  their  liberty  in  one  sense ;  that  is,  they  are 
equal  in  the  eye  of  the  criminal  law,  (nearly  so,)  have 
a  right  to  be  tried  by  their  peers  according  to  law,  and 
cannot  on  any  occasion  be  subjected  to  punishment 
by  the  rulers,  as  such.  So  far  the  progress  of  Eng- 
land has  been  satisfactory ;  and,  above  every  country 
in  the  world,  she  has  been  distinguished  for  her  race 
of  independent  judges,  whose  conduct  for  many  years 
past  has  been  one  of  the  greatest  moral  wonders  of 
the  world.  In  the  whole  history  of  the  administration 
of  justice,  there  is  nothing  to  compare  with  the  quiet 
grandeur  with  which  the  judges  of  England  have 
unostentatiously  performed  their  duties.  Apart  from 
religion,  this  has  been  England's  truest  greatness,  her 
most  solid  claim  to  the  admiration  of  all  mankind. 
The  deeds  of  her  greatest  commanders  are  as  dust  in 
the  balance,  compared  with  the  deeds  of  her  judges. 
These  have  been  truly  great;  and  England  owes  to 
them  that  moral  supremacy  of  the  laic,  which  is  the 
surest  basis  of  civil  society,  and  the  grandest  natural 
phenomenon  that  comes  within  the  limits  of  man's 
cognizance.  Long  may  Heaven  continue  to  favor 
England  with  upright  judges,  and  long  may  English- 
men continue  to  regard  them  with  the  highest  honor. 

But,  in  another  sense,  Englishmen  have  not  achieved 
their  liberty,  and  a  main  question  remains  to  be  de- 
cided. Its  ultimate  decision  is  by  no  means  a  matter 
of  doubt,  but  it  may  be  years  before  it  comes  to  defi- 
nite issue.     This  question  is,  "  the  right  of  the  deliber- 


RIGHT    OF    REPRESENTATION.  319 

I 

ative  assembly  to  make  laws  for,  and  impose  taxation 
on,  that  portion  of  the  population  who  have  no  voice 
in  the  election  of  the  representatives ;  "  in  other  words, 
the  question  of  universal  suffrage.  It  is  plainly  evi- 
dent, that  those  who  have  no  power  to  elect  are  not 
citizens  of  the  state.  They  are  an  inferior  class,  ruled 
by  force ;  and  the  emancipation  of  this  class,  and  their 
equalization  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  is  the  first  great 
question  that  will  agitate  the  kingdom.  Economical 
questions  as  to  whether  there  shall  be  three  soldiers 
or  half  a  dozen,  or  whether  a  certain  duty  shall  be 
ten  per  cent,  or  twenty,  or  whether  the  government 
should  give  more  or  less  aid  to  emigration,  all  these 
are  quite  unimportant  compared  with  the  main  ques- 
tion, of  whether  two  or  three  millions  of  men  are 
morally  bound  to  obey  and  acknowledge  a  govern- 
ment that  excludes  them  from  representation.  Let  this 
question  be  treated  as  it  may,  of  one  thing  we  are 
quite  convinced ;  namely,  that  the  non-electing  popu- 
lation will  either  obtain  the  right  by  the  consent  of 
the  present  rulers,  or  ultimately  they  will  take  it  by 
force.  The  change  must  come  as  it  lies  in  the  order 
of  human  progression ;  but  what  the  means  of  effect- 
ing the  change  shall  be,  remains  to  be  determined. 
In  all  probability,  when  once  the  question  is  thorough- 
ly a  national  one,  the  present  rulers  will  admit  the 
necessity  of  the  change,  and  place  the  whole  popula- 
tion on  an  equality  as  regards  their  political  func- 
tions. And  when  once  this  last  great  question  of 
liberty  has  been  disposed  of,  the  country  cannot  fail  to 
commence  another  evolution,  and  to  enter  on  a  line 
of  progress  that  shall  ultimately  place  men  on  the 


320  SOCIAL    SCIENCE. 

same  equality  with  regard  to  natural  property  that  will 
then  prevail  with  regard  to  political  liberty.* 
,  But  let  the  mechanism  of  the  changes  be  what  they 
may,  let  our  views  be  right  or  wrong  with  regard  to 
the  process  of  improvement,  we  yet  maintain  that  our 
major  proposition  is  fully  borne  out.  We  allege,  as 
the  most  general  proposition,  that  the  improvement  of 
social  science  will  improve  man's  social  action,  and 
that  the  improvement  of  man's  social  action  will  im- 
prove man's  social  condition ;  in  fact,  that  the  acqui- 
sition of  social  science  will  ultimately  produce  a  social 
millennium.  There  is  a  science  of  man,  and  of  man's 
action,  if  we  can  only  discover  it ;  and  the  discovery 
of  that  science  will  produce  effects  analogous  to  the 
effects  produced  by  any  other  science.     Let  us,  then, 

*  We  hope,  at  some  future  time,  to  be  able  to  lay  before  the 
public  some  remarks  on  the  equalization  of  actual  property.  An 
absolute  equality  of  actual  property  is  neither  possible,  nor  desira- 
ble, nor  just.  We  do  not  believe  that  there  is  an  insuperable  diffi- 
culty in  showing  how  a  system,  perfectly  just  in  theory,  can  be 
carried  into  practice,  and  yet  preserve  to  every  man  the  absolute 
control  of  the  fruits  of  his  personal  skill,  labor,  and  industry.  The 
great  question  of  modern  times  is,  "  What  is  the  theory  of  a  per- 
fect political  state  ? "  Admitting  man's  fallen  nature,  and  all  the 
elements  that  might  be  supposed  to  interfere  with  the  realization  of 
a  perfect  state,  what  is  its  theory  ?  There  must  be  a  theory,  be 
what  it  may.  That  theory  is  the  great  desideratum  of  modern 
times.  It  settles  definitely  and  forever  what  must  be  the  end  of 
man's  political  progress.  For  ourselves,  we  believe  assuredly  that 
God  has  made  man's  logical  reason  to  harmonize  with  man's  condi- 
tion ;  and  thus,  whatever  the  reason  can  ascertain  to  be  true,  must, 
when  reduced  to  practice,  produce  good,  and  not  evil.  The  more 
men  advance,  the  more  will  they  perceive  that  truth,  the  intellectual 
proposition,  is  the  foundation  of  good,  the  outward  condition. 


METHOD    OF    SCIENCE.  321 

endeavor  to  estimate,  for  a  moment,  some  of  the 
effects  that  may  reasonably  be  anticipated  from  the 
discovery,  acknowledgment,  and  reduction  to  ordina- 
tion, of  social  science.* 

But,  in  the  first  place,  let  us  observe  that  the  natural 
history  of  a  science  always  begins  at  the  wrong  end. 
We  do  not  mean  that  it  ought  not  to  do  so ;  on  the 
contrary,  it  ought  to  do  so,  and  must  do  so,  because  it 
cannot  do  otherwise.  Nature  furnishes  us  with  wholes, 
and  these  must  first  be  manipulated  as  whole  individ- 
uals. These  are  named,  described,  and  classed  after 
a  fashion.  Neither  the  nomenclature,  however,  nor 
the  classification,  are  destined  to  remain.  They  serve 
a  temporary  purpose,  and  are  of  use  to  facilitate  com- 
munication.    Thus  chemistry  cannot  commence  with 

I 
*  The  term  discovery  is  perhaps  liable  to  be  misunderstood,  or 
perhaps  rather  to  be  objected  to.  We  do  not  mean  that  any  object 
called  a  science  is  to  be  discovered  like  a  fossil  or  a  new  planet. 
Science  exists  in  the  mind,  not  in  external  nature  ;  and  the  discov- 
ery of  science  is  the  discovery  of  the  truths  of  a  science,  and  of 
the  process  by  which  those  truths  are  substantiated.  Thus,  Aris- 
totle discovered  logic  when  he  laid  bare  the  process  of  reasoning", 
and  exhibited  the  necessary  forms  under  which  man's  intellect 
works.  Aristotle  did  not  discover  that  man  could  reason ;  neither 
did  he  discover  a  new  object ;  but  he  discovered  a  science,  a  mode 
of  knowledge.  Newton  did  not  discover  the  sun,  nor  the  moon,  nor 
the  earth ;  but  he  discovered  the  mode  of  their  operations.  The 
sun,  the  moon,  and  the  earth  remained  unaffected  by  the  discovery ; 
they  performed  their  functions  as  usual,  without  the  slightest  atten- 
tion to  the  great  philosopher.  The  change  was  in  the  credence  of 
mankind.  And  so  it  is  with  all  science.  The  change  is  in  the  cre- 
dence of  mankind.  Now,  intellect  (taken  as  intellect,  without  re- 
garding the  moral  influences  that  may  bias  its  judgments)  is  of  that 
nature  that  it  is  convinced  by  evidence.    All  human  intellect  is 


322  METHOD    OF    SCIENCE. 

oxygen,  hydrogen,  calcium,  and  potassium,  &c.  These 
are  the  logical  primaries,  or  simples,  of  chemistry ;  but 
they  are  by  no  means  the  chronological  primaries. 
Neither  does  anatomy  begin  with  fibrine,  albumen,  nor 
globules,  but  with  a  whole  animal,  and  with  a  head,  a 
thorax,  an  abdomen,  thoracic  members,  and  abdominal 
members.  Neither  does  zoology  begin  with  organic 
substance,  its  arrangement  into  the  organs  of  nutrition, 
locomotion,  sensation,  reproduction,  &c. ;  but  with  a 
great  number  of  different  animals,  presenting  different 
outward  appearances.  This  principle  is  universal  in 
science,  that  the  chronological  commencement  is  with 
a  whole,  a  complex  mass ;  while  the  logical  commence- 
ment of  the  science,  properly  so  called,  is  with  a  sim- 

radically  the  same,  only  variable  in  quantity.  And  scientific  dis- 
covery is  the  discovery  of  that  mode  of  presenting  propositions 
which  necessarily  leads  intellect,  or  any  number  of  unbiased  in- 
tellects, to  the  same  identical  conclusions.  There  is  but  one  truth, 
and  consequently  there  is  but  one  scheme  of  knowledge ;  and  the 
great  final  result  of  scientific  discovery,  is  the  restoration  of  the 
unity  of  human  credence.  Men  may  differ  in  taste,  in  likings,  and 
in  dislikings  ;  but  their  intellect  cannot  differ  in  judgment,  except 
through  superstition  or  error.  The  discovery  of  science,  therefore, 
is  the  discovery  of  the  knowledge  itself,  and  of  that  mode  of  pre- 
senting it  that  shall  convince  intellect  as  intellect.  On  this  account 
it  has  been  said,  that  "  he  discovers  who  proves."  As  science  ad- 
vances, diversity  of  opinion  dies  away,  and  unity  of  knowledge 
takes  its  place.  To  produce  this  unity  of  knowledge  for  the  whole 
race  of  man,  is  the  magnificent  destiny  of  science ;  and  the  ham- 
blest  cultivator  of  natural  knowledge  is,  like  the  coral  insect,  help- 
in"  lo  rear  an  edifice,  which,  emerging  from  the  vexed  ocean  of 
conilicting  credence,  shall  be  first  stable  and  secure,  and,  at  last, 
shall  cover  itself  with  verdure,  flowers,  and  fruits,  and  bloom  beauti- 
ful in  the  face  of  heaven. 


METHOD    OF    SCIENCE.  .      323 

pie  primary,  from  which  we  start  to  build  up  the  com- 
plex mass.* 

To  express  this  in  logical  formula,  let  us  say  that 
the  chronological  commencement  is  with  an  individual 
presenting  the  greatest  -comprehension  and  the  least 
extension,  and  that  the  logical  commencement  is  with 
ah  individual  presenting  the  greatest  extension  and  the 
least  comprehension.^ 

The  process  of  science,  therefore,  is  in  the  first  place 
analytic,  and  when  the  analysis  has  been  carried  down 
to  the  last  elements,  the  process  is  reversed,  and  it  then 
becomes  synthetic.  And  this  is  true  of  the  math- 
ematical sciences  as  well  as  of  the  physical  sciences, 
although  the  mathematical  sciences  are  invariably 
presented  in  the  synthetic  form.  In  them  we  have 
the  first  and  most  simple  appearance  of  analysis,  and 
the  greatest  preponderance  of  synthesis.     In  the  ad- 


*  "  All,  or  almost  all,  the  substances  found  on  the  globe  of  the 
earth  have  been  subjected  to  chemical  investigation.  The  result 
has  been,  that  all  the  animal  and  vegetable  substances,  without 
exception,  and  by  far  the  greatest  number  of  mineral  bodies,  are 
compounds." 

f  To  Sir  William  Hamilton,  of  the  University  of  Edinburgh,  the 
logical  world  is  indebted  for  an  exposition  of  the  theory  of  com- 
prehension and  extension. 

Among  the  individual  objects  of  natural  science,  man  is  the  one 
that  presents  the  greatest  comprehension ;  but  the  name,  man,  ex- 
tends only  to  himself.  The  name  animal,  on  the  contrary,  extends 
to  an  immense  variety  of  organized  beings,  but  comprehends  only  a 
sensitive  organized  individual.  A  blood  globule,  as  a  matter  of 
real  science,  has  a  great  extension,  but  comprehends  only  a  very 
simple  form  of  organization.    The  word  being  (noun  substantive)  is 


324  method  of  science. 

vanced  physical  sciences,  on  the  contrary,  we  have  the 
greatest  amount  of  analysis  ;  so  great,  in  fact,  that  the 
analytic  portion  of  the  science  has  frequently  been 
mistaken  for  the  whole  science.  The  whole  science, 
however,  i3  not  completed  until  both  the  analytic  por- 
tion and  the  synthetic  portion  are  achieved.  Geome- 
try has  its  preparatory  analysis,  exactly  as  chemistry 
has  its  analysis ;  and  though  no  mention  is  made  of 
this  in  geometrical  treatises,  the  fact  cannot  be  over- 
looked when  we  take  a  survey  of  the  philosophy  of 
science.  Nature  does  not  furnish  us  with  points  hav- 
ing no  extent,  with  straight  lines  having  no  breadth, 
with  perfect  circles,  squares,  and  triangles,  &c.  On 
the  contrary,  nature  furnishes  us  with  forms  very  im- 
perfect for  the  most  part,  and  very  complex  for  the 
most  part,  and  these  we  analyze  into  the  elementary 
forms  of  position,  (the  point,)  and  direction  and  ex- 


that  which  presents  the  greatest  possible  extension  and  least  possible 
comprehension.  What  is  called  the  universe,  on  the  contrary,  pre- 
sents the  greatest  possible  comprehension,  and  the  least  possible 
extension.  There  can  only  be  one  universe ;  but  there  may  be  an 
infinity  of  beings,  or  rather  an  indefinity.  Extension  appears  to 
represent  number,  where  we  begin  with  unity,  and  repeat  indefi- 
nitely ;  and  comprehension  appears  to  represent  quantity,  where  we 
begin  with  infinity,  and  subdivide  indefinitely.  The  difference 
between  number  and  quantity  has  been  far  too  much  overlooked, 
apparently  from  the  circumstance  that  unity  is  (absurdly)  allowed 
to  be  divisible.  That  is,  we  divide  one  unit  into  two  units.  Now, 
the  fact  is,  we  have  doubled  the  number  and  ludved  the  quantity. 
Unity  in  pure  arithmetic  is  absolutely  indivisible  until  we  assign  it 
a  value,  or  quantity,  and  then  it  may  represent  any  number ;  but  in 
pure  arithmetic,  unity  is  the  one  simple. 


METHOD    OF    SCIENCE. 

tent,  (the  line,)  and  with  these  we  proceed  to  construct 
extent  in  two  directions,  (the  superficies,)  and  extent 
in  three  directions,  (the  solid.*) 

In  politics,  therefore,  as  in  every  other  science,  the 
natural  history  comes  first,  and  then  the  science.  The 
most  obvious  divisions  of  things  as  they  are,  are  the 
first  clumsy  attempts  at  analysis ;  and  laws  begin,  not 
by  constructing  the  state  as  it  ought  to  be  constructed, 
but  by  attempting  to  remedy  the  most  obvious  evils. 
This  is  the  case  even  where  laws  have  been  made  in  a 
good  intention.  We  do  not  refer  to  those  bad,  and 
unjust,  and  despotic  laws  which  have  prevailed  in  all 
European  states,  but  to  the  best  portion  of  the  laws 
viewed  in  their  best  light ;  and  these  we  maintain  to 
have  begun  at  the  latter  end  of  the  question,  and  not 
at  its  beginning. 

*  Space,  as  an  unlimited  solid,  we  take  to  be,  not  simple,  as  usu- 
ally represented,  but  as  compound.  The  concept  space  is  com- 
posite, and  may  be  analyzed  into  position,  direction,  and  extent. 
These  three  concepts  are  simple,  cannot  be  defined,  and  form  the 
elementary  substantives  of  geometry.  Direction  and  extent  give 
rise  to  two  different  methods.  For  instance,  by  measuring  the  dis- 
tances (extent)  between  all  the  points  of  a  country,  (suppose  by 
chain,)  we  may  construct  a  map,  and  the  map  shall  have  a  scale ; 
but  we  shall  not  be  able  to  tell,  in  the  least,  how  to  place  the  map 
—  that  is,  we  know  nothing  about  the  direction.  And  if  we  meas- 
ure only  the  direction  (suppose  by  compass)  of  the  various  points, 
we  shall  also  have  a  map,  and  this  map  we  shall  place  correctly,  but 
it  will  not  have  a  scale  —  that  is,  we  know  nothing  about  the  ex- 
tent. To  have  both  the  direction  and  the  extent,  we  must  combine 
both  methods ;  and  on  this  account  a  survey  by  triangulation  re- 
quires a  measured  base  line,  the  only  use  of  which,  however,  is  to 
give  the  scale,  the  form  being  determined  by  the  direction  of  the 
points. 

28 


326  ARBITRARY    DETERMINATION    OF    CRIME. 

The  first  and  most  obvious  requirement  in  a  coun- 
try is  some  degree  of  security  for  life,  liberty,  and 
property.  This  gives  birth  to  criminal  law,  the  great 
end  of  which  is  ostensibly  to  prevent  crimes.  Now 
here  we  have  the  whole  evidence  of  history  that  law 
began  at  the  wrong  end.  Law  ought  to  emanate 
from  ethics,  and  the  very  first  and  most  important 
question  to  determine  is,  "  What  is  a  crime,  and  what 
is  not  a  crime  ?  "  Instead  of  ascertaining  what  was  a 
crime,  men  assumed  the  crime,  and  then  proceeded  to 
enact  laws  for  its  punishment.  They  made  a  synthe- 
sis before  making  an  analysis,  and  made  that  synthe- 
sis the  basis  of  political  enactment,  and  committed 
murder  and  robbery,  and  every  other  crime,  under  the 
shelter  of  their  legislation.  So  far  as  the  science  of 
politics  was  concerned,  they  were  in  much  the  same 
position  as  those  who  made  astronomy  without  obser- 
vation ;  that  is,  they  were  wholly  and  totally  basing 
on  arbitrary  assumption.  But  wrong  proceedings  in 
politics  are  far  more  serious  than  wrong  proceedings 
in  other  departments,  inasmuch  as  man  and  man's 
welfare  are  concerned ;  and  the  laws  of  former  times, 
and  to  a  large  extent  of  the  present  time,  being  based 
on  superstition,  necessarily  produced,  and  continue 
to  produce,  effects  the  most  detrimental  to  society. 
Even  admitting  the  major  proposition  of  the  law,  that 
"crime  ought  to  be  punished,"  the  minor,  "this  act 
and  that  act  are  crimes,"  was  purely  arbitrary;  it  was 
determined  on  no  principle  of  stability,  was  variable, 
contradictory,  often  absurd,  and  very  generally  unjust. 
Thus,  at  one  period  it  was  a  crime  for  a  man  to  be 
free,  (as  it  still  is  in  Russia  and  the  southern  states 


WHAT    IS    A    CRIME?  327 

of  America ;)  at  another  period  it  was  a  crime  to  have 
a  slave.  At  one  period  it  was  a  crime  to  go  to 
church ;  at  another,  to  refrain  from  going  to  church. 
At  one  period  it  was  a  crime  to  shoot  a  deer;  at 
another,  no  crime.  At  one  period  it  was  a  crime  to 
be  a  witch ;  at  another  period  it  was  admitted  that 
there  were  no  witches.  Now  all  this  diversity  is 
exactly  similar  to  the  diversity  that  prevailed  in  the 
physical  sciences  before  Bacon's  time.  The  major 
principles  of  investigation  were  not  in  dispute;  but 
Bacon,  with  a  grasp  of  magnificent  genius,  laid  hold 
of  the  minors  of  the  sciences,  and  told  men  that  they 
must  first  ascertain  them  before  they  could  arrive  at 
knowledge. 

And  so  it  is  in  law,  the  exponent  of  men's  views  of 
political  science.  The  minor  proposition,  "What  is 
a  crime?"  requires  to  be  determined  on  exactly  the 
same  principles  as  we  determine  "What  is  a  square?" 
or,  "  What  is  the  orbit  of  the  earth?"  Without  this 
determination,  made  on  principles  which  are  not  arbi- 
trary but  scientific,  law  is  despotism;  and  no  man 
in  the  world  is  morally  bound  to  obey  it,  except  as 
Scripture  may  enjoin  him  to  obey  even  unjust  laws. 
If  legislatures  will  make  arbitrary  crimes,  —  that  is, 
make  actions  legally  criminal  which  are  not  naturally 
criminal,  —  no  population  is  bound  to  obey  them. 
On  the  contrary,  it  becomes  one  of  the  highest  duties 
of  man  to  resist  such  laws  —  to  use  every  effort  to 
procure  their  abolition;  and,  if  he  cannot  do  so  by 
reason,  then  to  do  so  by  force.  The  welfare  of  hu- 
manity demands  this  at  the  hand  of  every  man ;  and 
the  base  and  slavish  doctrine  of  non-resistance  is  fit, 


328  CRIME    AND    PROPERTY. 

not  for  men  who  study  truth  in  God's  universe,  but 
for  hireling  sycophants,  who  care  not  what  man  may 
suffer  so  that  their  vile  carcasses  are  clothed  and 
fed.  The  liberties  we  have  in  England  are  mainly 
owing  to  the  fact,  that  England  would  not  tolerate 
the  determination  of  crime  by  the  executive  rulers,  but 
reserved  this  for  the  deliberative  assembly ;  and,  in  so 
doing,  England  has  undoubtedly  made  a  declaration 
—  not  so  explicit  as  it  would  be  now  —  that  she  re- 
serves the  right  to  try  the  issue  by  force  of  arms  with 
any  government  that  should  make  artificial  crimes,  or 
punish  the  population  for  actions  which  were  neither 
contrary  to  the  laws  of  God,  of  reason,  or  of  nature. 
The  power  of  the  ruler  to  determine  "what  is  a 
crime,"  is  the  origin  and  sole  basis  of  the  political 
degradation  of  the  continent  of  Europe.  Abstract 
this  determination  from  the  power  of  the  rulers,  —  let 
it  be  made  on  a  principle  of  independent  investigation, 
and  let  the  rulers  be  the  executors  of  the  laws,  —  and 
we  have  the  first  great  practical  reform  that  envelops 
the  germ  of  all  others,  and  that  cannot  fail  ultimately 
to  entail  the  best  blessings  of  liberty  and  security. 
All  the  revolutions  of  the  continent,  from  the  day  of 
the  Jeu  de  Paume  down  to  the  year  1849,  have  origi- 
nated in  nothing  else  than  the  false  determination  of 
crime  by  the  law,  and  the  power  of  the  ruler  not 
merely  to  execute  laws,  but  to  make,  alter,  and  origi- 
nate them. 

But  intimately  connected  with  the  theory  of  crime 
(much  more  so  than  is  usually  imagined)  is  the 
1  henry  of  natural  property.  The  law  assumed  crime 
arbitrarily,  and  proceeded  to  punish  it;  it  assumed 


CRIME    AND    PROPERTY,  329 

property  arbitrarily,  and  proceeded  to  protect  it.  The 
king,  who  had  the  power  to  make  or  unmake  crimes, 
had  the  power  to  dispose  of  the  land  that  belonged  to 
the  state.*  He  sold  or  gifted  it,  and  thus  in  the  long 
run  the  whole  of  the  lands  of  England,  with  some 
trifling  exceptions,  have  been  alienated  from  the  na- 
tion, and  the  burden  of  taxation  has  been  placed  upon 
the   people.f     Superstition  —  that  is,  unfounded  cre- 

#  James  I.  considered  that,  "as  it  is  atheism  and  blasphemy 
in  a  creature  to  dispute  what  the  Deity  may  do,  so  it  is  presumption 
and  sedition  in  a  subject  to  dispute  what  the  king  may  do  in  the 
height  of  his  power.  Good  Christians  will  be  content  with  God's 
will  revealed  in  his  Word ;  and  good  subjects  will  rest  in  the  king's 
will,  revealed  in  his  law."  —  [Works,  557-531.)  This  profane  com- 
parison was  familiar  to  the  servile  lawyers  of  the  day.  (See  Finch, 
Law.  81.3.)  —  Euc.  Met.  I 

f  As  an  instance  of  the  manner  in  which  the  lands  of  England 
have  been  disposed  of,  and  consequently  the  taxation  placed  on 
the  industrious  classes,  we  give  the  following  from  the  Biographia 
Britannica :  — 

"In  the  year  1695,  King  William  made  this  nobleman  [Lord 
Portland]  a  grant  of  the  lordships  of  Denbigh,  Bromfield,  Yale, 
and  other  lands,  containing  many  thousand  acres,  in  the  princi- 
pality of  Wales ;  which,  being  part  of  the  demesne  thereof,  the 
grant  was  opposed,  and  the  House  of  Commons  addressed  the  king 
to  put  a  stop  to  the  passing  it,  which  his  majesty  accordingly  com- 
plied with,  and  recalled  the  grant,  promising,  however,  to  find  some 
other  way  of  showing  his  favor  to  Lord  Portland,  who,  he  said,  had 
deserved  it  by  long  and  faithful  services;  and  this  promise  the 
king  after  made  good It  was  not  long  after  King  Wil- 
liam recalled  these  grants,  before  his  majesty  found  means  to  make 
Lord  Portland  others  in  recompense  for  the  revenues  of  the  princi- 
pality of  Wabs,  namely,  a  grant  of  certain  buildings  in  Whitehall, 
for  forty -five  years,  at  the  rent  of  six  shillings  and  eight  pence ;  a 
grant  of  the  manor  of  Grantham,  in  the  county  of  Lincoln ;  Honor 
of  Penrith,  in  the  county  of  Cumberland ;  manor  of  Dracklaw  and 
28* 


330  CRIME    AND    PROPERTY. 

dence  —  was  at  the  bottom  of  the  king's  right  in  both 
cases ;  and  the  present  inhabitants  of  the  British 
islands  are  bound  to  observe  the  laws  made  in  former 
times,  concerning  crimes  and  property,  just  in  so  far 
as  those  laws  are  now  equitable,  or  would  now  be  re- 
enacted  were  there  no  laws  on  those  subjects.  The 
present  possessor  of  a  portion  of  land  derives  not  one 
iota  of  present  right  from  the  former  gift  of  a  defunct 
monarch;  and  his  right,  to  be  now  valid,  must  be 
such,  that,  were  all  his  titles  destroyed,  the  nation 
would  proceed  to  place  him  in  possession  of  the  lands, 
because  he,  as  an  individual  man,  had  an  equitable 
claim  to  them.  Just  as,  if  all  the  laws  and  statutes 
of  England  were  destroyed,  the  nation  would  proceed 
as  usual  to  the  arrest  and  punishment  of  the  murderer 
or  robber  —  those  persons  being  punished,  not  because 
there  are  laws  for  their  punishment,  but  because  it  is 
just  that  they  should  be  punished,  and  just  that  there 
should  be  laws  to  punish.  The  justice  of  the  punish- 
ment does  in  no  case  derive  from  the  law,  but  the 

Rudneth,  in  Cheshire ;  manor  of  Torrington,  in  Norfolk ;  manors 
of  Partington,  Bristol,  Garth,  Hornsey,  Thwing,  Burnisley,  and 
Leven,  in  the  county  of  York  —  all  parcel  of  the  ancient  revenue 
of  the  crown  of  England ;  the  manor  of  Pevensey,  in  the  county  of 
Sussex,  parcel  of  the  duchy  of  Lancaster ;  and  all  the  lands  and 
tenements,  &c.,  thereunto  belonging,  to  hold  to  his  lordship  and  his 
heirs ;  and  also  his  majesty's  manor  of  East  Greenwich,  in  the 
county  of  Kent,  under  the  rent  of  £4  life.  4d.  a  year." 

The  present  effect  of  these  grants  is  exactly  equivalent  to  the 
addition  of  the  present  annual  value  of  these  lands  to  the  present 
taxation  of  the  community  of  Britain.  Had  the  lands  of  England 
not  been  alienated  from  the  state,  there  need  not  have  been  one 
penny  of  taxation  on  the  industrious  classes. 


CRIME    AND    PROPERTY.  331 

whole  force  and  validity  of  the  law  derives  from  the 
justice  of  the  punishment ;  and  where  the  punishment 
is  not  just,  that  punishment  is  a  crime,  whatever  the 
law  may  be,  or  whatever  it  may  declare. 

One  striking  fact  is  apparent  in  considering  the 
past  history  of  laws  with  regard  to  crimes  and  prop- 
erty. The  laws  with  regard  to  crimes  have  been 
considered  alterable ;  the  laws  with  regard  to  property 
have  been  considered  unalterable.  One  generation  of 
legislators  and  rulers  made  an  action  a  legal  crime ; 
but  the  next  generation  did  not,  on  that  account, 
consider  itself  bound  forever  so  to  esteem  it.  On  the 
contrary,  every  generation  of  legislators  has  consid- 
ered itself  at  full  liberty  to  alter,  revise,  amend,  and 
abolish  such  laws,  according  to  its  own  judgment. 
But  with  regard  to  the  king's  gift  of  lands  it  has  been 
quite  otherwise.  The  deeds  of  past  rulers  have  been 
supposed  to  extend  to  all  future  generations ;  and  the 
doctrine  now  prevalent  is,  that  the  lands,  once  alien- 
ated by  the  king's  gift,  could  not  be  reassumed  by  the 
nation  without  a  breach  of  equity  —  without,  in  fact, 
committing  that  crime  abhorrent  in  the  eyes  of  aris- 
tocracy — "  attacking  the  rights  of  property."  This 
discrepancy  is  at  once  explained,  when  we  reflect  that 
the  legislators  of  Britain  have  been  for  the  most  part 
the  landlords  themselves,  or  those  so  immediately  con- 
nected with  their  interests,  that  the  government  was, 
to  all  intents  and  purposes,  a  landlordocracy.  But  the 
question  still  occurs,  and  must  occur  again  and  again, 
"  If  the  acts  of  past  rulers  were  not  morally  perma- 
nent with  regard  to  crime,  how  can  they  possibly  be 
so  with  regard  to  property  ?   and  if  they  are  morally 


332  CRIME    AND    PROPERTY. 

permanent  with  regard  to  property,  how  can  they  be 
otherwise  with  regard  to  crime  ?  " 

We  have  now  to  show  that  crime  and  property  are 
not  distinct ;  in  fact,  that,  so  far  as  regards  legislation, 
they  are  identical;  and  that  the  laws  (or  king's  grants, 
which  are,  in  fact,  nothing  else  than  laws,  although 
this  fact  is  overlooked)  regarding  landed  property 
are  neither  more  nor  less  than  laws  regarding  crime. 
Property  is  usually  regarded  as  an  object  —  as  some- 
thing essentially  distinguished  from  action.  Yet  we 
shall  undertake  to  show  that  action  alone  is  concerned, 
and  that  all  laws  regarding  property  are  merely  laws 
regarding  action.  And  if  we  succeed  in  doing  this, 
we  have  unhinged  the  superstition  that  prevails  on  the 
subject  of  landed  property  —  we  have  loosened  the 
fabric  of  aristocracy,  and  laid  open  a  question  that 
for  many  years  to  come  will  occupy  the  attention  of 
Great  Britain.  There  is  already  in  the  public  mind 
a  very  extensive  suspicion  that  the  present  distribution 
of  the  land  is  the  true  and  main  cause  of  England's 
distress  and  Ireland's  wretchedness ;  but  the  supposed 
difficulty  of  presenting  a  scheme  which  should  be 
perfectly  just  in  theory,  and  practicable  and  beneficial 
if  carried  into  effect,  appears  to  have  deterred  many 
from  openly  attacking  the  question,  and  from  subject- 
ing it  to  the  same  kind  of  calm  and  rational  investiga- 
tion so  lavishly  accorded  to  other  questions  of  incom- 
parably less  importance.  The  apparent  hopelessness, 
also,  of  affecting  any  radical  change  in  the  present 
system,  and  the  fear  of  advocating  "wild"  doctrines, 
have  both  exerted  an  influence  in  repressing  investiga- 
tion.    This  apathy,  however,  cannot   continue   long. 


CRIME    AND    PROPERTY. 


333 


Whatever  may  be  the  result,  the  investigation  cannot 
fail  to  be  made ;  and  even  if  it  only  terminated  in 
substantiating  the  validity  of  the  "  rights  "  of  the  land- 
lords, it  would  be  satisfactory  to  the  country  to  know 
that  there  was  truth  and  not  superstition  at  the  bottom 
of  the  arrangements.  But  that  such  would  be  the 
result  is,  at  all  events,  doubtful ;  and  when  the  country 
is  thoroughly  convinced  of  the  futility  of  the  econom- 
ical schemes  that  appear  one  after  another,  —  and  it  is 
fast  approaching  that  conviction,  —  it  will  allow  the 
administrators  of  the  government  to  pursue  their  course 
unheeded,  while  it  fixes  its  own  attention  on  pros- 
pective changes  far  more  extensive  than  ever  could 
emanate  from  a  government  constituted  like  that  of 
Britain. 

We  now  undertake  to  show  that  the  gift  of  land  by 
the  king  is  nothing  more  than  a  law  affecting  action; 
and,  consequently,  is  of  the  same  character  as  a  law 
relating  to  crime.  And  if  so,  it  must  follow  the  gen- 
eral course  of  the  laws  relating  to  crime ;  and  if  those 
laws  are  not  morally  permanent,  neither  is  the  king's 
gift  of  land  morally  permanent,  but  may  be  revised, 
amended,  or  abolished,  exactly  in  the  same  manner  as 
a  law  affecting  crime.  And  over  and  above,  we  main- 
tain, that  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  is  one  atom 
more  valid,  or  more  binding,  on  account  of  legislation, 
but  that  they  are  right  now,  or  wrong  now,  wholly  and 
solely  according  to  their  own  merits  ;  that  the  law  can- 
not make  a  crime,  although  the  law  may  call  an  action 
by  this  name,  and  treat  it  as  such ;  and  that  the  law 
cannot  make  a  portion  of  land  property,  although  it 
may  call  it  property.     Both  crime  and   property  are 


334  CRIME    AND    PROPERTY. 

anterior  to  law,  and  superior  to  it ;  and  it  was  not  to 
make  either  the  one  or  the  other,  but  to  prevent  the 
one  and  protect  the  other,  that  legislative  law  was 
called  into  existence.  Law  is  not  the  moral  measure 
of  right  and  wrong ;  but  the  rule  of  practice  for  the 
policeman,  constable,  jailer,  judge,  sheriff,  and  hang- 
man ;  and  until  law  is  absolutely  perfect^  there  is  a 
canon  higher  than  the  canon  of  law,  one  more  valid 
and  more  stable  —  the  canon  of  reason  —  to  which  law 
itself  must  be  subject. 

A  law  against  crime  is  a  public  declaration  that 
certain  acts  ought  not  to  be  performed ;  and  that  he 
who  performs  them  shall  be  visited  with  certain 
specified  penalties.  This,  we  maintain,  is  exactly  the 
essence  of  the  king's  grant  of  landed  property.  Be- 
cause, — 

1st.  The  king's  grant  of  land  is  an  authorization  to 
use  the  land  in  favor  of  the  grantee.     And,  — 

2d.  The  king's  grant  is  a  prohibition  to  all  other  per- 
sons  to  use  the  land.     And,  — 

3d.  The  law  declares  that  if  any  persons  use  the 
land  without  permission  of  the  grantee,  they  shall  be 
punished. 

Now  the  essential  part  of  this  political  arrangement 
is  this :  "  All  persons  in  the  nation  are  forbidden, 
under  pains  and  penalties,  to  use  a  certain  portion  of 
land,  with  the  exception  of  the  grantee,  or  by  his  per- 
mission." This,  then,  is  essentially  a  law  against 
action  —  a  law  declaring  that  to  use  a  certain  por- 
tion of  land  is  a  crime  for  the  vast  majority  of  the 
population. 

Now,  if  we  turn  to  the  effects  of  this  arrangement, 


PROPERTY    IN    LAND.  335 

we  find  that  the  grantee  is  in  no  respect  bound  to 
make  the  land  produce.  He  may  utterly  neglect  it ; 
nay,  he  may,  as  has  actually  been  done  recently  in 
the  Highlands  of  Scotland  (and  as  the  king  himself 
did  ages  ago  at  the  New  Forest)  —  he  may  drive  off 
the  population,  drive  off  the  sheep,  (the  food  of 
man,)  and  convert  the  district  into  a  game  desert 
for  his  own  amusement  —  he  having  plenty  of  wealth, 
derived  perhaps  from  other  lands,  wherewith  to  sup- 
port these  costly  pleasures  —  at  the  expense  of  the 
nation* 

Such,  on  the  side  of  the  grantee,  is  the  limit  of 
liberty.  Let  us  now  ask,  what  the  limit  is  on  the 
part  of  the  nation.  No  matter  what  may  be  the 
state  of  the  land  —  even  if  it  is  lying  waste,  and  pro- 
ducing nothing  for  man's  support,  as  is  actually  the 
case  in  many  parts  of  the  kingdom  —  no  man  in 
Britain  may  put  into  it  a  spade  or  a  potato,  to  save 
his  family  from  starvation,  without  incurring  the 
penalties  of  the  law.  He  would  be  a  criminal,  (the 
law  would  call  him  so,)  and  he  would  be  treated  as 
such. 

This  state  of  affairs   represents  the  extremes ;  and 

*  "  The  Marquis  of  Breadalbane's  forest  of  Corrichebach,  or  the 
Black  Mount,  in  Glenorchy,  was  restored  at  great  cost  (having-  been 
previously  converted  into  sheep  walks)  in  1820 ;  it  covers  35,000 
acres."  —  Quarterly  Review. 

That  is,  if  we  understand  the  passage  aright,  these  35,000  acres 
were  formerly  wild,  and  without  sheep.  Afterwards,  sheep  were 
introduced,  and  consequently  so  much  more  food  was  produced. 
And  in  1820  the  sheep  were  driven  off,  and  the  land  again  made  a 
game  desert  for  the  amusement  of  a  single  individual.  Rights  of 
property ! 


336  PROPERTY    IN    LAND. 

all  that  is  better  than  the  extremes  is  due,  not  to  the 
law,  but  to  the  laws  of  nature.  Now,  the  law  has 
done  this  grievous  injury ;  it  has  deprived  the  poor 
of  the  natural  remedy  whereby  they  would  have  cor- 
rected so  enormous  an  abuse.  Let  us  suppose  that 
there  was  no  law,  and  that  one  man  claimed  thirty 
thousand  acres  (see  last  note)  for  his  amusement. 
Other  persons  require  the  land  for  their  support. 
They  begin  to  occupy  it,  and  he  endeavors  to  repel 
them.  Now,  what  would  be  the  natural  consequence  ? 
What  ought  the  cultivators  to  do  ?  Should  they  retire 
and  starve?  or  expatriate  themselves?  They  would 
resist  the  aggression  by  force,  and  in  so  doing  they 
would  only  do  their  duty*  But  the  law  will  not  allow 
them  to  resist.  The  law  has  first  deprived  them  of 
the  land,  and  then  enlisted  a  standing  army  to  prevent 
them  from  using  the  natural  means  of  recovering  it.f 
But  independently  of  the  specific  character  of  the 
actual  laws  and  arrangements  prevalent  in  Britain, 
we  take  the  question  up  on  the  most  general  ground, 

#  This  principle,  however  startling  in  words,  is  universally  ac- 
knowledged and  acted  on  by  civilized  communities.  When  they 
form  colonies  in  lands  inhabited  by  tribes  which  do  not  cultivate 
the  soil,  but  occupy  it  as  a  hunting-ground,  the  cultivating  colonists 
always  repel  the  aggression  of  the  hunters. 

f  Exactly  as  the  laws  of  Britain  did,  and  the  laws  of  the  south- 
ern States  do,  first  deprive  a  man  of  his  natural  liberty,  and  then 
use  the  power  of  the  state  to  prevent  his  recovering  it  by  force. 
One  of  the  most  curious  superstitions  in  the  world  is  the  belief 
that  we  may  lawfully  go  to  war  with  foreign  men  for  a  very  slight 
cause  ;  and  that  we  must  not  go  to  war  with  what  people  call  our 
own  countrymen,  even  when  they  wrong  us  ten  times  more  than  the 
foreigners. 


PROPERTY    IN    LAND.  337 

and  we  affirm,  as  a  universal  proposition,  that  where 
there  is  not  a  question  of  action,  there  is  no  question 
of  morals.  And,  consequently,  if  any  object  be  treated 
of  independently  of  human  action,  it  does  not  come 
within  the  limits  of  morals,  and  can  give  rise  neither 
to  crime  nor  to  duty.  And,  consequently,  if  the  land 
be  separated  from  the  question  of  human  action,  it  is 
no  longer  property,  but  a  mere  physical  object  that 
enters  the  physical  sciences.  And,  consequently,  the 
moment  we  endeavor  to  establish  a  distinction  between 
laws  relating  to  property  and  laws  relating  to  action, 
we  have  obliterated  property,  and  left  only  land  in  its 
physical  character,  and  not  in  its  moral  character.  It 
is  the  theory  of  human  action  alone  that  can  make 
land,  or  any  thing  else,  property.  The  very  moment 
we  have  used  the  word  property  in  its  moral  sense,  as 
giving  rise  to  duties  and  crimes,  (or,  rather,  becoming 
the  object  of  duties  and  crimes,)  that  moment  have  we 
involved  it  in  the  theory  of  human  action,  from  which 
it  can  never  be  separated  until  we  return  it  to  its  phys- 
ical signification.  And,  when  so  returned,  it  can 
neither  be  the  object  of  a  duty  nor  of  a  crime.  In  its 
physical  sense,  land  can  give  rise  to  no  crimes,  nor  can 
it  ever  be  property  until  we  consider  it  as  involved  in 
the  doctrine  of  human  action. 

And  this  being  the  case,  the  laws  and  arrangements 
of  past  rulers  relating  to  property  are  in  no  possible 
respect  more  binding  than  their  laws  and  arrangements 
relating  to  crime,  property  being  only  a  concise  expres- 
sion of  a  proposition  that  prohibits  actions  of  a  certain 
character.  Drop  the  prohibition  of  the  action,  and 
the  property  has  altogether  disappeared.  And,  conse- 
29 


338  PROPERTY    IN    LAND. 

quently,  all  past  arrangements  with  regard  to  land  are 
as  open  to  be  revised,  amended,  or  abolished,  as  past 
arrangements  with  regard  to  actions  called  erimes ; 
and,  consequently,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  "  the 
rights  of  landed  property"  separated  from  the  mere 
dictum  of  the  law,  which  the  nation  has  an  undoubted 
right  to  alter  or  abolish  whenever  it  shall  see  fit  to  do 
so.  And  if  the  nation  were  to  resolve  to  resume  and 
take  back  all  lands  which  had  been  granted  by  the 
crown,  (with  considerations  affecting  those  individuals 
who  had  purchased,)  the  nation  would  not  be  guilty 
of  any  crime,  or  wrong,  or  impropriety,  but  would  be 
exactly  in  the  same  position  as  it  is  when  it  abolishes 
laws  against  witchcraft,  or  laws  in  favor  of  the  slave 
trade,  or  laws  which  make  it  a  legal  crime  to  be  a 
Jew  or  a  Catholic. 

Superstition,  on  this  point,  may  endure  for  a  few 
years  longer ;  but  no  truth  can  be  more  certain  than 
that  God  gave  the  land  for  the  benefit  of  all ;  and  if 
any  arrangement  interfere  with  or  diminish  that  bene- 
fit, then  has  man,  as  man,  as  the  recipient  of  God's 
bounty,  an  undoubted  right  to  alter  or  abolish  that 
arrangement,  exactly  as  he  alters  his  arrangements 
in  agriculture,  in  medicine,  in  mechanics,  or  in  navi- 
gation. No  more  crime,  and  no  more  wrong,  attaches 
to  his  alterations  in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other. 

We  have  now,  therefore,  opened  up  the  way  for  a 
consideration  of  some  of  the  effects  that  may  reason- 
ably be  expected  to  follow  the  discovery  of  political 
science. 

1st.  The  major  proposition,  "  Crime  ought  to  be 
prevented  ;  and  there  ought  to  be  laws,  and  an  execu- 


MAJOR   AND    MINOR    OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE.        339 

tive  administration  of  those  laws,  for  the  prevention 
of  crime"  This  major  proposition  is  not  in  dispute ; 
and  the  progression  of  man  in  his  political  aspect  does 
not  consist  in  any  alteration  to  be  made  in  the  major 
proposition. 

2d.  The  minor  proposition,  "  What  is  a  crime  ? 
This  and  that  action  are  crimes."  In  this  minor  lies 
the  whole  essence  of  political  progression  and  political 
amelioration.  Political  improvement  takes  place  ex- 
actly as  men  discover  and  definitely  determine  the 
true  nature  of  crime ;  and  exactly  as  they  confine  their 
laws  to  the  prohibition  of  those  actions  which  are 
crimes,  and  to  the  non-prohibition  of  those  actions 
which  are  not  crimes.  The  laws  of  man  cannot  make 
a  crime,  neither  can  they  unmake  a  crime.  Crime  is 
logically  anterior  to  human  legislation ;  and  the  very 
end  and  intent  of  legislation,  in  its  first  and  most 
essential  capacity,  is  to  prevent  crime. 

All  nations  with  which  we  are  acquainted  have 
punished,  as  crimes,  actions  which  were  not  crimes ; 
and  the  gradual  improvement  of  the  laws  of  man  in 
this  respect  is  one  of  the  great  phenomena  that  we 
learn  from  history.  On  the  gradual  alteration  of  the 
laws  (of  Britain,  for  instance)  may  be  based  a  most 
conclusive  argument,  that  political  science  is  under- 
going a  gradual  process  of  discovery,  those  laws  being 
altered  invariably  in  accordance  with  a  change  of  cre- 
dence, gradually  gaining  ground  with  the  population. 

But  while  we  have  a  positive  major  proposition,  we 
have  also  a  negative  major  proposition,  which  is, — 

"  No  action  that  is  not  a  crime  ought  to  be  pre- 
vented by  the  law." 


340  LAW    MEASURED    BY    JUSTICE. 

Now,  as  legislators  and  rulers  are  only  men,  (there 
is  no  divine  wisdom  nor  divine  sacredness  *  about 
them,)  they  may  be  the  criminals  as  well  as  any  of 
the  population ;  and  if  they  assume  powers  and  en- 
force laws  which  emanate  from  their  will,  (and  not 
from  an  impartial  judgment,)  they  are  exactly  in  the 
case  of  an  individual  who  commits  crime  by  resorting 
to  violence. 

It  is  quite  easy  for  the  generality  of  writers  on 
these  subjects  to  treat  of  crime  as  committed  by  the 
population.  They  see  so  far,  and  sometimes  their 
views  are  valuable  and  correct.  But  they  have  first 
perched  the  government  on  a  great  height,  which  they 
do  not  intend  to  survey,  and  then  confine  their  ob- 
servations to  the  subject  population.  To  include 
both  at  one  view  appears  a  stretch  beyond  their  power, 
and  hence  their  admirable  dissertations  are  unsatisfac- 
tory;  and  by  unsatisfactory,  we  do  not  mean  that 
they  are  not  distinguished  by  talent  of  the  highest 
order,  and  by  upright  sincerity ;  but  that  they  treat 

*  "  James  I.  was  so  accustomed  to  regard  himself,  and  to  be 
addressed  by  his  flatterers  as  '  the  Lord's  anointed,'  '  the  vice- 
gerent of  God  upon  earth,'  in  fact,  a  kind  of  deputed  deity,  that  he 
was  constantly  tempted  to  accuse  his  subjects  of  blasphemy  and 
irreligion  when  they  presumed  to  oppose  his  will,  or  to  call  in  ques- 
tion his  lawless  assumptions  of  authority ;  at  the  same  time,  there 
was  no  form  of  impiety,  from  the  light  and  irreverent  mention  of 
the  sacred  name  in  familiar  speech,  to  profane  cursing  and  swear- 
ing, and  to  the  blasphemous  and  audacious  assumption  of  a  kind 
of  parity  with  the  Supreme  Being,  by  which  the  lips  and  mind  of 

the  prince  himself  were  undefiled James  was  the  first  of 

England  to  whom  the  unappropriate  title  of  sacred  majesty  was 
applied."  —  Miss  Aikin's  Mem.  Court,  James  I. 


LAW    MEASURED    BY    JUSTICE.  341 

only  one  portion  of  the  phenomenon,  and  omit  its  cor- 
relative. Exactly  as  if  one  were  to  write  an  able  dis- 
sertation on  the  earth's  motion,  furnishing  us  with  a 
perfect  diagram  and  specification  of  the  orbit,  and  an 
exact  determination  of  the  velocity,  and  yet  should 
altogether  omit  to  mention  the  sun.  Such  a  disserta- 
tion, let  its  details  be  as  perfect  as  they  may,  would 
be  altogether  unsatisfactory ;  because  the  correlative, 
the  sun,  has  not  been  exhibited  in  its  relations  to  the 
earth. 

And  so  it  is  with  crime.  He  who  studies  crime  as 
apportion  of  man  science,  (and  not  merely  as  acci- 
dentally treated  of  in  this  system  of  law  that  happens 
to  be  in  force  in  Britain,  or  that  system  of  law  that 
happens  to  be  in  force  in  another  country,)  must  in- 
clude in  his  view  the  whole  phenomenon,  and  must 
inquire  what  does  man  do,  as  man.  And  when  we 
turn  to  Britain  with  this  principle,  we  must  regard 
the  whole  population,  king,  lords,  commons,  soldiers, 
judges,  laborers,  paupers,  in  fact,  the  whole  mass  of 
society,  as  merely  men.  And  when  we  define  crime, 
and  find  that  actions  coinciding  with  that  definition 
are  performed  by  any  of  these  parties,  by  whatever 
name  they  may  be  called,  or  under  whatever  pretences 
they  may  appear,  we  must  not  hesitate  to  call  the 
action  by  the  name  of  crime,  and  to  say,  This  is  a 
crime  committed  by  men.  Reverence  for  law,  as  law, 
as  a  human  rule  of  action  de  facto  enacted  by  legis- 
lators, is  mere  debasing  superstition ;  nor,  however 
venerable  law  may  be  in  some  men's  estimation,  do 
we  consider  either  their  law  or  their  worship  of  it  at 
29* 


342  SUPREMACY    OF    JUSTICE. 

all  entitled  to  respect*  Men  venerate  law  and  care 
nothing  for  justice,  just  as  they  venerate  the  priest 
and  forget  the  Deity.  And  if  any  legislature,  or  any 
king,  commit  an  act,  which  act  would  not  be  equita- 
ble between  two  individuals,  we  no  more  hesitate  to 
call  it  a  crime  in  the  one  case  as  well  as  in  the  other. 
And  when  legislators,  taking  advantage  of  the  super- 
stitious veneration  which  men  still  have  for  power 
and   human    authority,  proceed    to   prohibit    actions 

#  As  an  instance  of  the  manner  in  which  lawyers  regard  the 
social  institutions  of  men,  we  may  give  the  following  quotation 
from  Crabb's  "  History  of  English  Law,"  p.  7 :  —  ■ 

"  It  is  worthy  of  observation,  that  all  the  Saxon  lawgivers  showed 
great  wisdom  in  the  business  of  legislation,  by  admitting  no  laws 
into  their  selections  but  what  were  adapted  to  the  temper  and 
manners  of  their  subjects,  being  for  the  most  part  taken  from 
people  that  were  nearly  allied  to  themselves." 

On  the  very  next  page,  we  have  an  illustration  of  the  great 
wisdom  of  the  Saxon  lawgivers.  "  The  Saxon  people  were  divided 
into  freemen  and  slaves." 

Slavery,  servitude,  villenage,  and  every  one  of  its  modifications, 
is  a  political  institution,  though  this  fact  is  apt  to  be  overlooked 
when  the  slave  comes  to  be  viewed  as  the  property  of  another  man. 
But  what  is  politics  ?  The  system  of  rules  which  ought  to  prevail 
between  man  and  man;  and  law  ought  to  consist  of  those  rules 
reduced  to  human  enactment.  Individual  injustice  may  make  a 
man  a  slave,  and  the  action  is  a  crime ;  but  the  criminality  does  not 
in  the  slightest  degree  diminish  when  the  action  is  authorized  by 
human  laws.  Now,  in  a  country  that  has  assumed  the  form  of 
a  state,  slavery  could  not  exist  unless  it  were  authorized  by  the  law  ; 
and  the  evil  influence  of  human  law  has  been,  that  it  sanctioned 
this,  and  many  other  abominations,  using  the  armed  force  of  the 
state  for  their  continuance,  and  transmitting  them  to  posterity  as 
institutions  under  which  men  were  born,  and  which,  to  a  certain 
degree,  were  to  them  natural,  or,  rather,  habitual. 


SUPREMACY    OF    JUSTICE.  343 

which  are  not  crimes,  and  to  burden  the  population 
with  unequal  taxation,  and  to  exclude  large  portions 
of  the  population  from  equal  rights  in  the  eye  of  the 
law  and  in  the  scheme  of  the  state,  we  do  not  hesitate 
to  affirm  that  such  legislation  should  be  regarded 
exactly  in  the  same  light  that  individual  violence  or 
restraint  would  be  regarded.  Men  are  the  agents,  the 
actors,  in  the  one  case  as  well  as  in  the  other ;  and 
the  action  which  is  wrong  for  individuals  without  titles, 
is  equally  wrong  for  individuals  called  by  any  names 
that  the  imagination  could  devise.  Man,  as  man,  is 
bound  by  the  moral  laws  of  justice,  and  no  arrange- 
ments which  the  human  race  could  make  can  ever 
emancipate  any  portion  of  that  race  from  the  same 
rules  and  requirements  that  are  binding  on  individuals. 
The  whole  idea  of  a  ruler,  of  a  man,  or  body  of  men, 
who  may  interfere  with  others  on  principles  different 
from  those  that  regulate  individual  or  private  interfer- 
ence, is  a  mere  idolatrous  superstition,  debasing  in  its 
influence,  and  disastrous  in  its  effects.  The  almighty 
Maker  and  Ruler  of  mankind  will  have  men  subject  to 
justice,  and  not  to  men;  and  the  very  moment  the 
rules  of  justice,  which  vary  not,  nor  can  vary,  are  de- 
parted from,  that  moment  is  man  relieved  from  his 
allegiance  to  the  ruler ;  and  if  the  population  have  the 
power,  they  may  arrest  the  rulers,  and  bring  them  to 
the  same  judicial  trial  that  would  be  reserved  for  the 
individual.* 

*  This  principle,  although  frequently  represented  as  seditious,  is 
not  only  clearly  acknowledged,  but  reduced  to  specific  law  in  Mag- 
na Charta.  The  principle  is  acknowledged,  although  the  applica- 
tion of  it  is  restricted  to  twenty-five  barons,  chosen  by  the  whole 


344  LAW    VERSUS    LEGISLATION. 

And  hence  the  necessity  for  a  "  science  of  justice," 
that  men  —  definitely  ascertaining,  on  principles  which 
are  not  arbitrary,  the  real  actions  which  are  criminal  — 
may  appoint  a  first  magistrate  to  carry  into  execution 
the  laws  of  justice.  And  this  first  magistrate  —  king, 
president,  or  any  thing  else  —  is  not  to  govern  men, 
but  to  regulate  them  according  to  the  laws  of  equity  ; 
and,  in  performing  this  function,  he  occupies  the  high- 
est position  to  which  man  may  attain,  and,  performing 
his  duties  with  impartial  sincerity,  he  merits  the  con- 
stant respect,  aid,  and  support  of  every  person  in  the 
land.  This  portion  of  the  British  constitution,  the 
first  magistrate  king,  the  independent  judges,  and  the 
jury  from  the  locality,  is  unsurpassed,  if  not  une- 
qualled, by  any  thing  in  the  whole  history  of  man. 
In  England,  we  have  in  this  portion  of  our  political 
mechanism  the  most  profound  reason  for  thankfulness 
to  God.  And  we  do  not  hesitate  to  make  a  curious 
assertion  —  that  if  oar  political  rulers  (those  who  tax 
and  restrict  us)  were  brought  into  the  courts  of  law  as 
individuals  performing  certain  specified  acts  towards 
other  individuals,  the  ordinary  process  of  criminal  trial 

of  the  barons ;  and  a  reservation  is  made  in  favor  of  the  persons  of 
the  king,  queen,  and  royal  children.  Chapter  xxxviii.  specifies  the 
manner  in  which  four  barons,  chosen  out  of  the  twenty-five,  shall 
notify  any  grievance,  and  petition  to  have  it  redressed  without 
delay :  u  And  if  it  is  not  redressed  by  us,  (the  king1,)  or  if  we 
should  chance  to  be  out  of  the  realm,  if  it  is  not  redressed  by  our 
justiciary  within  forty  days,  &c,  the  four  barons  aforesaid  shall  lay 
the  cause  before  the  rest  of  the  twenty-five  barons,  and  the  said 
twenty-five  barons,  together  with  tlie  community  of  the  whole  king- 
dom, shall  distrain  and  distress  us  all  the  ways  possible ;  namely,  by 
seizing  our  castles,  lands,  possessions,"  &c. 


UNIVERSALITY    OF    JUSTICE.  345 

by  jury,  and  judge,  and  law,  would  at  once,  rectify 
nearly  every  political  evil  in  the  country.  Had  the 
slave  owner  been  tried,  he  could  not  have  been  con- 
victed because  of  the  law ;  but  had  the  legislature  been 
tried  for  making  laws  to  allow  slavery,  and  for  using 
the  British  arms  to  support  it,  there  can  be  no  question 
that,  if  the  ordinary  decisions  were  adhered  to,  the 
jury  would  have  found  the  legislature  guilty,  and  Eng- 
land may  proudly  say  that  her  judges  would  not  have 
hesitated  to  pronounce  the  condemnation. 

Only  let  the  taxer,  and  the  taxee,  who  is  excluded 
from  a  voice  in  the  representation,  be  viewed  as  two 
men,  or  two  bodies  of  men;  let  them  enter  the  present 
courts  of  law,  and  let  the  case  be  tried  irrespective  of 
political  considerations,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  taxee  would  establish  his  right  to  dispose  of  his 
property  without  the  interference  of  the  taxer.  They 
are  only  men,  neighbors  ;  and  what  is  not  just  between 
two  men,  never  can  be  just,  however  great  the  number 
of  individuals,  or  however  euphonious  the  names  that 
may  be  applied  to  them. 

This  principle  of  allowing  no  man  whatever,  and 
no  body  of  men  whatever,  to  emancipate  themselves 
from  the  strict  requirements.of  justice,  but  in  all  their 
corporate  actions  to  be  subject  to  the  same  principles 
of  equity  that  are  binding  on  the  individual  —  this 
principle  is  the  great  end  of  political  amelioration.  In 
advocating  it,  we  teach  doctrines,  it  is  true,  which  are 
little  less  than  revolutionary ;  and  revolutions,  either 
moral  or  physical,  there  must  be  until  the  ultimate 
term  of  man's  political  progression  is  evolved,  and  the 
course  of  transition  from  the  rule  of  power  to  the  rule 


346  UNIVERSALITY    OF    JUSTICE. 

of  reason  is  complete.  We  advocate,  not  a  breach  of 
justice,  but  its  universal  extension;  its  extension  to  all 
the  acts  of  man,  as  man,  whether  he  appear  under  the 
form  of  an  isolated  individual,  or  under  the  more  im- 
posing aspect  of  a  deliberative  assembly  and  executive 
government,  ruling  the  millions  of  a  state.  All  we 
ask  is,  that  the  same  principles  that  regulate  the  laws 
as  they  affect  individuals,  should  be  extended  to  the 
political  actions  of  the  rulers ;  and  if  once  this  princi- 
ple were  realized,  all  partiality,  class  legislation,  privi- 
lege, commercial  restriction,  customs  laws,  game  laws, 
&c,  would  immediately  disappear.  These  things  have 
no  foundation  except  in  the  will  of  the  rulers;  and 
man,  as  man,  is  neither  bound  to  obey  or  acknowledge 
as  a  dispenser  of  justice  that  government  that  persists 
in  imposing  on  the  population  its  own  superstitious 
and  destructive  devices,  instead  of  the  impartial  laws 
of  equity,  made  equally  for  all  men  and  equally  ad- 
ministered. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  may  be  affirmed  that 
the  first  great  effect  that  will  follow  the  discovery  of 
political  science,  is  the  definite  and  non-arbitrary  de- 
termination of  the  great  minor,  "  What  is  a  crime?" 
And  this  being  determined  according  to  a  scientific 
method  which  shall  command  the  assent  of  the  human 
intellect,  the  practical  consequence  will  be,  that  every 
restriction  will  be  removed  from  every  action  that  is 
not  a  crime.  And  consequently  there  will  be  perfect 
freedom  for  every  man  to  exercise  his  talents  and  his 
industry  without  state  interference,  or  restriction,  or 
taxation  of  any  kind  whatever,  so  long  as  he  shall  con- 
tinue to  refrain  from  those  actions  which,  according  to 


DEFINITION    OF    CRIME.  347 

the  science  of  equity,  are  demonstrated  to  be  crimes. 
Progression  —  that  is,  change  —  must  be  anticipated 
as  natural  and  necessary,  until  the  political  aspect  of 
mankind  shall  present  a  realization  of  this  condition. 
Definitely  to  determine  what  is  a  crime,  and  what  is 
not  a  crime,  is  one  of  the  first  great  problems  of  polit- 
ical science.  We  define  crime  to  be,  "  a  breach  of 
equity ;  "  *  and  consequently  we  maintain  that  what- 
ever is  not  a  breach  of  equity  is  not  a  crime,  and 
under  no  circumstances  whatever  ought  to  be  prohib- 
ited or  restricted  by  the  laws.  Absolute  freedom,  then, 
to  perform  every  action  that  is  not  a  breach  of  equity, 
constitutes  the  great  final  termination  of  man's  polit- 
ical progress,  so  far  as  liberty  is  concerned. 

But  what  is  man's  final  termination  with  regard  to 
the  other  great  substantive  of  politics,  property  ? 

Here  we  approach  a  subject  that,  in  the  course  of  a 
few  years,  (in  all  probability,)  will  be  the  great  element 
of  strife  and  contention.  Here  is  the  rock  on  which 
England's  famous  constitution  of  king,  lords,  and 
commons  will  suffer  its  final  shipwreck.  Such  an 
assertion  is,  of  course,  at  present  a  mere  opinion ;  but 
if    the    scheme   we    have    advanced  be   in    the  main 


*  It  may,  perhaps,  be  necessary  to  add,  "  or  of  decency."  The 
repression  of  offences  against  decency  forms,  however,  a  very  small 
portion  of  man's  political  action.  With  the  exception  of  these,  and 
the  observance  of  the  Sabbath,  we  believe  our  definition  to  be  gen- 
eral. It  is  the  true  political  definition  ;  but  the  political  definition 
does  not  exactly  include  every  thing  that  men  in  society  have  to 
take  into  consideration.  Political  science  is  abstract ;  but  the  real 
substantive,  man,  is  concrete ;  and  his  conditions  must  be  consid- 
ered in  applying  tha  science  to  his  circumstances. 


348  SERFDOM    AND    ARISTOCRACY. 

correct,  then  we  do  not  hesitate  to  affirm,  that  if  we  con- 
tinue that  scheme  into  the  future,  we  may  see  that  the 
question  of  landed  property  will  be  the  cause  of  a  stu- 
pendous struggle  between  the  aristocracy  and  the 
laborocracy  of  Britain,  and  that  its  final  settlement 
will  entail  the  destruction  of  the  constitution.  And 
the  question  lies  in  narrow  bounds,  all  that  is  required 
being  an  answer  to  a  question  virtually  the  follow- 
ing :  "  Is  the  population  to  be  starved,  pauperized,  and 
expatriated,  or  is  the  aristocracy  to  be  destroyed?"* 
For  ourselves,  we  have  not  the  slightest  hesitation  in 
predicting  the  final  result;  but  what  may  be  the 
mechanism  of  the  changes  requires  altogether  a  differ- 
ent course  of  investigation.  On  the  mode  of  change 
we  pronounce  no  opinion  ;  but  on  the  matter  of  change 
we  no  more  hesitate  to  prognosticate  than  we  do  to 
predict  that,  ere  a  few  years  longer,  the  millions  of 
Russian  serfs  will  have  gained  their  emancipation ; 
and  surely  serfdom  is  as  ancient  and  venerable  an  in- 
stitution as  aristocracy. 

Serfdom  and  aristocracy  are,  in  fact,  the  correlatives 
of  each  other.  Wherever  there  are  serfs,  there  there 
are  aristocrats;  and  wherever  there  are  aristocrats, 
there  there  are  serfs ;  and  though  the  laborers  of  Eng- 
land are  not  serfs  in  one  sense,  inasmuch  as  they  may 
emigrate  if  they  can  find  the  means,  they  are,  to  all  in- 
tents and  purposes,  serfs  so  long  as   they  remain  in 

*  By  the  destruction  of  the  aristocracy,  we  do  not  mean  the  de- 
struction of  the  aristocrats,  any  more  than  by  the  destruction  of  pau- 
perism, we  should  mean  the  destruction  of  the  persons  of  the  pau- 
pers. It  is  to  the  system  that  we  refer  exclusively,  and  only  as 
either  system  has  been  created  by  the  arrangements  of  men. 


SERFDOM   AND    ARISTOCRACY.  349 

England.  It  is  a  mere  fallacy  to  suppose  that  serfdom 
has  been  abolished  in  England.  It  has  not  been  abol- 
ished, it  has  only  been  generalized.  And  here  we  must 
have  recourse  to  an  illustration  to  show  that  serfdom, 
or  even  slavery,  may  be  abolished  in  appearance,  and 
yet  retained  in  reality,  the  means  of  compulsion  being- 
changed  with  the  advance  of  society,  which  would 
no  longer  tolerate  the  open  employment  of  individual 
force. 

Let  us  suppose  an  island  divided  into  thirty  estates. 
These  estates  belong  to  thirty  proprietors,  and  are 
cultivated  by  slaves,  by  genuine  out-and-out  salable 
negroes.  These  slaves  are  the  property  (!)  of  the 
white  proprietors,  each  of  whom  has  a  stock  of  one 
hundred.  There  are  then  thirty  proprietors,  and  three 
thousand  laboring  slaves,  supported  by  the  island  — 
the  slaves  having  sustenance  and  the  labor,  the  propri- 
etors having  indolence  and  the  luxury.  As  the  slaves 
belong  to  the  proprietors,  they  are  individual  slaves, 
confined  to  the  cultivation  of  their  respective  estates. 
Let  us  now  suppose  that  the  proprietors  made  a  new 
arrangement  of  their  affairs ;  that,  instead  of  possess- 
ing each  a  hundred  slaves,  they  thought  it  would  be 
more  convenient  to  establish  a  system  by  which  those 
proprietors  who  wanted  the  labor  of  more  at  any 
particular  time  should  be  able  to  have  it,  and  those 
who  at  any  particular  time  had  not  work  for  a  hun- 
dred, should  relieve  themselves  of  the  expense  of  their 
keep.  To  effect  this,  and  to  throw  the  trouble  of  the 
new  system  on  the  slaves,  they  abandon  the  sys- 
tem of  individual  slavery,  and  generalize  it.  Each 
proprietor  gives  up  his  right  to  his  negroes ;  but 
30 


350  SERFDOM    AND    ARISTOCRACY. 

the  negroes  are  still  to  do  the  work  of  the  island,  and 
the  proprietors  are  still  to  have  the  profit.  Nor  is  it 
difficult  to  effect  this  arrangement  without  compulsion 
—  all  that  is  necessary  being  to  establish  the  rule,  that 
the  negroes  shall  be  fed  by  those  for  whom  they  work, 
and  that  their  wages  shall  be  their  sustenance.  All  the 
land  being  in  the  hands  of  the  proprietors,  the  negroes 
can  obtain  support  only  by  laboring  for  the  propri- 
etors. But  it  is  found  that  the  new  arrangement  has 
still  its  inconveniences.  At  certain  seasons  of  the 
year  there  is  not  work  for  the  whole  three  thousand 
laborers ;  and  as  they  can  only  obtain  support  from 
the  proprietors,  the  latter  establish  a  general  or  corpo- 
rate fund  for  the  sustenance  of  those  who  happen  to 
be  out  of  employ.     This  is  a  poor-law. 

But  still  the  system  is  capable  of  improvement; 
that  is,  more  of  the  trouble  may  be  allotted  to  the  ne- 
groes, without  the  profits  of  the  proprietors  being  inter- 
fered with.  The  proprietors  under  the  present  system 
are  obliged  to  provide  the  aliments  of  the  laborers,  and 
this  of  course  is  not  only  troublesome,  but  the  regula- 
tion of  the  quantity  is  attended  with  inconveniences. 
The  proprietors,  therefore,  knowing  that  they  have  all 
the  land,  and  that  the  laborers  cannot  find  support 
except  by  laboring  for  them,  establish  an  intermediate 
class,  (of  shopkeepers,)  who  receive  the  provisions  from 
the  proprietors  and  dispense  them  to  the  laborers.  The 
shopkeepers  are  only  transformed  laborers,  employed 
in  a  particular  department  of  the  economy  of  the 
island. 

This  new  system,  however,  requires  a  means  of  ex- 
change to  enable  the  proprietors  to  be  certain  that  none 


SERFDOM    AND    ARISTOCRACY.  351 

of  the  laborers  obtain  food  without  doing  the  neces- 
sary work,  and  labor  must  therefore  have  a  representa- 
tive, which  shall  enable  the  laborer  to  obtain  his  day's 
food  when  he  has  done  his  day's  work.  This  repre- 
sentative is  money.  The  laborer  does  a  day's  work, 
and  receives  a  coin,  a  shell,  a  token,  or  a  piece  of 
paper,  the  essential  character  of  which  is  —  that  it  is 
"  an  order  for  a  dai/s  food? 

But  the  shopkeeper  being  a  laborer,  must  receive 
his  own  food,  and  this  he  does  by  receiving  for  the  to- 
kens which  represent  labor  a  larger  quantity  from  the 
proprietors  than  the  quantity  he  gives  to  the  laborers. 

The  figure  might  be  extended,  and  the  system  of 
modern  society  might  be  made  to  grow  out  of  the  two 
primary  elements,  the  proprietor  and  the  slave. 

But  what  we  ask  is  this,  Are  the  laborers,  when  their 
slavery  has  been  generalized,  and  money  has  been  in- 
troduced, are  they  not  still  the  serfs  of  the  proprietors  ? 
True,  the  proprietors  have  no  longer  individual  slaves, 
and  cannot  inflict  individual  punishments  ;  but  the 
whole  body  of  the  laborers  still  belong  to  the  whole 
body  of  the  proprietors,  inasmuch  as  the  land  belongs 
to  the  latter,  and  the  laborers  cannot  obtain  their  sus- 
tenance without  laboring  for  them. 

Now,  suppose  the  accumulated  profits  of  the  propri- 
etors were  sufficient  to  enable  them  to  live  for  a  certain 
number  of  years  without  the  cultivation  of  their  lands, 
and  they  should  by  any  mad  freak  resolve  to  do  so, 
and  not  to  employ  the  laborers ;  the  latter  would,  of 
course,  be  reduced  to  destitution  and  starvation ;  so 
that,  although  the  individual  life  of  a  laborer  is  not  in 
the  hands  of  an  individual  proprietor,  the  lives  of  the 


352 


SERFDOM    AND    ARISTOCRACY. 


whole  class  of  laborers  would  be  in  the  hands  of  the 
class  of  the  proprietors.  And  if  a  large  proportion  of 
the  latter  were  to  absent  themselves  from  the  island, 
and  not  to  cause  the  lands  to  be  cultivated,  of  course 
a  large  portion  of  the  laborers  would  be  reduced  to 
want,  or  perhaps  to  hunger-fever  and  death.  And 
this  is  what  takes  place  in  Ireland.* 

Now,  are  not  the  laborers  serfs  under  these  circum- 
stances ?  We  maintain  that  they  are,  and  that  the 
laborers  f  of  England,  Ireland,  and  Scotland  are  serfs ; 
though  the  name  is  a  disagreeable  one,  and  the  fact  of 
their  serfdom  is  concealed  by  the  economical  arrange- 
ments by  which  the  internal  business  of  the  country 
is  carried  on.  The  laborers  are  the  serfs,  and  the  pro- 
prietors are  the  aristocracy  ;  and  it  makes  little  or  no 
difference  whether  we  have  an  imaginary  island  with 
thirty  proprietors  and  three  thousand  laboring  serfs,  or 


#  General  statement  in  acres  of  the  cultivated,  uncultivated,  and 
unprofitable  land  of  the  United  Kingdom.  —  (From  the  Third  Re- 
port  of  the  Emigration  Committee.) 


Cultivated. 

Uncultivated 
wastes  capable 
of  improve- 
ment. 

Unprofitable. 

Total. 

England.  .  .  . 

Wales 

Scotland.  .  .  . 

Ireland 

British  Islands. 

25,632,000 
3,117,000 
5,265,000 

12,125,280 
383,690 

3,454,000 

530,000 

5,950,000 

4,900,000 

166,000 

3,256,400 
1,105,000 
8,523,930 
2,416,664 
569,469 

32,342,400 

4,752,000 

19,738,<80 

19,441,944 

1,119,159 

46,522,970 

15,000,000 

15,871,463 

77,394,4.33 

f  By  laborers,  of  course,  we  mean  all  who  labcr  for  their  bread, 
whether  merchants,  manufacturers,  professional  men,  artisans, 
farmers,  agricultural  laborers,  operatives,  &c. 


SERFDOM    AND    ARISTOCRACY.  353 

a  real  island  with  thirty  thousand  proprietors  and  five 
or  six  millions  of  laboring  serfs.  Let  the  political  ar- 
rangements be  what  they  may,  let  there  be  universal  or 
any  other  suffrage,  so  long  as  the  aristocracy  have  all 
the  land,  and  derive  the  rent  of  it,  the  laborer  is  only  a 
serf,  and  a  serf  he  will  remain  until  he  has  uprooted 
the  rights  of  private  landed  property.  The  land  is  for 
the  nation,  and  not  for  the  aristocracy. 

We  affirm,  then,  that  serfdom  has  not  been  abol- 
ished, but  only  generalized,  in  England,  Ireland,  and 
Scotland  ;  and  this  generalization  appears  to  be  the 
step  of  transition  through  which  society  must  pass,  in 
its  progress  from  the  condition  of  individual  lord  and 
individual  serf,  to  the  condition  of  equitable  equality, 
in  which  there  shall  be  no  lord  and  no  serf,  but  only 
freemen  without  privileges  and  without  oppressions.* 

But  it  is  necessary  to  understand  what  we  mean  by 
a  lord  and  a  serf. 

A   serf  is   a   man  who,   by   the   arrangements   of 

*  "These  villeins,  belonging  principally  to  lords  of  manors, 
were  either  villeins  regardant,  —  that  is,  annexed  to  the  manor  or 
land,  —  or  else  they  were  in  gross,  or  at  large ;  that  is,  annexed  to 
the  person  of  the  lord,  and  transferable  by  deed  from  one  owner 
to  another.  They  could  not  leave  their  lord  without  his  permis- 
sion, but,  if  they  ran  away  or  were  purloined  from  him,  might 
be  claimed  and  recovered  by  action,  like  beasts  or  other  chattels. 
They  held,  indeed,  small  portions  of  land,  by  way  of  sustaining 
themselves  and  families,  but  it  was  at  the  mere  will  of  the  lord, 
who  might  dispossess  them  whenever  he  pleased ;  and  it  was  upon 
villein  services,  that  is,  to  carry  out  dung,  to  hedge  and  ditch  the 
lord's  demesnes,  and  any  other  the  meanest  offices ;  and  their 
services  were  not  only  base,  but  uncertain,  both  as  to  their  time 
and  quantity.  A  villein,  in  short,  was  in  much  the  same  state 
30* 


354  SERFDOM    AND    ARISTOCRACY. 

mankind,  is  deprived  of  the  object  on  which  he  might 
expend  his  labor,  or  of  the  natural  profit  that  results 
from  his  labor,  and,  consequently,  is  under  the  neces- 
sity of  supporting  himself  and  his  family  by  his  labor 
alone.  And  a  lord,  or  an  aristocrat,  is  a  man  who,  by 
the  arrangements  of  mankind,  is  made  to  possess  the 
object^  and  who,  consequently,  can  support  himself 
and  his  family  without  labor,  on  the  profits  created  by 
the  labor  of  others.  This  is  the  essential  distinction 
between  the  lord  and  the  serf;  and  we  maintain  that 
the  constitution  of  the  world  forbids  that  any  arrange- 
ment of  this  kind  should  result  in  any  other  than  an 
evil  condition  of  society,  which  must  necessarily  con- 
demn a  large  part  of  the  population  to  physical  degra- 
dation ;  and  if  to  physical  degradation,  to  moral 
degradation.  No  instance  can  be  adduced  of  a  popu- 
lation reduced  to  extreme  poverty  —  as  must  ever  be 
the  case  where  the  land,  the  great  source  of  wealth,  is 
allotted  to  a  few  who  labor  not  —  where  that  popula- 

with  us  as  Lord  Moles  worth  describes  to  be  that  of  the  boors  in 
Denmark,  and  which  Stiernhoak  attributes  also  to  the  traals  or 
slaves  in  Sweden,  which  confirms  the  probability  of  their  being,  in 
some  degree,  monuments  of  the  Danish  tyranny.  A  villein  could 
acquire  no  property  either  in  lands  or  goods ;  but,  if  he  purchased 
either,  the  lord  might  enter  upon  them,  oust  the  villein,  and  seize 
them  to  his  own  use,  unless  he  contrived  to  dispose  of  them  again 
before  the  lord  had  seized  them,  for  the  lord  had  then  lost  his 
opportunity. 

"  In  many  places,  also,  a  fine  was  payable  to  the  lord  if  the  vil- 
iein  presumed  to  marry  his  daughter  to  any  one  without  leave  from 
the  lord ;  and,  by  the  common  law,  the  lord  might  also  bring  an 
action  against  the  husband  for  damages  in  thus  purloining  his  prop- 
erty."—  Blackstone's  Commentaries,  book  ii.  chap.  6. 


DETERIORATION    OF    MAN.  355 

tion  has  not  been  also  and  in  consequence  reduced  to 
moral  and  intellectual  degradation,  and  where  the 
spirit  of  man  has  not  been  depraved  and  borne  down 
by  the  circumstances  in  which  man,  and  not  God,  has 
placed  him.* 

In  endeavoring  to  estimate  what  must  be  the  ulti- 
mate condition  of  mankind  with  regard  to  natural 
property,  we  have  two  methods  of  determination : 
first,  that  of  political  science ;  second,  that  of  analogy, 
based  on  the  actual  history  of  the  past  evolution  of 
mankind  with  regard  to  natural  liberty.  We  have 
already  stated  that  the  too  great  substantives  of  poli- 
tics are  liberty  and  property.     Each  of  these  gives  rise 

*  Poverty  and  want  are  evils,  inasmuch  as  they  produce  human 
suffering ;  but  they  are  far  greater  evils,  as  they  tend  to  produce 
the  deterioration  of  man.  And  when  this  deterioration  is  produced 
by  the  political  arrangements  of  a  country,  with  regard  to  the  land 
and  the  other  natural  sources  of  wealth,  the  alteration  of  those 
arrangements  becomes  a  moral  duly  of  the  very  highest  character. 
As  an  illustration  of  this  deterioration  of  man,  we  quote  the  follow- 
ing passage  from  the  Edinburgh  Review,  October,  1848,  where  the 
writer  is  treating  of  man  scientifically,  and  without  reference  to 
politics.  Let  the  reader  contrast  this  passage  with  a  political  arti- 
cle in  the  same  number  of  the  Edinburgh  Review,  where  the  writer 
appears  to  assert,  that  "  of  a  hundred  honest,  industrious,  and 
upright  men,  the  vast  majority  are  certain  to  do  well."  According 
to  the  laws  of  nature  they  would  do  well,  but  according  to  the  laws 
of  Ireland  no  personal  qualifications  would  relieve  the  masses  from 
hopeless  poverty  so  long  as  the  present  politcal  arrangements  are 
allowed  to  remain.  In  Ireland,  the  object  of  labor  (the  land)  has 
been  taken  from  the  inhabitants,  and  vast  districts  are  lying  unim- 
proved and  uncultivated  in  the  face  of  a  population  willing  to  work 
for  the  lowest  wages.  On  the  one  hand  is  the  land  lying  idle,  and 
on  the  other  is  the  labor  lying  idle ;  and  the  landlordocracy  is  the 
obstacle  that  prevents  the  two  from  being  brought  into  contact,  and 


356  LIBERTY  AND  PROPERTY. 

to  a  course  of  evolution,  and  the  two  courses  of  evolu- 
tion are  analogous;  that  is,  the  process  is  similar, 
while  the  substantives  involved  in  the  process  are 
diverse.  Thus  the  lord  and  the  serf  present  the  far- 
thest possible  remove  from  equity,  both  as  regards 
liberty  and  as  regards  property;  and  the  process  by 
which  the  serf  gradually  emancipates  his  personal 
actions  from  the  power  of  the  lord,  may  be  taken  as 
an  indication  of  the  process  by  which  he  will  ulti- 
mately succeed  in  depriving  the  lord  of  his  exclusive 
possession  of  the  earth,  and  thereby  emancipating  his 
own  labor  from  the  burdens  that  oppress  it,  and  from 
the  depreciation  of  value  which  it  must  necessarily 

thereby  securing  an  abundant  provision  for  the  population.  So 
long  as  the  land  is  unimproved  and  uncultivated,  it  is  nonsense  to 
assert  that  Ireland  is  over-populous,  or  that  she  could  not  support  a 
much  larger  population.  It  is  the  law,  and  not  nature,  that  reduces 
Ireland  to  starvation. 

"Races  which  have  advanced  the  farthest  in  civilization,  and 
attained  the  greatest  perfection  of  physical  form,  produce  also 
examples  of  physical  inferiority  in  individuals  or  families.  Among 
other  consequences  of  long-continued  want  and  ignorance,  the 
conformation  of  the  cranium  appears  to  have  been  affected.  The 
Sanatory  Commission  would  arrive  at  this  conclusion,  we  believe, 
were  it  to  examine  the  worst  part  of  the  population  of  our  great 
towns;  the  most  convincing  proof,  however,  is  unfortunately  fur- 
nished by  the  lowest  classes  of  the  Irish  population."  There  are 
certain  districts  in  Leitrim,  Sligo,  and  Mayo,  (as  pointed  out  by  an 
intelligent  writer  in  the  Dublin  University  JMfagfmJnt,  No.  48,) 
chiefly  inhabited  by  the  descendants  of  the  native  Irish,  driven 
by  the  British  from  Armagh  and  the  south  of  Down,  about  two 
centuries  ago.  These  people,  whose  ancestors  were  well  grown, 
able  bodied,  and  comely,  are  now  reduced  to  an  average  stature  of 
five  feet,  two  inches,  are  pot-bellied,  bow  legged,  and  abortively 
featured,  and    are    especially   remarkable  for  "open,  projecting 


THE  LORD  AND  THE  SERF.  357 

experience,  so  long  as  the  great  body  of  the  population 
are  merely  laborers  for  the  lords.  And  laborers  for 
the  lords  the  great  body  of  the  population  must  be, 
so  long  as  the  soil,  the  mines,  the  fisheries,  &c,  are 
accorded  to  a  small  number  of  individual  proprietors. 
As  regards  personal  liberty,  the  lord  and  the  serf 
present  the  greatest  possible  diversity.  They  are 
the  antipodes,  the  positive  and  negative  poles,  of 
man's  possible  condition.  The  antagonism  cannot 
be  greater;  it  is  absolute,  ultimate,  final.  Man  can- 
not make  the  disparity  more  perfect;  it  is  the  abso- 
lute dominion  of  strength,  and  the  absolute  subjection 
of  weakness.     The  lord  is  the  possessor,  the  serf  is  the 

mouths,  with  prominent  teeth  and  exposed  gums,  their  advancing 
cheek  bones  and  depressed  noses  bearing  barbarism  on  their  very 
front"  In  other  words,  within  so  short  a  period  they  seem  to  have 
acquired  a  prognathous  type  of  skull,  ["  the  third  type  of  configura- 
tion of  the  skull  has  been  very  happily  named  by  Dr.  Prichard 
prognathous,  to  express  its  most  distinctive  character,  namely,  the 
forward  prominence  of  the  jaws,"]  like  the  savages  of  Australia, 
"  thus  giving  an  example  of  deterioration  from  known  causes,  as 
almost  compensates  by  its  value  to  future  ages  for  the  suffering 
and  debasement  which  past  generations  have  endured  in  perfecting 
its  appalling  lesson."  "The  hordes  of  wretched  Irish,  whom 
famine  has  driven  to  seek  subsistence  in  the  seaports  and  manu- 
facturing towns  of  Great  Britain,  must  have  enabled  many  of  our 
readers  to  make  this  observation  for  themselves :  every  gradation 
being  perceptible,  from  the  really  noble  type  of  countenance  and 
figure  seen  in  some  of  them,  to  that  utterly  debased  aspect  which 

can  be  looked  at  only  with  disgust In  both  cases  (the 

Irish  and  the  Australians)  the  same  cause  —  a  long-continued 
deficiency  of  food  and  social  degradation  (where  a  sufficient  eleva- 
tion to  resist  these  depressing  agencies  had  not  been  previously 
attained)  —  has  terminated  in  the  same  results." — Edinburgh  Re- 
view, October,  1848,  p.  443. 


358  THE  LORD  AND  THE  SERF. 

possessed;  the  one  is  a  being  who  commands,  the 
other  a  thing  who  obeys.  The  one  has  the  profit 
without  the  labor,  the  other  the  labor  without  the 
profit. 

Such  a  condition  —  contrary  as  it  is  to  every  prin- 
ciple of  reason,  of  equity,  and  of  religion  —  is  not  only 
established  by  licentious  power,  but  authorized  and 
perpetuated  by  human  law.  And  thus  the  iniquity 
was  made  to  receive  a  sanction,  which,  although  based 
on  the  darkest  superstition,  yet  lent  a  kind  of  moral 
authorization  to  the  system,  and  enabled  the  lords  to 
speak  of  their  rights;  while  the  serfs,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  impressed  with  a  kind  of  fear  that  they 
might  be  doing  wrong  when  they  resorted  to  force  to 
rid  themselves  of  the  oppression. 

And  the  history  of  the  acquisition  of  liberty  (in 
Britain,  for  instance)  is  only  the  history  of  the  gradual 
destruction  of  the  privileges  of  the  lord,  and  of  the 
legal  title  which  the  serf  has  from  time  to  time  suc- 
ceeded in  establishing  to  those  natural  rights  of  which 
he  had  been  deprived.  The  vast  transformations  that 
have  taken  place  in  the  social  conditions  of  English- 
men may  be  concisely  expressed  in  the  proposition, 
that  "  they  have  gradually,  and  through  the  course  of 
many  centuries,  been  progressing  from  the  extreme  of 
antagonism  and  disparity  towards  absolute  equality 
in  the  eye  of  the  law,  so  far  as  the  matter  of  liberty 
is   concerned."*     It  is  true  that  this   process   is   not 

*  "  The  rest  of  their  slaves  have  not,  like  ours,  particular  em- 
ployments allotted  to  them.  Each  is  the  master  of  a  habitation 
and  household  of  his  own.  The  lord  requires  from  him  a  certain 
quantity  of  grain,  cattle,  or  cloth,  as  from  a  tenant ;  and  so  far  only 


EQUALITY  IN  THE  EYE  OF  THE  LAW.      359 

yet  complete,  and  that  considerable  changes  must 
yet  take  place  before  the  government  of  the  country 
becomes  the  impartial  administrator  of  equal  law,  made 
the  same  for  every  inhabitant  of  the  country,  without 
the  slightest  distinction  of  individuals  or  of  classes, 
except  in  so  far  as  individuals  may  be  made  to  fill 
offices ;  which  offices  may  have  peculiar  duties,  pecu- 
liar responsibilities,  and  peculiar  remunerations  at- 
tached to  them.  But  this  question  of  official  disparity 
is  a  mere  question  of  executive  administration,  similar 
to  the  appointment  of  directors  or  managers  in  a  cor- 
porate concern,  where  some  are  appointed  to  act  for 
all;  without,  however,  establishing  any  disparity  of 
rights,  but  only  such  a  disparity  of  functions  as  the 
common  judgment  of  the  society  may  find  advisable 
for  the  success  of  its  operations. 

If,  then,  the  progress  of  modern  society  has  been  a 
gradual  but  sure  progress  from  the  extreme  of  dis- 
parity towards  absolute  parity  in  the  eye  of  the  law, 
so  far  as  personal  liberty  is  concerned,  we  have  only 
to  identify  the  laws  of  property  with  the  laws  of  lib- 

the  subjection  of  the  slave  extends.  His  domestic  offices  are  per- 
formed by  his  own  wife  and  children.  It  is  unusual  to  scourge  a 
slave,  or  punish  him  with  chains  or  hard  labor.  They  are  some- 
times killed  by  their  masters ;  not  through  severity  of  chastisement, 
but  in  the  heat  of  passion,  like  an  enemy,  with  this  difference,  that 
it  is  done  with  impunity.  Freedmen  (manumitted  slaves)  are  little 
superior  to  slaves,  seldom  filling  any  important  office  in  the  family ; 
never  in  the  state,  except  in  those  tribes  which  are  under  regal 
government.  There  they  rise  above  the  freeborn,  and  even  the 
nobles ;  in  the  rest,  the  subordinate  condition  of  the  freedmen  is  a 
proof  of  freedom."  —  Tacitus,  Manners  of  the  Germans,  xxv. 
(Aiken's  Translation.) 


360      EQUALITY  IN  THE  EYE  OF  THE  LAW, 

erty  to  arrive  at  a  firm  conviction,  that  the  progress 
will  continue  in  the  same  direction  until  parity  in  the 
eye  of  the  law  shall  be  evolved,  so  far  as  natural  prop- 
erty is  concerned.  If  we  were  to  view  the  laws  re- 
lating to  natural  property  (the  earth)  as  distinct  from 
the  laws  relating  to  personal  liberty,  then  we  should 
base  an  argument  on  analogy,  and  we  should  main- 
tain that  the  evolution  that  has  taken  place  in  the 
matter  of  liberty  would  also  take  place  in  the  matter 
of  natural  property.  And  this  argument  would  be 
valid,  and  would  afford  a  high  probability  that  the 
equalization  of  natural  property  was  to  be  antici- 
pated as  the  conclusion  of  human  evolution  in  that 
department. 

But  if  property  be  considered  as  one  of  the  substan- 
tives of  moral  dynamics,  and  if  we  reason  the  ques- 
tion on  the  scheme  of  human  action  —  inquiring  not 
into  the  laws  that  have  reference  to  the  object,  but 
into  the  laws  that  have  reference  to  man  and  man's 
actions  —  we  thereby  identify  the  laws  of  liberty  and 
the  laws  of  property,  and  come  to  view  both  as  the 
laws  that  should  preside  over  human  function;  be- 
cause, to  allocate  a  certain  portion  of  the  earth  to  one 
individual,  is  only  to  prohibit  all  other  individuals 
from  using  that  portion,  and  the  question,  viewed  in 
this  light,  can  only  be  argued  as  a  branch  of  the  more 
general  question,  "  How  can  one  man  justly  lay  re- 
strictions on  another  man  ?  "  And  when  the  question 
is  viewed  in  this  light,  it  is  plainly  evident  that  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  a  law  of  property,  distinct  and 
separate  from  a  law  of  liberty,  but  that  the  theory  of 
liberty  must  include  the  theory  of  property;  and  if 


AND    IN    THE    SCHEME    OF    THE    STATE.  361 

the  time  should  come  when  the  law  shall  be  impartial 
with  regard  to  human  action,  then  of  necessity  must 
the  law  be  impartial  with  regard  to  natural  property  ; 
in  fact,  with  regard  to  every  thing  that  is  not  created  by 
the  skill  and  labor  of  the  individual. 

Let  us  consider  that  the  very  essence  of  just  law 
is,  that  it  is  "  no  respecter  of  persons,"  and  that 
a  priori  it  acknowledges  no  difference  and  no  distinc- 
tion between  the  individuals  who  are  to  be  regulated 
by  its  enactments.  Law,  to  be  just,  must  be  the  same 
for  all  the  individuals  who  are  to  be  subject  to  it; 
and  if  law  be  made  in  such  a  manner  that  it  imposes 
on  one  man  a  restriction  which  it  does  not  impose  on 
another,  then  is  that  law  not  just,  nor  is  man  morally 
bound  to  acknowledge  it  or  obey  it  The  validity  of 
law  depends  exclusively  on  its  equity  and  impartiality ; 
and  wherever  the  law  starts  by  acknowledging  or 
establishing  diversities  of  privileges,  there  is  the  law 
unjust,  partial,  and  wicked  ;  and  it  is  the  duty  of  man, 
as  man,  to  destroy  that  law,  and  to  reestablish  the 
equilibrium  of  equity,  which  ought  never  to  have  been 
disturbed.  The  very  end  and  intention  of  impartial 
law  is  the  prevention  of  the  disturbance  of  the  equi- 
librium of  equity;  and  where  the  law,  instead  of 
preventing  this  disturbance,  originates,  defends,  and 
perpetuates  it,  that  law  has  altogether  departed  from 
the  true  intention  of  law,  and  its  abolition  is  absolutely 
necessary  before  man  can  attain  to  the  best  condition 
possible  for  him  on  earth. 

We  are  fully  aware  that  there  exists  in  the  minds 
of  many  persons  a  vague  apprehension,  that  if  the 
present  laws  relating  to  landed  property  were  to  be 
31 


362      EQUALITY  IN  THE  EYE  OF  THE  LAW, 

disturbed,  evils  of  the  most  malignant  character  would 
invade  the  society  of  Britain.  Nothing  can  be  more 
absurd,  more  puerile,  more  dastardly.  The  very  same 
fears  have  prevailed  with  regard  to  every  other  change 
that  has  taken  place ;  and,  down  to  the  last  change 
that  man  shall  make  in  his  political  arrangements,  we 
may  rest  satisfied  that  the  craven,  the  placeman,  and 
the  aristocrat  will  not  fail  to  vent  loud  lamentations 
on  the  evils  which,  in  their  estimation,  are  sure  to  fol- 
low. The  oft-repeated  quotation  from  the  great  bard, 
"'Tis  better  to  bear  the  ills  we  have,  than  fly  to  others 
that  we  know  not  of,"  is  dragged  in  to  give  the  sanc- 
tion of  that  proud  name  to  fears  which  he  would  have 
regarded  with  scorn,  and  to  interested  representations 
which  he  would  have  rejected  with  detestation.  True, 
in  Shakspeare's  sense,  it  is  better  to  bear  the  ills  of 
human  life  than  to  rush  with  the  red  hand  into  the 
presence  of  the  almighty  Giver  of  life.  True,  this  is 
true.  And  even  in  our  own  lot  it  may  be  better  to 
bear  one  worldly  evil  than  to  make  a  change  which 
might  entail  other  worldly  evils  which  we  know  not 
of.  This  also  is  true.  But  surely  none  can  be  so  be- 
sotted as  not  to  perceive  that  the  question  comes  in 
another  form,  and  that  a  new  reading  must  be  adopted 
before  we  can  have  an  applicable  sentiment.  The 
question,  wherever  there  is  injustice,  is  not,  whether  it 
is  better  to  bear  the  ills  we  have ;  but,  whether  it  is 
better  to  make  others  bear  the  ills  we  inflict  upon 
them  ;  and,  whether  it  is  better  for  them  to  bear  the 
ills  which  men  inflict,  than  fly  to  changes  which  deliver 
the  oppressed  from  the  pain,  and  the  oppressor  from 
the  sin,  of  the  injustice. 


AND    IN    THE    SCHEME    OF    THE    STATE.  363 

But  while  we  maintain  that  the  continual  progress 
of  mankind  is  towards  equality  in  the  eye  of  the  law, 
and  that  as  men  were  once  at  the  utmost  extreme  of 
inequality,  and  have  been  gradually  and  surely  de- 
creasing that  inequality  ;  and  consequently  that  we 
have  the  evidence  of  past  history  to  give  us  the  line 
of  progress,  and  the  evidence  of  reason  that,  if  that 
line  continue,  it  must  terminate  in  the  total  abolition 
of  privilege  and  the  establishment  of  absolute  equal- 
ity; »we  have  also  the  dogma  of  political  science, 
which  proves  equality  to  be  right,  and  evidence  from 
the  other  sciences  to  prove  that  what  is  right  ulti- 
mately comes  to  be  adopted  in  practice. 

This  portion  of  the  argument  presents  itself  in  the 
following  aspect :  — 

1st.  There  is  no  possibility  of  establishing  a  diver- 
sity of  rights  between  the  various  individuals  of  which 
the  human  race  is  composed,  in  so  far  as  those  individ- 
uals enter  into  relation  with  each  other  for  the  forma- 
tion of  a  state  or  community,  acting  for  the  common 
advantage. 

In  saying  that  there  is  no  possibility  of  establishing 
such  a  diversity  of  rights,  we  mean,  that  there  is  no 
natural  source  of  knowledge  whatever  from  which 
such  a  diversity  could  possibly  flow.  There  may  be  a 
diversity  of  strength,  or  of  intellect,  or  of  skill,  or  of 
cunning ;  but  the  very  moment  we  admit  an  abstract 
or  general  moral  law,  we  absolutely  obliterate  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  diversity  of  rights.  Men  find  themselves 
on  the  surface  of  the  globe,  and  find  themselves  also 
possessed  of  a  reason  which  furnishes  general  prop- 
ositions applicable  to  the  race;    and  there  exists  no 


364      EQUALITY  IN  THE  EYE  OF  THE  LAW, 

natural  means  whatever  of  determining  what  individ- 
ual men  should  possess  more  rights  than  their  fellows, 
or  what  individual  men  should  possess  fewer  rights  than 
their  fellows.  The  only  possible  means  by  which  such 
a  diversity  could  be  established,  would  be  a  revelation 
from  the  Creator  of  mankind ;  and  except  in  the  one 
case,  of  the  Hebrew  nation,  we  have  no  evidence  that 
the  Creator  has  ever  pointed  out  any  individuals,  or 
any  families,  who  were  to  enjoy  specified  rights,  in 
contradistinction  to  the  general  rights  which  men  de- 
rive from  the  intuitions  of  the  reason. 

2d.  Men  having  fallen  from  the  first  estate  in  which 
they  were  created,  have  in  their  moral  actions  and  po- 
litical arrangements  followed,  not  the  dictates  of  their 
impartial  reason,  but  the  dictates  of  their  selfish  pas- 
sions ;  and  thus  those  in  power  have  not  only  acted 
wrongfully,  but  have  enacted  wrong,  bad,  and  wicked 
laws,  thereby  perpetuating  the  injustice  under  the  for- 
mal sanction  of  legislation. 

3d.  On  this  account,  human  laws  and  human 
arrangements,  instead  of  being  impartial  and  for  the 
benefit  of  human  society  at  large,  have  originated  and 
perpetuated  systems  of  partiality,  whereby  power  and 
privilege  were  accorded  to  certain  individuals,  families, 
classes,  castes,  &c,  at  the  expense  of  the  other  mem- 
bers of  the  race ;  who,  of  necessity,  were  restricted  in 
their  rights  in  the  same  ratio  that  the  privileged  classes 
were  endowed  with  privileges. 

4th.  Human  society,  therefore,  instead  of  presenting 
an  ethically  homogeneous  aspect,  resulting  from  the 
universal  prevalence  of  impartial  law,  (which  laid  on 
all   exactly  the   same  moral    restrictions,  and   which 


AND    IN    THE    SCHEME    OF    THE    STATE.  365 

accorded  to  all  exactly  the  same  liberty  for  the  develop- 
ment of  individual  labor,  skill,  industry,  and  enterprise,) 
has  exhibited  the  human  race  as  divided  into  classes 
endowed  with  diverse  privileges ;  and  has  figured  forth 
the  antagonism  of  the  oppressor  and  the  oppressed, 
instead  of  the  harmony  of  equal  freemen,  each  devel- 
oping his  own  fortunes  within  those  moral  restrictions 
which  are  immutable. 

5th.  But  the  arrangements  of  mankind  have  not 
only  established  diversities  of  rights  affecting  mere 
action,  (in  Britain,  for  instance,  we  have  a  franchised 
class  and  an  unfranchised  class ;  that  is,  a  freed  class, 
or  class  of  freed  serfs,  and  an  unfreed  class,  or  class  of 
laboring  serfs  not  yet  freed,)  but  they  have  established 
diversities  of  rights  affecting  the  possession  of  the 
earth,  which  the  Creator  intended  for  the  race ;  and 
thus  one  man  was  endowed  with  vast  extents  of  terri- 
tory, while,  on  the  other  hand,  multitudes  were  thereby 
necessarily  deprived  of  every  thing  except  their  labor. 
So  singular  a  system  could  only  originate  in  the  reign 
of  power,  and  could  only  be  perpetuated  through  the 
ignorance  of  the  masses  of  the  population.  But  the 
arrangements  of  mankind  with  regard  to  the  earth  did 
not  stop  here.  One  generation  was  not  content  with 
making  arrangements  which  were  to  be  in  force  for 
that  generation  alone ;  but  laws  were  enacted,  and 
customs  were  acknowledged,  whereby  the  arrange- 
ments of  one  generation  were  to  descend  to  future 
generations,  and  to  be  imposed  on  men  not  yet  born, 
wTho  were  to  be  born  into  a  world  already  portioned 
out,  and,  consequently,  to  which  they  had  no  title. 
Those,  therefore,  who  were  born  into  the  world  in  a 
31* 


366      EQUALITY  IN  THE  EYE  OF  THE  LAW, 

country  where  the  land  had  been  accorded  to  individ- 
ual proprietors,  could  obtain  their  livelihood  only  by 
laboring  for  other  men ;  and  as  those  to  whom  the 
land  had  been  accorded  could  not  cultivate  it  them- 
selves, and  as  the  land  was  required  for  the  support  of 
the  population,  the  laborers  were  under  the  necessity 
of  paying  a  rent  to  those  who  thus  procured  a  vast 
revenue  without  labor.  This  system  of  diversity  of 
rights  to  the  natural  earth,  which  God  intended  for  the 
race,  being  perpetuated  from  generation  to  generation, 
entails  with  it,  as  its  necessary  attendant,  that  baneful 
condition  of  society,  in  which  we  have  a  few  aristo- 
crats endowed  with  vast  wealth  without  labor,  and  a 
multitude  of  laborers  reduced  to  poverty,*  destitution, 
and  sometimes  to  actual  starvation.! 

*  "La condition  des  paysans  est  des  plus  malheureuses.  Les 
fortunes  sont  tellement  disproportionnees,  qu'on  ne  voit  que  des 
riches  et  des  pauvres,  les  petits  proprietaires  sont  fort  rares.  II  en 
resulte  un  manque  d'emulation  et  de  courage  pour  fonder  des  etab- 
lissements  d'industrie  et  pour  ameliorer  l'agriculture."  —  Did.  Geog. 
Univ.,  Art.  Calabre. 

f  One  would  scarcely  imagine  that  in  London,  the  wealthiest  city 
in  the  Avorld,  people  could  be  starved  to  death.  We  mention  an 
incident  that  came  within  our  own  experience.  Some  years  ago  we 
were  present  at  a  dispensary,  one  of  those  admirable  and  unosten- 
tatious institutions  established  to  afford  medical  relief  to  the  poor  in 
London,  and  supported  principally  by  the  efforts  of  the  medical  offi- 
cers. A  widow  appeared  as  a  patient.  She  stated  that  she  had  six 
children  to  support,  and  that  her  whole  earnings  amounted  to  7s.  a 
week.  We  saw  the  medical  officer  shake  his  head,  doubting  that 
the  case  was  beyond  the  reach  of  medicine.  The  surgeon  was  a 
humane  man,  and  he  did  what  he  could  for  her.  Some  months 
after,  we  saw  him  again,  and  inquired  for  the  widow.  She  had 
died.     We  asked  the  nature  of  her  disease ;  and  the  reply  was, 


AND    IN    THE    SCHEME    OF    THE    STATE.  367 

6th.  The  whole  idea  of  a  diversity  of  rights  and 
privileges  originates  in  the  corrupted  heart  of  mankind, 
and  in  the  darkened  intellect  that  has  allowed  supersti- 
tion to  dictate  its  credence,  instead  of  basing  its  prop- 
ositions on  the  axioms  of  the  reason. 

"  She  died  of  starvation ! "  With  the  hand  of  death  upon  her,  she 
had  labored  for  her  children,  and  at  last  she  died  for  want  of  food. 
Such  is  London. 

Does  the  reader  suppose  such  things  do  not  occur  ?  Let  us  take 
a  sketch  by  the  great  depictor  of  modern  manners,  Mr.  Charles 
Dickens :  — 

'"  Ah ! '  said  the  man,  bursting  into  tears,  and  sinking  on  his 
knees  at  the  feet  of  the  dead  woman,  '  Kneel  down,  kneel  down  — 
kneel  round  her  every  one  of  you,  and  mark  my  words.  I  say  she 
starved  to  death.  I  never  knew  how  bad  she  was  till  the  fever 
came  upon  her,  and  then  her  bones  were  starting  through  the  skin. 
There  was  neither  fire  nor  candle ;  she  died  in  the  dark  —  in  the 
dark !  She  couldn't  even  see  her  children's  faces,  though  we  heard 
her  gasping  out  their  names.  I  begged  for  her  in  the  streets,  and 
they  sent  me  to  prison.  When  I  came  back,  she  was  dying ;  and 
all  the  blood  in  my  heart  was  dried  up,  for  they  starved  her  to 
death.  I  swear  it  before  the  God  that  saw  it  —  they  starved  her ! ' 
He  twined  his  hands  in  his  hair,  and  with  a  loud  scream  rolled 
grovelling  upon  the  floor,  his  eyes  fixed,  and  the  foam  gushing  from 
his  lips."  —  Oliver  Twist. 

Fain  would  we  express  a  hope  that  Mr.  Dickens,  to  whom  God 
has  given  so  admirable  a  genius,  might  one  day  turn  his  attention 
to  the  condition  of  the  laboring  classes  in  the  manufacturing  towns 
of  England.  He  might  then  become  indeed  a  benefactor  to  his 
country ;  and,  as  no  pen  can  command  a  more  powerful  interest 
than  his  own,  he  might  reap  the  noble  satisfaction  of  alleviating 
those  dreadful  evils  that  prey  on  the  population.  The  warning  voice 
might,  it  is  true,  be  heard  in  vain  ;  but  so  certainly  as  those  evils 
are  not  removed  by  better  social  conditions,  accompanied  by  moral 
and  intellectual  education,  so  certainly  will  they  one  day  produce 
their  natural  fruits  of  frantic  revolt.  v~'       ^t^^Z^^ 


Library*  . 

Of  rfelMhrnia-     ^f 


368      EQUALITY  IN  THE  EYE  OF  THE  LAW. 

However  long  men  may  be  in  coming  to  the  con- 
clusion, they  must  ultimately  accord  that  there  are  no 
natural  means  known  by  which  a  diversity  of  rights 
could  possibly  be  established.  A  diversity  of  rights 
implies,  that  some  individuals  are  to  be  endowed  with 
certain  privileges  not  common  to  the  race.  And  these 
individuals  would  require  to  be  recognizable.  Now, 
no  natural  means  whatever,  no  methods  of  apprecia- 
tion known  to  man,  ever  did,  or  ever  could,  enable  the 
human  race  to  say,  a  priori,  "  This  individual  is  en- 
titled to  more  rights  than  that  individual."  Nothing 
but  a  revelation  from  the  Creator  could  ever  establish 
such  a  distinction ;  and  consequently  all  diversities  in 
the  human  race  must  be  diversities  of  office,  and  diver- 
sities of  condition,  produced  by  the  more  or  less  success- 
ful result  of  individual  labor,  enterprise,  or  skill.  Every 
other  diversity  is  contrary  to  reason  ;  and  when  estab- 
lished by  human  law,  such  law  is  bad,  wrong,  and 
wicked,  and  ought  to  be  abolished. 

7th.  The  whole  history  of  man  informs  us  that  the 
human  race  is  gradually  emerging  from  superstition, 
gradually  acquiring  knowledge,  and  gradually  applying 
that  knowledge  to  rectify  the  arrangements  which 
were  made  in  times  of  superstition.  Anti  history  also 
informs  us,  that  wherever  truth  is  substantiated,  it 
does,  sooner  or  later,  receive  the  assent  of  the  human 
intellect;  and  though  the  progress  has  been  partial, 
both  as  regards  the  quantity  of  truth  received,  and  the 
extent  to  which  it  has  been  received  by  the  nations  of 
the  earth,  the  advances  already  made  leave  no  possible 
doubt  as  to  the  system,  process,  or  scheme,  according 
to  which  man  abandons  superstition,  and  adheres  at 


PERPETUAL    SUPREMACY    OF    JUSTICE.  369 

last  to  those  propositions  which  are  properly  substan- 
tiated. In  every  department  of  human  action,  we 
may  in  the  present  day  observe  the  gradual  substitu- 
tion of  scientific  method  for  empirical  method,  or  for  the 
fictions  of  superstition ;  and  as  no  doubt  can  possibly 
be  entertained  that  men  are  now  approaching  man 
science,  we  may  rest  satisfied  that  the  political  rela- 
tions of  man  will,  ere  long,  be  treated  according  to  a 
scientific  method  —  that  fictions  will  be  abandoned, 
and  that  arrangements  will  be  made  in  accordance 
with  the  dictates  of  the  reason,  instead  of  emanating 
from  the  right  of  the  strongest,  confirmed  by  legis- 
lation. 

8th.  The  great  theoretic  change  that  must  take 
place  in  Britain,  is  the  abolition  of  the  belief  that  one 
generation  of  men  can  be  bound  by  the  arrangements 
of  past  generations;  and,  instead  of  that  belief,  the 
substitution  of  a  belief  that  men  in  every  age  must  be 
governed  by  reason;  that,  whatever  the  arrangements 
or  laws  of  past  generations  may  have  been,  those  ar- 
rangements or  laws  are  binding  now  only  in  so  far  as 
they  are  now  right,  quite  independently  of  any  sanc- 
tion they  may  have  received  from  legislation.  The 
acts  of  past  men  are  no  more  binding  on  present  men 
in  matters  of  politics  than  they  are  in  matters  of  as- 
tronomy or  theology ;  and  when  we  find  the  soil  of 
Britain  disposed  of,  not  according  to  any  scheme  that 
pretends  to  be  now  right,  but  according  to  the  arrange- 
ments of  men  long  since  dead,  who  enacted  the  perpe- 
tuity of  their  arrangements,  we  may  rest  satisfied  that 
the  nation  must  ere  long  turn  its  attention  to  the  re- 
vision  of   those   arrangements,   and   inquire,   "  What 


370  DISPOSITION    OF    THE    SOIL. 

ought  to  be  the  present  disposition  of  the  soil,  supposing- 
no  arrangements  whatever  had  been  inherited  from  past 
generations" 

No  political  truth  requires  to  be  more  strenuously 
impressed  upon  the  world,  than  that  the  men  of  every 
succeeding  generation  have  the  same  right  to  make 
their  own  arrangements,  unburdened  with  any  respon- 
sibilities, restrictions,  diversities  of  rights  and  privi- 
leges, other  than  those  restrictions  imposed  by  the 
general  laws  of  equity,  or  those  diversities  of  office 
which  they  may  agree  to  make  for  their  general  advan- 
tage. Nothing  can  be  more  absurd  than  to  suppose 
that  a  past  generation  can  make  arrangements  to 
deprive  the  present  generation  (at  any  given  time)  of 
its  full  right  to  dispose  of  the  earth  in  the  mode  that 
is  best  for  the  present  generation;  and  though  the 
laws  of  Britain  are  utterly  contrary  to  reason,  in  this 
respect,  inasmuch  as  lands  are  entailed  in  particular 
families,  to  whom  other  Britons  must  pay  a  rent  for 
the  use  of  the  soil,  we  need  not  hesitate  to  affirm,  that 
the  moment  a  scientific  method  (whether  inductive  and 
economical,  or  deductive  and  moral)  comes  to  be  ap- 
plied to  the  question,  "  Whose  is  the  soil,  and  how 
should  it  be  distributed  ?  "  that  moment  will  the  fabric 
of  English  aristocracy  be  undermined,  and  the  social 
laws  of  Britain  will  undergo  a  thorough  regeneration. 
Superstition  on  this  point  may  endure  for  a  few  years 
longer;  but  so  certainly  as  men  achieve  equality  in  the 
eye  of  the  law  with  regard  to  natural  liberty,  so  cer- 
tainly must  they  ultimately  achieve  equality  with 
regard  to  natural  property.  And  so  certainly  as  men 
reduce  to  practice  the  propositions  of  knowledge  in  the 


DISPOSITION    OF    THE    SOIL.  371 

other  sciences,  so  certainly  will  they  ultimately  reduce 
to  practice  the  propositions  of  political  science ;  and 
instead  of  being  the  slaves  of  superstition,  held  in  awe 
by  the  bugbears  of  hereditary  rights,  the  authority  of 
{wrong)  laws,  and  the  impositions  of  legal  fictions,  they 
will  make  reason  the  ruler,  moral  science  the  expositor 
of  reason,  and  subject  themselves  to  the  laws  of 
justice,  and  no  longer  to  the  laws  of  men. 

If,  then,  we  admit  that  every  generation  of  men  has 
the  same  free  right  to  make  its  own  arrangements,  and 
to  carry  into  effect  the  principles  it  knows  or  believes 
to  be  true,  quite  independently  of  the  arrangements 
that  have  been  made  by  any  anterior  generations,  we 
must  also  of  necessity  admit,  that  the  earth  and  all  it 
contains  belong,  for  the  time  being,  to  every  existing 
generation,  and  that  the  disposition  of  the  earth  (as  the 
great  storehouse  from  which  man  must  derive  his  sup- 
port and  sustenance)  is  not  to  be  determined  by  the 
laws,  customs,  arrangements,  king's  gifts,  or  prescrip- 
tive rights  of  any  past  generation  of  men,  but  by  the 
judgment  and  reason  of  the  existing  generation, 
ordering  all  arrangements  according  to  the  rules  of 
equity,  which  are  always  valid  and  always  binding, 
and  which  at  every  given  moment  of  time  are  the 
rules  which  ought  to  determine  human  action.  Con- 
sequently the  question  at  every  period  is,  "  What  is 
the  equitable  disposition  of  the  earth  ?  "  Is  it  equita- 
ble that  any  arrangements  of  past  generations  should 
cause  one  man  now  to  be  born  heir  to  a  county,  or 
half  a  county,  or  quarter  of  a  county,  while  the  other 
inhabitants  of  that  county  are  thereby  deprived  of  all 
right  to  the  soil,  and  must  consequently  pay  a  rent  to 


372      EQUALITY  IN  THE  EYE  OF  THE  LAW, 

the  one  individual  who  naturally  has  not  one  particle 
of  right  to  the  earth  more  than  they  have  themselves? 
And  if  such  an  arrangement  be  not  now  equitable, 
most  undoubtedly  it  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  con- 
tinue ;  and  if  any  government  (instead  of  administrat- 
ing the  laws  of  equity)  use  the  armed  power  of  the 
nation  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  such  arrangements, 
such  government  has  departed  from  its  proper  inten- 
tion, and  is  not  entitled  to  obedience. 

If,  then,  we  admit  that  every  generation  of  men  has 
exactly  the  same  free  right  to  the  earth,  unencumbered 
by  any  arrangements  of  past  ages,  the  great  problem 
is  to  discover  "  such  a  system  as  shall  secure  to  every 
man  his  exact  share  of  the  natural  advantages  which  the 
Creator  has  provided  for  the  race ;  while,  at  the  same 
time,  he  has  full  opportunity,  without  let  or  hinderance, 
to  exercise  his  labor,  industry,  and  skill,  for  his  own 
advantage"  Until  this  problem  is  solved,  both  in 
theory  and  in  practice,  political  change  must  continu- 
ally go  on. 

The  great  practical  termination,  therefore,  towards 
which  modern  societies  are  continually  progressing,  is 
equalization  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  both  with  regard  to 
natural  liberty  and  natural  property.  And  if  we  view 
property  (natural  property  —  that  is,  that  which  is  not 
created-  by  human  labor,  industry,  or  skill)  as  entering 
the  theory  of  morals  —  and  we  must  view  it  in  this 
light  when  we  view  it  by  the  aid  of  a  scientific 
method  —  we  include  natural  property  in  the  theory  of 
human  function,  and  posit  finally  that  the  progression 
of  mankind  is  towards  that  political  condition  in  which 
the  law  shall  be  exactly  one  and  the  same  for  all  men, 


AND    IN    THE    SCHEME    OF    THE    STATE.  373 

without  diversities  of  rights  or  privileges,  and  without 
diversities  of  condition  other  than  diversities  of  office, 
and  diversities  of  condition  produced  by  the  more  or  less 
successful  result  of  individual  labor,  skill,  or  enterprise. 
And  the  ground  on  which  we  identify  *  the  laws  of 
property  and  the  laws  of  liberty  is  this :  When  human 
laws  accord  to  one  man  a  portion  of  the  earth  as  prop- 
erty, the  essential  character  of  such  an  arrangement  is, 
that  all  other  men  are  prohibited  or  restricted  from  using' 
that  portion  of  the  earth ;  and  consequently  this  law  is 
merely  a  law  restricting  action,  inasmuch  as  the  pro- 
hibition is  specific,  whereas  there  is  no  injunction  on  the 
proprietor  to  cultivate  the  land,  or  make  it  produce  its 
maximum  for  the  increase  of  human  welfare. 

Absolute  equalization  in  the  eye  of  the  law  with 
regard  to  natural  rights,  is  the  final  termination  of 
man's  political  progress,  the  last  term  in  that  grand 
series  of  changes  that  commenced  with  the  two  oppo- 
site elements  —  the  lord  and  the  serf;  and  which  will 
terminate  with  the  one  element  —  the  freeman  with- 
out privileges  and  without  oppressions. 

There  cannot  be  the  slightest  question  that  the 
progression  of  modern  states  is  towards  universal 
suffrage;  that  is,  towards  absolute  equalization  of 
the  political  function  of  the  individuals  of  whom  the 
state  is  composed.  The  necessary  attendant  of  uni- 
versal suffrage  must  be,  "the  equal  eligibility  of  every 
member  of  the  state  to  fill  any  office  in  the  state." 

When  a  state  arrives  at  this  ultimatum  with  regard 

*  Identify  —  to  make  one ;  or  to  establish  an  identity  between 
two  things  that  appear  under  different  names  or  different  aspects. 

32 


374      EQUALITY  IN  THE  EYE  OF  THE  LAW, 

to  the  political  function  of  each  individual,  the  ques- 
tion of  natural  property  must  fall  to  be  discussed; 
and  as  no  possible  reason  can  be  alleged  why  one 
individual  should,  a  priori,  be  endowed  with  more  of 
the  earth  (which  God,  the  Creator  and  Father  of  man- 
kind, has  given  to  the  human  race)  than  any  other  in- 
dividual; and  as  every  generation  of  existing  men  must 
have  exactly  the  same  title  to  a  free  earth,  unencum- 
bered with  any  arrangements  of  past  generations,  we 
may  rest  satisfied  that,  through  whatever  transforma- 
tions men  may  pass,  the  ultimate  point  at  which  they 
must  necessarily  arrive  is  absolute  equality  with  regard 
to  natural  property.  And  if  so,  the  intention  of  Provi- 
dence will  then  be  realized,  that  the  industrious  man 
shall  be  rich,  and  the  man  who  labors  not  shall  be 
poor.  Such  is  the  intention  of  nature,  and  such  is 
the  intention  of  the  almighty  Maker  of  mankind. 

The  great  social  problem,  then,  that  cannot  fail 
ere  long  to  appear  in  the  arena  of  European  discussion 
is,  "  to  discover  such  a  system  as  shall  secure  to  every 
man  his  exact  share  of  the  natural  advantages  which 
the  Creator  has  provided  for  the  race ;  while,  at  the 
same  time,  he  has  full  opportunity,  without  let  or  Inn- 
derance,  to  exercise  his  skill,  industry,  and  perseverance 
for  his  own  advantage" 

Of  this  problem,  we  maintain  that  there  can  be  but 
one  general  solution  possible ;  and  the  whole  analogy 
of  scientific  discovery  assures  us  that,  sooner  or  later, 
the  problem  will  be  solved,  that  the  solution  will  be 
acknowledged,  and  that  it  will  be  transformed  from 
an  intellectual  dogma  into  a  practical  rule  of  action, 
thereby  presenting  a  realization,  in  outward  condition. 


AND    IN    THE    SCHEME    OF    THE    STATE.  375 

of  those  propositions  which  the  reason  has  seen  to 
be  correct. 

The  solution  we  propound  (and  which  we  hope  to 
defend  more  at  large  at  some  future  period)  is  the 
following,  although,  of  course,  there  is  no  supposition 
that  any  general  solution  can  be  immediately  applica- 
ble to  the  circumstances  of  this  or  any  other  country. 

[For  convenience'  sake,  we  neglect  all  speculations 
as  to  what  may  or  may  not  be  the  geographical 
arrangements  of  states  at  a  future  period.  We  shall 
speak  of  England  alone,  and  consider  the  state  of 
England  as  composed  of  an  indefinite  number  of 
members,  all  equal  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  all  on  a 
parity  with  regard  to  primary  political  function,  and 
all  equally  eligible  to  fill  any  office  to  which  they  may 
be  elected  by  the  suffrages  of  the  majority.  All 
authority  of  man  is  of  course  excluded,  and  the  canon 
of  right  is  the  science  of  equity  ;  that  is,  the  rules 
of  divine  and  immutable  justice,  as  capable  of  being 
apprehended  by  the  human  reason.] 

1st.  Reason  can  acknowledge  no  difference  of 
original  rights  between  the  individuals  of  which  the 
human  race  is  composed. 

2d.  Equality  of  rights  cannot  be  sacrificed  by  any 
arrangements  which  one  generation  of  men  make  for 
succeeding  generations ;  but  equality  of  rights  is  per- 
petual, inasmuch  as  that  equality  derives  from  the 
human  reason,  which  varies  not  from  age  to  age. 

Even  if  it  were  true  that  there  ought  to  be  an  in- 
equality of  rights  among  the  individuals  of  the  human 
race,  it  would  be  absolutely  impossible  to  determine 
which  individuals  of  the  race  should  be  born  to  more 


376      EQUALITY  IN  THE  EYE  OF  THE  LAW, 

rights,  and  which  individuals  to  fewer  rights,  than  their 
fellows.*  An  inequality  of  rights  can  only  be  based 
on  superstition,  and  the  very  moment  reason  is  substi- 
tuted for  superstition  in  political  science,  (as  it  has 
been  in  the  physical  sciences,)  that  moment  must 
men  admit  that  no  possible  means  are  known  by 
which  an  inequality  of  rights  could  possibly  be  sub- 
stantiated. Even  if  it  were  true,  for  instance,  that 
there  should  be  an  aristocracy  and  a  serfdom,  there 
are  no  possible  means  of  determining  which  individuals 
should  be  the  aristocrats,  and  which  individuals  the  serfs. 
3d.  The  state  of  England,  then,  would  present  a 
soil    (including    the   soil   proper,   the   mines,   forests, 

*  "  Whilst  we  maintain  the  unity  of  the  human  species,  we  at  the 
same  time  repel  the  depressing  assumption  of  superior  and  inferior 
races  of  men."  ['The  very  cheerless,  and,  in  recent  times,  too 
often  discussed  doctrine  of  the  unequal  rights  of  men  to  freedom, 
and  of  slavery  as  an  institution  in  conformity  with  nature,  is  unhap- 
pily found  most  systematically  developed  in  Aristotle's  Politico,  i. 
3,  56.']  "  There  are  nations  more  susceptible  of  cultivation,  more 
highly  civilized,  r»ore  ennobled  by  mental  cultivation,  than  others, 
but  none  in  themselves  nobler  than  others.  All  are  in  like  degree 
designed  for  freedom  —  a  freedom  which,  in  the  ruder  conditions 
of  society,  belongs  only  to  the  individual,  but  which,  in  social 
states,  enjoying  political  institutions,  appertains  as  a  right  to  the 
whole  body  of  the  community."  If  we  would  indicate  an  idea 
which,  throughout  the  whole  course  of  history,  has  ever  more 
and  more  widely  extended  its  empire,  or  which,  more  than  any 
other,  testifies  to  the  much  contested,  and  still  more  decidedly  mis- 
understood perfectibility  of  the  whole  human  race,  it  is  that  of 
establishing  our  common  humanity  —  of  striving  to  remove  the 
barriers  which  prejudice  and  limited  views  of  every  kind  have 
erected  amongst  men  —  and  to  teach  all  mankind,  without  reference 
to  religion,  nation,  or  color,  as  one  fraternity,  one  great  community, 
fitted  for  the  attainment  of  one  object,  the  unrestrained  develop- 


AND    IN    THE    SCHEME    OF    THE    STATE.  377 

fisheries,  &c.,  in  fact,  that  portion  of  the  natural  earth 
called  England)  which  was  permanent,  and  a  popula- 
tion that  was  not  permanent,  but  renewed  by  succes- 
sive generations. 

4th.  The  question,  then,  is,  "  What  system  will 
secure  to  every  individual  of  these  successive  genera- 
tions his  portion  of  the  natural  advantages  of  Eng- 
land ?  "  Of  this  problem,  we  maintain  that  there  is 
but  one  solution  possible. 

5th.  No  truth  can  be  more  absolutely  certain,  as 
an  intuitive  proposition  of  the  reason,  than  that  "  an 
object  is  the  property  of  its  creator;"  and  we  main- 
tain that  creation*  is  the  only  means  by  which  an 

ment  of  the  psychical  powers.  This  is  the  ultimate  and  highest 
aim  of  society,  identical  with  the  direction  implanted  by  nature  in 
the  mind  of  man  towards  the  indefinite  extension  of  his  existence. 
He  regards  the  earth  in  all  its  limits,  and  the  heavens  as  far  as 
his  eye  can  scan  their  bright  and  starry  depths,  as  inwardly  his 
own,  given  to  him  as  the  objects  of  his  contemplation,  and  as  a 
field  for  the  development  of  his  energies.  Even  the  child  longs  to 
pass  the  hills,  or  the  seas,  which  enclose  his  manor  house  ;  yet, 
when  his  eager  steps  have  borne  him  beyond  those  limits,  he  pines 
like  the  plant  for  his  native  soil ;  and  it  is  by  this  touching  and 
beautiful  attribute  of  man,  this  longing  for  that  which  is  unknown, 
and  this  fond  remembrance  of  that  which  is  lost,  that  he  is  spared 
from  an  exclusive  attachment  to  the  present.  Thus  deeply  rooted 
in  the  innermost  nature  of  man,  and  even  enjoined  upon  him  by  his 
highest  tendencies,  the  recognition  of  the  bond  of  humanity  be- 
comes one  of  the  noblest  leading  principles  in  the  history  of  man- 
kind."—  Humboldt's  Cosmos,  vol.  i.  p.  368;  Bohii's  edition. 

*  In  the  arts  man  creates  form;  in  political  economy  he  creates 
value ;  and  in  politics  he  creates  property.  And  as  the  evolution 
is  in  this  order  —  1st,  the  Arts ;  2d,  Political  Economy ;  3d,  Politics  ; 
the  laws  of  political  economy  must  be  discovered  before  there  can  be 
a  system  of  property  rational  in  its  theory  and  scientific  in  its  form. 

32* 


378  PROPERTY    IN    THE    SOIL. 

individual  right  to  property  can  be  generated.  Con- 
sequently, as  no  individual  and  no  generation  is  the 
creator  of  the  substantive,  earth,  it  belongs  equally  to 
all  the  existing  inhabitants ;  that  is,  no  individual  has 
a  special  claim  to  more  than  another. 

6th.  But  while  on  the  one  hand  we  take  into  con- 
sideration the  object,  —  that  is,  the  earth,  —  we  must 
also  take  into  consideration  the  subject;  that  is,  man, 
and  man's  labor. 

7th.  The  object  is  the  common  property  of  all,  no 
individual  being  able  to  exhibit  a  title  to  any  partic- 
ular portion  of  it.  And  individual  or  private  property 
is,  the  increased  value  produced  by  individual  labor. 
Again :  in  the  earth  must  be  distinguished  the  perma- 
nent earth  and  its  temporary  or  perishable  produc- 
tions. The  former,  —  that  is,  the  permanent  earth, — 
we  maintain,  never  can  be  private  property;  and  every 
system  that  treats  it  as  such  must  necessarily  be  un- 
just. No  rational  basis  has  ever  been  exhibited  to  the 
world  on  which  private  right  to  any  particular  portion 
of  the  earth  could  possibly  be  founded. 

8th.  But  though  the  permanent  earth  never  can  be 
private  property,  —  although  the  laws  may  call  it  so, 
and  may  treat  it  as  such,  —  it  must  be  possessed  by 
individuals  for  the  purpose  of  cultivation,  and  for  the 
purpose  of  extracting  from  it  all  those  natural  objects 
which  man  requires. 

9th.  The  question,  then,  is,  Upon  what  terms,  or 
according  to  what  system,  must  the  earth  be  possessed 
by  the  successive  generations  that  succeed  each  other 
on  the  surface  of  the  globe?  The  conditions  given 
are  —  First.  That  the  earth  is  the  common  property 


PROPERTY    IN    THE    SOIL.  379 

of  the  race ;  Second.  That  whatever  an  individual  pro- 
duces by  his  own  labor  —  whether  it  be  a  new  object, 
made  out  of  many  materials,  or  a  new  value  given  by 
labor  to  an  object  whose  form,  locality,  &c,  may  be 
changed  —  is  the  private  property  of  that  individual, 
and  he  may  dispose  of  it  as  he  pleases,  provided  he 
does  not  interfere  with  his  fellows ;  Third.  The  earth 
is  the  perpetual  common  property  of  the  race,  and 
each  succeeding  generation  has  a  full  title  to  a  free 
earth.  One  generation  cannot  encumber  a  succeeding 
generation. 

And  the  condition  required  is,  such  a  system  as 
shall  secure  to  the  successive  individuals  of  the  race 
their  share  of  the  common  property,  and  the  oppor- 
tunity, without  interference,  of  making  as  much  pri- 
vate property  as  their  skill,  industry,  and  enterprise 
would  enable  them  to  make. 

The  scheme  that  appears  to  present  itself  most 
naturally  is,  the  general  division  of  the  soil,  portioning 
it  out  to  the  inhabitants  according  to  their  number. 
Such  appears  to  be  the  only  system  that  suggests 
itself  to  most  minds,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  objec- 
tions brought  forward  against  an  equalization  of 
property.  All  these  objections  are  against  the  actual 
division  of  the  soil ;  and  certainly  such  a  division  is 
theoretically  erroneous,  especially  when  the  fractional 
parts  are  made  the  property  of  the  possessors.  But 
independently  of  this,  the  profits  arising  from  trade, 
&c,  would  induce  many  individuals  to  forsake  agri- 
culture, and  to  abandon  their  portion  to  those  who 
preferred  the  cultivation  of  the  soil  to  any  other 
pursuit.     A  purely  agricultural  population  is  almost 


'380  PROPERTY    IN    THE    SOIL. 

impossible  at  any  period;  but  when  men  have  made 
considerable  advances  in  the  arts,  &c,  a  general  return 
to  agricultural  pursuits  is  a  mere  chimera,  a  phantom. 
Men  must  go  forward,  never  backward.  To  speak  of 
a  division  of  lands  in  England  is  absurd.  Such  a 
division  would  be  as  useless  as  it  is  improbable.  But 
it  is  more  than  useless;  it  is  unjust:  and  unjust,  not 
to  the  present  so  called  proprietors,  but  to  the  human 
beings  who  are  continually  being  born  into  the  world, 
and  who  have  exactly  the  same  natural  right  to  a 
portion  that  their  predecessors  have.  For  instance, 
let  us  suppose  a  hundred  thousand  acres  divided  into 
a  thousand  portions,  and  accorded  as  property  to  a 
thousand  persons.  This  appears,  at  first  sight,  to  be 
an  equitable  arrangement;  and  if  the  persons  were 
immortal,  and  begot  no  children,  the  arrangement 
might  be  unobjectionable.  But  if  the  soil  were  made 
property,  it  would  be  alienable,  and  one  of  the  thou- 
sand persons  might  alienate  his  hundred  acres  to 
another  proprietor,  who  would  then  come  to  have  two 
hundred  acres.  This  might  be  perfectly  equitable 
between  the  two  parties  themselves;  but  there  are 
others  interested  in  the  transaction,  and  their  rights 
must  not  be  overlooked.  Let  us  suppose  that,  in 
a  few  years,  the  adult  population  had  increased  to 
one  thousand  and  fifty.  The  fifty  new  men  have 
exactly  the  same  right  to  a  fractional  share  that  the 
original  one  thousand  had — mere  priority  of  time 
making  no  possible  difference  in  the  right  of  men  to 
the  natural  globe.  What,  then,  would  require  to  be 
done  ?  It  would  be  necessary,  either,  1st,  to  preserve 
the  original    proprietors  in  their  so  called  properties, 


PROPERTY    IN    THE    SOIL.  381 

thereby  depriving  the  fifty  new  men  of  all  share  of  the 
globe ;  or,  2d,  to  make  a  new  division  of  the  whole 
lands,  dividing  them  into  one  thousand  and  fifty 
portions.  This,  of  course,  would  destroy  the  propri- 
etorship of  the  first  occupants,  and,  in  the  practical 
division  of  the  lands,  would  involve  the  recasting 
of  the  whole  thousand  farms  or  holdings.  Every 
one  would  require  to  shift  its  boundaries  every  time 
that  an  increase  of  the  population  rendered  a  new 
division  requisite.  Such  a  system  would  be  destruc- 
tive to  the  cultivation  of  the  soil;  and  though  per- 
haps possible,  it  would  be  attended  with  inconve- 
niences which  render  its  reduction  to  practice  out 
of  the  question. 

The  actual  division  of  the  soil  need  never  be  antici- 
pated, nor  would  such  a  division  be  just,  if  the  divided 
portions  were  made  the  property  (legally,  for  they 
could  never  be  so  morally)  of  individuals. 

If,  then,  successive  generations  of  men  cannot  have 
their  fractional  share  of  the  actual  soil,  (including 
mines,  &c,,)  how  can  the  division  of  the  advantages 
of  the  natural  earth  be  effected  ? 

By  the  division  of  its  annual  value  or  rent ;  that  is, 
by  making  the  rent  of  the  soil  the  common  property  of 
the  nation.  That  is,  (as  the  taxation  is  the  common 
property  of  the  state,)  by  taking  the  whole  of  the  taxes 
out  of  the  rents  of  the  soil,  and  thereby  abolishing  all 
other  kinds  of  taxation  whatever.  And  thus  all  in- 
dustry would  be  absolutely  emancipated  from  every 
burden,  and  every  man  would  reap  such  natural 
reward  as  his  skill,  industry,  or  enterprise  rendered 
legitimately  his,  according  to  the  natural  law  of  free 


382  PROPERTY    IN    THE    SOIL. 

competition.*  This  we  maintain  to  be  the  only  theory 
that  will  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  problem  of 
natural  property.  And  the  question  now  is,  How  can 
the  division  of  the  rent  be  effected  ?  An  actual  division 
of  the  rent  —  that  is,  the  payment  of  so  much  money 
to  each  individual  —  would  be  attended  with,  perhaps, 
insuperable  inconveniences ;  neither  is  such  an  actual 
division  requisite,  every  requirement  being  capable  of 
fulfilment  without  it. 

We  now  apply  this  solution  to  England.  England 
forms  a  state ;  that  is,  a  community  acting  through 
public  servants  for  the  administration  of  justice,  &c. 
In  the  actual  condition  of  England,  many  things  are 
at  present  unjust ;  and  the  right  of  the  government 
to  tax  and  make  laws  for  those  who  are  excluded 
from  representation  is,  at  all  events,  questionable. 
However,  we  shall  make  a  few  remarks  on  England 
as  she  is,  and  on  England  as  she  ought  to  be  ;  that  is, 
as  she  would  be,  were  the  rules  of  equity  reduced  to 
practical  operation. 

1st.  The  state  has  alienated  the  lands  to  private 
individuals  called  proprietors,  and  the  vast  majority  of 
Englishmen  are  born  to  their  labor  minus  their  share 
of  the  taxation. 

2d.  This  taxation  of  labor  has  introduced  vast  sys- 
tems of  restriction   on  trades  and  industry.     Instead 

*  We  have  no  hesitation  whatever  in  predicting,  that  all  civilized 
communities  must  ultimately  abolish  all  revenue  restrictions  on  in- 
dustry, and  draw  the  whole  taxation  from  the  rents  of  the  soil.  And 
this  because  (as  we  shall  endeavor  to  show  in  a  future  portion  of 
the  subject)  the  rents  of  the  soil  are  the  common  produce  of  the 
whole  labor  of  a  community. 


PROPERTY    IN    THE    SOIL.  383 

of  a  perfectly  free  trade  with  all  the  world,  England 
has  adopted  a  revenue  system  that  most  materially 
diminishes  both  the  amount  of  trade  and  its  profit. 
And,  instead  of  a  perfectly  free  internal  industry,  Eng- 
land has  adopted  an  excise  that  is  as  vexatious  in  its 
operation  as  can  well  be  conceived.  Both  the  customs 
and  excise  laws,  and  every  other  tax  on  industry,  have 
arisen  from  the  alienation  of  the  soil  from  the  state ; 
and  had  the  soil  not  been  alienated,  no  tax  whatever 
would  have  been  requisite ;  and  were  the  soil  resumed, 
(as  it  undoubtedly  ought  to  be,)  every  tax  of  every 
kind  and  character,  save  the  common  rent  of  the  soil, 
might  at  once  be  abolished,  with  the  whole  army  of 
collectors,  revenue  officers,  cruisers,  coast  guards,  ex- 
cisemen, &c,  &c. 

3d.  Taxation  can  only  be  on  land  or  labor.  [By 
land  we  mean  the  natural  earth,  not  merely  the  agri- 
cultural soil.]  These  are  the  two  radical  elements 
that  can  be  subjected  to  taxation,  capital  being  origi- 
nally derived  from  one  or  the  other.  Capital  is  only 
hoarded  labor  or  hoarded  rent ;  and  as  all  capital  must 
be  derived  from  the  one  source  or  the  other,  all  taxation 
of  capital  is  only  taxation  of  land  or  of  labor.  Con- 
sequently all  taxation  of  whatever  kind  is,  1st,  tax- 
ation of  labor,  that  is,  a  deduction  from  the  natural 
remuneration  which  God  intended  the  laborer  to  derive 
from  his  exertions ;  or,  2d,  taxation  of  land  ;  that  is,  the 
appropriation  of  the  current  value  of  the  natural  earth 
to  the  expenses  of  the  state. 

Now,  labor  is  essentially  private  property,  and  land 
is  not  essentially  private  property,  but  on  the  contrary 
is  the  common   inheritance    of   every  generation    of 


384  THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM. 

mankind.  Where  the  land  is  taxed,  no  man  is  taxed, 
nor  does  the  taxation  of  land  interfere  in  any  way 
whatever  with  the  progress  of  human  industry.  On 
the  contrary,  the  taxation  of  land,  rightly  directed, 
might  be  made  to  advance  the  condition  of  the  country 
to  a  high  degree  of  prosperity. 

4th.  For  the  expenses  of  a  state  there  must  be  a 
revenue,  and  this  revenue  must  be  derived  from  the 
taxation  of  labor,  or  from  the  rent  of  the  lands.  There 
is  no  other  alternative  ;  either  the  rents  of  the  soil  must 
be  devoted  to  the  common  expenses  of  the  state,  or 
the  labor  of  individuals  must  be  interfered  with.;  and 
restrictions,  supervisions,  prohibitions,  &c,  must  be 
called  into  existence,  to  facilitate  the  collection  of  the 
revenue. 

5th.  In  England,  exactly  the  same  injustice  was 
practised  with  regard  to  natural  property  that  was 
practised  with  regard  to  natural  liberty ;  and  though 
the  laws  and  customs  that  took  away  the  natural  lib- 
erty of  the  laboring  serf  have  been  for  the  most  part 
abolished,  the  laws  and  customs  that  make  the  land 
the  exclusive  property  of  the  aristocracy  remain  almost 
intact,  and  have  yet  to  undergo  their  progress  of  abo- 
lition. Let  us  first  look  at  the  circumstances  of  the 
case.  And  here  we  shall  make  a  few  quotations  from 
the  impartial  Blackstone.* 

*  Every  Englishman  should  diligently  peruse  the  first  few  chap- 
ters of  the  second  book  of  Blackstone's  Commentaries,  "  Of  the 
Rights  of  Things,"  and,  in  addition  to  these,  an  article  in  the  Quar- 
terly Review  for  July,  1829,  on  the  condition  of  the  English  peas- 
antry. From  these,  and  a  history  of  the  resumption  and  subsequent 
alienation  of  the  church  lands,  he  will  gather  a  tolerable  idea  of 


THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM.  385 

"  The  constitution  of  feuds  had  its  original  from  the 
military  policy  of  the  northern,  or  Celtic  nations  — 

the  Goths,  the  Huns,  the  Franks,  &c It  was 

brought  by  them  from  their  own  countries,  and  con- 
tinued in  their  respective  colonies  as  the  most  likely 
means  to  secure  their  new  acquisitions ;  and  to  that 
end  large  districts,  or  parcels  of  land,  were  allotted  by 
the  conquering  general  to  the  superior  officers  of  the 
army,  and  by  them  dealt  out  again  in  smaller  parcels 
or  allotments  to  the  inferior  officers  and  most  deserv- 
ing soldiers.  These  allotments  were  called  feoda, 
feud,  fiefs,  or  fees  ;  which  last  appellation,  in  the  north- 
ern languages,  signifies  a  conditional  stipend  or  reward. 
Rewards,  or  stipends,  they  evidently  were ;  and  the 
condition  annexed  to  them  was,  that  the  possessor 
should  do  service  faithfully,  both  at  home  and  in  the 
wars,  to  him  by  whom  they  were  given ;  for  which 
purpose  he  took  the  juramentum  ftdelitatis,  or  oath  of 
fealty ;  and  in  case  of  the  breach  of  this  condition  and 


the  circumstances  that  have  led  to  the  present  condition  of  Eng- 
land. The  lands  of  England  have  been  disposed  of  according  to 
two  laws  —  the  law  of  the  strongest  and  the  law  of  the  most  cunning ; 
hence  England's  pauperism  and  England's  moral  degradation. 
There  yet  remains  another  law,  and  its  reduction  to  practice  will, 
one  day  or  other,  regenerate  the  social  condition  of  the  population 
—  the  law  of  equity. 

The  article  on  the  "  condition  of  the  English  peasantry  "  is  well 
worthy  of  republication  in  a  separate  form.  Its  appearance  in  that 
periodical  prevents  all  suspicion  of  its  having  been  written  for  the 
purpose  of  exciting  discontent ;  and  yet  we  do  not  hesitate  to  affirm, 
that  if  once  the  laboring  classes  were  seriously  to  take  up  the  ques- 
tions on  which  it  treats,  they  would  resolve  never  to  rest  satisfied 
till  they  had  abolished  the  landed  aristocracy  of  England,  and 
emancipated  their  own  labor  from  the  burdens  that  have  been  im- 
posed upon  them  from  the  allocation  of  the  land  to  the  aristocracy, 
and  of  the  taxation  to  the  laborers  of  the  country. 
33 


386  THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM. 

oath,  by  not  performing  the  stipulated  service,  or  by- 
deserting  the  lord  in  battle,  the  lands  were  again  to 
revert  to  him  who  granted  them." 


This  explains  the  mechanism  by  which  the  lands 
were  allocated;  but  the  right  to  allocate  was  the  right 
of  the  sword,  or  right  of  the  strongest;  and  conse- 
quently any  future  person  who  should  prove  strong 
enough  to  overcome  the  occupiers,  would  have  exactly 
the  same  right  to  allocate  them  to  other  individuals. 
The  whole  of  the  feudal  system  was  based  on  the 
right  of  the  strongest;  and  if  the  unfortunate  Irish 
were  strong  enough  to  reconquer  the  lands  of  Ireland, 
they  would  have  exactly  the  same  right  that  was  re- 
duced to  practice  by  the  feudal  laws. 

"  But  this  feudal  polity,  which  was  thus  by  degrees 
established  over  all  the  continent  of  Europe,  seems  not 
to  have  been  received  in  this  part  of  our  island  —  at 
least  not  universally,  and  as  a  part  of  the  national 
constitution,  till  the  reign  of  William  the  Norman. 
....  From  the  prodigious  slaughter  of  the  English 
nobility  at  the  battle  of  Hastings,  and  the  fruitless 
insurrections  of  those  who  survived,  such  numerous 
forfeitures  had  accrued,  that  he  was  able  to  reward  his 
Norman  followers  with  very  large  and  extensive  pos- 
sessions  The  king  held  a  great  council  to  in- 
quire into  the  state  of  the  nation ;  the  immediate 
consequence  of  which  was  the  compiling  of  the  great 
survey  called  Domesday-book,  which  was  finished  in 
the  next  year;  and  in  the  latter  end  of  that  very  year, 
the  king  was  attended  by  all  his  nobility  at  Sarum, 
where  all  the  principal  landholders  submitted  their 
lands  to  the  yoke  of  military  tenure,  became  the  king's 


THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM.  387 

vassals,  and  did  honor  and  fealty  to  his  person.*  This 
may  possibly  have  been  the  era  of  formally  introducing 
the  feudal  tenures  by  law ;  and  perhaps  the  very  law 
thus  made  at  the  Council  of  Sarum  is  that  which  is 

still  extant This   new  polity,  therefore,  seems 

not  to  have  been  imposed  by  the  Conqueror,  but  na- 
tionally and  freely  adopted  by  the  general  assembly  of 
the  whole  realm,  in  the  same  manner  as  other  nations 
of  Europe  had  before  adopted  it,  upon  the  same  prin- 
ciple of  self-security.  And,  in  particular,  they  had  the 
recent  example  of  the  French  nation  before  their  eyes, 
which  had  gradually  surrendered  up  all  its  allodial  or 
free  lands  into  the  king's  hands,  who  restored  them  to 
the  owners  as  a  beneficium  or  feud,  to  be  held  by  them 
and  such  of  their  heirs  as  they  previously  nominated 
to  the  king ;  and  thus  by  degrees  all  the  allodial  estates 
in  France  were  converted  into  feuds,  and  the  freemen 
became  the  vassals  of  the  crown.  The  only  difference 
between  this  change  of  tenures  in  France  and  that  in 
England  was,  that  the  former  was  effected  gradually 
by  the  consent  of  private  persons  ;  the  latter  was  done 
at  once  all  over  England  by  the  common  consent  of 
the  nation The  grand  and  fundamental  max- 
im of  all  feudal  tenure  is  this :  That  all  lands  were 
originally  granted  out  by  the  sovereign,  and  are  there- 
fore  holden   either  mediately  or  immediately  of  the 

*  This,  in  fact,  was  the  formation  of  the  state  of  England,  after 
its  conquest  by  the  Normans.  But  it  was  the  construction  of  the 
state  on. false  principles.  This  formation,  so  far  as  the  landlords 
were  concerned,  was  legally  dissolved  in  the  reign  of  Charles  II., 
when  the  lands  became  the  property  (in  law)  of  the  aristocracy. 
The  state  is  now  beginning  to  be  re-formed  on  true  principles ;  and 
it  appears  probable  that  its  ultimate  form  will  be  that  of  a  republic 
with  universal  suffrage,  with  all  the  lands  rented  from  the  state,  and 
consequently  without  any  other  taxation  of  any  kind  or  character 
whatever. 


388 


THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM. 


crown.  The  grantor  was  called  the  proprietor  or  lord, 
being  he  who  retained  the  dominion  or  ultimate  prop- 
erty of  the  feud  or  fee  ;  and  the  grantee,  who  had  only 
the  use  and  possession,  according  to  the  terms  of  the 
grant  was  styled  the  feudatory  or  vassal,  which  was 
only   another  name  for  the  tenant  or   holder  of  the 

lands Besides    an  oath   of  fealty,  the  vassal 

did  usually  homage  to  his  lord ;  professing  that  he  be- 
came his  man  from  that  day  forth,  of  life,  and  limb, 
and  earthly  honor.  When  the  tenant  had  thus  pro- 
fessed himself  to  be  the  man  of  his  superior  or  lord, 
the  next  consideration  was  concerning  the  service 
which,  as  such,  he  was  bound  to  render  in  recompense 
for  the  land  that  he  held.  This,  in  pure,  proper,  and 
original  feuds,  was  only  twofold  —  to  follow  or  do  suit 
to  the  lord  in  his  courts  in  time  of  peace,  and  in  his 
armies  or  warlike  retinue  when  necessity  called  him  to 
the  field.  The  military  branch  of  service  consisted  in 
attending  the  lord  to  the  wars,  if  called  upon,  with 
such  a  retinue,  and  for  such  a  number  of  days,  as  were 
stipulated  at  the  first ;  donation  in  proportion  to  the 

quantity  of  the  land At  the  first  introduction 

of  feuds,  as  they  were  gratuitous  so  also  they  were 
precarious,  and  held  at  the  will  of  the  lord,  who  was 
then  the  sole  judge  whether  his  vassal  performed  his 
services  faithfully.     Then  they  became  certain  for  one 

or  more  years In  process  of  time,  feuds  came 

by  degrees  to  be  universally  extended  beyond  the  life 
of  the  first  vassal  to  his  sons,  or  perhaps  to  such  one 
of  them  as  the  lord  should  name ;  and,  in  this  .case, 
the  form  of  the  donation  was  strictly  observed ;  for  if 
a  feud  was  given  to  a  man  and  his  sons,  all  his  sons 
succeeded  him  in  equal  portions;  and,  as  they  died 
off,  their  shares  reverted  to  the  lord,  and  did  not  de- 
scend to  their  children,  or  even  to  their  surviving 
brothers,  as  not  being  specified  in  the  donation.  But 
when  such  a  feud  was  given  to  a  man  and  his  heirs 


THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM.  389 

in  general  terms,  then  a  more  extended  rule  of  suc- 
cession took  place ;  and,  when  the  feudatory  died,  his 
male  descendants  in  infinitum  were  admitted  to  the 
succession. 

"  These  were  the  principal  and  very  simple  qualities 
of  the  genuine  or  original  feuds,  which  were  all  of  a 
military  nature,  and  in  the  hands  of  military  persons  ; 
though  the  feudatories,  being  under  frequent  incapaci- 
ties of  cultivating  and  manuring  their  own  lands,  soon 
found  it  necessary  to  commit  part  of  them  to  inferior 
tenants,  obliging  them  to  such  returns  in  service,  corn, 
cattle,  or  money,  as  might  enable  the  chief  feudatories 
to  attend  their  military  duties  without  distraction ; 
which  returns,  or  reditus,  were  the  original  of  rents. 

"  In  this  chapter  (chap,  vi.)  we  shall  take  a  short 
view  of  the  ancient  tenures  of  our  English  estates,  or 
the  manner  in  which  lands,  tenements,  and  heredita- 
ments might  have  been  holden,  as  the  same  stood  in 
force  till  the  middle  of  the  last  century ;  in  which  we 
shall  easily  perceive  that  all  the  particularities,  all  the 
seeming  and  real  hardships,  that  attended  those  ten- 
ures, were  to  be  accounted  for  upon  feudal  principles, 
and  no  other ;  being  fruits  of,  and  deduced  from,  the 
feudal  policy. 

"  Almost  all  the  real  property  of  this  kingdom  is,  by 
the  policy  of  our  laws,  supposed  to  be  granted  by,  de- 
pendent upon,  and  holden  of,  some  superior  lord,  by 
and  in  consideration  of  certain  services  to  be  rendered 
to  the  lord  by  the  tenant  or  possessor  of  this  property. 
The  thing  holden  is  therefore  styled  a  tenement,  the 
possessors  thereof  tenants,  and  the  manner  of  their 
possession  a  tenure.  Thus  all  the  land  in  the  kingdom 
is  supposed  to  be  holden,  mediately  or  immediately,  of 
the  king,  who  is  styled  lord  paramount,  or  above  all. 
Such  tenants  as  held  under  the  king  immediately, 
when  they  granted  out  portions  of  their  lands  to  infe- 
rior persons,  became  also  lords  with  respect  to  those 
33* 


390  THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM. 

inferior  persons,  as  they  were  still  tenants  with  respect 
to  the  king;  and  thus,  partaking  of  a  middle  nature, 
were  called  mesne,  or  middle  lords.  So  that  if  the 
king  granted  a  manor  to  A,  and  he  granted  a  portion 
of  the  land  to  B,  now  B  was  said  to  hold  of  A,  and 
A  of  the  king;  or,  in  other  words,  B  held  his  lands 
immediately  of  A,  but  mediately  of  the  king.  The 
king,  therefore,  was  styled  lord  paramount ;  A  was 
both  tenant  and  lord,  or  was  a  mesne  lord;  and  B 
was  called  tenant  paravail,  or  the  lowest  tenant,  being 
he  who  was  supposed  to  make  a  vail,  or  profit,  of 
the  land.  In  this  manner  are  all  the  lands  of  the  king- 
dom h olden  which  are  in  the  hands  of  subjects ;  for, 
according  to  Sir  Edward  Coke,  in  the  law  of  England 
we  have  not  properly  allodium;  which,  we  have  seen, 
is  the  name  by  which  the  feudists  abroad  distinguish 
such  estates  of  the  subject  as  are  not  holden  of  any 
superior.  So  that  at  the  first  glance  we  may  observe, 
that  our  lands  are  either  plainly  feuds,  or  partake  very 
strongly  of  the  feudal  nature. 

"  All  tenures  being  thus  derived,  or  supposed  to  be 
derived,  from  the  king,  those  that  held  immediately 
under  him  in  right  of  his  crown  and  dignity  were 
called  tenants  in  capite,  or  in  chief,  which  was  the  most 
honorable  species  of  tenure ;  but,  at  the  same  time, 
subjected  the  tenants  to  greater  and  more  burdensome 
services  than  inferior  tenures  did.  This  distinction 
ran  through  all  the  different  sorts  of  tenure,  of  which 
I  now  proceed  to  give  an  account. 

"  There  seem  to  have  subsisted  among  our  ancestors 
four  principal  species  of  lay  tenures,  to  which  all  oth- 
ers may  be  reduced ;  the  grand  criteria  of  which  were 
the  natures  of  the  several  services,  or  renders,  that 
were  due  to  the  lords  from  their  tenants.  The  ser- 
vices, in  respect  of  their  quality,  were  either  free  or 
base  services;  in  respect  of  their  quantity,  and  the 
time  of  exacting  them,  were  either  certain  or  uncer- 


THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM.  391 

tain.  Free  services  were  such  as  were  not  unbecom- 
ing the  character  of  a  soldier  or  a  freeman  to  perform ; 
as  to  serve  under  his  lord  in  the  wars,  to  pay  a  sum 
of  money,  and  the  like.  Base  services  were  such  as 
were  fit  only  for  peasants,  or  persons  of  a  servile  rank; 
as  to  plough  the  lord's  land,  to  make  his  hedges,  to 
carry  out  his  dung,  or  other  mean  employments 

"  The  first,  most  universal,  and  esteemed  the  most 
honorable  species  of  tenure,  was  that  by  knight- 
service,  called  in  Latin  servitium  mUitare,  and  in  law 
French  chivalry,  or  service  de  chivaler,  answering  to 
the  fief  dPhaubert  of  the  Normans.  This  differed  in 
very  few  points  from  a  pure  and  proper  feud,  being 
entirely  military,  and  the  general  effect  of  the  feudal 
establishment  in  England.  To  make  a  tenure  by 
knight-service,  a  determinate  quantity  of  land  was 
necessary,  which  was  called  a  knight's  fee,  feodum 
militare ;  the  measure  of  which  in  3  Edward  I.  was 
estimated  at  twelve  ploughlands,  and  its  value  (though 
it  varied  with  the  times)  in  the  reigns  of  Edward  I. 
and  Edward  II.  was  stated  at  £20  per  annum.  And 
he  who  held  this  proportion  of  land  (or  a  whole  fee) 
by  knight-service,  was  bound  to  attend  his  lord  to  the 
wars  for  forty  days  in  every  year  if  called  upon;  which 
attendance  was  his  reditus,  or  return,  his  rent  or  ser- 
vice for  the  land  he  claimed  to  hold.  If  he  held  only 
half  a  knight's  fee,  he  was  only  bound  to  attend  twenty 
days,  and  so  in  proportion 

"  The  personal  attendance  in  knight-service  growing 
troublesome  and  inconvenient  in  many  respects,  the 
tenants  found  means  of  compounding  for  it,  by  first 
sending  others  in  their  stead,  and  in  process  of  time 
making  a  pecuniary  satisfaction  to  the  lords  in  lieu  of 
it.  This  pecuniary  satisfaction  at  last  came  to  be  lev- 
ied by  assessments  at  so  much  for  every  knight's  fee ; 
and  therefore  this  kind  of  tenure  was  called  scutagium 
in  Latin,  or  servitium  scuti  —  scutum  being  then  a  well- 


392  THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM. 

known  denomination  for  money ;  and  in  like  manner 
it  was  called  in  our  Norman-French  escuage,  being 
indeed  a  pecuniary  instead  of  a  military  service.  The 
first  time  this  appears  to  have  been  taken  was  in  the 
5  Henry  II., on  account  of  his  expedition  to  Toulouse; 
but  it  soon  came  to  be  so  universal  that  personal  at- 
tendance fell  quite  into  disuse.  Hence  we  find  in  our 
ancient  histories,  that  from  this  period,  when  our  kings 
went  to  war,  they  levied  scutages  on  their  tenants,  that 
is,  on  all  the  land  holders  of  the  kingdom,  to  defray 
their  expenses  and  to  hire  troops ;  and  these  assess- 
ments in  the  time  of  Henry  II.  seem  to  have  been 
made  arbitrarily,  and  at  the  king's  pleasure;  which 
prerogative  being  greatly  abused  by  his  successors,  it 
became  matter  of  national  clamor,  and  King  John  was 
obliged  to  consent  by  his  Magna  Charta*  that  no  scu- 


#  Villeins  were  not  protected  by  Magna  Charta;  nullus  liber 
homo  capiatur  vel  imprisonetur,  &c,  was  cautiously  expressed  to 
exclude  the  poor  villein ;  for,  as  Lord  Coke  tells  us,  "  the  lord  may 
beat  his  villein,  and  if  it  be  without  cause  he  cannot  have  any  rem- 
edy." —  Note  in  Christian's  Blackstone. 

"  He  that  holds  in  pure  villenage  shall  do  whatsoever  is  com- 
manded him,  and  always  be  bound  to  an  uncertain  service." 

The  villein  was  originally  a  serf  or  slave,  whose  political  condi- 
tion gradually  underwent  improvement  with  the  progress  of  society. 
The  villeins  of  England  have  attained  to  personal  liberty ;  that  is, 
the  present  laborers  who  do  the  work  of  England  —  who  create  its 
wealth  — are  no  longer  subject  to  the  personal  tyranny  of  either 
lord  or  king.  But  from  the  generalization  of  serfdom  they  are  com- 
pelled by  natural  causes,  starvation,  hunger,  &c,  to  do  the  work  for 
a  bare  subsistence,  in  contradistinction  to  the  law  of  nature  and  the 
law  of  God,  that  he  who  does  the  work  shall  reap  the  profit  which 
the  Almighty  has  annexed  to  labor  expended  on  the  natural  earth. 
Aristocracy,  like  serfdom,  has  also  been  generalized ;  that  is,  in- 
stead of  individual  aristocrats  ruling  individual  serfs,  a  general 
court  or  assembly  of  aristocrats  now  rules  the  whole  mass  of  labor- 


THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM,  393 

tage  should  be  imposed  without  consent  of  Parliament. 
But  this  clause  was  omitted  in  his  son  Henry  IIL's 
charter,  where  we  only  find  that  scutages  or  escuage 
should  be  taken  as  they  were  used  to  be  taken  in  the 
time  of  Henry  II. ;  that  is,  in  a  reasonable  and  mod- 
erate manner.  Yet  afterwards,  by  statute  25  Edw.  I. 
c  5  and  6,  and  many  subsequent  statutes,  it  was  again 
provided  that  the  king  should  take  no  aids  or  tasks  by 
his  common  assent  of  the  realm :  hence  it  was  held  in 
our  old  books  that  escuage  or  scutage  could  not  be 
levied  but  by  consent  of  Parliament;  such  scutages 
being  indeed  the  groundwork  of  all  succeeding  subsi- 
dies, and  the  land  tax  of  later  times, 

"  Since,   therefore,   escuage    differed   from    knight- 


ers,  and  taxes  their  labor  to  an  extent  equal  to  the  whole  rental  of 
the  country. 

"  Under  the  Saxon  government  there  were,  as  Sir  William  Tem- 
ple speaks,  a  sort  of  people  in  a  condition  of  downright  servitude, 
used  and  employed  in  the  most  servile  works,  and  belonging,  both 
they,  their  children,  and  effects,  to  the  lord  of  the  soil,  like  the  rest 
of  the  cattle  or  stock  upon  it.  These  seem  to  have  been  those  who 
held  the  folk-land,  from  which  they  were  removable  at  the  lord's 
pleasure.  On  the  arrival  of  the  Normans  here,  it  seems  not  im- 
probable that  they,  who  were  strangers  to  any  other  than  a  feudal 
state,  might  give  some  sparks  of  enfranchisement  to  such  wretched 
persons  as  fell  to  their  share,  by  admitting  them,  as  well  as  others, 
to  the  oath  of  fealty ;  which  conferred  a  right  of  protection,  and 
raised  the  tenant  to  a  kind  of  estate  superior  to  downright  slavery, 
but  inferior  to  every  other  condition.  This  they  called  villenage, 
and  the  tenants  villeins,  either  from  the  word  viles,  or  else,  as  Ed- 
ward Coke  tells  us,  a  villa  ;  because  they  lived  chiefly  in  villages, 
and  were  employed  in  rustic  works  of  the  most  sordid  kind,  resem- 
bling the  Spartan  helots,  to  whom  alone  the  culture  of  the  lands 
Was  consigned,  their  rugged  masters,  like  our  northern  ancestors, 
esteeming  war  the  only  honorable  employment  of  manhood.1' 
—  Blackstone,  book  ii.  chap.  6. 


THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM. 

service  in  nothing  but  as  a  compensation  differs  from 
actual  service,  knight-service  is  frequently  confounded 
with  it.  And  thus  Littleton  must  be  understood  when 
he  tells  us  that  tenant  by  homage,  fealty,  and  escuage, 
was  tenant  by  knight-service ;  that  is,  that  this  tenure 
(being  subservient  to  the  military  policy  of  the  nation) 
was  respected  as  a  tenure  in  chivalry.  But  as  the  ac- 
tual service  was  uncertain,  and  depended  upon  emer- 
gencies, so  it  was  necessary  that  this  peculiar  compen- 
sation should  be  equally  uncertain,  and  depend  on  the 
assessments  of  the  legislature,  suited  to  these  emer- 
gencies. For  had  the  escuage  been  a  settled  invariable 
sum,  payable  at  certain  times,  it  had  been  neither  more 
nor  less  than  a  mere  pecuniary  rent ;  and  the  tenure, 
instead  of  knight-service,  would  have  then  been  of 
another  kind,  called  socage ;  of  which  we  shall  speak 
in  the  next  chapter. 

"  For  the  present  I  have  only  to  observe,  that  by  the 
degenerating  of  knight-service,  or  personal  military 
duty,  into  escuage  or  pecuniary  assessments,  all  the 
advantages  (either  promised  or  real)  of  the  feudal  con- 
stitution were  destroyed,  and  nothing  but  the  hardships 
remained.  Instead  of  forming  a  national  militia, 
composed  of  barons,  knights,  and  gentlemen,  bound 
by  their  interest,  their  honor,  and  their  oaths,  to  defend 
their  king  and  country,  the  whole  of  this  system  of 
tenure  now  tended  to  nothing  else  but  a  wretched 
means  of  raising  money  to  pay  an  army  of  occasional 
mercenaries.  In  the  mean  time  the  families  of  all  our 
nobility  and  gentry  groaned  under  the  intolerable  bur- 
dens which  (in  consequence  of  the  fiction  adopted 
after  the  Conquest)  were  introduced  and  laid  upon 
them  by  the  subtlety  and  finesse  of  the  Norman  law- 
yers. For,  besides  the  scutages,  to  which  they  were 
liable  in  defect  of  personal  attendance  —  which,  how- 
ever, were  assessed  by  themselves  in  Parliament  — 
they  might  be  called  upon  by  the  king  or  lord  para- 


THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM.  395 

mount  for  aids,  whenever  his  eldest  son  was  to  be 
knighted,  or  his  eldest  daughter  married,  not  to  forget 
the  ransom  of  his  own  person.  The  heir,  on  the  death 
of  his  ancestor,  if  of  full  age,  was  plundered  of  the  first 
emoluments  arising  from  his  inheritance,  by  way  of 
relief  and  primer  seisin;  and  if  under  age,  of  the 
whole  of  his  estate  during  infancy.  And  then,  as  Sir 
Thomas  Smith  very  feelingly  complains,  <  When  he 
came  to  his  own  after  he  was  out  of  wardship,  his 
woods  decayed,  houses  fallen  down,  stock  wasted  and 
gone,  lands  let  forth  and  ploughed  to  be  barren ; '  to 
reduce  him  still  further,  he  was  yet  to  pay  half  a  year's 
profits  as  a  fine  for  suing  out  his  livery,  and  also  the 
price  or  value  of  his  marriage,  if  he  refused  such  wife 
as  his  lord  and  guardian  had  bartered  for  and  imposed 
upon  him ;  or  twice  that  value  if  he  married  another 
woman.  Add  to  this  the  untimely  and  expensive 
honor  of  knighthood,  to  make  his  poverty  more  com- 
pletely splendid.  And  when,  by  these  deductions,  his 
fortune  was  so  shattered  and  ruined  that  perhaps  he 
was  obliged  to  sell  his  patrimony,  he  had  not  even 
that  poor  privilege  allowed  him  without  paying  an 
exorbitant  fine  for  a  license  of  alienation. 

"  A  slavery  so  complicated  and  so  extensive  as  this 
called  aloud  for  a  remedy,  in  a  nation  that  boasted 
of  its  freedom.  Palliatives  were,  from  time  to  time, 
applied  by  successive  acts  of  Parliament,  which  as- 
suaged some  temporary  grievances,  till  at  length  the 
humanity  of  King  James  I.  consented,  in  consideration 
of  a  proper  equivalent,  to  abolish  them  all,  though  the 
plan  proceeded  not  to  effect :  in  like  manner  as  he 
had  formed  a  scheme,  and  began  to  put  it  in  execu- 
tion, for  removing  the  feudal  grievance  of  heritable 
jurisdictions  in  Scotland,  which  has  since  been  pur- 
sued and  effected  by  the  statute  20  Geo.  II.  c.  43. 
King  James's  plan  for  exchanging  our  military  ten- 
ures seems  to  have  been  nearly  the   same   as*  that 


396  THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM. 

which  has  since  been  pursued,  only  with  this  differ- 
ence, that,  by  way  of  compensation  for  the  loss  which 
the  crown  and  other  lords  would  sustain,  an  annual 
fee-farm  rent  was  to  have  been  settled,  and  insepara- 
bly annexed  to  the  crown,  and  assured  to  the  inferior 
lords,  payable  out  of  every  knight's  fee  within  their 
respective  seigniories  —  an  expedient  seemingly  much 
better  than  the  hereditary  excise,  which  was  afterwards 
made  the  principal  equivalent  of  these  concessions. 
For  at  length  the  military  tenures,  with  all  their  heavy 
appendages,  (having  during  the  usurpation  been  dis- 
continued,) were  destroyed  at  one  blow  by  the  statute 
12  Car.  II.  c.  24,  which  enacts  'that  the  court  of 
wards  and  liveries,  and  all  wardships,  liveries,  primer 
seizins,  and  ousterlemains,  values  and  forfeitures  of 
marriages,  by  reason  of  any  tenure  of  the  king  or 
others,  be  totally  taken  away;  and  that  all  fines  for 
alienations,  tenures  by  homage,  knight's  service,  and 
escuage,  and  also  aids  for  marrying  the  daughter  or 
knighting  the  son,  and  all  tenures  of  the  king  in  capite, 
be  likewise  taken  away ;  and  that  all  sorts  of  tenures, 
held  of  the  king  or  others,  be  turned  into  free  and  com- 
mon socage,  save  only  tenures  in  frankalmoign,  copy- 
holds, and  the  honorary  services  (without  the  slavish 
part)  of  grand  serjeantry;'  —  a  statute  which  was  a 
greater  acquisition  to  the  civil  property  of  this  kingdom 
than  even  Magna  Charta  itself;  since  that  only  pruned 
the  luxuriances  that  had  grown  out  of  the  military 
tenures,  and  thereby  preserved  them  in  vigor,  but  the 
statute  of  King  Charles  extirpated  the  whole,  and 
demolished  both  root  and  branches."  —  Blackstone, 
book  ii.  chap.  4. 

"  The  abolition  of  military  tenures,  which  was 
effected  by  statute,  was  one  of  the  most  acceptable 
measures  that  have  been  adopted The  prin- 
cipal and  original  purpose  of  these  tenures  was  to 
secure  an  efficient  military  force  for  the  protection  of 
the  realm 


THE    FEUDAL    SYSTEM.  397 

•"To  supply  the  deficiency  in  the  king's  revenue, 
which  the  subtraction  of  the  feudal  profits  and  the 
successive  grants  of  the  crown  had  occasioned,  was  of 
course  the  next  subject  of  consideration  for  the  legis- 
lature. King  James  conceived  the  plan  of  securing  an 
equivalent  for  the  feudal  profits  by  an  annual  fee-farm 
rent,  which  was  to  have  been  settled  and  inseparably 
annexed  to  the  crown,  and  assured  to  the  inferior 
lords,  payable  out  of  every  knight's  fee  within  their 
respective  seigniories.  This  plan  appears  to  have 
been  pursued  in  regard  to  inferior  lords ;  but  in  respect 
to  the  king,  the  principal  equivalent  for  these  conces- 
sions was  the  excise. 

"  The  excise  was  a  novel  mode  of  taxing  commodi- 
ties, either  immediately  on  their  consumption,  or  more 
frequently  on  their  retail  sale.  It  is  said  to  have  been 
first  devised  in  the  reign  of  Charles  L,  and  was  given 
to  the  crown  by  act  of  Parliament  as  an  equivalent 
for  the  profits  of  the  feudal  tenures ;  and  although  a 
very  unpopular  tax,  it  has  been  imposed  on  fresh  com- 
modities  in  every  subsequent  reign. In  con- 
sequence of  the  abolition  of  the  feudal  tenures,  a 
permanent  kind  of  military  force  was  now  raised, 
called  a  standing  army,  of  which  it  appears  that  this 
king,  Charles  II.,  had  not  more  than  the  number  of 
5000."  —  CrabVs  Hist.  English  Laic. 

"  The  origin  of  a  permanently  embodied  military 
force  may  be  dated  from  the  commencement  of  this 

reign These  formed  at  first  a  force  of  about 

5000  men;  but  in  the  latter  part  of  the  next  reign 
this  force  was  augmented  to  30,000.  Parliament, 
however,  never  sanctioned  the  enrolment  of  this  large 
army,  nor  did  it  vote  the  money  required  for  their 
maintenance.  They  were  embodied  by  the  authority 
of  the  crown  only,  and  were  paid  for  either  out  of  the 
civil  list,  or  by  diverting  money  voted  for  other  pur- 
poses. It  was  on  this  unconstitutional  force  that 
34 


ARABLE    AND    PASTURE. 

James  II.  mistakenly  depended  for  the  success  of 
his  anti-Protestant  and  arbitrary  schemes." — Wade's 
British  Chronology. 

Such  is  the  most  concise  history  that  we  could  lay 
before  the  reader,  in  quotations,  of  the  politics  of  Eng- 
lish landed  property.  We  shall  show,  presently,  what 
a  momentous  change  is  recorded  in  this  little  history ; 
but,  before  proceeding  to  any  remarks  of  our  own,  we 
must  advert  to  another  change  in  the  disposition  of  a 
large  portion  of  the  soil  of  England. 

"  In  the  course  of  the  fourteenth  century,  the  de- 
mand for  wool  to  supply  not  only  the  markets  of  the 
Netherlands,  but  also  the  infant  manufacturers  of  our 
own  country,  rapidly  increased.  This  circumstance 
brought  about  an  important  change  in  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  population.  The  owners  of  land,  find- 
ing sheep-feeding  more  profitable  than  husbandry, 
commenced  the  same  system  which  we  have  all  wit- 
nessed in  full  operation  in  the  Highlands  of  Scotland. 
The  peasantry,  previously  employed  in  tillage,  were 
turned  adrift  upon  the  world  ;  the  allotments  of  arable 
land,  which  had  afforded  them  and  their  families  the 
means  of  subsistence,  were  enclosed,  consolidated,  and 
converted  into  sheep-walks ;  and  the  policy  of  Henry 
VII.  greatly  accelerated  a  social  revolution  which  had 
commenced  before  his  accession.  The  misery  and 
suffering  which  this  change  of  system  inflicted  upon 
the  ejected  peasantry,  have  been  depicted  in  beautiful 
and  glowing  language  by  Sir  Thomas  More,  in  his 
Utopia. 

"  '  Your  sheep,'  says  he,  '  which  were  wont  to  be  so 
meek  and  tame,  and  so  small  eaters,  now  become  so 
great  devourers,  and  so  wild,  that  they  eat  up  and 
swallow  down  the  very  men  themselves.     They  con- 


ARABLE    AND    PASTURE.  399 

sume,  destroy,  and  devour  whole  fields,  houses,  and 
cities ;  for,  look  in  what  part  of  the  realm  doth  grow 
the  finest,  and  therefore  dearest  wool ;  there,  noblemen 
and  gentlemen  —  yea,  and  certain  abbots,  holy  men, 
God  wot!  —  not  contenting  themselves  with  the 
yearly  revenues  and  profits  that  were  wont  to  grow 
to  their  forefathers  and  predecessors  of  their  lands, 
nor  being  content  that  they  live  in  rest  and  pleasure, 
nothing  profiting,  yea,  much  annoying,  the  weal  pub- 
lic, leave  no  ground  for  tillage.  They  enclose  all  into 
pastures,  they  throw  down  houses,  they  pluck  down 
towns,  and  leave  nothing  standing  but  only  the 
church,  to  be  made  a  sheep-house.  And,  as  though 
you  lost  no  small  quantity  of  ground  by  forests, 
chases,  lands,  and  parks,  those  good,  holy  men,  turn 
all  dwelling-places  and  all  glebe  lands  into  desolation 
and  wilderness. 

"  '  Therefore,  that  one  covetous,  and  unsatiable  cor- 
morant and  very  plague  of  his  native  country  may 
compass  about  and  enclose  many  thousand  acres  of 
ground  together  within  one  pale  or  hedge,  the  hus- 
bandmen be  thrust  out  of  their  own,  or  else,  either  by 
cozen  and  fraud,  or  by  violent  oppression,  they  be  put 
beside  it,  or  by  wrongs  and  injuries  they  be  so  wearied 
that  they  be  compelled  to  sell  all,  By  one  means, 
therefore,  or  other,  —  either  by  hook  or  by  crook, — 
they  must  needs  depart  away,  poor,  silly,  wretched 
souls !  —  men,  women,  husbands,  wives,  fatherless 
children,  widows,  woful  mothers  with  their  young 
babes  and  their  whole  household,  small  in  substance 
and  much  in  number,  as  husbandry  requireth  many 
hands ;  for  one  shepherd  or  herdsman  is  enough  to 
eat  up  that  ground  with  cattle,  to  the  occupying 
whereof  about  husbandry  many  hands  were  requisite. 
After  that  so  much  ground  was  enclosed  for  pasture, 
an  infinite  multitude  of  sheep  died  of  the  rot ;  such 
vengeance   God  took  of  their  inordinate,  unsatiable 


400  ENCLOSURE    OF    COMMONS. 

covetousness — sending  among  the  sheep  that  pestif- 
erous murrain,  which  much  more  justly  should  have 

fallen  on  the  chief  masters'  own  heads 

"  A  very  considerable  portion  of  the  discarded  occu- 
piers were  thus  absorbed  ;  but  the  remainder,  amount- 
ing, as  it  appears  from  all  the  records  of  the  period,  to 
no  inconsiderable  number,  either  unable  to  find  a  small 
spot  of  land  to  rent  and  occupy,  or  unwilling  to  submit 
to  the  confinement  of  towns  and  manufactories,  became 
wandering  beggars,  infesting  the  roads  and  villages  of 
the  country.  Hence  the  English  poor-laws.  During 
this  memorable  period  in  the  history  of  our  peasantry, 
various  laws  were  enacted  for  the  suppression  of  va- 
grancy, and  these  were  finally  amended  and  consolidat- 
ed in  the  celebrated  act  of  43  Elizabeth But 

another  revolution  was  now  approaching,  and  one 
which  has  affected  their  (the  peasantry)  welfare  more 
extensively,  as  well  as  more  intensely,  than  even  the 
momentous  change  wrought  under  the  dominion  of 
the  Tudors.  The  numerous  small  farms  which  had 
escaped  consolidation,  and  consequently  supplied  an 
asylum  for  the  peasantry  discarded  from  the  larger 
estates,  were  now  doomed  to  undergo  a  similar  revolu- 
tion. Through  the  operation  of  too  obvious  causes, 
several  of  the  smaller  farms  in  each  parish  had  come 
to  be  the  property  of  one  landlord.  It  was  then  dis- 
covered that  the  division  and  enclosure  of  the  common 
fields  and  wastes  of  the  parish  would  render  this  prop- 
erty more  profitable,  by  facilitating  the  introduction  of 
an  improved  system  of  tillage.  In  1709,  an  applica- 
tion was  made  to  Parliament  for  an  act  to  divide  and 
enclose  the  common  fields  and  wastes  belonging  to 
the  parish  of  Roplcy.  This  served  as  an  encourage- 
ment and  example,  and  applications  of  the  same  kind 
became  annually  more  frequent.  It  appears  that,  since 
that  period,  very  nearly  4000  bills  of  enclosure  have 
been  passed ;  and  it  is  also  well  known  that,  in  numer- 


LANDED    PROPERTY.  401 

ous  instances,  the  same  end  has  been  reached  without 
legislative  interference,  by  private  agreement  among 
the  parties  interested.  In  a  word,  we  have  scarcely  a 
doubt  that  about  5000  parishes  (a  moiety  of  the  whole 
territory  of  England)  have  been  subjected  to  the  oper- 
ation of  these  measures  in  the  space  of  about  one 
hundred  and  twenty  years  ;  and  as  little  (however  ben- 
eficial the  division  and  consequent  improvement  of 
this  vast  territory  may  have  proved  to  the  owners,  and 
to  some  other  classes)  that  the  change  has  been  a  wo- 
ful  one  for  our  peasantry.  We  believe  that  the  final 
extinction  of  the  class  of  small  occupiers  and  crofters 
has,  in  almost  every  instance,  followed  the  division  of 
common  field  parishes." — Quarterly  Review ,  July,  1829. 

The  political  history  of  landed  property  in  England, 
therefore,  appears  to  have  been  as  follows :  — 

1st.  The  lands  were  accorded  by  the  king  to  persons 
who  were  to  undertake  the  military  service  of  the 
kingdom. 

2d.  The  performance  of  this  military  service  was 
the  condition  on  which  individuals  held  the  national 
land. 

3d.  The  lands  were  at  first  held  for  life,  and  after- 
wards were  made  hereditary. 

4th.  The  military  service  was  abolished  by  the  law, 
and  a  standing'  army  introduced. 

5th.  This  standing  army  was  paid  by  the  king. 

6th.  The  king,  having  abolished  the  military  services 
of  the  individuals  who  held  the  national  land,  resorted 
to  the  taxation  of  articles  of  consumption  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  army. 

The  lands  of  England,  therefore,  instead  of  being 
held  on  condition  of  performing  the  military  service 
34* 


402 


THE    POLITICS    OF 


of  the  kingdom,  became  the  property  of  the  individ- 
uals who  held  them,  and  thus  the  slate  of  England 
lost  the  lands  of  England.  And  the  military  service 
of  the  kingdom,  instead  of  being  performed  by  those 
individuals  who  held  the  national  land,  was  hence- 
forth (after  the  reign  of  Charles  II.)  to  be  paid  for 
by  the  general  taxation  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
country. 

Therefore  the  present  system  of  taxation,  and  the 
national  debt,  the  interest  of  which  is  procured  by  the 
forcible  taxation  of  the  general  inhabitants  of  Eng- 
land, are  both  due  to  the  alienation  of  the  lands  from 
the  state,  inasmuch  as  the  national  debt  (incurred  for 
war  expenses)  would  have  been  a  debt  upon  the  lands, 
and  not  a  debt  upon  the  people   of   England.*      If, 


*  Total  Expense  of  the  Army,  Navy,  and  Ordnance,  from  1790  to 
1815,  inclusive,  in  millions  sterling,  {round  numbers.) 


Years. 

Millions. 

Years. 

Millions. 

Years. 

Millions. 

1791 

4 

1800 

29 

1808 

39 

1792 

8 

1801 

26 

1809 

42 

1793 

13 

1802 

23 

1810 

43 

1794 

20 

1803 

21 

1811 

47 

1795 

28 

1804 

30 

1812 

49 

1796 

30 

1805 

36 

1813 

54 

1797 

27 

1806 

37 

1814 

60 

1798 

25 

1807 

36 

1815 

43 

1799 

27 

To  this  it  may  be  added,  that  the  war  charges  of  the  kingdom, 
from  the  year  1815  to  1&48,  amounted  to  484  millions  sterling ;  and 
the  advantage  to  the  country  of  an  aristocratic  House  of  Commons, 
having  an  unlimited  power  to  tax  the  labors  of  the  community,  may 
be  inferred  from  the  fact,  that  from  1835  to  1847,  (inclusive,)  the 
expenses  of  the  war  establishments  increased  rather  more  than  a 


LANDED   PROPERTY. 


403 


therefore,  the  legislature  had  a  right  to  abolish  the  mil- 
itary services  of  those  who  held  the  national  land,  and 
thereby  to  impose  on  the  general  community  all  the 
liabilities  of  the  military  service  of  the  kingdom,  the 
legislature  has  the  same  right  to  abolish  the  general 
taxation  of  the  community,  and  to  allocate  to  those 
who  hold  the  land  all  the  expenses  that  have  been 
incurred,  and  are  still  incurred,  for  the  war  charges  of 
the  kingdom. 

The  alienation  of  the  land  from  the  state,  and  its 
conversion  into  private  property,  was  the  first  grand 
step  that  laid  the  foundation  of  the  modern  system  of 
society  in  England  —  a  system  that  presents  enor- 
mous wealth  in  the  hands  of  a  few  aristocrats,  who 
neither  labor,  nor  even  pay  taxes  in  proportion  to  those 
who  do  labor,  (land  pays  no  legacy  duty  on  being  trans- 
mitted;) and  a  vast  population  laboring  for  a  bare 
subsistence,  or  reduced  sometimes  by  millions  to  the 
condition  of  pauperism. 

So  long  as  this  system  is  allowed  to  continue,  it 
appears  (from  the  constitution  of  the  earth,  and  of 
man's  power  to  extract  from  it  a  maintenance)  an  ab- 
solute impossibility  that  pauperism  should  be  obliter- 
ated ;  inasmuch  as  the  burden  of  taxation  necessarily 
falls  on  labor i  and  more  especially  as  the  value  of  labor 


million  every  two  years.     Nothing  less  that  miracles  could  save  the 
country  from  pauperization  under  such  a  system  of  government. 

No  reformation  of  the  public  expenditure,  however,  can  possibly 
be  anticipated  until  men  of  an  entirely  different  class  form  the  ma- 
jority of  the  House  of  Commons ;  and  this  change  can  only  be  se- 
cured by  a  total  revision  of  the  whole  system  of  representation. 


404  THE    POLITICS    OF 

is  necessarily  diminished  wherever  there  is  a  soil  allo- 
cated to  an  aristocracy.* 

The  abolition  of  the  military  tenures,  however,  did 
not  complete  the  great  evolution  by  which  the  lands 
of  England  have  been  transformed  into  the  property 
of  a  few  thousand  aristocrats.  That  evolution  con- 
sisted of  three  great  facts,  — 

1st.  The  allocation  of  the  church  lands  to  individu- 
al proprietors. 

2d.  The  abolition  of  military  tenure,  and  the  sub- 
stitution of  the  taxation  of  articles  of  consumption; 
in  other  words,  of  the  taxation  of  labor. 

3d.  The  enclosure  of  the  common  lands,  whereby 
vast  numbers  of  the  peasantry  were  ruined,  deprived 
of  their  legal  rights,  which  were  quite  as  valid  as  the 
entails  of  the  aristocracy,  and,  being  separated  from 
the  land,  were  sent  to  propagate   pauperism  in  the 

*  Political  economists  have  insisted  much  on  the  small  matters 
that  affect  the  value  of  labor.  By  far  the  most  important  is,  the 
mode  in  which  the  land  is  distributed.  Wherever  there  is  a  free 
soil,  labor  maintains  its  value.  Wherever  the  soil  is  in  the  hands 
of  a  few  proprietors,  or  tied  up  by  entails,  labor  necessarily  under- 
goes depreciation.  In  fact,  it  is  the  disposition  of  the  land  that  de- 
termines the  value  of  labor.  If  men  could  get  the  land  to  labor  on, 
they  would  manufacture  only  for  a  remuneration  that  afforded  more 
profit  than  God  has  attached  to  the  cultivation  of  the  earth.  Where 
they  cannot  get  the  land  to  labor  on,  they  are  starved  into  working 
for  a  bare  subsistence.  There  is  only  one  reason  why  the  labor  of 
England,  Ireland,  and  Scotland  is  of  so  little  marketable  value,  and 
that  reason  is,  the  present  disposition  of  the  soil.  Were  the  soil  dis- 
posed of  according  to  the  laws  of  equity,  there  cannot  be  the  least 
doubt  that  the  labor  of  the  laboring  classes  would  at  once  rise  to  at 
least  double  its  present  value. 


LANDED    PROPERTY.  405 

towns  and  villages.  Such  were  the  great  political 
events  that  terminated  in  the  separation  of  the  people 
of  England  from  the  soil  of  England,  and  such  was 
the  price  paid  for  that  personal  freedom  and  personal 
independence  which  has  been  gradually  evolving  from 
the  time  of  the  Norman  formation  of  the  state  of 
England,  and  which  will  come  to  a  natural  termina- 
tion the  moment  men  are  equalized  in  their  political 
functions.  The  moment  the  law  becomes  impartial, 
and  recognizes  no  a  priori  difference  between  the  indi- 
viduals of  whom  the  state  is  composed,  that  moment 
has  the  grand  evolution  of  liberty  come  to  a  conclusion, 
and  the  evolution  of  natural  property  will  then  enter 
on  its  course. 

On  the  three  events  which  have  at  last  left  the  lands 
of  England  in  the  hands  of  a  small  number  of  aristo- 
crats, we  shall  make  only  one  or  two  observations. 

Every  one  of  these  events  has  a  right  side  as  well 
as  a  wrong  side ;  and  unless  we  learn  to  estimate 
impartially  the  value  of  the  changes,  we  are  in  danger 
of  taking  a  distorted  view  of  the  morals  as  well  as  of 
the  matter  of  the  changes. 

1st.  It  was  right  to  abolish  the  monasteries. 

2d.  It  was  right  to  abolish  the  military  tenures. 

3d.  It  was  right  to  enclose  the  common  lands. 

And  it  was  wrong,  — 

1st.  To  allocate  the  church  lands  to  individuals. 

2d.  To  allow  the  lands  to  remain  as  the  property 
of  those  who  neither  cultivated  them,  nor  were  liable 
for  the  performance  of  the  military  service  of  the 
kingdom. 

3d.  To  make  such  a  disposition  of  the  common 


406  THE    POLITICS    OF 

lands  as  disinherited  the  peasantry,  and  at  last  left 
the  common  lands  in  the  hands  of  the  aristocracy  as 
property. 

So  soon  as  the  Roman  religion  was  supplanted  in 
England,  there  can  be  no  question  that  it  was  right 
to  abolish  the  monasteries ;  and  though  many  hard- 
ships were  no  doubt  inflicted  on  some  excellent  men 
and  women,  (for  the  church  in  England  contained 
both,)  the  system  had  grown  old.  It  had  outlived  its 
time,  and  the  day  of  its  departure  had  arrived.  Man 
was  to  take  a  new  expansion ;  to  enter  on  a  course 
of  thought;  to  begin  to  exercise  his  reason,  and  no 
longer  to  believe  on  mere  authority.  And  the  removal 
of  the  Papal  church  of  England  was  the  first  great  re- 
quirement for  the  commencement  of  a  course  that 
must  terminate  at  last  in  absolute  liberty  of  thought, 
and  absolute  non-interference  of  the  legislature  with 
the  credence  of  any  individual.  But  the  iniquity  of  the 
mode  in  which  the  monasteries  were  suppressed  was 
in  the  fact,  that  the  lands  were  transformed  into  the 
property  of  the  aristocracy.  If  the  king  resumed  them 
in  his  official  character  of  head  of  the  state  of  England, 
he  could  not  justly  transform  them  into  his  own  pri- 
vate property,  nor  could  he  justly  transform  them  into 
the  private  property  of  any  individual  members  of  the 
state.  Such  a  transaction  is  utterly  beyond  the  inten- 
tion of  civil  government,  and  its  toleration  could  not 
take  place  in  a  community  governed  by  reason.  And 
when  we  take  into  consideration  that  there  are  but 
two  objects  of  taxation,  namely,  individual  labor  or 
the  natural  earth,  the  allocation  of  these  lands  as  pri- 
vate property  was  only  tantamount  to  the  prospective 


LANDED    PROPERTY.  407 

abstraction  of  the  value  of  the  lands  from  the  future 
laborers  of  the  country.  Were  there  no  such  thing  as 
taxation,  the  gift  of  lands  would  be  comparatively  a 
matter  of  indifference,  (provided  there  was  no  restric- 
tion whatever  on  its  sale  and  purchase ;)  but  so  long 
as  taxation  on  labor  exists,  the  gift  of  lands  is  exactly 
equivalent  to  the  present  abstraction  of  the  present 
annual  value  of  those  lands  from  the  present  laborers 
of  England.  And  herein  lies  the  injustice  and  evil 
of  the  king's  gift  of  the  abbey  lands. 

Again :  the  abolition  of  military  tenures  was  right, 
because  that  system  had  also  grown  old.  It  was  in- 
efficient ;  useless  for  the  military  service  of  the  king- 
dom ;  it  did  not  work ;  its  evil  remained  without  its 
good.  But  the  transformation  of  the  lands  into  the 
property  of  the  aristocracy,  and  the  establishment  of  a 
system  of  taxation  that  has  entailed  the  heaviest  debt 
and  the  heaviest  taxation  in  the  world  on  the  laborers 
of  England  —  these  were  the  evils  that  entailed  Eng- 
land's pauperism.  Had  the  lands  of  England  been 
liable  (as  most  justly  they  should  have  been  liable) 
for  their  own  defence,  there  can  be  little  or  no  doubt 
that  the  national  debt  (at  all  events,  the  600  millions 
incurred  in  attempting  to  arrest  the  progress  of  Eu- 
rope) would  not  have  been  incurred  at  all.  Had  the 
land  been  liable,  the  aristocracy,  who  held  the  land, 
would  never  have  plunged  into  a  war,  the  principal 
effects  of  which  appear  to  have  been  the  deferring  of 
the  requisite  changes  on  the  continent  of  Europe,  and 
the  infliction  of  a  debt  on  England  which  will  ulti- 
mately effect  the  destruction  of  the  aristocracy.  The 
king  never  could  justly,  as  the  head  of  the  state,  abolish 


408  THE    POLITICS    OF 

the  liability  of  the  land  to  defray  the  war  charges  of 
the  state,  by  attaching  those  liabilities  to  the  individu- 
al laborers,  while  the  land  holders  were  allowed  to 
carry  off  a  free  land.  This,  in  fact,  is  the  greatest 
political  change  that  has  taken  place  in  England  — 
of  infinitely  more  importance  to  the  present  genera- 
tion than  the  revolution  that  expelled  the  Stuarts. 
The  prerogatives  of  the  crown  could  not  have  failed 
to  undergo  changes  in  the  natural  order  of  evolution. 
As  knowledge  progressed,  the  king,  from  a  ruler,  must 
have  become  an  administrator.  But  the  legal  estab- 
lishment of  labor  taxation,  and  the  accordance  of  the 
land  as  the  property  of  the  aristocracy,  fixed  upon 
the  country  a  system  that  had  the  appearance  of 
right,  and  that  brought  with  it  the  impress  of  imperial 
legislation ;  while  it  originated  in  the  darkest  igno- 
rance or  the  most  licentious  overstretch  of  power,  and 
could  not  fail  to  produce  ultimately  the  most  per- 
nicious results.  The  tax -payers  of  England  can  never 
be  sufficiently  reminded,  that  there  need  have  been  no 
taxes  had  it  not  been  for  the  alienation  of  the  land 
from  the  state. 

The  enclosure  of  the  common  lands,  again,  was  a 
proper  measure,  inasmuch  as  the  lands  were  producing- 
little  ;  and  every  measure  that  caused  the  lands  to  pro- 
duce more  for  the  consumption  of  the  country  was  so 
far  beneficial.  It  would  have  been  quite  absurd  to 
leave  the  common  lands  in  pasture,  while  their  enclo- 
sure would  produce  for  the  service  of  the  country  a 
much  larger  quantity  of  food.  And  the  same  argu- 
ment that  took  away  the  lands  of  the  peasantry,  would 
now  take  away  the  lands  of  those  proprietors  who 
allow  their  lands  to  lie  uncultivated. 


LANDED    PROPERTY.  409 

On  the  effects  of  the  enclosure  of  the  common  lands, 
we  quote  another  passage  from  the  same  article  in  the 
Quarterly  Review,  July,  1829  :  — 

"  Here,  no  doubt,  it  will  be  observed,  that  in  every 
instance  an  allotment  of  land  was,  on  the  divis- 
ion of  the  waste,  assigned  to  the  owners  of  common 
rights,"  {incumbents,  rather  than  owners ;)  "  and  that  an 
allotment  in  severalty,  if  properly  attended  to  and  cul- 
tivated, must  have  proved  much  more  valuable  to  the 
cottager  than  what  he  had  lost.  If  such  had  been  the 
case,  we  readily  admit  that  the  division  could  not  have 
proved  detrimental  to  him1;  but,  unfortunately,  this 
very  rarely  happened.  These  allotments  were  assigned, 
under  enclosure  acts,  not  to  the  occupier,  but  the  owner 
of  the  cottage.  Few  cottages  were  in  the  occupation 
of  their  owners  ;  they  generally,  indeed,  we  may  say 
universally,  belonged  to  the  proprietors  of  the  neigh- 
boring farms  ;  and  the  allotments  granted  in  lieu  of  the 
extinguished  common  rights  were  generally  added  to 
the  large  farms,  and  seldom  attached  to  the  cottages. 
The  cottages  which  were  occupied  by  their  owners 
had,  of  course,  allotments  attached  to  them  ;  but  these 
have  by  degrees  passed  by  sale  into  the  hands  of  some 
large  proprietor  in  the  neighborhood.  De  facto,  in 
ninety-nine  cases  out  of  the  hundred,  the  allotment 
has  been  detached  from  the  cottage,  and  thrown  into 
the  occupation  of  some  adjoining  farmer. 

"  That  such  a  change  should  have  been  attended 
with  most  important  consequences,  can  excite  no  sur- 
prise in  any  reflecting  mind.  So  far  as  it  goes,  a  com- 
plete severance  has  been  effected  between  the  English 
peasantry  and  the  English  soil.  The  little  farmers  and 
cottiers  of  the  country  have  been  converted  into  day 
laborers,  depending  entirely  upon  daily  earnings,  which 
may,  and  frequently  in  point  of  fact  do,  fail  them. 
They  have  now  no  land,  upon  the  produce  of  which 
35 


410  THE    POLITICS    OF 

they  can  fall  as  a  reserve  whenever  the  demand  for  la- 
bor happens  to  be  slack.  This  revolution  is  unques- 
tionably the  true  cause  of  the  heavy  and  increasing 
burdens  now  pressing  upon  parishes  in  the  form  of 
poor-rates.  Independently  of  all  reasoning  founded 
upon  general  principles,  this  is  a  truth  capable  of  being 
substantiated  by  a  mass  of  evidence,  so  clear  and  so 
well  authenticated  as  to  leave  no  room  for  doubt.  In 
almost  every  instance  the  increase  of  poor-rates  has 
kept  pace  visibly  with  the  progress  of  enclosures." 

The  passage  we  have  underlined — "a  complete 
severance  has  been  effected  between  the  English  peas- 
antry and  the  English  soil"  —  points  out  the  great 
economical  cause  of  England's  periodical  distress ;  a 
distress  which,  were  it  not  for  the  poor-laws,  would 
occasionally  manifest  itself  (as  it  did  in  1830-31)  in 
tumultuous  assemblages  and  breaches  of  the  law. 
And  assuredly  that  severance  between  the  subjective 
labor  and  the  objective  soil  will  yet  rectify  itself.  No 
class  of  society  can  be  visited  with  long-continued 
evils,  without  entailing  evil  on  the  other  classes.  And 
though  the  manufactures  o£  England,  taking  an  ex- 
pansion altogether  unprecedented  in  the  history  of  the 
world,  were  able  to  consume  the  redundant  population, 
the  time  must  come  when  the  rate  of  increase  will  di- 
minish, when  the  population  shall  find  no  maintenance 
either  in  the  towns  or  in  the  country,  and  social 
changes,  attended  with  a  more  equitable  distribution 
of  the  sources  of  wealth,  will  result  in  spite  of  all 
that  men  can  do  to  prevent  them. 

While  the  increase  of  the  poor  rates  in  England 
reached  to  such  an  extent,  that  in  not  a  few  cases  the 


LANDED    PROPERTY.  411 

half  of  the  rental,  and  in  the  ease  of  the  parish  of 
Cholesbury  the  whole  of  the  rental,  was  absorbed  ;  and 
while  new  legislative  enactments  were  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  prevent  the  ruin  of  the  land  holders  —  it  is 
singular  to  observe  how  little  inquiry  was  made  into 
the  radical  cause  of  England's  pauperism.  Rates  and 
paupers  are  correlatives,  and  the  rates  increase  because 
the  paupers  have  increased.  No  remedial  measure 
that  attempts  only  to  supply  the  wants  of  those  who 
are  paupers  will  ever  reach  the  depths  of  pauperism ; 
and  while  there  is  of  course  an  imperative  necessity  to 
relieve  a  famished  population,  there  is  quite  as  great  a 
necessity  to  inquire,  "  Why  does  it  happen,  that  in  the 
richest  country  in  the  world  a  large  portion  of  the  pop- 
ulation should  be  reduced  to  pauperism  ?  "  Until  the 
causes  of  pauperism  are  satisfactorily  ascertained,  and 
until  the  remedy  is  applied  to  the  cause,  no  remedial 
measure  can  do  more  than  alleviate  the  evil.  Apply 
the  remedy  to  the  cause,  and  the  evil  is  eradicated. 
The  cause,  or  at  least  one  of  the  great  causes,  is  that 
expressed  in  the  words  of  the  reviewer,  "  the  severance 
between  the  English  peasantry  and  the  English  soil ; " 
and  until  the  peasantry  recover  that  soil,  the  inhab- 
itants of  England  may  rest  satisfied  that  the  curse  of 
pauperism  will  pursue  them ;  and  if  the  remedy  be 
not  applied  in  time,  that  the  vengeance  of  Heaven 
will  be  manifested  against  a  nation  —  with  so  many 
privileges — that  allows  her  children  to  be  condemned 
to  want,  and  ignorance,  and  moral  degradation. 

Although  we  have  presented  the  reader  with  this 
sketch  of  the  historical  politics  of  landed  property,  we 
attach   little  or   no   importance  to  it.      No  historical 


412     THE  GRADUAL  EVOLUTION  OF  TRUTH. 

argument  is  ever  capable  of  deciding  a  present  question 
of  equity.  Men  must  go  forward,  never  backward. 
History  may  enlighten,  may  instruct,  may  teach  us 
what  has  been,  and  may  afford  us  the  groundwork  of 
an  argument  for  anticipating  what  shall  be  in  future  ; 
but  history  will  not  supply  the  motive  for  action,  nor 
can  it  ever  furnish  the  rule  of  action.  For  these  we 
must  look  to  the  present  times :  the  motive  must  be  a 
living  one,  not  a  dead  one ;  and  the  rule  must  be 
a  rule  that  depends,  not  on  one  age  rather  than  an- 
other, but  a  rule  that  always  was  valid  had  man  been 
able  to  see  it,  that  is  valid  now,  and  that  will  be  valid 
when  we  shall  have  passed  away,  and  our  places  are 
supplied  by  the  generations  that  come  after  us.  In 
the  past  we  see  the  concrete  manifestations  of  man's 
phenomena,  we  see  the  phases  through  which  he  has 
passed,  and  we  may  learn  to  extract  or  evolve  the  law 
of  the  direction  in  which  he  is  progressing.  In  man's 
actual  history,  all  variable  as  it  is,  like  the  outward  ap- 
pearances of  nature,  we  behold  a  stupendous  series  of 
real  phenomena,  in  which  men  and  nations  are  the 
actors.  The  rulers  and  the  ruled,  the  monarch,  the 
aristocrat,  and  the  serf,  the  priest,  the  artist,  the  mer- 
chant, and  the  soldier,  all  play  their  respective  parts  in 
man's  political  drama.  Events  roll  on,  and  history 
records  the  scenes. 

But  beneath  the  outward  variety  of  man's  historic 
representations,  can  we  not  plunge  below  the  surface 
and  seize  some  stable  element,  some  scheme,  some 
law,  some  generalized  fact,  some  plan  or  principle  on 
which  the  drama  has  been  constructed,  some  perma- 
nent truth  that  evolves  amid  all  the  apparent  diversity 


A    THEORETIC    ULTIMATUM.  413 

of  images  ?  Can  we  not  transform  the  real  elements 
as  they  appear  into  some  abstract  form  that  enables  us 
to  state  them  in  a  rational  equation  ?  Can  we  not 
apprehend  the  essential  character  of  the  changes,  as 
well  as  their  empirical  character,  and  derive  instruction 
for  the  reason,  as  well  as  materials  for  the  memory 
and  the  understanding? 

No  truth  appears  to  be  more  satisfactorily  and  more 
generally  borne  out  by  the  history  of  modern  Europe, 
than  that  the  progression  of  men  in  the  matter  of  lib- 
erty "is  from  a  diversity  of  privileges  towards  an 
equality  of  rights ; "  that  is,  that  the  past  progress  has 
been  all  in  this  direction  since  the  maximum  of  diver- 
sity prevailed  in  the  aspect  of  individual  lord  and  indi- 
vidual serf.  And  if  this  be  the  case,  it  cannot  be  an 
unreasonable  conclusion,  that  if  sufficient  time  be 
allowed  for  the  evolution,  the  progress  of  change  will 
continue  to  go  on  till  some  ultimate  condition  is  evolved. 
And  that  ultimate  condition  can  only  be  at  the  point 
where  diversity  of  privilege  disappears,  and  every  in- 
dividual in  the  state  is  legally  entitled  to  identically 
the  same  political  functions.  Diversities  of  office 
there  may  be,  and  there  must  be,  but  diversity  of 
rights  there  cannot  be  without  injustice. 

Such,  then,  is  the  theoretic  ultimatum  that  satisfies 
the  reason  with  regard  to  its  equity,  and  such  is  the 
historic  ultimatum  that  the  reason  infers  from  the  past 
history  of  mankind.  Such,  then,  is  the  point  towards 
which  societies  are  progressing ;  and  when  that  point 
is  reached,  the  ultimatum  of  equity  is  achieved,  and 
the  present  course  of  historical  evolution  is  complete. 
35* 


414  THE    CLASSES    OF    SOCIETY. 

But  while  on  the  one  hand  we  cast  our  eyes  on  the 
ultimate  object  to  be  obtained  —  on  that  which  is  theo* 
retically  right  —  it  should  never  be  forgotten  that  two 
other  questions  nearer  at  hand  claim  as  urgent  an  at- 
tention—  the  questions,  "  Where  are  we  at  present  in 
the  line  of  progress  ?  "  and  "  What  are  the  next  steps 
that  require  to  be  taken  to  lead  society  towards  its 
final  destination  ?  "  These  are  questions  for  the  prac- 
tical statesman  and  for  the  present  generation,  who 
require  to  deliver  themselves  from  the  evils  that  have 
grown  to  a  height,  and  whose  real  character  has  been 
apprehended  by  the  nation.  On  these  questions  we 
shall  only  make  a  passing  remark. 

Diversity  of  opinion  may  arise  between  two  men 
who  are  both  apparently  in  the  right,  if  the  attention 
of  the  one  be  directed  to  what  is  theoretically  right, 
and  the  attention  of  the  other  to  what  is  practically 
expedient  as  the  next  step  which  the  present  balance 
of  powers  in  the  state  renders  possible.  At  every  pe- 
riod there  are  some  men  in  advance  of  their  age,  some 
suited  to  the  practical  requirements  of  their  age,  and 
others  behind  their  age  —  the  gejndce  or  loiterers,  who 
remain  in  the  rear.  The  latter  class,  for  the  most  part, 
are  composed  of  those  whose  interests  are  implicated 
in  the  present  disposition  of  affairs,  and  who  dread 
change  of  every  description,  perhaps  from  a  vague 
apprehension  that  they  may  lose  their  present  powers, 
while  the  increase  of  those  powers  is  an  event  not  to 
be  anticipated.  This  class  is  gradually  losing  its  in- 
fluence, gradually  receding  from  the  direction  of  the 
state,  and  submitting  to  a  current  that  it  can  no  longer 


THE    PRACTICAL    MAN    AND    THE    THEORIST.         415 

control,  but  which  it  may  to  a  certain  extent  impede. 
The  other  two  classes  are  the  real  laborers ;  with  them 
lies  the  motive  of  progression,  and  the  judgment  to 
determine  in  what  particular  direction  change  ought 
to  be  effected.  *  For  the  loiterers,  every  change  is  bad ; 
and  the  whole  of  their  practical  function  is  to  retard, 
to  contrive  obstacles,  to  find  impediments,  and  if  pos- 
sible to  prevent  investigation.  But  for  the  other  two 
classes,  not  only  is  the  impulse  necessary,  but  on  them 
lies  the  burden  of  devising  new  conditions,  which  shall 
be  more  beneficial  than  the  present  conditions,  of  ex- 
ploring, pioneering,  preparing  the  way,  and  finally  of 
dragging  onward  the  cumbrous  car  of  state,  held  back 
as  it  is  by  those  who  inherit  from  darker  ages  the 
power  of  retardation.  Between  the  first  two  classes, 
however,  there  must  ever  be  diversity  of  opinion,  so 
long  as  the  one  class  is  bent  on  what  is  theoretically 
right,  and  the  other  on  what  it  deems  to  be  practically 
expedient.  The  first  regards  the  measures  of  the  sec- 
ond as  unsatisfactory,  as  half  measures,  as  mere  sops 
to  allay  the  Cerberus  of  popular  discontent.  The 
second,  on  the  contrary,  regard  the  measures  of  the 
first  as  impracticable  schemes,  as  theoretic  measures, 
good  enough  perhaps  in  the  abstract,  (that  is,  meas- 
ures that  satisfy  the  reason,)  but  which,  from  some 
peculiarity  in  present  circumstances,  are  quite  incapa- 
ble of  application.  The  one  professedly  takes  reason 
for  his  criterion,  and  rejects  every  measure  that  falls 
short  of  its  requirements  ;  the  other  extends  his  view 
no  farther  than  to  the  single  point  that  enables  him  to 
take  one  step  in  advance.  The  one  takes  the  un- 
changeable  and   imperishable   element   of   man,   the 


416  THE    PRACTICAL    MAN    AND    THE    THEORIST. 

objective  reason,*  crowns  it  with  imperial  authority, 
and  demands  that  all  should  at  once  acknowledge  its 
supremacy.  The  other  takes  the  variable  element  of 
man  —  his  subjective  condition  —  and,  rejecting  every 
dogma  that  claims  to  be  absolute,  discourses  only  on 
the  proximate  possibility  of  improving  that  condition. 
The  one  sees  the  transparent  image  of  truth  divested 
of  the  garb  of  humanity ;  the  other  sees  the  outward 
raiment  in  its  frailty  and  imperfection,  and  heeds  not 
to  draw  aside  the  drapery  that  conceals  the  divinity 
of  reason. 

Between  these  two  parties,  therefore,  there  is  not  so 
much  a  perpetual  warfare  as  a  perpetual  misunder- 
standing. Their  point  of  view  is  different.  They 
stand  on  different  elevations,  and  have  quite  a  differ- 
ent range  of  horizon.  Granting  that  some  of  both 
parties  (and  who  can  doubt  it  ?)  have  the  honest  and 
sincere  desire  to  advance  society  in  the  right  direction, 
there  is  between  them  an  incompatibility  both  of  con- 
viction and  of  feeling,  which  forbids  that  they  should 
cooperate  as  laborers  in  the  same  field,  and  for  the 
same  ultimate  object.     The  one  views  society  as  in  a 


*  Axiomatic  truth  is  subjective  when  in  spontaneous  operation, 
but  it  is  objective  when  reduced  to  language,  and  expressed  in  prop- 
ositions. This  fact  is  altogether  overlooked  by  those  who  descant 
on  the  subjectivity  of  axiomatic  truth.  On  the  very  same  principle, 
heat,  color,  sound,  &c,  &c,  matter,  mind,  and  every  thing  else,  are 
subjective  according  to  these  philosophers,  so  that  there  really  is 
nothing  —  in  fact,  it  is  quite  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  there  can  be 
any  thing  —  the  universe  being  only  a  great  delusion.  If  the  sim- 
plicity of  a  philosophical  system  be  the  criterion  of  its  perfection, 
this  system  can  scarcely  be  excelled. 


THE    PRACTICAL    MAN    AND    THE    THEORIST.         417 

state  of  transition,  and  presses  forward  towards  an 
ultimatum.  The  other  views  society  as  engaged  in 
its  ordinary  labor,  believes  in  no  ultimatum,  but  ac- 
knowledges that  certain  changes  are  rendered  neces- 
sary by  a  change  of  circumstances.  The  one  views 
the  revival  of  learning  as  the  passage  out  of  Egypt, 
and  the  present  time  as  the  journeying  through  the 
wilderness  towards  the  promised  land  of  rest.  The 
other  believes  in  no  Egypt  and  no  promised  land,  but 
feels  that  the  daily  labor  must  be  done  in  the  world 
of  politics  as  well  as  in  the  world  of  matter.  The 
one  stands  on  the  top  of  Pisgah,  and  beholds  afar  off 
the  Canaan  of  his  hopes,  the  land  of  long  expectation, 
and  the  land  for  which  the  past  journeyings  of  the 
race  have  been  but  the  necessary  preparations.  The 
other,  like  Lot,  beholds  the  plain  of  Jordan  that  it  is 
wTell  watered  every  where,  and  journeys  eastward  that 
he  may  find  sustenance  for  his  flock.  The  one  is 
an  intellectualist,  who  believes  in  the  supremacy  of 
reason,  and  attributes  the  systematic  errors  of  society 
to  erroneous  propositions.  The  other  is  an  empiric, 
who  admits  no  absolute  criterion,  but  admits  that  the 
conditions  of  mankind  may  be  gradually  improved. 
The  one  fixes  his  eye  on  truth,  and  forgets  the  inter- 
mediate distance  that  separates  man  from  its  realiza- 
tion. The  other  fixes  his  eye  on  man  a3  he  appears 
at  present,  forgetting  alike  the  history  of  his  trans- 
formation and  the  probable  goal  that  must  form  his 
destination. 

To  a  certain  extent,  both  are  necessary ;  both  are 
workers  in  the  great  field  of  human  improvement 
and  of  man's  amelioration.     Incomprehensible  as  they 


418         THE    PRACTICAL    MAN    AND    THE    THEORIST. 

must  ever  be  to  each  other,  (till  the  last  final  item  of 
change  shall  bring  both  to  an  identity  of  purpose,)  they 
are  fellow-laborers  in  the  scheme  of  human  evolution. 
The  one  devises  afar  off  the  general  scheme  of  prog- 
ress ;  the  other  carries  the  proximate  measures  of  that 
scheme  into  practical  operation.  The  one  is  the  hy- 
drographer  who  constructs  the  chart;  the  other,  the 
mariner  who  navigates  the  ship,  ignorant,  perhaps, 
what  may  be  its  final  destination. 

Between  the  man  of  theory  and  the  man  of  practice, 
therefore,  there  is  (at  present)  a  perpetual  though 
fluctuating  difference.  Seldom  is  it  given  to  man  in 
this  world  to  understand  aright  his  own  position;  and 
though  he  may  labor,  and  labor  well,  it  i3  rare  that  he 
can  appreciate  correctly  the  true  position  of  his  labors. 
And  thus  in  the  field  of  politics,  the  theorist  and  the 
man  of  practice  appear  to  misunderstand  the  bearings 
of  their  respective  occupations.  The  theorist,  too 
often  trusting  to  his  individual  perceptions,  forgets 
that  propositions  which  appear  to  him  of  absolute 
certitude  can  never  be  accepted  by  the  world  until 
they  have  received  a  far  wider  authentication  than 
any  one  man  could  possibly  bestow  upon  them.  And 
though  perchance  he  might  evolve  some  propositions 
which  should  ultimately  be  able  to  stand  their  ground, 
experience  will  prove  that  the  diffusion  of  truth  is  no 
less  necessary  than  its  discovery.  Truth,  like  leaven, 
must  pervade  the  mass  before  the  requisite  transforma- 
tion is  effected.  On  the  other  hand,  the  man  of  prac- 
tice moves,  for  the  most  part,  as  he  is  impelled  by  the 
convictions  of  the  multitude,  and  his  object  is  not  to 
theorize  but  to  design  the  requisite  changes,  and  to 


THE    END    OF    PROGRESSION.  419 

carry  them  into  execution.  The  theories  of  to-day  he 
regards  with  indifference  or  aversion ;  they  are  of  no 
practical  avail;  he  is  pressed  with  the  necessity  of 
action,  and  act  he  must,  or  his  place  must  be  ceded 
to  another.  But  he  also  forgets.  He  forgets  that  the 
very  measures  which  he  now  reduces  to  practical 
operation  were  the  theories  of  the  past  generation,  and 
that  he  is  only  carrying  into  execution  the  schemes 
which  the  practical  men  of  other  times  regarded  in  the 
same  light  as  he  regards  the  theories  of  to-day ;  and 
the  very  theories  (some  of  them  at  all  events)  which 
he  regards  with  aversion,  are  destined  to  become  the 
measures  of  some  future  man  of  practice,  who  bestows 
on  the  theories  of  his  day  the  same  characteristic  ab- 
horrence. He  forgets  that  he  moves  in  action  because 
the  multitude  have  moved  in  mind;  and  that  the 
multitude  moved  in  mind  because  they  had  imbibed 
the  theories  of  former  speculators,  and  changed  their 
credence  under  the  influence  of  conviction.  He  forgets 
that  change  of  action  comes  from  change  of  credence, 
and  that  change  of  credence  comes  from  theoretic 
speculation.  He  forgets  that  if  there  were  no  theories 
there  would  be  no  change,  and  if  no  change,  no  neces- 
sity for  him  to  execute  it. 

In  assigning,  then,  a  theoretic  ultimatum  to  man's 
political  progress,  we  posit,  — 

1st.  That  this  ultimatum  is  the  only  one  that  satis- 
fies the  reason. 

2d.  That  its  probability  is  borne  out  by  the  history 
of  the  past  changes  that  have  taken  place  in  the  rela- 
tive conditions  of  the  various  political  classes  of  which 
society  has  hitherto  been  composed. 


420  THE    END    OF    PROGRESSION. 

3d.  That  if  society  continue  to  progress  -on  the 
same  scheme  or  plan  that  may  be  inferred  from  an 
observation  of  its  past  progress,  and  if  sufficient  time 
be  allowed  for  the  completion  of  the  evolution,  there 
must  come  a  period  when  the  equilibrium  of  equity 
shall  be  restored,  and  every  individual  in  the  state 
shall  be  exactly  equal  in  his  primary  political  function. 

4th.  That  all  diversities  of  rights  and  privileges, 
being  contrary  to  the  theoretic  reason  of  mankind, 
shall  altogether  disappear ;  and  the  law,  which  is  (in 
its  proper  sense)  the  expression  of  the  theoretic  rea- 
son, shall  acknowledge  no  political  difference  whatever 
between  the  individuals  who  form  the  state,  except 
such  diversities  of  office  as  may  be  found  advisable 
for  conducting  the  business  of  the  body  politic.  And 
this  diversity  of  office  to  be  determined  exclusively  by 
the  free  election  of  the  whole  associated  individuals 
who  form  the  state. 

5th.  That  law  derives  from  the  general  or  abstract 
reason  of  the  human  race,  and  therefore  it  can  never 
acknowledge  a  political  difference  between  the  individ- 
uals of  the  race  without  being  guilty  of  partiality  and 
injustice. 

6th.  Absolute  equality  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  with- 
out the  slightest  distinction  of  individuals  or  classes, 
is,  therefore,  the  ultimatum  of  political  progression ; 
and  this  ultimatum  is  the  only  condition  that  satisfies 
the  requirements  of  the  reason,  and  the  only  condition 
that  presents  a  rational  termination  to  those  changes 
which,  according  to  history,  have  been  gradually  taking 
place  for  centuries* 


CHAPTER  IV. 

BRIEF  OUTLINE  OF  AN  HISTORICAL  SKETCH,  BEING 
AN  ATTEMPT  TO  APPREHEND  THE  SENTIMENTS 
OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND  WHICH  HAVE  RULED  SOCI- 
ETY, AND  TO  APPRECIATE  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  MAN  THROUGH  HIS  HISTORIC 
MANIFESTATIONS. 

But,  while  an  equality  of  political  rights  may  be 
posited  as  a  logical  ultimatum  that  satisfies  the  rea- 
son, and  therefore  as  an  ultimatum  that  may  surely 
be  expected  to  evolve  in  one  nation  after  another,  as 
knowledge  progresses  and  the  arrangements  of  super- 
stition are  broken  down  before  the  advance  of  truth,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  organization  of  society  is 
the  end  to  be  achieved ;  and  the  practical  ultimatum 
is  the  organization  of  society  on  true  principles  instead 
of  on  false  principles. 

To  suppose  that  theoretic  principles  are  incapable 
of  being  reduced  to  practice  because  they  are  theoretic, 
is  not  only  an  assumption  that  God  has  created  man's 
reason  in  opposition  to  the  requirements  of  his  terres- 
trial condition,  but  it  is  also  a  palpable  inconsistency 
utterly  untenable.  All  arrangements  are  necessarily 
based  on  theoretic  principles  of  some  kind  or  other; 
nor  can  man,  by  any  possibility,  make  any  construc- 
tion of  society  which  is  not  de  facto  the  actual  reali- 
36 


422  THEORIES. 

zation  of  a  tlieory.  It  is  exactly  the  same  with  phi- 
losophy. Every  man  might  reject,  in  words,  the  claims 
of  philosophic  theories ;  yet  no  sooner  does  he  proceed 
to  act  than  he  immediately  gives  his  unconditional 
assent  to  some  philosophical  theory,  and  declares,  in 
the  most  explicit  and  intelligible  of  all  modes,  his  un- 
reserved belief  in  philosophic  propositions  which  in- 
volve the  highest  abstractions  of  the  reason.  Let  the 
whole  phenomenon  of  his  action  be  translated  into 
language,  and  at  the  bottom  will  necessarily  be  found 
a  philosophic  theory.  Incapable  as  he  may  be  of 
reflection,  or  of  reducing  his  credence  to  its  ultimate 
form,  he  has  by  the  very  fact  of  action  pronounced 
judgment  on  the  great  questions  of  philosophy.  No 
intelligent  act  can  be  performed  without  also  involv- 
ing, as  an  absolute  necessity,  a  theory ;  and  therefore 
the  question  lies,  not  between  the  acceptance  or  the 
rejection  of  theories,  but  between  the  acceptance 
of  a  true  or  a  false  theory,  for  one  must  necessarily 
be  chosen. 

Every  form  of  society,  every  form  of  government, 
every  system  of  association,  every  actually  existing 
form  of  civil  polity,  is  the  realization  of  speculative 
propositions.  Every  government  necessarily  has  its 
theory,  of  which  that  government  is  only  the  practical 
realization.  Every  system  established  by  man,  either 
in  church  or  state,  has  been  only  the  outward  expres- 
sion of  an  inward  credence,  which  credence  involved 
a  theory ;  and  this  theory  is  true  or  false. 

In  the  past  arrangements  of  society,  therefore,  it  is 
possible  to  detect  the  theories  on  which  those  arrange- 
ments have  been  based,  to  inquire  whether  they  were 


THE  PAPACY  AND  THE  FEUDAL  SYSTEM.     423 

true  or  false,  and  to  trace  them  in  their  evolution  as 
they  changed  from  one  to  the  other,  under  the  influ- 
ence of  new  circumstances  and  newly  developed  truth. 

In  Britain,  the  constitution  of  civil  society,  like  that 
of  ecclesiastical  society,  has  only  once  been  subjected 
to  systematic  arrangement;  once  only  has  the  state 
been  formed  in  such  a  manner  that  each  individual 
has  had  his  civil  position  allocated  to  him  by  law, 
while,  at  the  same  time,  he  was  directly  connected 
with  the  other  individuals,  forming  together  one  politi- 
cal association. 

The  church,  as  one  association,  presented  itself  un- 
der the  form  of  the  papacy ;  the  state,  as  one  associa- 
tion, presented  itself  under  the  form  of  the  feudal 
system.  The  papacy  was  the  complete  organization 
of  the  church  on  false  principles ;  the  feudal  system 
was  the  complete  organization  of  the  state  on  false 
principles ;  and  the  history  of  modern  society  is  the 
history  of  the  gradual  destruction  of  those  two  great 
systems  —  of  the  de-organization  of  the  papal  church 
—  of  the  de-organization  of  the  feudal  state  —  of  the 
reduction  of  both  to  unassociated  elements;  and  of 
the  gradual  growth  of  those*  new  principles,  which 
shall  ultimately  rearrange  those  elements  into  a  new 
form,  and  present  once  more  a  united  churcji,  con- 
structed upon  two  principles ;  and  an  organized  state, 
or  real  political  association,  completely  organized  on 
those  principles  of  political  truth  which  took  their  birth 
in  the  reformation  of  religion,  and  since  that  period 
have  been  undergoing  development,  becoming  more 
powerful,  more  generally  received,  and  more  and  more 
extensively  applied. 


424 


WAR FEUDALISxM. 


The   political    construction    of    society,   under  the 
feudal  system,  was  essentially  based  on  the  assump- 
tion of  a  diversity  of  orders,  or  classes,  or  castes.     In 
its  origin,  the  feudal  system  had  been  a  genuine  and 
true  expression  of  man's  requirements.     Superiority  of 
position  was  acquired  by  superiority  of  skill,  courage, 
or  enterprise;  and  so  long  as  it  was  a  war  system, 
and  the  lands  were  accorded  to  the  warriors,  the  feudal 
system  was  correct  in  principle,  and  efficient  in  its 
operation.     But  when  the  system  had  grown,  and  had 
become  not  an  accidental  form  produced  by  circum- 
stances, but  an  intentional  form  confirmed  by  parch- 
ment   laws,  —  when    the    settled   warrior   became   a 
hereditary  noble,  and  society  presented  no  longer  a 
genuine  war   construction,   but  a  civil   construction, 
which  was  the  parchment  representation  of  the  genu- 
ine feudalism,  —  the  superiority  of  merit  disappeared, 
and  its  place  was  taken  by  a  superiority  of  rank.    The 
war  feudalism  was  a  spontaneous  allocation  of  offices 
to  individuals  according  to  their  capacities;  but  the 
parchment   feudalism  was   the   construction  of  civil 
society  on  the  principle  of  hereditary  rank,  hereditary 
jurisdiction,    hereditary    legislation,    and     hereditary 
landed  property.     This  system  was  the  construction 
of  civil  society  on  false  principles;  and  modern  so- 
ciety is  gradually  growing  out  of  this  form  of  con- 
struction  to   assume   another   form   of   organization, 
based  on  the  principle  of  equality. 

Let  us,  then,  ask,  What  was  the  essential  form  of 
society  in  its  feudal  construction  ? 

A,  B,  C,  D,  and  E  will  represent  individuals,  to 
whom  the  feudal  system  allocated  the  following 
positions :  — 

\ 


THE    FEUDAL    CONSTITUTION    OF    SOCIETY.         425 

A  is  a  king  by  right. 

B  is  a  great  landlord  by  right,  vassal  of  A  and 
lord  of  C. 

C  is  a  vassal,  holding  land  from  B  by  military 
service. 

D  is  a  sub-feudatory,  holding  land  from  C  for 
services  not  immediately  military. 

E  is  a  serf  belonging  to  A,  B,  C,  or  D,  without 
political  rights.     He  is  property,  not  a  person. 

Such  would  be  the  feudal  constitution  of  society. 
Of  course  the  word  right  is  employed,  in  its  custom- 
ary false  sense,  to  indicate  what  is  received  by  law,  or 
custom,  not  in  its  moral  sense. 

According  to  the  feudal  theory,  A  was  supposed  to 
derive  his  rights  from.  God,  and  to  be  subject  to  God 
alone ;  and  this  doctrine  was  asserted  in  France  down 
to  a  short  period  before  the  revolution.  In  England, 
it  was  considered  to  be  abolished  by  the  revolution 
of  1688. 

B  was  subject  to  A,  and  derived  his  rights  from  A, 
whose  vassal  he  was.  These  rights,  however,  became 
hereditary,  and,  when  sanctioned  by  custom,  B  main- 
tained them  as  inherent.     B's  son  was  born  a  lord. 

C  was  subject  to  B,  and  subject  also  to  A;  so  that 
B  was  subject  to  A,  and  lord  of  C. 

D  was  subject  to  C,  and  was  proprietor  of  E. 

E  was  property  of  D.  He  was  master  of  nobody, 
not  even  of  himself.  All  that  he  had  belonged  to  his 
owner. 

In  this  scheme  of  political  society,  A  legislates  for 
B,  tries  B  in  his  great  court,  and  punishes  him  on 
occasion.  B,  however,  has  a  jurisdiction  of  his  own, 
36* 

I 


426      THE    EQUITABLE    CONSTITUTION    OF    SOCIETY. 

and  tries  C  in  his  little  or  baronial  court,  and  punishes 
him  on  occasion.  C  has  a  minor  jurisdiction  over  D. 
And  D,  being  proprietor  of  E,  legislates  for  him,  and 
punishes  him  as  he  thinks  proper. 

Such  was  the  feudal  arrangement  of  society  with 
regard  to  political  rights.  And  this  was  the  system 
effectually  uprooted  and  destroyed  by  the  French 
revolution  —  the  system  that  has  been,  and  still  is, 
gradually  undergoing  a  process  of  destruction  in 
Britain.  Feudalism  has  not  been  destroyed  in  Britain; 
it  has  only  been  generalized  and  modified.  Vast 
changes  have  yet  to  take  place  before  it  finally  dis- 
appears. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  aspect  of  this  society,  when 
the  doctrine  of  equality  has  been  applied  to  it  so  far 
as  liberty  is  concerned. 

A  is  no  longer  a  king,  but  a  freeman. 

B  is  no  longer  a  lord,  but  a  freeman. 

C  is  no  longer  a  military  vassal,  but  a  freeman. 

D  is  no  longer  a  socman,  but  a  freeman. 

E  is  no  longer  a  serf,  but  a  freeman. 

And  these  freemen,  being  equal  in  rights,  proceed 
to  form  a  state,  and  elect  a  government  for  the  regula- 
tion of  the  whole. 

In  the  former  case  we  have  the  rule  of  superstition 
and  prescription ;  in  the  latter,  the  rule  of  reason  and 
equal  justice  to  all.  In  the  former  case  we  have  priv- 
ileges accorded  to  a  few,  at  the  expense  of  the  rights 
(the  moral  rights)  of  the  many ;  in  the  latter  case  we 
have  no  privileges,  no  hereditary  distinctions,  and  no 
diversity  of  conditions,  except  those  of  office,  or  those 
produced   by  the   more   or  less   successful   result  of 


CAUSES    OF    WAR.  427 

industry,  skill,  or  enterprise.  In  the  former  case  we 
have  a  system  that  contains  within  itself  the  destruc- 
tion of  justice ;  in  the  latter  a  system  that  contains 
within  itself  the  construction  of  a  jural  society.  In 
the  former  case  we  have  a  system  that  contains 
necessarily,  — 

1.  A  cause  of  war  of  B  against  A,  (the  barons 
bridle  the  king.) 

2.  A  cause  of  war  of  C  against  B. 

3.  A  cause  of  war  of  D  against  C. 

4.  A  cause  of  war  of  E  against  ABC  and  D,  be- 
cause ABC  and  D  had  deprived  him  of  his  rights  as 
a  man  —  as  a  moral  being  accountable  to  God. 

In  the  latter  case  we  have  the  obliteration  of  all  just 
cause  of  war.  Where  none  has  a  legal  right  which  is 
not  accorded  to  another  in  the  scheme  of  the  state,  the 
cause  of  internal  strife  is  obliterated ;  and  though  gov- 
ernments go  to  war  on  very  insufficient  pretexts,  pop- 
ulations seldom  or  never  do  so  without  a  just  cause. 
The  obliteration  of  the  cause,  therefore,  may  fairly  be 
expected  to  obliterate  the  fact. 

The  feudal  system,  with  all  its  modifications  past 
and  present,  however  mild  or  constitutional,  is  nothing 
more  than  systematized  slavery.  At  the  bottom  of 
society  there  must  always  be  found  the  great  masses 
in  a  worse  condition  than  nature  intended.  And 
wherever  the  feudal  system  exists,  or  any  remnant  of 
it,  that  system,  or  its  remnant,  creates  a  cause  of  war 
among  the  classes  of  society;  which  cause  of  war 
creates  perpetual  uneasiness,  frequent  agitations,  and 
occasional  revolutions. 

It  must  be  observed  that  the  feudal  system  had  no 


428  THE    TRADER. 

place  for  the  trader.  The  trader  is  a  non-feudal  ele- 
ment in  society,  and  belongs  to  a  different  system  of 
organization.  His  day  is  fast  approaching,  and  he 
will  ultimately  push  out  hereditary  feudalism  from  the 
direction  of  the  state.  He  began  without  a  place, 
without  a  rank,  and  almost  without  ordinary  protec- 
tion. As  a  Jew  he  was  persecuted  and  cruelly  wronged, 
barbarously  treated  because  he  had  no  brute  force  to 
repel  aggression.*     As  a  foreigner  he  was  taxed  and 

*  "  Another  considerable  article  of  the  crown  revenue  was  the 
profits  arising  from  the  Jews.  Our  histories  are  every  where  full 
of  the  great  and  extraordinary  taxes  and  impositions  laid  on  them ; 
they  were  a  constant  fund  for  a  necessitous  court.  Mr.  Maddox 
has  produced  a  multitude  of  the  exchequer  records  to  evince  this 
truth  ;  but  as  he  has  not  given  any  reason  for  the  exercise  of  this 
arbitrary  power,  but  only  taken  notice  of  the  fact  that  they  were  so 
taxed  ;  and  as  this  conduct  of  our  ancient  kings  seems  to  have  per- 
plexed Lord  Coke  in  some  parts  of  his  works,  —  we  shall  beg  leave 
to  inquire  into  the  grounds  and  reason  of  this  behavior ;  because 
such  arbitrary  and  extraordinary  methods  are  contrary  to  the 
analogy  of  our  constitution  in  other  respects* 

"  Some  think  our  kings  had  a  right  to  use  the  Jews  in  what  man- 
ner they  pleased,  and  that  their  fortunes  and  estate  were  absolutely 
at  the  king's  disposal,  and  this  by  a  grant  from  the  legislature.  For 
it  appears  by  the  twenty-ninth  law  of  the  Confessor,  that  the  Jews 
were  the  absolute  property  of  the  king.  The  words  are,  Judati  et 
omnia  sua  sunt  regis ;  quod  si  quispiam  detinuerit  eo*,  vel  pecuniain 
eorum,  pcrquirat  rex  si  vult,  tanquam  suum  proprium :  and  the 
reader  may  see  this  law  enforced  among  the  ordinances  of  Henry  II. 
and  Richard  I.,  concerning  the  Jews.  He  may  likewise  find  a  very 
memorable  record  in  the  first  volume  of  Rymer's  Collections,  where 
Henry  III.  mortgages  for  £5000  to  his  brother,  the  Earl  of  Corn- 
wall, omnis  Judaos  regni  Anglic,  with  a  power  of  distraining  the 
bodies  of  all  or  any  of  them,  if  the  money  was  not  paid  at  the  times 
prefixed."  —  History  of  Taxes  from  William  the  Conqueror  to  A.  D. 
1761. 


WAR  FEUDALISM  AND  PARCHMENT  FEUDALISM.  429 

tolerated,   and    as    a  native    he   was   a  base  trader 
engaged  in  ignoble  pursuits. 

The  feudal  system  was  organization  on  false  princi- 
ples, but  it  was  organization ;  and  so  long  as  the  or- 
ganization was  genuine  and  spontaneous,  the  feudal 
system  was  the  true  and  living  expression  of  man's 
necessities.  The  leader  was  a  leader,  a  lion  heart  who 
could  dare  and  do.  He  led  because  he  could  lead,  and 
was  followed  from  instinct,  which  knows  its  leader  and 
follows  him.  But  when  the  feudal  system  was  trans- 
planted from  the  field  to  the  court,  —  when  the  pen 
of  the  lawyer  supplanted  the  sword  of  the  knight,  and 
the  banner  of  parchment  was  more  powerful  than  the 
pennon,  —  the  life  of  feudalism  was  gone,  and  a  clat- 
tering skeleton  remained  with  its  dead  formalities. 
War  feudalism  was  a  good,  and  genuine,  and  true 
man  ;  but  parchment  feudalism  was  a  mock  man,  — 
the  one  was  the  organization  of  force,  —  the  other  the 
law  copy  of  that  organization,  and  the  attempts  to  fix 
in  perpetuity  the  form  without  the  elements.  In  the 
one,  power  was  the  essential,  and  form  the  accidental ; 
in  the  other,  form  was  the  essential,  and  power  was 
the  accidental.  The  one  had  a  leader  who  did  govern ; 
the  other,  a  king  who  was  supposed  to  govern.  The 
one  had  an  aristocracy  of  talent ;  the  other  an  aristoc- 
racy of  sheepskin.  The  one  gave  lands  because  he 
first  conquered  them;  the  other  gave  lands  because 
they  fell  into  his  hands.  The  one  gave  lands  to  men 
of  the  sword  who  could  defend  them ;  the  other  to 
fools  and  favorites.  The  one  was  a  real  lion  who 
showed  himself;  the  other  was  a  stuffed  lion  with  a 
fox  for  a  showman. 


430       WAR    FEUDALISM    AND    PARCHMENT    FEUDALISM. 

Every  human  system  grows,  expands,  arrives  at 
maturity,  decays,  and  dies.  The  system  dies,  but  man 
does  not  die.  Man  goes  on  to  new  systems,  which 
grow,  expand,  and  die  also  ;  and  again  to  new  systems, 
which  also  die.  But  beneath  the  surface  of  the  human 
systems  there  is  a  reality  which  does  not  die  —  a  real- 
ity which  evolves.  One  system  teaches  one  truth,  and 
another  system  another  truth,  and  the  truth  remains 
when  the  system  has  disappeared.  All  attempts  to  fix 
systems  in  perpetuity  are  unnatural.  The  vital  ele- 
ment is  fled,  and  the  body  must  perish,  or  if  preserved 
is  a  mummy.  And  all  systems  preserved  by  law 
beyond  their  natural  existence  are  mummy  systems. 
And  it  would  be  no  less  absurd  to  allocate  a  mainte- 
nance to  a  mummy  than  to  a  system.  If  the  man  is 
alive,  he  must  support  himself;  if  dead,  he  needs  no 
maintenance.  And  if  the  system  is  alive,  it  will  make 
its  maintenance  because  men  require  it ;  and  if  men 
require  it  not,  it  is  a  mummy  system,  and  should  have 
no  maintenance. 

All  human  systems,  intentionally  established,  or 
reduced  to  legal  institutions,  originate  in  the  credences 
of  man ;  and  so  long  as  the  credences  last,  the  systems 
are  natural,  and  do  not  decay.  But  when  the  credence 
advances,  the  system  is  no  longer  the  expression  of 
man's  requirements ;  and  the  system  if  preserved  can 
do  evil,  and  only  evil.  With  the  advance  of  credence 
the  system  ought  to  advance  also ;  for  man,  in  perpet- 
uating systems,  perpetuates  only  the  expression  of  his 
former  ignorance.  The  feudal  system  was  the  organi- 
zation of  power,  because  man  believed  war  to  be  the 
noblest  occupation.     It  was  power  organized ;  and  if 


WAR   FEUDALISM    AND    PARCHMENT    FEUDALISM.       431 

it  had  been  true  that  war  was  man's  real  occupation, 
the  feudal  system  was  the  true  system  of  organi- 
zation. Bat  another  element  than  force  began  to 
divide  men's  credence  —  law.  And  the  form  of  the 
feudal  system  was  transformed  from  the  right  of 
the  sword  to  the  right  of  the  sheepskin.  The  sword 
was  bad,  but  the  system  was  efficient  so  long  as 
it  was  spontaneous.  The  sheepskin  was  an  im- 
provement on  the  sword;  and  had  the  system  of 
the  sheepskin  gone  back  to  the  genuine  origin  of 
the  system  of  the  sword,  it  would  have  resulted  in 
the  same  efficiency  that  characterized  the  power  of 
feudalism.  The  sword  has  a  right  use  and  a  wrong 
use  —  it  may  be  in  the  hand  of  justice,  or  it  may  be 
in  the  hand  of  will.  And  the  sheepskin  also  has  a 
right  use  and  a  wrong  use  —  it  may  be  the  expression 
of  justice,  or  it  may  be  the  expression  of  will.  The 
sword  is  force,  the  sheepskin  is  law ;  and  when  men 
advance  from  the  organization  of  force  to  the  organi- 
zation of  law,  the  parchment  supersedes  the  sword, 
and  injustice  may  be  done  by  the  one  exactly  as  it 
was  done  by  the  other.  It  is  a  higher  and  more 
systematic  kind  of  injustice,  and  so  far  it  is  a  prog- 
ress, as  fine  and  imprisonment  is  an  advance  upon  the 
torture  wheel.  The  feudal  system  grew  spontaneous- 
ly, and  the  elements  of  its  power  were  in  the  form  of 
its  spontaneous  construction.  But  the  form  of  its 
construction  was  not  preserved,  and  feudalism  decayed 
from  the  very  attempt  to  perpetuate  it. 

Feudalism  became  hereditary ;  but  neither  courage 
nor  skill  are  hereditary,  and  hereditary  warriors  are 
mummies.     The   hereditary  system   transformed   the 


432       WAR    FEUDALISM    AND    PARCHMENT    FEUDALISM. 

whole  genius  of  feudal  society,  and  the  feudal  system, 
as  a  war  organization,  had  lost  its  power.  The  prin- 
ciple of  feudalism,  as  a  war  system,  was  to  allocate 
the  lands  to  him  who  was  the  warrior ;  the  principle 
of  feudalism,  as  a  parchment  system,  was  to  consider 
him  warrior  who  held  the  lands.*  And  when  the 
force  organization  of  society  gave  way  to  the  law 
organization  of  society,  the  hereditary  principle  was 
transplanted  into  the  legislature,  and  men  became 
hereditary  legislators.  But  wisdom  is  no  more  he- 
reditary than  courage  and  skill;  and  the  hereditary 
system  of  legislation  —  the  parchment  feudalism  — 
became  as  inefficient  as  the  hereditary  system  of 
defence  —  the  pennon  feudalism.  A  new  element 
was  required,  and  a  new  element  appeared,  to  dispute 
the  claims  of  hereditary  force  or  hereditary  law. 

The  pennon  feudalism  had  a  pursuit  —  war;  and 
the  parchment  feudalism  had  a  pursuit  —  pleasure. 
First,  Mars,  then  Bacchus  and  Venus,  has  been  the 
course  of  semi-barbarous  man  in  all  ages.  But  neither 
war  nor  pleasure  will  satisfy  mankind ;  and  man  must 
progress  beyond  his  mere  animal  desires.  A  new 
pursuit  began  to  grow  amid  the  wars  and  pleasures 

*  "  The  companion  requires  from  the  liberality  of  his  chief  the 
warlike  steed,  the  bloody  and  conquering-  spear,  and  in  place  of 
pay  he  expects  to  be  supplied  with  a  table,  homely  indeed,  but 
plentiful." 

Note  by  M.  Brotier.  —  "  From  hence,  Montesquieu  (Esprit  des 
Lois,  xxx.  3)  justly  derives  the  origin  of  vassalage.  At  first  the 
prince  gives  to  his  nobles  arms  and  provisions;  as  avarice  ad- 
vanced, money ;  and  then  lands  were  required,  which  from  bene- 
fices became  at  length  hereditary  possessions,  and  were  called  fiefs. 
Hence  the  establishment  of  the  feudal  system."  —  Aiken's  Tacitus. 
Manners  of  Germans. 


THE  TRADER  AND  THE  FEUDAL  SYSTEM.     433 

of  feudalism  —  trade.  This  new  pursuit  was  a  new 
advance  of  society,  and  it  introduced  a  new  element 
in  the  shape  of  wealth.  It  was  not  merely  trade,  but 
trade  beginning  to  be  organized  and  systematized. 
Trade,  like  war  or  pleasure,  had  always  formed  part 
of  the  occupation  of  mankind.  But  feudalism,  not 
content  with  organizing  an  army,  had  organized  civil 
society  on  the  war  principle ;  and  parchment  feudal- 
ism organized  society  on  the  principle  that  the  aristo- 
crats were  for  pleasure,  and  the  rest  of  the  people  for 
labor  to  supply  their  pleasures.  "  Priests  are  set  apart 
for  prayer,  but  it  is  fit  that  noble  chevaliers  should  enjoy 
all  ease  and  taste  all  pleasures ;  while  the  laborer  toils 
in  order  that  they  may  be  nourished  in  abundance  — 
they  and  their  horses  and  their  dogs."  Trade,  how- 
ever, crept  in ;  and  society  began  to  admit  a  portion 
of  the  trade  principle.  And  this,  like  every  thing 
else,  began  on  false  grounds ;  with  privileges,  charters, 
restrictions,  exemptions,  local  boundaries,  and  a  hun- 
dred other  interruptions  to  the  laws  of  nature.  Trade, 
however,  asserted  its  claims,  and  advanced  a  new 
element  into  the  constitution  of  government.  The 
burgesses  were  tolerated,  because  they  had  money 
and  could  pay  taxes ;  and  gradually  the  traders  have 
pushed  their  way  against  the  parchment  lords,  as  the 
parchment  lords  pushed  theirs  against  the  pennon 
lords.  The  commons  are  partly  knights  who  represent 
proprietors  of  land,  and  partly  "  citizens  and  bur- 
gesses, chosen  by  the  mercantile  or  supposed  trading 
interest  of  the  nation."  And  though  the  commons 
have  never  in  reality  represented  the  people  of  Britain, 
but  at  the  most  the  wealthier  traders,  the  direction  of 
37 


434  THE    FEUDAL   LORDS. 

society  may  be  inferred  from  the  relative  position  of 
the  commons  now,  and  the  commons  two  or  three 
centuries  ago.  Henry  VIII.  was  a  parchment  king, 
whose  will  was  law.  The  war  lords  had  fought  them- 
selves out  in  the  wars  of  the  Roses,  and  as  war  lords 
appeared  no  more.  The  commons  were  a  few  cringing 
burgesses,  without  power.  The  king  was  the  state, 
and,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  the  only  real  power 
in  the  state.  He  did  what  it  has  been  the  lot  of  few 
to  do  —  he  changed  the  religion  of  the  nation  and 
confiscated  the  lands  of  the  church,  and,  in  so  doing, 
laid  the  foundation  of  the  parchment  power  of  the 
lords.  A  few  reigns,  and  the  commonwealth  passed 
over ;  and  the  lords  had  found  that  law,  and  not  the 
sword,  was  the  genuine  source  of  power.  The  lords 
were  now  the  state,  and  admitted  William  of  Orange 
to  be  the  organ  of  aristocratic  domination.  This 
scheme  has  extended  down  to  the  present  day ;  but 
another  change  has  been  going  on,  showing  plainly 
that  the  power  of  the  lords  is  no  more  permanent  than 
the  power  of  the  king.  The  commons  have  taken  up 
the  power.  It  is  now  customarily  admitted  that  the 
government  cannot  function  without  a  majority  of 
the  commons ;  in  fact,  that  the  king  reigns,  but  does 
not  govern,  and  that  a  majority  in  the  commons  is 
the  necessary  element  for  carrying  on  the  operations 
of  the  state.  The  lords  have  retired  in  solemn  de- 
cency, and  the  knights  and  burgesses  direct  the  affairs 
of  Britain. 

To  suppose,  however,  that  this  change  is  ultimate, 
would  be  contrary  to  all  the  teaching  of  history. 
Parchment  lordship   is   contrary  to   the  credence  of 


THE    FEUDAL    LORDS.  435 

modern  times.  Men  are  beginning  to  believe  that  he 
who  does  not  work  ought  not  to  be  supported,  as  those 
who  do  work  support  the  whole.  The  war  lord  worked, 
and  worked  hard.  He  fought,  or  was  ready  to  fight, 
and  his  life  was  at  stake  for  his  wages.  He  deserved 
his  reward.  He  was  a  man  who  led  men ;  and  so 
long  as  he  was  a  real  war  lord,  and  war  was  the  real 
pursuit,  he  was  a  genuine  man,  and  filled  an  office  for 
which  men  were  willing  to  accord  him  wages.  When 
he  became  a  parchment  lord,  he  still  worked.  He 
made  laws,  and  ruled  the  country.  He  was  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  necessary,  like  the  bishop,  who  once  worked 
also,  and  ruled  the  church.  And  in  former  days,  the 
rule  of  the  church  was  no  more  a  jest  than  the  rule  of 
the  state.  It  was  a  real  office  —  a  thing  not  of  silks 
and  drawing-rooms ;  but  of  the  translation  of  the 
Word  of  God,  and  appearance  at  the  martyr's  stake 
when  requisite.  The  bishop  was  a  pastor,  a  real  gen- 
uine pastor,  who  had  a  flock,  and  cared  for  it ;  and  even 
now,  if  it  were  possible  to  reanimate  the  bishop,  and 
make  him  again  a  leader,  a  genuine  leader  of  men, 
there  is  no  man  in  the  country  who  could  count  fol- 
lowers with  him.  But  both  have  outlived  their  time. 
The  commons  are  said  to  rule,  and  the  bishop's  voice 
is  heard  only  in  the  minor  wranglings  of  sectarianism. 
True,  there  are  good  and  pious  bishops  and  archbish- 
ops, and  their  writings,  as  cultivated  men  and  ministers, 
are  excellent.  But  as  bishops,  they  are  almost  un- 
known.*    The  office  is  no  longer  requisite.     And  the 

*  For  an  account  of  the  revenues  of  the  church  of  England, 
incomes  of  the  bishoprics,  &c,  see  Wade's  "  Unreformed  Abuses 


436  THE    FEUDAL    LORDS. 

parchment  lord  is  also  antiquated,  because  he  does  not 
work.  There  is  no  work  for  parchment  lords,  no  de- 
mand in  the  market,  nothing  for  them  to  do.  For- 
merly, if  there  had  been  no  lords,  they  would  have 
been  originated.  Society  required  them,  and  would 
pay  for  them;  and,  if  there  had  been  none,  society 
would  have  made  them,  and  did  make  them.     There 

in  Church  and  State."  Some  curious  facts  are  there  stated  regard- 
ing the  expense  at  which  England  supports  her  ecclesiastical  min- 
istrations. It  seems  that  there  are  32  cathedral  and  collegiate 
churches  in  England  and  Wales,  with  261  members,  (deans,  canons, 
prebendaries,  &c.,)  and  a  revenue  of  £184,123  per  annum.  For 
this  sum  a  week-day  service  is  maintained,  (in  addition  to  the  Sab- 
bath services,)  and  the  congregations  are  stated  to  amount  to  nearly 
the  same  number  as  the  officials.     Thus :  — 


Cathedrals. 

Officials  Present. 

Congregations 

Durham,           3 

L                        32 

18 

Peterborough,  ] 

L                        12 

7 

Wells,              ] 

L                        19 

22 

Carlisle,           ] 

I                        17 

9 

Rochester,        ] 

L                        22 

14 

Oxford,  (!)        ] 

t                        15 

18 

Lincoln, 

t                        24 

8 

7                        141  Persons,  96 
The  seven  bishoprics  bearing  the  above  names  had  the  following 
incomes  in  1843 :  — 

Durham, £22,416 

Peterborough, 4,060 

Bath  and  Wells,        ...        -  4,567 

Carlisle,    ------  2,476 

Rochester,         -----  1,102 

Oxford, 2,506 

Lincoln,    ------  5,610 


Total,        -        £42,737 


THE    FEUDAL    LORDS.  437 

was  an  office  which  men  required  to  fill ;  an  office  that 
had  its  labors,  its  responsibilities,  its  dangers,  and  con- 
sequently its  rewards.  But  if  lords  no  longer  lead, 
and  no  longer  govern  in  reality ;  or  if  they  govern  not 
as  lords,  but  as  wealthy  members  of  the  state,  influ- 
encing the  election  of  the  commons  who  do  govern 
—  their  office  is  gone ;  like  the  war  lords,  who  were 
useless  when  made  hereditary,  and  settled  on  their 
estates.  The  war  lords  disappeared,  and  an  enlisted 
army  of  real  soldiers  took  their  place.  Men  who  were 
not  born  soldiers  by  caste,  but  who  became  soldiers  by 
profession,  have  been  universally  substituted  for  the 
feudal  soldiers.  The  feudal  soldiers  were  inefficient ; 
their  office  was  taken  up  by  men  who  could  do  the 
duty  better,  and  against  whom  the  feudal  soldiers  did 
not  dare  to  appear.  And  so  with  the  parchment 
lords.  Their  office  was  to  make  laws,  to  govern  the 
country,  to  rule  the  state.  And  if  they  no  longer  rule 
the  state,  but  have  disappeared  from  the  work  before 
the  enlisted  legislators  who  were  not  born  legislators, 
but  became  so,  their  office  has  vanished ;  and,  if  history 
tell  true  tales  of  the  past,  we  may  rest  assured  that 
time  will  ultimately  accord  the  office  to  those  who  do 
the  work  in  reality.  Pleasure  lords  are  too  contrary  to 
the  spirit  of  labor  which  an  age  of  trade  requires,  to 
be  allowed  long  to  occupy  the  first  position.  The 
work  of  parchment  aristocracies  is  gone  from  their 
hands,  and  commons  govern ;  and  though  titles  are 
harmless  in  the  present  day  compared  to  what  they 
were  once,  there  is  maintenance  in  luxury  without  labor, 
which,  in  an  age  of  trade,  is  certain  at  last  to  reduce 
the  question  to  a  calculation  of  profit  and  loss,  meas- 
37* 


438  THE    FEUDAL    LORDS. 

ured  by  money,  and  to  make  trading'  rulers  act  on  the 
result  of  the  balance  sheet. 

In  estimating,  however,  the  historic  probabilities  of 
Britain,  various  considerations  must  be  taken  into 
account.  It  seems  quite  certain  that  the  pleasure 
lords  cannot  continue  to  occupy  the  first  position, 
merely  because  they  have  a  sheepskin  with  a  few 
black  marks  upon  it.  But  who  is  to  take  their  place  ? 
The  trading  community  are  fast,  very  fast,  pushing 
out  the  parchment  holders.  Land  tenures  are  under- 
going alterations.  Old  families  are  failing,  not  from 
the  want  of  parchments,  but  from  the  want  of  wealth. 
Merchants  are  now  the  notables,  the  men  of  note  who 
express  the  requirements  of  the  country.  But  the  pur- 
suit of  money  is  no  more  the  ultimate  pursuit  of  man 
than  the  pursuit  of  war  or  pleasure.  The  trader,  in 
his  turn,  must  cede  the  first  place  to  those  who  express 
man's  higher  requirements.  Money  is  a  means,  not 
an  end;  and  when  those  who  represent  the  means 
have  played  their  part,  those  who  represent  something 
beyond  the  means  will  assert  their  claims,  and  push 
the  trader  from  the  direction  of  the  state.  Man  is  a 
rational  and  a  moral  being,  and  his  rational  and  moral 
nature  must  ultimately  prevail  to  determine  the  ar- 
rangements of  society. 

Let  us  then  look  at  the  principles  that  have  deter- 
mined the  past  construction  of  British  society.  What 
have  been  the  occupations  of  the  governing  class? 
What  in  fact  has  been,  in  the  estimation  of  society, 
the  highest  pursuit  of  the  civil  and  secular  man  ? 

1st.  War.  Society  was  constructed  on  the  war 
principle.     War  manifested  itself  first  in  the  form  of 


WAR,    PLEASURE,    AND    POLICY.  439 

barbarous  war ;  second,  knightly  war ;  and  third,  na- 
tional war ;  and  then  the  war  construction  of  society 
was  finished.  The  war  was  then  performed,  not  by 
the  rulers  in  person,  but  by  a  service ;  that  is,  by  men 
who  fought  because  they  were  paid  for  it.  The  army 
was  not  the  state,  but  the  servant. 

2d.  Pleasure.  As  one  system  arrives  at  its  height, 
and  begins,  although  imperceptibly,  to  decay,  another 
system,  which  is  destined  to  supersede  it,  already  has 
begun  to  take  root  and  to  grow  up  under  the  shelter 
of  the  old  system.  The  war  system  gave  birth  to  the 
political  system,  and  the  war  leader  was  the  origin  of 
the  political  ruler.  National  war  gave  birth  to  the 
national  court,  and  the  national  court  gave  birth  to 
courtly  pleasures,  and  the  knights  who  had  been  field 
knights  gradually  became  transformed  into  court 
knights.  As  the  war  system  decayed,  the  court  knights 
superseded  the  war  knights,  the  accomplishments  of 
the  court  were  held  in  higher  estimation  than  the  ac- 
complishments of  the  field,  till  at  last  the  fop  was  the 
genuine  ruler,  and  society  was  constructed  on  the 
pleasure  principle.  Barbarous  pleasures  grew  first, 
then  refined  pleasures,  till  at  last  the  very  corruption 
of  manners  necessitated  a  change. 

3d.  Policy.  Out  of  the  courtly  pleasures  grew 
courtly  policies.  The  ambition  was  now,  not  to  be  a 
warrior,  nor  a  mere  court  gallant,  but  a  statesman. 
An  age  of  policy  occurred,  in  which  the  destinies  of 
nations,  and  the  welfare  of  whole  populations,  were 
sacrificed  to  the  crotchets  of  statesmen  who  made 
great  experiments  for  their  amusement.  The  popu- 
lation, who  did  the  work  and  got  the  food  out  of  the 


440  TRADE. 

earth,  had  first  been  sacrificed  for  the  war  rulers,  then 
for  the  pleasure  rulers,  and  now  they  were  sacrificed 
for  the  policy  rulers.  The  balance  of  power  was  one 
of  their  crotchets,  the  integrity  of  the  empire  another, 
the  balance  of  trade  another,  and  the  protection  of  trade 
and  agriculture  another.  To  these  gentlemen  Britain 
owes  the  American  war,  the  French  war,  the  national 
debt,  the  corn  laws,  the  customs,  excise,  (in  their  pres- 
ent extent  of  evil,)  and  a  great  many  other  things  not 
less  destructive  to  the  laboring  community  than  was 
the  reign  of  war  or  pleasure.  War  killed  a  man,  and 
to  a  genuine  man  there  is  pleasure  in  war,  —  in  fight- 
ing, contending,  striving,  and  battling,  —  although  at 
the  last  he  is  killed.  It  was  a  rude  and  fierce  pleas- 
ure, and  very  destructive  to  society ;  but  still  a  man 
had  a  chance  of  fighting,  and  that  was  something. 
But  policy  kills  a  man  without  even  the  chance  of  the 
fight,  taxes  him  to  expatriation,  hunger-fevers  him  to 
death  with  thoughts  of  murder  in  his  head,  and  inten- 
tions of  murder  in  his  heart  if  he  recovers.  The  reign 
of  policy  was,  and  is,  no  less  destructive  to  society 
than  the  reign  of  war,  and  it  also  must  pass  away, 
and  is  passing  away  fast.  The  policy  statesman  is 
making  way  for  the  trader;  and  the  trader,  who  also 
is  only  a  step  in  advance,  and  not  a  finality,  is  already 
sheltering  the  man  who  will  supersede  him  —  the 
political  economist.  The  trader's  day  is  now,  and 
every  day  will  see  the  policy  and  pleasure  laws  clear- 
ing away,  because  they  interfere  with  trade.  Trade  is 
now  the  genuine  pursuit  of  Britain,  as  war  was  once ; 
and  as  the  feudal  laws  grew  and  decayed,  and  have 
been  undergoing  a  process  of  abolition,  which  will  not 


THE  PERIOD  OF  BARBAROUS  WAR.        441 

stop  till  every  vestige  of  them  is  utterly  obliterated 
both  from  the  the  statute  book  and  from  the  institu- 
tions of  British  society,  the  trading  laws,  which  are  at 
this  moment  pauperizing  the  population,  must  give 
way  one  after  another  till  men  discover  that  God  has 
constituted  nature  aright,  and  that  the  only  protection 
trade  requires  is  protection  from  violence,  and  fraud, 
and  state  interference. 

In  endeavoring  to  fix  the  periods  of  war,  pleasure, 
and  policy,  of  course  no  exact  boundaries  can  be 
assigned.  The  one  system  grew  out  of  the  other,  and 
one  was  developing  while  the  other  was  decaying. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  easy  to  point  out  the  period 
when  each  system  was  in  operation,  just  as  it  is  easy 
to  perceive  the  colors  in  the  rainbow,  although  we 
cannot  exactly  determine  where  the  one  color  ends 
and  the  other  begins. 

The  Roman  period  of  British  history  belongs  to 
the  ancient  world.  It  has  little  or  nothing  to  do  with 
modern  development.  It  was  the  realization  of  a 
different  system  of  credence  from  that  which  was  to 
take  possession  of  the  world.  The  credence  was  false, 
and  the  system  had  worn  out.  The  middle  of  the 
fifth  century,  then,  was  the  period  when  the  modern 
history  of  Britain  commences. 

The  first  period  was  expressed  in  barbarous  war. 
From  the  shores  of  the  Baltic,  and  from  the  neigh- 
boring countries,  hordes  of  barbarous  warriors  poured 
forth  under  the  names  of  Saxons,  Danes,  or  North- 
men. They  were  pirates  by  profession,  pagans  in 
religion,  and  men  of  the  most  dauntless  courage,  com- 
bined with  the  direst  ferocity.  Their  trade  was  war, 
which  they  carried  on  relentlessly. 


442  THE    PERIOD    OF    KNIGHTLY    WAR. 

The  Saxons  settled  in  Britain,  and  laid  the  rude 
foundations  of  a  civil  state.  Christianity  began  to 
exert  its  influence  ;  and  though  the  Saxon  leaders  or 
kings  were  for  the  most  part  warriors,  the  people 
would  probably  have  settled  down  to  peaceable  agri- 
culture had  it  not  been  for  the  arrival  of  new  hordes 
of  Northmen,  who  from  the  latter  part  of  the  eighth 
century  invaded  England,  and  continued  the  bar- 
barous system  of  war  down  to  the  Norman  conquest. 

By  barbarous  war  must  be  understood  war  which 
is  not  conducted  according  to  rules  which  bind  both 
parties ;  and  this  system  may  be  said  to  have  pre- 
vailed from  the  departure  of  the  Romans  to  the  arrival 
of  the  Normans. 

The  Normans  introduced  knightly  war.  A  knight 
was  not  a  barbarian.  He  had  his  laws  of  chivalry  — 
rude  at  first,  but  gradually  becoming  more  precise, 
more  merciful,  more  fair,  and  more  punctilious  of 
honor.  William  was  a  knightly  leader;  neither  a 
barbarian  nor  a  king,  but  a  war  chief  whose  title 
was  the  sword,  but  still  the  sword  of  a  regulator  or 
systematizer. 

From  1066  to  1485  was  the  period  of  knightly  war, 
and  Richard  III.  was  the  last  of  the  knight  warriors. 
His  successor,  Henry  VII.,  was  a  king  —  a  law  or 
parchment  king  —  a  politic  prince,  who  did  his'best  to 
destroy  the  war  retinues  of  the  barons  who  had  so 
long  distracted  the  country  with  their  minor  dissen- 
sions. During  this  period  we  have  two  types  of 
leaders,  —  one  at  the  end  of  the  twelfth  century,  the 
other  at  the  beginning  of  the  fifteenth,  —  namely, 
Richard  I.,  who  was  more  a  knight  than  a  king,  and 


THE  PERIOD  OF  COURT  PLEASURES.       443 

Henry  V.,  who  was  a  knight  fast  verging  towards  a 
king.  Both  were  warriors,  both  performed  prodigies 
in  the  field ;  but  Richard  was  a  knight  leader,  Henry 
a  king  leader.  Tnis  was  the  period  of  warlike  pleas- 
ures, jousts,  and  tournaments,  which  prepared  the 
nobles  for  the  court  pleasures  that  superseded  them 
in  after  times. 

The  wars  now  became  national,  and  the  individuals 
who  performed  the  service  had  little  or  no  connection 
with  the  cause  of  the  wars.  From  this  period  down 
to  James  II.,  the  king  ruled  ;  and  he  ruled  not  in  the 
field,  but  in  the  cabinet. 

This  was  the  period  of  courtly  pleasures ;  at  first 
rude,  coarse,  and  sensual,  but  gradually  becoming 
more  refined.  The  nobles  became  court  gallants,  and 
the  warlike  pastimes  gradually  died  away.  The  court 
of  Elizabeth  was  the  type  of  the  transition,  and  the 
court  of  Charles  II.  was  the  full-developed  type  of 
pleasure.  Here  were  courtiers  and  courtesans  in  their 
glory;  the  first  without  courage,  the  latter  without 
modesty,  but  very  elegant  and  agreeable  gentlemen 
and  ladies,  there  can  be  no  doubt. 

England  had  never  been  so  great  as  under  the  do- 
minion of  Oliver  Cromwell,  and  Cromwell  permitted 
no  court  gallants.  And  had  England  and  Scotland 
understood  their  interests,  there  would  have  been  no 
Charles  II.  and  no  James  II.  on  this  side  of  the  Straits 
of  Dover.  Twice  England  has  missed  her  destiny, 
and  suffered  for  it;  once  when  Wickliffe  taught  re- 
ligion, while  Wat  Tyler  demanded  the  abolition  of 
slavery  and  the  destruction  of  the  feudal  system. 
These  were  voices  which   England  would  not  hear ; 


444        THE  PERIOD  OF  COURT  POLICY. 

and  England  had  a  Henry  VIII.  and  a  Charles  II.  to 
do  the  work.  And  once  when  Cromwell  would  have 
organized  the  state  if  men  would  have  let  him.  But 
they  chose  rather  a  king  than  a  republic,  and  Charles 
II.  abolished  the  feudal  tenures,  allowing  the  lands  to 
escape ;  and  George  III,  in  consequence  of  that 
alienation,  fixed  the  national  debt  on  the  laborers  of 
the  country.  The  third  time  that  England's  opportu- 
nity occurs,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  sure  work  will  be 
made  of  the  evils  that  remain ;  and  probably  that  op- 
portunity is  not  quite  so  far  distant  as  many  imagine. 

From  the  reign  of  William  III.  down  to  the  reign 
of  George  IV.  was  the  age  of  policy.  Whigs  and 
tories  now  began  to  rule.  They  were  no  longer  war 
lords  nor  pleasure  lords,  but  policy  lords.  Every  thing 
now  became  a  mysterious  matter  of  policy.  The 
most  vague  and  ridiculous  notions  were  esteemed 
profound  truths,  to  which  as  much  importance  was 
attached  by  the  nobles  of  this  period,  as  had  been 
attached  to  the  shape  of  a  frill  by  the  court  gallants 
of  the  former  period,  or  to  the  punctilios  of  knightly 
war  in  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries. 

The  court  women  also,  like  the  men,  had  progressed 
beyond  the  mere  elegancies  of  the  courtesan,  and 
had  become  politicians  or  tools  for  political  purposes. 
War  was  now  not  the  pursuit  but  the  engine  of  the 
politician ;  and  national  wars  were  engaged  in  at  the 
expense  of  the  people  as  matters  of  policy.  The 
court  of  Anne  represented  the  earlier  form  of  this 
period  ;  and  in  it  we  recognize  pursuits  essentially 
different  from  those  of  former  courts.  William  had 
been  half  a  king,  half  a  tool  in  the  hands  of  the  policy 


THE  PERIOD  OF  COURT  POLICY.         445 

aristocracy.  The  religion  of  the  people  had  by  no 
means  been  the  great  motive  that  led  to  the  intro- 
duction of  his  Protestant  majesty,  but  the  protes- 
tantizing of  the  state,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the 
despotism  of  the  crown.  The  monarch  now  ruled  no 
more,  but  the  ministers  and  the  parties ;  and  the  mon- 
arch was  the  legal  instrument  in  the  hands  of  the 
parties;  in  fact,  the  effigy  shown  to  the  people  to 
give  validity  to  the  arrangements  of  legislators  and 
schemers.  During  William's  reign,  the  policy  system 
acquired  its  strength,  and  in  Anne's  reign  it  took  the 
direction  of  the  national  affairs.  Her  court,  conse- 
quently, became  the  scene  of  political  intrigues,  in 
which  she  was  the  puppet,  the  politicians  the  show- 
men, and  the  people  the  spectators  who  paid  for  the 
show.  "  The  queen  loved  her  own  way,  and,  with 
the  ordinary  infirmity  of  conscious  incapacity,  was 
extremely  jealous  of  any  semblance  of  interference 
with  the  exercise  of  her  authority ;  yet  she  was  the 
constant  slave  of  favorites,  who  in  their  turn  were  the 
tools  of  intriguing  politicians.  Though  her  preferences 
and  dislikes  had  often  no  better  foundations  than  the 
predilections  of  the  toilet,  it  was  upon  them  that  the 
policy  of  her  administration  and  the  destinies  of  Eu- 
rope depended.  By  a  chambermaid's  intrigue  Boling- 
broke  triumphed  over  his  rival,  the  earl  of  Oxford.  It 
was  because  the  queen  fondly  doated  on  the  Duchess 
of  Marlborough,  that  her  reign  was  'adorned  by  the 
glories  of  Blenheim  and  Ramillies ; '  it  was  because 
Mrs.  Abigail  Masham  artfully  supplanted  her  bene- 
factress in  royal  favor,  that  a  stop  was  put  to  the  war 
which  ravaged  the  continent ;  it  was  in  great  part  owing 
38 


446         THE  PERIOD  OF  COURT  POLICY. 

to  the  influence  of  the  duchess  of  Somerset,  another 
favorite  lady,  that  the  queen  did  not  attempt  to  recall 
her  brother,  the  Chevalier  St,  George.  Thus,  probably, 
a  feeble-minded  princess,  influenced  only  by  her  wait- 
ing-women, determined  that  the  Pretender  should  be 
excluded  from  England,  a  tory  and  high  church 
ministry  formed,  and  a  Bourbon  seated  beyond  the 
Pyrenees.  Of  the  twelve  years  of  her  majesty's 
reign,  ten  were  years  of  fierce  warfare,  that  laid  waste 
the  finest  countries  in  Europe.  The  point  at  issue 
between  France  and  the  confederate  powers  was  the 
succession  to  the  Spanish  monarchy  ;  whether  Philip 
of  Anjou,  a  grandson  of  Louis  XIV.,  or  Charles  Arch- 
duke of  Austria,  the  second  son  of  Leopold,  emperor 
of  Germany,  should  inherit  the  crown  of  Spain. 
England  exerted  her  utmost  force  in  this  contest,  both 
in  men  and  money,  though  it  was  nearly  indifferent 
to  her  interests  whether  Austria  or  France  were  ag- 
grandized by  the  acquisition  of  Spain  and  America." 
"  But  the  splendid  triumphs  of  Marlborough  and  Prince 
Eugene  were  an  inadequate  compensation  for  the 
decay  of  trade  and  rapid  increase  of  the  public  debt 
and  taxes"  This,  however,  was  only  the  commence- 
ment of  the  policy  system,  which  came  to  its  full  com- 
pletion in  the  reign  of  George  III.,  who  was  to  po/ir// 
exactly  what  Charles  II.  had  been  to  pleasure ;  name- 
ly, the  complete  and  full-grown  type,  who  carried  the 
system  to  its  maximum,  and  indicated  to  a  certainty 
that  a  change  of  system  would  take  place  ere  long. 

The  whigs  and  tories,  or  policy  lords,  have  gov- 
erned England  from  the  revolution  of  168S  down  to 
the  present  time;  but  a  new  system  is  in  preparation, 


THE  PERIOD  OF  COURT  POLICY.        447 

and  must  soon  undergo  its  development.  The  policy 
lords  are  abandoning  the  direction  of  state  affairs  to 
men  of  facts  and  figures ;  and  these  facts  and  figures 
are  certain  in  the  long  run  to  obliterate  the  policy 
system,  and  to  establish  the  government  of  political 
economy. 

During  this  period  (from  the  end  of  the  seventeenth 
century  to  the  present  time,  nearly)  church  and  state 
was  the  watchword  of  internal  politics.  The  altar  and 
the  throne  were  the  effigies,  church  and  state  was  the 
war-cry,  and  the  clergy  and  nobles  were  the  priests  of 
the  superstition.  Every  thing  was  squared  upon  the 
plan  of  church  and  state  policy.  Scotland,  which  had 
withstood  the  arms  of  England,  was  overcome  by 
state  policy,  and  united  legislatively  and  executively 
to  the  state.  "  This  important  measure  was  more 
popular  in  England  than  Scotland,  where  it  was 
stoutly  opposed  by  Fletcher  of  Saltoun,  the  earl  of 
Belhaven,"  and  the  dukes  of  Athol  and  Hamilton, 
though  the  quiet  acquiescence  of  the  last  with  a  major- 
ity of  the  Scots  Parliament  was  procured  by  a  judi- 
cious distribution  of  honors  and  bribes  towards  the 
close  of  the  negotiations."  This  was  another  step 
towards  the  generalization  of  government,  which  has 
been  going  on  since  the  barons  were  denied  the  right 
of  private  war,  and  which  process  of  generalization 
is  as  apparent  in  the  history  of  France  as  in  that  of 
Britain. 

Another  and  very  important  step  was  the  suppres- 
sion or  suspension  of  the  convocation  of  the  church 
of  England ;  a  step  which  in  fact  destroyed  the  ecclesi- 
astical liberties  of  that  church,  and  made  it  a  branch 


448         THE  PERIOD  OF  COURT  POLICY. 

of  the  service,  like  the  army.  As  soon  as  the  convo- 
cation revives,  a  new  era  will  commence  for  England. 

The  great  reign  of  policy,  however,  was  the  reign 
of  George  III.,  which  exhibited  the  system  in  full  per- 
fection. The  policy  of  this  reign  appears  now  to  be 
remarkable  ;  but  to  the  actors  themselves  appeared  no 
doubt  very  wise  and  clever,  and  quite  as  indubitably 
right  as  war  or  pleasure  had  appeared  to  Richaixl  I.  or 
Charles  II.  The  first  great  exhibition  was  the  attempt 
to  coerce  the  American  colonies,  "  the  deluded  and 
unhappy  multitude,"  as  the  inhabitants  of  America 
were  termed  in  the  king's  speech  of  1777.  This  was 
a  policy  war ;  and  it  cost  Britain  about  one  hundred 
and  thirty  millions  sterling,  the  interest  of  which  is 
now  taken  from  the  profits  of  the  present  laborers. 
And  the  policy  of  the  war  may  be  inferred  from  the 
fact,  that  the  advantages  derived  by  Britain  from  a 
trade  with  free  America  increased  continually  from 
the  moment  the  transatlantic  Britons  were  allowed  to 
make  their  own  political  arrangements.  The  next 
piece  of  policy  was  the  great  French  war,  or  series 
of  wars,  which  was  at  first  a  war  against  popular 
democracy,  and  latterly  a  war  against  imperial  despot- 
ism. The  policy  rulers  of  Britain  carried  on  this  war 
at  an  expense  of  about  six  hundred  millions  sterling ; 
and,  to  defray  the  charge,  the  revenues  of  this  and 
future  generations  were  sold  in  perpetuity  to  Jews  and 
money  dealers. 

Another  piece  of  policy  was  the  union  with  Ireland 
without  Catholic  emancipation,  and  the  union  of  the 
Protestant  Episcopal  church  of  that  country  with  the 
church  of  England.     The  reign   of  policy,  however, 


THE  PERIOD  OF  COURT  POLICY.         449 

has  culminated,  and  a  new  system  may  reasonably  be 
expected  to  supplant  it.  Catholic  emancipation,  the 
reform  bill,  the  emancipation  of  the  negroes,  and  the 
repeal  of  the  corn  laws,  are  certain  evidences  that  the 
reign  of  mere  policy  is  dying  away.  Changes  of  this 
character,  however,  do  not  take  place  at  once ;  but  as 
new  generations  grow  up  in  different  circumstances, 
and  with  different  associations,  new  credences  sup- 
plant the  old,  and  those  new  credences  grow  grad- 
ually into  realization.  The  policy  system  is  not  dead, 
only  dying.  It  still  retains  its  power  with  regard  to 
Russia,  the  great  bugbear  of  the  policy  gentry,  as  if 
God  intended  the  nations  of  the  earth  to  progress  only 
as  the  rulers  of  Britain  would  allow  them.  The  Rus- 
sians are  the  progressors,  the  centralizers,  the  general- 
izes, the  reducers  to  rule  and  system ;  and  the  Rus- 
sians are  doing  that  greatest  of  all  state  services  — 
destroying  the  power  of  the  nobles,  and  subjecting 
men  to  the  laws  of  the  state.  Of  course,  Russia  is  a 
despotism,  and  cannot  be  otherwise  without  falling 
into  confusion.  There  is  a  period  in  the  history  of 
civilization  when  the  ruler  is  necessarily  despotic,  as 
there  are  evils  which  can  give  way  only  before  the 
influence  and  beneath  the  hand  of  despotism.  Des- 
potism alone,  whether  democratic  or  autocratic,  ap- 
pears capable  of  destroying  the  superstitious  ecclesias- 
tical institutions  which  have  descended  from  darker 
ages.  Henry  VIII.  was  a  despot,  and,  had  he  not 
been  a  despot,  he  could  not  have  uprooted  the  papal 
church  and  taken  away  its  lands.  The  French  demo- 
crats were  despots,  and  they  also  uprooted  the  state 
superstition,  and  took  away  its  lands.  And  who 
38* 


450         THE  PERIOD  OF  COURT  POLICY. 

knows  how  soon  a  Russian  despot  may  destroy  the 
Greek  church,  and  emancipate  the  whole  of  the  serfs  ? 
Organization  by  all  means,  and  at  all  hazards,  appears 
the  only  mode  by  which  barbarous  nations  can  be  civ- 
ilized ;  and  the  real  evil  lies  not  in  despotic  power,  but 
in  the  legal  or  parchment  perpetuation  of  that  power 
beyond  the  circumstances  that  make  it  arise  spon- 
taneously. 

And  yet  of  this  progressing  Russia,  (which  has  al- 
ready collected  the  laws  of  the  empire,  thereby  laying 
the  foundation  of  the  ultimate  supremacy  of  law,  and 
not  of  man,)  the  policy  rulers  of  Britain  consider  them- 
selves bound  by  policy  to  entertain  vague  apprehen- 
sions, and  in  consequence  to  prop  up  the  Mahomedan 
despotism,  which  does  not  progress.  It  would  have 
been  much  more  rational  if  England  and  France  had 
driven  the  Turks  out  of  Europe  altogether.  To  allow 
the  first  geographical  position  in  eastern  Europe  to 
remain  in  the  hands  of  Mahomedans,  is  perfectly 
absurd ;  and  if  Russia  can  take  possession  of  it,  surely 
England,  with  Gibraltar,  Malta,  the  Cape,  &c,  &c, 
can  have  no  just  ground  of  interference,  except  to 
make  sure  that  the  seas  are  kept  open  for  her  mer- 
chants. The  seas  are  "  the  highways  of  the  world," 
and  every  nation  has  a  right  to  require  that  they  shall 
never  be  obstructed.  Britain  has  already  had  two  les- 
sons in  policy  wars,  and  these  might  suffice  to  show 
their  total  inefficiency  to  produce  even  the  end  re- 
quired, setting  aside  the  question  whether  the  end  was 
desirable.  Notwithstanding  the  efforts  of  Britain. 
America  did  become  independent;  and  all  that  Britain 
obtained  was  her  debt.     And,  notwithstanding  all  the 


OCCUPATIONS  OF  THE  RULING  CLASS.       451 

efforts  of  Britain,  France  rejected  the  Bourbons,  old 
and  young;  and  all  that  Britain  obtained  was  a  much 
larger  debt.  And  if  the  latter  effort,  which  cannot 
reasonably  be  expected  to  be  surpassed  on  any  .future 
occasion,  was  so  utterly  powerless  to  arrest  the  progress 
of  advancing  credence,  surely  the  policy  system  may 
be  laid  aside  as  a  mere  superstition,  destructive  to 
those  who  act  upon  its  dictates,  and  proven  beyond 
dispute  to  be  not  the  rule  that  should  guide  statesmen 
in  their  labors. 

But  the  reign  of  policy  is  fast  drawing  to  a  close  ; 
and  we  must  endeavor  to  estimate  its  logical  success- 
or. Looking  to  the  past,  what  may  we  expect  the 
future  to  be  ?  This  is  the  question  for  which  we  have 
endeavored  to  exhibit  the  principles  of  the  past ;  and 
out  of  those  principles  we  think  there  flows  a  future 
scheme  of  progress. 

What  have  been  the  occupations  of  the  ruling  classes 
of  Britain  ? 

1st.  War,  which  was  barbarous  war  so  long  as  the 
Northmen  were  afloat. 

Knightly  war,  consequent  on  the  Norman  conquest. 
William  was  partly  a  barbarous  leader,  partly  a  great 
baron  with  his  retainers,  and  partly  a  knight ;  or  a  war 
leader  beginning  gradually  to  grow  into  a  knight. 
Richard  I.  was  a  knight,  Henry  V.  was  still  a  knight 
with  a  considerable  degree  of  the  court,  and  Richard 
III.,  the  last  warrior,  was  more  of  the  courtier  than 
the  knight.  These  are  the  types  or  representatives  of 
the  war  period  of  society.  The  nobles,  or  ruling 
classes,  followed  the  same  kind  of  development;  first, 
barbarous  warriors,  then  knightly  warriors,  then  barons 


452  WAR,    PLEASURE,    AND    POLICY. 

with  retinues,  who  fought  for  causes,  and  then 
courtiers. 

2d.  Pleasure.*  The  nobles,  from  knightly  war  pro- 
gressed to  knightly  courtesy  in  the  former  period,  and 
the  wTarlike  pastimes  at  which  ladies  were  present, 
prepared  them  for  the  court  pleasures.  Queen  Eliza- 
beth was  a  court  lady,  (still,  however,  with  a  smatter- 
ing of  the  war  system,)  and  in  her  court  the  nobles 
exhibit  the  feeble  remains  of  knighthood,  and  the 
rapid  growth  of  courtiership.  In  Charles  IL's  time 
the  war  knight  had  become  supplanted  entirely  by  the 
court  knight.  Court  pleasures  were  the  summit  of 
human  aspiration  for  the  rulers  of  the  state. 

3d.  Policy.  The  introduction  of  a  foreign  ruler 
necessarily  introduced  foreign  politics,  and  the  cour- 
tiers naturally  became  schemers  and  intriguers.  The 
court  of  Anne  presents  the  pleasure  courtier  defunct, 
and  the  policy  courtier  assuming  the  first  importance. 
In  George  IIL's  reign,  the  policy  system  had  ar- 
rived at  full  perfection;  and,  if  it  could  have  been 
carried  on  without  costing  money,  might  have  gone 
on  perhaps  much  longer. 

Between  war,  knightly  war,  courtly  pleasures,  and 
courtly  policy,  there  is  a  natural  connection.  The  one 
grows  out  of  the  other.  Their  order  is  not  accidental. 
Courtly  pleasures  could  never  have  succeeded  imme- 


*  The  question  is,  What  pursuit  was  esteemed  as  the  highest 
pursuit  in  which  men  could  engage  ?  and  though  pleasure  expresses 
imperfectly  the  meaning,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  during  this 
period  court  pleasure  held  the  very  first  rank,  as  war  had  previously 
done,  and  policy  did  at  a  later  period. 


WAR,    PLEASURE,    AND     POLICY.  453 

diately  on  barbarous  war;  nor  could  courtly  policy 
have  succeeded  immediately  on  knightly  war.  We 
have  here  a  growth,  or  expansion,  or  development,  of 
the  pursuits  of  the  ruling  classes ;  and,  singularly 
enough,  the  connection  of  one  system  with  another  is 
still  preserved  in  language.  The  ambiguities  of  words 
sometimes  involve  curious  truths ;  and  several  words 
now  in  use  in  English  are  applicable  to  two  of  these 
systems.  The  word  gallantry  may  mean  gallantry  in 
the  field  or  in  the  court ;  in  the  former  it  belongs  to  the 
war  system,  in  the  latter  to  the  pleasure  system ;  and 
when  court  gallantry  from  ceremonious  devotion  be- 
came transformed  into  the  Charles  the  Second  system, 
the  word  intrigue  expresses  the  action,  and  this  is  also  ap- 
plicable to  the  policy  pursuits  which  followed.  Thus :  — 

Co^&,  \  W**  ZTyf—'  \  ***»-• 
But  the  policy  system  is  drawing  to  a  close.  The 
balance  of  power  is  an  exploded  superstition ;  the 
balance  of  trade  is  nearly  exploded ;  the  integrity  of 
the  empire  is  now  a  matter  of  little  moment;  and 
Canada  or  the  West  Indies  might  govern  themselves 
without  costing  Britain  another  one  hundred  and  thirty 
millions  to  prevent  them  ;  and  the  protection  of  trade 

*  The  ambiguous  word  that  connects  the  policy  system  with  the 
political  economy  system  is  perhaps  measures.     Thus :  — 

&»;&,  }  **-*  PoI"^fea3ures'  j  '«-«»■  S,  \ mm"'- 

Where  the  word  measures  means  in  the  first  sense  actions,  and  in 
the  second  sense  measurements  —  that  is,  the  measurements  that 
determine  whether  the  actions  are  or  are  not  correct.  The  word  is 
actually  used  in  these  two  senses. 


454  THE    POLICY    SYSTEM. 

and  agriculture  are  very  generally  regarded  as  fallacious 
impostures,  meaning  monopoly,  labor  taxation,  and 
increase  of  the  landlords'  rents. 

But  what  system  follows  policy  in  the  natural  order 
of  development? 

Policy  is  a  very  vague  word  as  used  by  politicians. 
It  had  a  definite  meaning  in  the  abstract,  but  in  the 
concrete  meant  any  thing  that  any  party  chose  to  advo- 
cate. In  the  abstract,  it  meant  that  certain  measures, 
or  certain  modes  of  operation,  would  be  advantageous 
to  the  country.  But  in  the  concrete,  it  meant  a  war 
with  America,  or  a  war  with  France,  or  the  exclusion 
of  foreign  goods,  or  the  deprivation  of  civil  rights 
because  a  man  held  certain  religious  tenets,  or  the 
employment  of  spies,  or  the  retention  of  the  negro  in 
slavery,  or  a  host  of  other  measures,  all  advocated  by 
the  ruling  classes  of  Britain  as  matters  of  excellent 
policy.  But  while  the  policy  superstition  was  in  the 
ascendant,  a  vast  trade  was  growing  up  in  Britain, 
and  traders  have  an  unfortunate  habit  of  regarding 
profit  and  loss  as  measured  by  money.  And  though 
traders  are  nearly  as  backward  in  ascertaining  their 
real  interests  as  agriculturists  in  abandoning  their 
clumsy  implements  and  adopting  an  improved  system 
of  cultivation,  trade,  with  free  discussion,  gradually 
opens  its  eyes,  and  discovers  that,  alas!  all  this  ad- 
mirable policy  has  been  only  a  delusion,  a  creditor  by 
blood,  glory,  and  pauperism,  and  a  debtor  to  vast  sums 
of  gold. 

Trade,  then,  imperceptibly,  and  almost  uncon- 
sciously, begins  to  influence  policy,  not  by  denying 
that  policy  ought  to  rule,  but  by  discovering  and 


THE    POLICY    SYSTEM. 

making  manifest  that  certain  acts  which  were  assumed 
to  be  politic  are  actually  disadvantageous ;  that  they 
involve  loss  and  not  profit,  and,  consequently,  that 
they  ought  not  to  be  done.  Knowledge  reduces  policy 
from  its  flights  of  eloquence  to  the  investigation  of 
facts  and  figures,  —  from  its  vague  and  mysterious 
superstitions  to  its  plain  and  palpable  truths,  far  less 
grand,  of  course,  but  still  truths;  and  truths  are  pow- 
erful when  profit  and  loss  are  concerned.  And  thus 
the  dispute  between  policy  and  trade  is  not  whether 
policy  ought  to  direct  the  affairs  of  the  state,  but 
whether  an  act  propounded  as  an  act  of  policy  really 
is  so  or  not.  Is  it  really  advantageous  ?  The  policy 
gentlemen  may  enlarge  on  the  glory  of  the  British 
arms,  the  necessity  of  preserving  the  constitution,  &c. ; 
but  Trade  replies,  "  Exactly.  But  does  what  you  are 
pleased  to  term  the  glory  of  the  British  arms  really 
conduce  to  the  welfare  of  the  country?  Does  your 
mode  of  understanding  the  constitution  really  con- 
duce to  the  welfare  of  the  country?  Does  your 
mode  of  imposing  and  spending  the  taxes  really  con- 
duce to  the  welfare  of  the  country?  for  in  this  case 
alone  can  your  measures  be  looked  upon  as  acts  of 
policy.11 

And  thus  the  moment  acts  of  policy  come  to  be 
accurately  measured,  instead  of  having  their  value 
assumed,  —  and  this  measurement  follows  quite  natu- 
rally in  the  order  of  progress,  —  the  policy  system  is 
defunct,  and  political  economy,  which  has  grown  out 
of  it  by  the  mere  measurement  of  the  acts  of  so-called 
policy,  supersedes  it.  Policy  was  a  major  without  a 
minor,  or  rather  with  any  minor  which  the  statesmen 


456  POLITICAL    ECONOMY. 

chose  to  put  into  the  syllogism;  but  political  econ- 
omy undertakes  to  furnish  the  true  minor,  —  not 
arbitrary,  but  scientific,  —  and  a  consequent  rule  of 
political  economy  takes  place  by  a  natural  order  of 
development. 

And  as  this  method  appears  so  plain  and  natural, 
it  would  seem  a  fair  inference  that  Britain  is  now 
about  to  see  the  policy  system  interred,  and  to  see  the 
political  economists  take  the  direction  of  the  country. 
And  that  they  will  ere  long  take  the  direction  of  the 
state,  appears  beyond  a  doubt  But  how  far  the  gov- 
ernment of  Britain,  upon  the  principles  of  political 
economy,  is  compatible  with  the  preservation  of  an 
aristocracy  and  a  labor  taxation,  of  course  remains  to 
be  proved.  The  economists  have  not  yet  the  power, 
nor  can  they  have  it  till  a  modification  takes  place  in 
the  representation ;  but  when  that  modification  takes 
place, —  and  perhaps  few  men  would  give  odds  that  it 
does  not  take  place  in  less  than  fifteen  years,  —  the 
rule  of  the  policy  lords  and  parchment  aristocracy  is 
done.  The  moment  a  new  change  makes  the  repre- 
sentation more  liberal  than  the  present  system,  and 
really  adapts  it  to  the  requirements  of  the  country, 
that  moment  does  a  new  era  of  government  open  up 
to  Britain,  and  that  moment  do  the  economists  natu- 
rally enter  on  the  functions  of  state  direction,  provided 
no  great  accidents  happen  in  the  interval. 

But  neither  is  political  economy  the  vltimate.  It  is 
a  step  beyond  policy,  as  the  reign  of  court  policy  was 
a  step  beyond  the  reign  of  court  pleasure.  But  it  is 
logically  insufficient.  There  are  questions  which  it 
cannot  answer,  or  dare  not  answer.     It  must  take  the 


POLITICAL    ECONOMY.  457 

money  management  of  the  state,  and  determine  the 
mode  in  which  taxes  should  be  levied,  as  well  as  the 
amount  of  taxes  ;  and,  in  determining  the  mode  in 
which  taxes  ought  to  be  levied,  it  must  come  between 
two  parties  —  the  laborers  who  create  the  wealth  of 
the  country,  and  the  landlords  who  consume  the  rents. 
This  position  will  bring  political  economy  to  a  stand. 
The  difficulty  is  insoluble  to  political  economy,  and 
a  new  system  must  grow,  develop,  and  assume  the 
direction  of  the  country. 

Political  economy  professes  to  teach  how  value 
grows,  increases,  accumulates,  and  who  makes  it. 
The  latter  question,  solved  by  a  fair  exposition  of 
ascertained  facts,  first  systematized,  and  then  reduced 
to  a  law,  lands  society  on  the  grand  question,  "  To 
whom  does  it  belong  ?  "  "With  this  question  political 
economy,  as  such,  has  no  concern.  It  is  beyond  polit- 
ical economy,  higher  than  political  economy,  and  is 
what  political  economy  is  not  —  it  is  final  in  theory. 
Let  political  economy  be  as  perfect  as  any  science 
can  possibly  be,  beyond  it  there  lies  the  question,  To 
whom  —  to  what  persons  —  does  the  created  value 
belong  ?  And  first  and  foremost  must  come  the  ques- 
tion of  the  land.  Suppose,  for  instance,  it  should 
be  clearly  proven,  according  to  the  science  of  facts, 
(as  some  have  termed  economy,)  that  it  would  be 
more  beneficial  to  the  whole  associated  community  of 
Britain  to  abolish  all  customs  and  excises,  and  all 
taxes  whatever  except  a  land  tax,  which  could  be  col- 
lected for  nothing,  or  next  to  nothing,  what  would 
political  economy  say  in  that  case  ?  Would  it  abolish 
39 


458  THE    EQUITY    SYSTEM. 

all  the  taxes  that  interfere  with  trade,  and  thereby 
absorb  the  rents  of  the  lands,  or  would  it  determine 
that  a  man  with  a  parchment,  who  does  not  labor,  is 
to  be  preferred  to  a  man  without  a  parchment,  who 
does  ?  From  this  dilemma  political  economy  cannot 
escape.  There  must  be  another  system  —  one  that 
can  solve  these  questions  by  rule  —  not  arbitrarily,  but 
scientifically  —  by  a  rule  that  is  general,  and  applica- 
ble to  all  parties. 

And  this  new  system  is  necessarily  politics,  or  the 
science  of  equity. 

Political  economy,  in  fact,  is  the  natural  preparative 
for  a  science  of  equity.  All  its  questions  solved,  (and 
solved  in  such  a  manner  that  the  solutions  are  inca- 
pable of  dispute,  and  come  to  be  taught  as  ordinary 
matters  of  ascertained  truth,)  there  yet  remains  the 
question,  "Who  is  the  proprietor  of  the  created  value  ?  " 
And  this  question  arises  necessarily  so  soon  as  political 
economy  has  discovered  who  creates  the  value.  And 
thus  politics,  or  the  science  of  equity,  springs  neces- 
sarily in  chronological  order  out  of  political  economy ; 
and  when  economists  have  directed  the  state  affairs  up 
to  those  questions  which  they  cannot  answer,  they 
must  cede  the  first  place  to  the  true  politicians,  or 
themselves  become  true  politicians.  And  when  that 
period  arrives,  the  political  evolution  is  complete,  and 
there  is  the  reign  of  equity  or  justice. 

To  sum  up  the  historic  probabilities,  then,  we  may 
present  the  following  table.  The  producers  of  food 
and  of  articles  to  exchange  against  food  are  the  ruled; 
and  the  rulers  appear  under  the  respective  forms  of 


HISTORIC    SUMMARY. 


459 


THE    RULERS. 


Warriors. 
War  on  barbarous  principles, 
from  the   departure  of  the   Ro- 
mans to  the  Conquest. 


THE    RULED. 


The   Cultivators,   Traders, 
Manufacturers,   &c,  &c. 


Knight  Warriors. 
From  the  Conquest  to  death  of 
Richard  III. 

King  and  Courtiers. 
From   Henry  VII.  to  revolu- 
tion of  1688. 

Church  and  State  Policy  Rulers. 
From  1688  to  George  IV.  or 
William  IV. 

Political  Economy  Rulers. 
Beginning  to  assume  direction 
of  the  state  in  the  reign  of  Queen 
Victoria. 


And  the  order  of  the  systems  that  have  hitherto 
been  pursued  by  the  ruling  classes,  and  of  the  systems 
which  may  be  expected  in  future,  is  as  follows  :  — 


Manifestation. 

1.  The  Barbarous  War  System. 

2.  The  Knightly  War  System. 

3.  The  Court  Gallant  System. 

4.  The  Court  Policy  System. 

5.  The  Political  Economy  System. 

6.  The  Science  of  Equity  System. 

7.  Finally,  the  Supremacy  of  Christianity. 


HISTORIC    DEVELOPMENT 

Faculties  of  Mind. 

1.  Combativeness  and  Lower  Passions  —  Manual  Arts  developing. 

2.  Combativeness  and  Sentiments  —  Fine  Arts  developing. 

3.  Voluptuousness,  with  the  Mechanical  Arts  developing. 

4.  Cunning,  with  the  Understanding  developing. 

5.  Benefit,  or  Utility,  with  the  Practical  Reason. 

6.  Justice,  with  the  Theoretic  Reason. 

7.  Benevolence,  with  the  Mind  developed. 

If  this  scheme  be  correct,  the  civilization  of  man 
under  the  influence  of  Christianity  —  such  as  it  was 
after  its  corruption,  and  such  as  it  was  when  reformed 
by  the  resuscitation  of  the  Bible  —  would  manifest 
itself  in  the  state  in  the  predominance  of 

Starting  point.  —  The  Lower  Passions. 

The  Lower  Sentiments. 

The  Non-Moral  Reason. 

The  Moral  Reason. 
Termination.  —   The  Higher  Sentiments. 

[By  non-moral  reason,  we  mean  the  intellect  applied 
to  external  nature,  or  to  such  of  the  human  phenomena 
as  neither  involve  man's  relation  to  man,  nor  the  laws 
that  should  regulate  the  interference  of  one  man  with 
another.  By  moral  reason,  we  mean  the  intellect  ap- 
plied to  the  relations  of  men  in  the  matter  of  interfer- 
ence, and  to  the  discovery  of  the  laws  which  should 
regulate  that  interference,  and  also  the  intellect  applied 
to  the  relations  of  man  to  the  divine  Being.] 

And  this  scheme,  (imperfectly  and  crudely  as  we  have 
advanced  it,)  we  maintain,  is  borne  out,  first,  by  the 


OF    MAN    IN    THE    STATE.  461 

analytic  reason  analyzing  the  forms  of  scientific  truth 
and  the  order  of  scientific  development ;  second,  by 
the  analysis  of  the  components  of  man's  nature ;  and 
third,  by  the  abstract  form  of  history,  so  far  as  it  has 
extended.  And  on  these  three  grounds,  if  they  coin- 
cide and  mutually  support  each  other,  may  be  pro- 
jected the  natural  probability  of  a  period  yet  to 
come,  when  justice  shall  be  realized  on  earth,  to  be 
followed  by  a  period  when  Christianity  shall  reign  su- 
preme, and  call  into  real  and  systematic  action  the 
higher  and  nobler  sentiments  of  man. 
39* 


CONCLUSION. 

"We  have  now  to  offer  a  few  observations  on  the 
knowledge  that  is  logically  subsequent  to  the  science 
of  equity,  and  which,  therefore,  may  be  expected  to 
evolve  chronologically  at  some  future  period.  The 
whole  of  our  argument  is  based  on  the  consideration, 
that  there  is  a  logical  connection  between  the  sciences, 
and  that,  therefore,  there  is  a  necessary  order  in  which 
they  must  evolve  chronologically ;  and,  consequently, 
that  the  logical  classification  of  the  sciences  does 
actually  scheme  out  in  its  abstract  form  the  intellec- 
tual development  of  the  human  race.  If,  then,  we 
can  class  the  knowledge  not  yet  reduced  to  scientific 
ordination,  we  can  project  according  to  a  plan  (which 
is  not  arbitrary)  the  future  phase  of  man's  intel- 
lectual credence,  and  consequently  form  within  cer- 
tain limits  an  estimation  of  man's  future  destiny 
on  earth. 

Science  exists  in  the  mind,  and  in  the  mind  alone. 
And  a  branch  of  knowledge  has  become  a  science 
when  its  substantive  elements  are  made  to  function  in 
the  blank  or  abstract  categories  of  the  reason,  which 
are  identically  the  same  in  all  human  intellect     And 


UNITY    OF    CREDENCE.  463 

on  this  account  it  is  that  science  abolishes  diversity 
and  restores  unity  of  credence.  And  as  there  is  but 
one  universe  for  man  to  know,  and  but  one  type  of 
intellect  *  to  apprehend  that  universe,  it  follows  as  a 
natural  necessity,  that  if  man  be  allowed  sufficient 
time  to  reduce  to  scientific  ordination  all  the  cogniza- 
ble substantives  that  exist  within  the  range  of  intellec- 
tion, a  universal  unity  of  credence  will  evolve.  And 
this  is  the  magnificent  destiny  of  science.  ^Esthetic 
differences  there  will  always  be,  so  long  as  individuals 
present  a  variety  of  constitution;  but  differences  of 
intellection  there  can  only  be  from  ignorance,  supersti- 
tion, or  error ;  and  science  is  the  obliterator  of  igno- 
rance, superstition,  and  error. 

The  unquestionable  tendency  of  science  is  to  im- 
prove the  condition  of  mankind  on  the  surface  of  the 
habitable  globe ;  but  the  past  period  of  scientific  evo- 
lution has  been  necessarily  employed  more  in  the  evo- 
lution of  true  intellection  than  in  the  transformation 
of  the  correct  credence  into  a  concrete  rule  of  action, 
which  should  bear  its  legitimate  fruits  and  exhibit  the 
human  race  in  an  aspect  as  yet  unknown,  and  as  yet 
almost  universally  discredited,  notwithstanding  the 
cheering  and  unmistakable  promises  of  divine  rev- 
elation. The  light  of  science  has  arisen,  and  the 
morning  of  man's  welfare  is  at  hand ;  but  the  light  is 
as  yet  only  cold  and  gray,  and  the  genial  rays  of 
warmth  that  shall  bring  into  life  the  good  are  only 
beginning  to  manifest  their  power,  and  to  bring  into 

*  The  same  in  essential  quality,  though  not  the  same  in  relative 
quantity. 


464         A  VALID  NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

active  being  those  germs  of  bounty  which  God  has 
never  withdrawn  from  the  world,  but  which  man  has 
hitherto,  in  the  darkness  of  his  fallen  nature,  turned  to 
so  little  avail.  Science  has  as  yet  only  been  under- 
going its  process  of  discovery ;  but  the  period  of  its 
application  must  ere  long  arrive,  and  a  new  world  of 
human  benefit,  as  different  from  all  that  man  has  yet 
experienced,  must  open  to  the  race  a  world  of  good,  as 
vast  and  wonderful  as  the  realm  of  truth  which  has 
opened  its  portals  to  the  inquiring  reason  of  modern 
humanity ;  revealing  matter  not  as  a  brute  material, 
but  as  the  home  of  varied  forces  with  which  the  Cre- 
ator has  endowed  it,  to  work  out  before  the  eyes  of  his 
creature  the  operations  of  created  nature.  Science  is 
truth,  and  truth  is  the  fountain  of  good.  The  age  of 
truth  is  now,  and  the  age  of  good  cannot  fail  to  appear. 

"  Knowledge  is  not  a  couch  whereon  to  rest  a 
searching  and  restless  spirit,  or  a  terrace  for  a  wander- 
ing and  variable  mind  to  walk  up  and  down  with  a 
fair  prospect,  or  a  tower  of  state  for  a  proud  mind  to 
raise  itself  upon,  or  a  fort  or  commanding  ground  for 
strife  and  contention  ;  or  a  shop  for  profit  or  sale ;  but 
a  rich  storehouse  for  the  glory  of  the  Creator,  and  the 
relief  of  man's  estate." 

If  science  were  merely  the  reflection  in  the  human 
intellect  of  the  order  of  nature's  operations,  science 
would  make  man  knowing  without  making  him  wise ; 
and  if  science  were  only  calculated  to  improve  man's 
terrestrial  condition,  and  to  make  man  rich,  science 
would  only  make  man  rich  as  the  brutes  are  rich. 
Beneath  the  outward  formula  of  science  there  lies  the 
everlasting  truth,  as  beneath  the  outward  forms  of 


A  VALID  NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  465 

nature  there  lies  the  everlasting  power.  Science  has 
a  higher  and  a  nobler  destiny  than  the  mere  illumina- 
tion of  the  intellect,  or  the  mere  increase  of  man's  ter- 
restrial advantages.  "  The  heavens  declare  the  glory 
of  God,  and  the  firmament  showeth  his  handiwork." 
And  the  summation  of  all  that  science  can  teach,  and 
of  all  that  man's  reason  can  abstract  from  the  sensa- 
tional apprehension  of  material  nature,  is  the  knowl- 
edge of  that  divine  Creator,  "  who  hath  measured  the 
waters  in  the  hollow  of  his  hand,  and  meted  out 
heaven  with  the  span,  and  comprehended  the  dust  of 
the  earth  in  a  measure,  and  weighed  the  mountains  in 
scales,  and  the  hills  in  a  balance." 

"  Lift  up  your  eyes  on  high,  and  behold  who  hath 
created  these  things,*  that  bringeth  out  their  host  by 
number ;  he  calleth  them  all  by  names,  by  the  great- 
ness of  his  might,  for  that  he  is  strong  in  power,  not 
one  faileth." 

Posterior  to  the  science  of  equity  in  the  logical  order 
of  classification  comes  theology ;  and  consequently,  if 
the  sciences  evolve  in  the  order  of  their  logical  ordina- 
tion, a  period  must  come  when  theology  —  natural 
theology  —  shall  be  evolved,  and  men  shall  come  to  a 
systematic  unity  of  credence  on  the  great  question  of 
"  Who  hath  created  these  things  ?  " 

We  have,  therefore,  to  inquire  what  kind  of  theol- 
ogy can  be  taught  by  reason,  and  how  the  scientific 

*  This  most  natural  reply  to  the  mere  logic  of  scepticism  is  said 
to  have  been  used  by  Napoleon  —  in  Egypt,  if  we  remember  rightly 
—  when  the  savans  around  him  were  developing  their  infidel  rea- 
sonings. "  All  very  true,  gentlemen,"  he  said,  pointing  to  the  starry 
firmament,  "  bvi  who  made  all  these  ?  " 


466  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

determination  of  the  Creator  grows  gradually  more 
and  more  precise  with  the  discovery  and  reduction  to 
ordination  of  the  various  sciences.* 

In  the  first  place,  we  may  assume  that  natural  the- 
ology is  impossible,  in  its  complete  form,  until  men 
have  arrived  at  a  knowledge  of  the  natural  universe. 
If  the  God  of  nature  be  inferred  from  the  works  of 
nature,  it  is  plainly  evident  that  a  knowledge  of  those 
works  is  antecedently  requisite  before  the  attributes  of 
God  are  placed  on  a  sure  and  scientific  basis  that  com- 
mands universal  assent,  f     And  if  the  various  sciences 

#  In  taking  this  view  of  natural  theology,  we  must  remind  the 
reader  that  we  treat  only  of  the  manner  in  which  theology  grows 
and  expands  in  the  reflective  reason  of  mankind,  and  thereby  be- 
comes capable  of  being  taught  as  a  branch  of  knowledge.  The 
question  of  individual  responsibility  is  much  more  implicated  in  the 
moral  character  of  the  dispositions  than  in  the  greater  or  less  per- 
spicuity of  the  intellectual  perceptions ;  so  much  so,  in  fact,  that 
each  individual  would  have  been  morally  responsible,  even  although 
no  man  had  ever  mentioned  the  name  of  the  divine  Creator  to  his 
fellow-man.  Responsibility  is  a  primary  fact  belonging  to  man's 
nature,  but  theology  is  susceptible  of  a  greater  or  less  degree  of 
perfection,  as  it  becomes  capable  of  being  systematically  exhibited 
in  a  series  of  propositions  logically  substantiated. 

f  By  natural  theology  we  do  not  mean  that  which  is  accepted  by 
the  church,  which,  neither  in  its  origin  nor  its  method,  is  natural 
theology,  but  rather  the  corroboration  of  the  general  truths  of 
Scripture  from  the  works  of  nature ;  but  we  mean  such  a  natural 
theology  as  shall  convince  intellect  as  intellect,  and  thereby  pro- 
duce a  unity  of  credence  for  the  whole  race  of  man.  The  question 
is  a  very  simple  one.  There  either  is,  or  there  is  not,  within  the 
range  of  natural  cognition,  the  proof,  perfectly  valid,  clear,  and 
satisfactory,  of  the  moral  existence  of  the  Creator.  If  there  is,  (as 
can  scarcely  be  doubted,  save  by  those  who  have  entangled  them- 
selves in  spurious  reasonings,  which  do  not  go  deep  enough,)  the 


NATURAL    THEOLOGY.  467 

are  only  openings  up  to  the  intellect  of  humanity  of 
the  various  portions  of  the  natural  universe,  it  is  also 
plainly  evident  that  the  sciences  have,  each  one  in  par- 
ticular, some  light  to  throw  on  the  great  question  of 
the  character  of  the  Creator,  and  that  the  whole  mass 
of  the  natural  sciences  must  give,  as  the  grand  result, 
a  purely  scientific  natural  theology,  beyond  which  man 
can  go  no  farther  without  a  supernatural  revelation ; 
and  therefore,  although  revelation  be  given  to  guide 
man  by  faith,  and  especially  to  make  known  to  man 
those  manifestations  of  divine  goodness  which  could 
not  possibly  be  learned  through  natural  theology,  it 
appears  evident  that  the  natural  knowledge  of  God 
will  grow  and  expand  under  the  development  of  sci- 
ence, until  in  the  end  natural  theology  comes  to  the 
very  verge  of  revelation,  and  proves  beyond  a  doubt 
that  revelation  is  exactly  what  man  required  to  com- 
plete his  range  of  knowledge.  It  might,  however,  be 
reasonably  advanced,  that  revelation  is  not  an  accidental 
source  of  knowledge,  existing  only  because  man  is  a 

proof  must  ultimately  enlighten  the  whole  world,  exactly  on  the 
same  principle  as  science  enlightens  the  world.  But  for  this,  time. 
is  requisite.  Nor  need  we  be  surprised  that  time  should  be  requi- 
site, when  we  reflect  that  even  physical  truth  is  slowly  accepted 
by  the  world.  The  Newtonian  philosophy  is,  as  yet,  only  accepted 
by  a  portion  of  the  world ;  and  even  it  was  met  by  refutations, 
"  proving  it  to  be  false  and  absurd,  both  by  mathematical  and  phys- 
ical demonstration."  And  if  physical  truth  of  this  kind  expands  so 
slowly,  and  takes  so  long  a  time  to  overrun  the  earth,  no  natural 
theology  could  expect  to  meet  with  a  more  cordial  reception,  but 
gradually  to  fight  its  way  with  the  superstitions,  false  religions, 
scepticisms,  and  mysticisms  which  enslave  the  larger  portion  of 
mankind. 


468  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

fallen  creature,  but  that  a  revelation  from  the  Creator 
is  as  really  a  natural  source  of  knowledge,  belonging  to 
this  earth  and  to  the  human  race,  as  is  the  world  of 
material  phenomena,  or  the  world  of  mental  phenom- 
ena. The  fall  of  man  did  not  entail  revelation.  Rev- 
elation was  anterior  to  the  fall,  and  was  a  portion  of 
man's  terrestrial  lot.  It  was  a  thing  not  miraculous, 
but  common  ;  and  it  would  appear  that  the  revelation 
we  now  have  is  the  substitute  for  the  ordinary  commu- 
nication that  would  have  taken  place  between  the 
Creator  and  the  intelligent  beings  he  had  called  into 
existence.  That  there  was  a  direct  communication 
between  God  and  his  human  creatures,  is  plainly 
affirmed  in  Scripture.  Revelation,  therefore,  (that  is, 
communication  from  the  world  of  spirit,)  is  not  to  be 
regarded  as  accidental  to  the  world,  but  as  part  of 
man's  lot  on  earth,  quite  as  much  one  of  man's  origi- 
nal sources  of  knowledge  as  sensation  or  intellection. 
But  setting  aside  this  view,  and  adhering  only  to 
the  traditional  element,  we  may  ask,  What  became  of 
man's  knowledge  of  God  ?  It  has  been,  of  course, 
preserved  in  the  books  of  Scripture,  and  in  the  minds 
of  a  small  portion  of  the  human  race ;  but  with  regard 
to  the  great  mass  of  mankind,  those  not  specially 
enlightened  by  supernatural  means,  what  became  of 
man's  knowledge  of  God  ?  In  every  country  of  the 
world  it  has  presented  itself  in  a  corrupted  form.  False 
gods,  and  false  views  of  God,  have  universally  pre- 
vailed. Superstition  (credence  without  evidence)  has 
universally  destroyed  some  of  the  attributes  of  the 
true  God,  and  substituted  for  them  some  invention  of 
man's  imagination.     And  not  only  has  theology  in  its 


NATURAL    THEOLOGY.  469 

general  form  been  corrupted  in  the  intellectual  appre- 
hension ;  but  in  the  practical  acknowledgment  of 
God  in  worship,  men  have  introduced  superstitious 
and  erroneous  ceremonies,  symbols,  and  offices,  which 
were  also  corrupt,  and,  in  many  cases,  absolute  abom- 
inations. 

Against  the  traditions  of  false  gods  and  erroneous 
worship,  science  enters  the  lists.  Science  assumes 
as  its  first  proposition  to  base  credence  on  evidence, 
and  thereby  to  evolve  truth  instead  of  error  or  su- 
perstition. 

Consequently  science,  taking  its  birth,  will  invaria- 
bly manifest  itself  in  scepticism.  And  this  scepticism, 
much  as  it  has  been  abused,  is  really  and  truly  a  valid 
process  when  brought  to  bear  on  a  superstition ;  and 
the  Christian  religion  is  now  valid,  because  it  has  stood 
before  every  attempt  of  scepticism,  and  fairly  tri- 
umphed over  every  effort  that  man  has  made  to  im- 
pugn the  divinity  of  its  origin.  In  every  country, 
therefore,  that  has  a  traditional  worship,  it  is  a  natural 
consequence  that  that  worship  should  be  tested  by 
scepticism,  whenever  it  happens  that  men  resolutely 
apply  a  scientific  method,  and  proceed  to  posit  truth 
only  when  it  is  substantiated  by  evidence.  Scepticism 
in  its  legitimate  form  is  doubt,  and  doubt  is  one  of  the 
great  elements  of  humanity  absolutely  requisite  to 
place  knowledge  on  a  secure  basis. 

Let  us  grant  then  that  a  scientific  method,  originat- 
ing in  a  country,  will  naturally  come  into  contact 
with  the  traditional  elements  already  prevalent  in  that 
country ;  and  also,  that  it  is  the  property  of  a  scien- 
tific method  to  destroy  superstition,  and  to  substan- 
40 


470  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

tiate  truth  —  first,  in  its  most  general  form,  and  then 
gradually  to  enter  more  and  more  specially  on  the  ac- 
curate survey  of  the  universe  with  which  man  is  ac- 
quainted. Truth  can  have  nothing  to  fear,  but  every 
thing  to  hope,  from  the  most  accurate  survey  that  man 
can  possibly  take  of  the  region  open  to  cognition. 

As  an  historical  fact,  the  cultivation  of  science  in 
Britain  and  France  was  accompanied  by  scepticism, 
far  less  terrible  in  the  former  country  it  is  true,  but  not 
the  less  arising  from  the  prevalence  of  a  scientific 
mode  of  grounding  credence  on  evidence. 

Let  us,  then,  endeavor  to  ascertain  how  a  true 
knowledge  of  God  must  naturally  grow, 

1st.  Scepticism  enters  into  a  contest  with  traditional- 
ism, and  as  in  every  country  there  has  been  either  a 
false  or  a  corrupted  religion,  scepticism  (setting  aside 
scriptural  reformation,  which  is  not,  properly  speak- 
ing, scientific*)  has    to    achieve   the   destruction    of 


*  As  Mr.  Morell  has  well  observed,  philosophy  reasons,  but  does 
not  preach.  Thus  the  advancement  of  natural  theology  consists  in 
developing  its  propositions,  and  substantiating  their  trueness.  A 
scriptural  reformation,  on  the  contrary,  consists  not  merely  in  the 
substantiation  of  propositions,  but  in  the  circumstance  that  men 
accept  the  propositions  of  Scripture  as  rules  of  life.  But  although 
philosophy,  in  one  sense,  is  purely  speculative,  we  must  not  over- 
look the  fact,  that  ethics,  while  inquiring  what  is  true,  has  for  its 
question,  "  What  ought  to  be  done  ?  "  And  if,  from  the  natural  re- 
lations of  man  to  man,  there  arises  a  system  of  human  ethics,  (or 
rules  of  action,)  so,  if  the  existence  of  God  be  established  by  a 
purely  scientific  method,  must  there  necessarily  rise  a  system  of 
theological  ethics,  establishing  in  general  terms  what  ought  to  be 
the  conduct  of  the  human  creature  in  reference  to  the  divine  Cre- 
ator. This  branch,  winch  the  great  Dr.  Chalmers  expounded  under 
the  name  of  "  ethics  of  theology,"  we  have  termed  Dikaistic,  (see 


NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


471 


superstition ;  but  in  place  of  superstition  it  has  nothing 
to  substitute. 

2d.  That  man  should  permanently  refrain  from  a 
theological  credence  is  out  of  the  question.  There  is 
either  nothing  whatever,  or  there  is  some  permanently 
enduring  something  that  was  anterior  to  man,  that 
underlies  all  the  operations  of  nature,  and  that  con- 
structed, and  continues  to  construct,  all  the  varied 
mechanisms,  physical  and  mental,  with  which  man  is 
acquainted ;  and  this  permanent  element  which  man 
posits,  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  his  reason,  is 
what  is  meant  by  God.  God,  therefore,  has  a  neces- 
sary existence  to  the  human  mind;  and  the  main 
question  is  not,  Whether  there  is  an  eternal  and  all- 
pervading  power  ;  for  man  cannot  conceive  that  there 
is  not ;  but,  What  is  the  character  of  that  immortal 
Power  that  sustains  the  universe  ?  what,  in  fact,  are 
the  attributes  of  God  ? 

And  in  the  growth  of  these  attributes,  that  is,  in 
the  addition  of  predicate  after  predicate  to  the  sub- 
stantive idea,  lies  the  process  by  which  a  natural 
theology,  purely  scientific,  must  ultimately  be  de- 
veloped, and  actually  command  the  human  credence 
in  the  same  manner  as  any  other  truth. 

The  first  positing  of  the  theological  idea  is,  logically, 
universal  existence  in  space  and  immortal  existence 
in  time.     This  is  the   first  step  towards  a  scientific 

table  in  the  Appendix,)  from  dlxaiog,  righteous ;  and  it  should  an- 
swer the  question,  "  How  ought  man  to  act,  rightly  or  righteously  ?  " 
It  is  plain,  however,  that  from  the  fall  of  man,  dikaistic  cannot 
satisfy,  but  only  direct,  in  general  terms,  to  the  fountain  of  divine 
satisfaction.  It  is  a  perfectly  valid  branch  of  knowledge,  but 
altogether  inadequate  for  man's  fallen  necessities. 


472  GROWTH    OF    THEOLOGY. 

theology  purely  rational  and  objective  ;  and  it  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  that  it  should  be  objective,  otherwise 
we  abandon  the  scientific  method,  and  launch  into 
mysticism.  An  infinite  and  immortal  substance  may 
be  termed  that  portion  of  natural  theology  which  is 
furnished  by  the  mathematical  contemplation  of  the 
universe.* 

#  Historically,  the  celebrated  argument  of  Samuel  Clarke  comes 
under  this  head.  Another,  and  well-constructed  argument,  is  that 
of  Moses  Lowman.  Neither  of  these  arguments  is  pure;  both 
authors  attempting  to  prove  more  than  can  be  proven  by  their 
method.  An  d  priori  argument  cannot  prove  a  fact,  only  a  rational 
necessity.  Geometry  does  not  prove  that  there  is  space ;  it  only 
proves  what  the  relations  between  the  forms  of  space  must  be. 
And  so  an  d  priori  argument  in  reference  to  theology  cannot  prove 
that  there  is  existence,  but  only  what  the  rational  necessities  of  the 
forms  of  existence  must  be  in  the  human  apprehension.  The  form 
of  this  argument  may  be  concisely  expressed  as  follows :  — 

1.  Major.    If  there  be  existence  actual,  there  must  be  exist- 

ence necessary. 

2.  Minor.     There  is  existence  actual. 

3.  Conclusion.     There  is  existence  necessary. 

The  major  proposition  is  an  abstract  conviction  of  the  human 
reason,  and  is  d  priori ;  and,  in  fact,  all  a  priori  propositions  should 
be  announced  in  the  hypothetical  form. 

The  minor  is  derived  from  experience,  and  consequently  the 
argument  is  not  d  priori. 

To  extend  the  argument,  it  is  necessary  to  discover  what  the  char- 
acteristics of  the  existence  actual  really  are,  and  thereby  to  infer, 
by  a  reflex  process,  the  attributes  of  the  existence  necessary.  The 
growth  of  the  theological  argument  depends  on  the  qualification 
and  quantification  of  the  actual  existence  known  to  man ;  and,  there- 
fore the  scheme  of  natural  theology  depends  on  the  extension  of  the 
sciences.  But  then  again,  experience  cannot  discourse  of  infinite 
attributes,  and  reason  must,  d  priori,  determine  the  infinity  of  the 
attributes,  although  reason  could  not  possibly  determine  the  exist- 
ence of  the  attributes  without  experience.    And  thus  reason  and 


SUBSTANCE,    INFINITY,    AND    POWER.  473 

The  universality  in  space  and  the  immortality  in 
time  being  posited,  the  general  groundwork  is  laid  for 
the  addition  of  predicates  ;  and  these  must  be  derived 
from  the  world  of  material  function.  The  physical 
sciences  must  contribute  to  transform  the  abstraction 
into  something  farther  removed  from  negation. 

The  next  attribute  is  power.  And  this  addition  of 
power  very  possibly  produces  pantheism.  The  idea 
has  now  become  an  infinite  and  immortal  power. 
And  further  than  this,  no  physical  or  metaphysical 
argument  can  legitimately  extend.  Another  region 
must  be  surveyed  before  science  posits  indubitably 
other  attributes  which  shall  transform  the  power  into 
intelligence ;  and  thus  the  theology  of  nature  will  re- 
ceive a  new  extension.  Physical  science,  as  such, 
can  afford  nothing  but  an  all-pervading  power;  and 
if  man  were  never  to  go  beyond  the  physical  sciences, 
the  scientific  world  would  remain  (that  is,  without 
revelation)  at  the  natural  theology  of  pantheism ;  and, 
historically,  pantheism  is  now  succeeding  the  conti- 
nental scepticism. 

It  has  usually  been  supposed  that  the  contempla- 
tion of  what  is  called  design  in  the  works  of  creation 
proves  the  existence  of  an  intelligent  designer.  This 
argument  has  been  so  commonly  advanced,  and  is 
supposed  to  be  so  perfectly  valid,  that  it  appears 
almost  a  philosophical  heresy  to  call  it  in  question. 

experience  gradually  and  systematically  construct  an  argument; 
reason  furnishing  the  metaphysic  of  necessity,  and  experience  the 
concrete  of  reality.  Reason  is  the  operation  of  weaving,  and 
experience  the  material  woven  ;  both  are  necessary  to  produce  the 
fabric. 

40* 


474  DESIGN. 

Let  us  examine,  therefore,  whether  this  argnment,  as 
hitherto  advanced,  is  really  conclusive.  It  may,  per- 
haps, be  necessary  to  observe  the  fact,  that  this  argu- 
ment has  not  convinced  a  large  portion  of  the  scien- 
tific world ;  and,  if  there  be  nothing  more  conclusive, 
it  is  evident  that  such  natural  theology,  taken  alone, 
has  failed. 

We  must  remind  the  reader  that  we  are  by  no 
means  engaged  in  an  attempt  to  prove  the  existence  of 
God;  but  only  to  trace  the  mode  in  which  the  idea  of 
God  arises  necessarily  in  the  human  reason  as  actually 
involved  in  the  spectacle  of  nature,  thoroughly  under- 
stood ;  and,  therefore,  we  only  endeavor  to  estimate 
how  much  is  really  and  truly  furnished  by  one  method, 
and  how  much  is  furnished  by  another  method.  And 
we  affirm  that  neither  the  mathematical  nor  the 
physical  contemplation  of  the  universe  can  legitimately 
introduce  any  term  into  the  conclusion  which  is  not 
a  term  of  mathematics  or  a  term  of  physics,  except 
those  general  terms  of  metaphysic  which  are  anterior 
to  both.  And  by  general  terms  of  metaphysic  we 
mean  those  which  express  abstractions  and  relations, 
without  in  the  least  affirming  whether  there  are  or  are 
not  any  realities  which  coincide  with  the  abstract 
terms.  The  office  of  metaphysic  is  to  furnish  abstract 
categories  (substantial  and  propositional)  into  which 
experience  must  locate  realities  ;  and  if  we  introduce 
terms  which  are  neither  abstract  nor  yet  furnished  by 
physical  (sensational)  experience,  we  have  an  illicit 
process,  and,  consequently,  an  inconclusive  argument. 
And  though  the  argument  of  design  is  satisfactory 
to  those  who  are  already  believers,  (as  illustrative  of  the 


DESIGN.  475 

divine  wisdom,)  we  must  remember  that  a  great 
difference  exists  between  an  exposition  of  God's  wis- 
dom and  a  proof  of  God's  existence,  so  conclusive  in 
itself  that  it  commands  the  assent  of  intellect,  as 
intellect. 

That  there  is  a  proof  of  God's  existence,  and  of  his 
power  and  wisdom,  so  perfectly  conclusive  that  it 
shall  command  the  assent  of  the  reason  of  mankind, 
we  have  no  possible  doubt ;  but  that  such  an  argu- 
ment can  be  drawn  from  physical  science  (farther  than 
power  is  concerned)  we  by  no  means  admit ;  inasmuch 
as  the  term  intelligence,  necessary  to  substantiate  the 
personality  of  God,  belongs  neither  to  metaphysics, 
nor  to  mathematics,  nor  to  physics. 

All  metaphysical  dogmas  must  confine  themselves 
to  abstract  terms,  abstract  divisions,  and  abstract  rela- 
tions.    Such  are  the  following :  — 

Existence,  non-existence,  necessity,  contingency,  cre- 
ation, created,  substance,  attribute,  cause,  effect,  condi- 
tion, change,  &c.  And  whenever  these  terms  are  used 
concretely,  and  not  abstractly,  we  have  left  the  realm 
of  metaphysic.  This  metaphysic  underlies  all  human 
knowledge  whatever,  and  is  in  reality  nothing  more 
than  the  necessary  form  of  thought.  Into  this  neces- 
sary form  of  thought,  the  mathematical  substantives 

—  identity,  equality,  number,  quantity,  space,  and  force 

—  are  located,  and  the  mathematical  sciences  arise. 
And  again,  into  the  blank  categories  of  the  mathemat- 
ical propositions  the  facts  of  sensation  are  located,  and 
the  physical  sciences  arise.  But  as  the  physical  sci- 
ences do  not  involve  objective  intelligence,  but  only 
the  objective  conditions  and  functions  of  matter,  it  is 


476  INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENT    DESIGN. 

plainly  evident  that  a  conclusion  which  involves  intel- 
ligence can  never  be  drawn  from  the  bare  contempla- 
tion of  matter ;  and  that,  therefore,  there  must  first  be 
the  contemplation  of  mind,  and  the  discovery  of  the 
laws  of  mind,  before  we  can  posit  legitimately  the 
intelligence  of  that  power  which  pantheistic  physics 
posits  as  universal. 

The  argument  that  there  is  design  in  the  works  of 
nature  is,  properly  speaking,  not  physical,  but  physico- 
psychological ;  and  the  bridge  that  connects  the  all- 
pervading  power  with  mind  is  as  follows :  — 

In  the  works  of  nature,  and  the  operations  of  na- 
ture, man  intuitively  perceives  by  his  reason  a  power 
or  force ;  and  the  primordial  force,  if  we  make  nothing 
objective  but  matter,  necessarily  lands  us  id  pantheism, 
which  is  at  present  the  theological  credence  of  a  large 
portion  of  the  scientific  men  on  the  continent.  And 
out  of  this  pantheism  there  is  no  scientific  exit  until 
mind  is  made  objective,  and  the  facts  of  mind  are 
brought  to  bear  on  the  facts  of  physics  ;  so  that  what 
was  before  only  a  primordial  force  becomes  an  intelli- 
gent agent,  of  whom  power  is  the  attribute. 

In  the  world  of  matter,  two  phenomena  are  appa- 
rent. First.  The  performance  of  a  function.  This  sup- 
plies the  material  from  which  man  intuitively  posits 
power  or  force.  Second.  The  adaptation  of  the  phys- 
ical conditions  of  matter  for  the  achievement  of  certain 
ends.  This  is  the  portion  that  has  been  called  design; 
but  as  design  implies  a  designer,  the  term  is  illegitimate 
until  it  has  been  determined  what  a  designer  is,  and 
what  the  term  design  is  really  employed  to  signify. 
If  we  assume  a  designer  because  there  is  design,  we 


INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENT    DESIGN.  477 

have  assumed  only  a  truism ;  but  we  have  forgotten 
to  establish  the  most  essential  proposition,  namely, 
that  the  adaptation  of  means  to  an  end  is  design. 
Every  merely  physical  argument  to  prove  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  primordial  force  will  split  on  this  rock ; 
and  it  is  absolutely  necessary,  therefore,  for  man  to 
progress  beyond  matter  science  before  natural  theology 
can  be  other  than  pantheism.  Pantheism  is  the  theol- 
ogy of  physical  science ;  and  if  there  were  no  other 
science  beyond  physical  science,  pantheism  would  be 
the  last  final  form  of  scientific  credence. 

Let  us,  however,  still  bearing  in  mind  the  division 
of  the  sciences  into 

The  mathematical  sciences,  (or  notion  sciences,) 

The  matter  sciences, 

The  man  sciences, 
—  Let  us  ask  how  the  primordial  force  of  pantheism 
is  legitimately  transformed   into    an    attribute  of  an 
intelligence. 

Let  a  designer  stand  for  an  intelligence  who  is  pos- 
sessed of  power,  and  who  intentionally  adapts  means 
to  an  end.  Design,  therefore,  will  stand  for  intentional 
adaptation  ;  and  from  the  contemplation  of  man  we 
are  enabled  to  make  the  above  definitions  without 
transcending  the  realm  of  experience.  When  we  have 
made  man  objective,  we  can  affirm,  "  man  can  design  ; " 
and  when  we  contemplate  the  product  of  man's  de- 
sign, we  find  it  expressed  in  the  terms,  "  adaptation  of 
means  to  an  end,"  where  neither  of  the  terms  are  psy- 
chological, but  such  as  are  used  legitimately  in  physi- 
cal science.  And  when,  on  the  other  hand,  we  find  in 
nature  the  adaptation  of  means  to  an  end,  we  infer 


478  POSSIBILITY    OF    MORAL    THEOLOGY. 

design  and  a  designer,  because  the  only  circumstances 
within  our  experience  in  which  we  can  trace  the  origi- 
nation of  adaptation  are  those  in  which  human  mind 
is  implicated.* 

And  thus  what  was  at  first  an  omnipresent  and  im- 
mortal substance,  and  afterwards  an  omnipresent  and 
immortal  power,  becomes  transformed  into  an  omni- 
present and  immortal  intelligence.  And  this  growth 
of  the  theological  idea  is  borne  out  by  the  chronologi- 
cal fact,  first,  Spinoza,  Clarke,  Lowman,  &c,  then 
Paley,  Chalmers,  and  the  Bridgewater  Treatises. 

But  an  intelligent  and  all-pervading  mind,  although 
possessed  of  even  infinite  power  and  infinite  wisdom, 
is  still  insufficient.      There  are  facts  in  nature  which 


*  The  word  design,  like  hundreds  of  other  words,  is  subject  to 
an  ambiguity  of  so  common  a  character,  that  it  is  apt  to  be  over- 
looked. In  one  sense  it  is  used  subjectively,  in  another  sense  it  is 
used  objectively.  In  its  subjective  sense  it  means  a  mode  of  action, 
in  its  objective  sense  it  means  a  product  of  cation  ;  and  when  man 
observes  the  character  of  the  product  resulting  from  his  own  mode 
of  action,  and  recognizes  in  the  objective  universe  products  of  an 
analogous  character,  he  transforms  the  objective  idea  of  those  prod- 
ucts into  a  subjective  form.  And  this  transformation  of  the  ob- 
jective into  the  subjective,  is  in  fact  the  whole  secret  of  the  pro- 
gression of  science.  When  the  mathematical  sciences  are  studied, 
they  are  objective ;  but  when  they  are  used,  they  are  transformed 
into  the  subjective  form,  and  become  powers  of  operation.  Every 
science,  when  its  laws  are  discovered,  becomes  thus  transformed 
into  a  subjective  power  of  operation  —  that  is,  into  an  art ;  exactly 
as  a  proposition  in  any  one  science  is  first  considered  objectively  as 
to  its  truth  or  falsity,  and  afterwards  used  subjectively  for  the  pur- 
pose of  determining  the  truth  or  falsity  of  a  subsequent  proposition. 
This  metamorphosis  is  one  of  the  most  beautiful  considerations  in 
the  whole  realm  of  reasoning. 


POSSIBILITY    OF    MORAL    THEOLOGY.  479 

power  taken  as  power,  and  wisdom  taken  as  wisdom, 
will  not  account  for.  Not  only  is  man,  when  made 
objective,  found  to  be  possessed  of  an  intellectual 
capacity  which  enables  him  to  design,  and  of  a  power 
which  enables  him  to  execute,  but  also  of  a  moral 
nature  which  lays  on  him  the  imperative  obligation 
of  designing  certain  ends,  and  of  refraining  from  de- 
signing certain  other  ends.  And  as  man  is  as  much 
a  portion  of  nature  as  is  matter,  we  must  have  a  pro- 
ductive power  of  such  a  character  as  would  account 
for  this  moral  nature  of  man,  and  to  have  this  we 
must  have  the  transformation  of  mere  natural  theol- 
ogy into  moral  theology.  And  although  this  moral 
theology  is  not  yet  universally  admitted  by  men  of 
science,  it  follows  so  plainly  and  evidently  from  the 
preceding  method  that  it  cannot  fail  to  evolve. 

Let  us  then  reinvestigate  the  process  according  to 
which  a  purely  scientific  natural  theology  must  grow. 
Natural  theology  is  strictly  a  science ;  and  this  science 
must  be  classed  as  the  last  and  highest  of  the  direct 
sciences.  In  so  far  as  it  is  an  intellectual  dogma,  only 
discoursing  of  truth,  it  is  a  direct  science,  quite  as 
much  so  as  dynamics,  which  treats  of  the  laws  of 
force,  except  only  that  dynamics  treats  of  the  laws  of 
mechanical  force,  and  thereby  explains  logically  (that 
is,  in  three  propositions,  one  of  which  follows  as  the 
conclusion  of  the  other  two)  the  mechanical  functions 
of  matter ;  while  theology  must  furnish  such  a  major 
power  as  shall  account  for  all  the  cognizable  phenom- 
ena within  the  reach  of  human  cognition.  And  thus 
exactly  as  man's  knowledge  of  the  universe,  both  ma- 
terial and  mental,  grows  and  expands  in  the  form  of 


480  POSSIBILITY    OF    MORAL    THEOLOGY. 

science,  so  must  the  idea  of  God  grow  and  expand 
also,  until  the  whole  of  the  possible  sciences  are  com- 
pleted, and  man  comes  to  the  universal  application  of 
truth. 

We  have  then  to  glance  once  more  at  the  order  of 
human  knowledge,  and  here  we  must  remark  on  the 
groundwork  of  the  mathematical  sciences. 

In  the  mathematical  sciences  the  object-noun  is 
an  abstraction.  Number,  quantity,  and  space  are 
abstractions. 

These  abstractions  are  divided  into  forms  or  partial 
numbers,  partial  quantities,  and  partial  spaces. 

And  these  forms  are  made  to  function  by  the  appli- 
cation of  the  subjective  axioms  of  the  reason.  These 
subjective  axioms  are  taken  for  granted  as  true,  ante- 
riorly to  any  consideration  of  the  actual  matter  of  the 
mathematical  sciences. 

But  these  subjective  axioms,  or  universal  and  purely 
abstract  propositions,  when  considered  as  objective, 
belong  to  the  region  of  metaphysic,  and,  therefore, 
metaphysic  is  the  groundwork  of  all  scientific  knowl- 
edge. And  metaphysic  furnishes  to  mathematic  the 
synthetic  propositions  purely  a  priori,  and  perfectly 
abstract,  which  enable  the  substantives  of  mathematic 
to  function.  That  is,  in  fact,  the  substantives  of  math- 
ematic are  located  in  the  blank  propositions  of  meta- 
physic, and  the  mathematical  sciences  are  produced ; 
in  the  same  manner  as  the  facts  of  sensational  obser- 
vation are  afterwards  located  in  the  propositions  of 
mathematic,  (that  is,  of  number,  quantity,  space,  and 
force,)  and  the  physical  sciences,  properly  so  called, 
are  produced. 


POSSIBILITY    OF    MORAL    THEOLOGY.  481 

The  order  of  human  knowledge,  therefore,  is,  logi- 
cally, — 

Metaphysics,  which  furnishes  the  abstraction  and  the 
axiom  to  mathematics. 

Mathematics,  which  furnishes  the  computing  power 
to  physics. 

Physics,  which  furnishes  the  correct  rule  of  the  arts  to 
political  economy. 

Political  economy,  which  furnishes  the  correct  mode 
of  action  to  politics. 

Politics,  which  furnishes  the  correct  mode  of  action  to 
theology.*  [Politics,  the  science  of  equity,  de- 
termines what  is  just;  and  theology  brings  the 
just  into  operation.] 

Theology,  which  furnishes  the  ultimate  rule  of  action 
for  mankind,  and  leads  his  hopes  towards  im- 
mortality, 

*  It  must  be  remembered  that  theology  would  not  be  of  practical 
avail  unless  man  were  a  moral  being  —  that  is,  an  accountable 
being.  The  existence  of  a  great  First  Cause  might  be  substan- 
tiated by  valid  evidence ;  but  to  make  man  accountable  to  the  First 
Cause  requires  a  separate  process  of  proof,  and  this  proof  is  found 
in  the  moral  nature  of  man ;  and  the  moral  nature  of  man  is  indu- 
bitably substantiated  the  moment  moral  science  is  achieved.  So 
that  moral  science  furnishes  to  speculative  theology  its  moral  ele- 
ment ;  and  though  politics  confines  itself  to  the  minor  question  of 
man's  accountability  to  man,  it  transmits  to  speculative  theology 
the  incomparably  greater  proposition,  that  man  must  also  be  account- 
able to  God,  which  proposition  a  merely  speculative  theology  could 
not  prove,  as  it  confines  itself  to  the  question  of  God's  existence. 
The  divine  attributes  could  not  be  proven  in  their  moral  form,  un- 
less man  be  first  admitted  to  be  a  moral  being.  Hence  the  advan- 
tage of  a  system  of  natural  morals,  which,  if  once  substantiated, 
must  forever  uproot  the  argumentations  of  the  sceptic. 
41 


482  NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

These  are  the  direct  sciences  which  are  objective ; 
and  this  is  not  only  the  order  in  which  they  must  be 
classed,  but  the  order  in  which  they  must  necessarily 
be  evolved  in  the  history  of  human  evolution. 

If  we  take  the  sciences  in  this  order,  it  is  plain  that 
science  reads  the  universe  backwards,  beginning  at  the 
most  ultimate  abstractions,  and  gradually  becoming 
more  and  more  real,  more  and  more  directly  appli- 
cable to  the  great  requirements  of  the  moral  man. 
And  if  we  consider  science  to  be  "  the  universe  seen 
by  the  reason,  and  not  merely  by  the  senses,"  we  see 
that  this  inverse  order  is  absolutely  necessary,  because 
the  reason  must  master  the  most  universal  forms  first, 
and  afterwards  those  that  are  more  special  in  their 
order.  But  while  metaphysic,  and  next  to  it  mathe-, 
matic,  is  the  genus  of  science  which  presents  the  great- 
est possible  extension,  it  is  that  which  presents  the 
least  possible  comprehension;  and  on  the  contrary, 
natural  theology,  considered  as  a  mode  of  thought,  pre- 
sents the  greatest  possible  comprehension,  really  involv- 
ing all  the  other  sciences  whatever. 

And  this  being  the  case,  natural  theology  grows 
(in  the  mind  of  man)  exactly  as  the  anterior  sciences 
are  perfected;  and  thus  the  final  ultimatum  of  all 
scientific  cognition,  when  perfected  in  its  whole  sphere, 
is  the  teaching  of  natural  theology.  And  on  this 
account  it  is,  that  the  prevalent  natural  theology, 
wherever  it  is  scientific,  will  always  assume  the  form 
of  those  sciences  which  have  been  last  laid  open  to 
the  intellect.  So  that  it  need  excite  no  surprise,  that 
at  one  period  of  man's  evolution  we  should  see  the 
metaphysical    attributes  developed;    at  a  subsequent 


NATURAL    THEOLOGY.  483 

period,  the  mathematical  attributes ;  at  a  subsequent 
period,  the  physical  attributes,  (power,  &c. ;)  at  a  still 
later  period,  the  intellectual  attributes ;  and  finally,  the 
moral  attributes.  But  this  progressive  development 
is  nothing  more  than  the  progressive  development  of 
man's  knowledge,  the  Divine  Reality  remaining  al- 
ways the  same,  however  darkened  or  however  en- 
lightened man  may  be ;  so  that  at  the  last,  natural 
reason,  by  a  purely  scientific  process,  will  have  seen 
in  the  universe,  not  an  aggregate  of  functioning  matter, 
nor  a  pantheistic  power,  nor  a  mere  intelligence  pos- 
sessed of  power,  but  an  Infinite  Creator,  infinite  in 
his  moral  attributes  ;  that  is,  infinitely  holy  ;  to  whom 
the  whole  human  race  is  accountable  for  every 
thought,  and  every  word,  and  every  action. 

And  thus  natural  theology,  opening  up  to  the  reason 
of  mankind,  one  after  another,  the  attributes  of  God, 
will  at  last  land  the  race  on  the  very  threshold  of 
divine  revelation,  which  alone  can  solve  the  moral 
difficulty  of  a  reason,  which  points  infallibly  in  one 
direction,  and  a  fallen  nature,  which  tends  infallibly  in 
another.  When  political  economy  shall  have  done 
her  work  on  earth,  and  taught  men  how  to  evolve  the 
maximum  of  material  good,  and  when  equity  shall  have 
taught  men  to  construct  society  in  accordance  with 
the  principles  of  justice,  the  reason  of  mankind  will 
still  go  onward,  and  the  higher  and  nobler  good,  the 
aspiration  after  immortality,  will  still  beckon  on  hu- 
manity ;  and  earth,  transformed  by  truth,  harmoniously 
reverberating  from  nature  to  reason,  and  from  reason 
to  revelation,  shall  at  last  rejoice  in  the  universal 
knowledge  of  Him  whose  kingdom  is  everlasting. 


484 


GRADUAL    EVOLUTION    OF    A 


Let  us  then  concisely  review  the  growth  of  the 
theological  idea,  and  examine  how  much  each  genus 
of  science  contributes. 

All  science  is  the  knowledge  of  Being,  and  each 
particular  science  discourses  of  the  mode  of  being,  or 
of  the  manifestation  of  being. 

1.  Metaphysic.     Posits  the  universal  mode  in  which 

the  human  mind  views  being.  Its 
contribution  to  theology  is  the  divis- 
ion of  being  into  necessary  and  con- 
tingent, substance  and  attribute,  cause 
and  effect^  &c. 

2.  Mathematic.    Introduces  space  and  quantity.     The 

idea  now  becomes  a  substance  hav- 
ing no   limits   in   space.     (Infinity.) 

3.  Dynamic.         Introduces  power.     And  as  space   is 

the  static  condition  of  the  universe, 
so  time  is  the  dynamic  condition. 
The  idea  becomes  non-limited  in 
time,  (immortal ;)  and  the  substance 
is  a  power  without  limits  in  time  or 
space. 

4.  Physic.  Introduces  construction,  or  the  adap- 

tation of  condition  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  an  end.  The  power  now 
becomes  an  infinite  constructive  pow- 
er.    (Pantheism.) 

5.  Economic.       Introduces  intentional  design  in  con- 

struction. The  idea  now  becomes 
an  intelligence  infinitely  powerful  and 
infinitely  wise. 

6.  Politic.  Introduces  justice.     That  is,   treats, 


GENUINE    NATURAL    THEOLOGY.  485 

not  of  the  mode  of  producing  an  end,  but  of  the  end 
that  ought  to  be  produced.  The  intelligence  now 
becomes  a  God  of  infinite  justice. 

Such  is  the  direct  mode  in  which  natural  theology- 
is  produced ;  but  it  is  plainly  evident  that  if  man  were 
to  stay  here,  he  has  nothing  whereon  to  ground  his 
Iwpes.  A  God  of  infinite  justice,  no  man  who  ever 
lived  on  earth  would  or  could  desire  to  stand  before. 
Justice  is  exactly  that  attribute  which,  while  it  clothes 
God  with  righteous  majesty,  fills  man  with  reasonable 
terror.  Man  is  not  only  an  intelligence  who  com- 
prehends, but  a  voluntary  agent  who  acts;  and  no 
man  who  ever  lived  would  desire  that  his  actions 
should  be  weighed  in  the  balances  of  justice,  and  that 
he  himself  should  abide  by  the  award.  Between  the 
dictates  of  man's  reason  and  the  history  of  his  actions 
there  is  a  discrepancy.  Man,  in  fact,  is  a  fallen  being ; 
and  science,  while  it  enlightens  him,  cannot  obliterate 
his  crimes.  Natural  theology,  then,  while  it  solves 
the  mystery  of  the  natural  universe,  can  never  solve 
the  mystery  of  the  moral  universe.  It  may  establish 
man's  responsibility,  but  in  so  doing  it  as  indubitably 
establishes  his  criminality;  and  thus  when  natural 
theology  shall  have  achieved  its  highest  point,  and 
blazoned  forth  the  moral  attributes  of  God,  it  will,  at 
the  same  time,  have  heralded  man's  condemnation^ 
and  pronounced  irrevocable  judgment  on  the  race. 

And  thus  the  final  destiny  of  natural  theology 
(which  really  comprehends  all  science  *)  is   only  to 

#  Man,  in  evolving  the  sciences,  reads  the  universe  backwards, 
and  terminates  at  natural  theology.    Thus  natural  theology  is,  in 
41* 


486  A    MILLENNIUM    ANTICIPATED. 

lead  man  at  last  to  the  divine  message  of  mercy—* 
to  the  glad  tidings  of  forgiveness  and  reconciliation. 
And  thus,  also,  as  the  sciences  evolve  chronologically 
in  the  same  order  that  they  are  logically  classified, 
the  ultimate  end  of  human  study,  and  of  all  man's 
intellectual  achievements,  is  only  at  last  to  prove 
beyond  a  doubt  the  absolute  necessity  both  of  a  reve- 
lation and  of  a  means  of  redemption,  of  which  God 
is  the  author.  And  therefore,  as  we  have  pursued 
exactly  the  same  method  in  evolving  the  sciences  to 
come  which  explains  the  evolution  of  those  already 
ordinated,  there  is  a  natural  ground  for  anticipating 
not  only  a  millennium  of  justice,  in  which  all  man's 
political  arrangements  shall  be  made  in  accordance 
with  the  dictates  of  enlightened  equity,  but  beyond 
that  period  a  millennium  of  Christianity,  when  the 
burdened  heart  of  humanity  shall  return  to  the  true 
waters  of  life,  and  drink  from  the  immortal  streams 
of  Truth. 

Having  thus  endeavored,  in  a  concise  manner,  to 
exhibit  the  mode  in  which  natural  theology  must  ne- 
cessarily be  evolved,  both  logically  in  the  reason  and 
chronologically  in  the   history  of  mankind,  we  may 

the  first  place,  or  in  the  process  of  its  formation,  an  inference.  But 
when  the  sciences  are  completed,  and  man  reverses  the  order  of 
knowledge  to  make  it  correlative  with  the  order  of  reality,  all  the 
operations  of  nature,  instead  of  being  viewed  as  the  proofs  of  God's 
existence,  are  viewed  as  the  operations  of  the  Divine  power  and 
wisdom.  And  thus,  though  all  knowledge  may  be  viewed  as 
leading  to  God,  all  reality  (save  the  moral  determinations  of  vol- 
untary agents)  must  be  viewed  as  flowing  from  God ;  so  that  a 
knowledge  of  God  and  of  the  divine  operations  would  really  com- 
prehend all  science  whatever. 


REVELATION.  487 

attempt  to  estimate  the  present  position  of  natural 
theology,  and  to  account  for  its  present  unsatisfactory- 
char  acter. 

1st.  Revelation  is  given  to  guide  man  correctly,  under 
all  circumstances  of  his  scientific  knowledge.  If  man 
be  ignorant  of  science,  revelation  is  in  itself  the  divine 
record  of  that  truth  which  it  behoves  man  the  most  to 
know.  Revelation  solves  the  moral  mystery  of  the 
universe,  and  points  out  to  man  the  one  thing  needful 
—  namely,  how  man  can  attain  to  an  immortality  of 
purified  soul  and  blissful  existence.  And  let  science 
progress  as  it  may  —  let  man's  knowledge  become  as 
extensive  and  as  accurate  as  it  ever  could  by  any  pos- 
sibility—  revelation  is  still  and  always  supreme,  always 
infinitely  greater  than  any  possible  increment  of  natu- 
ral knowledge.  Revelation  has  an  absolute  and  infi- 
nite truth  for  the  most  ignorant,  and  it  has  also  an 
absolute  and  infinite  truth  for  the  most  enlightened. 

2d.  Between  natural  theology,  which  is  purely  scien- 
tific, (that  is,  such  as  would  have  arisen  had  there 
never  been  a  revelation,  and  consequently  no  tradi- 
tional idea  of  Deity,)  and  such  natural  theology  as 
first  takes  its  major  propositions  from  Scripture,  and 
then  proceeds  to  illustrate  them  from  nature,  there  is 
of  course  a  difference  so  great,  that  the  two,  although 
passing  under  the  same  name,  are  not  even  compara- 
ble. Natural  theology  is  as  different  in  its  method  from 
scriptural  physics,  or  scriptural  metaphysics,  or  scriptu- 
ral morals,  as  is  geology  from  the  scriptural  account 
of  the  creation.  The  two  can  never  be  legitimately 
compared  until  the  natural  science  is  completed,  ex- 
actly as  geology  can  never  be  legitimately  compared 


488  THEOLOGY STRICTLY    SCIENTIFIC. 

with  Scripture  until  men  of  science  have  agreed  what 
geology  actually  does  teach.* 

3d.  Natural  theology,  purely  scientific,  is  an  attempt 
to  solve  the  mystery  of  the  universe  by  the  natural 
powers  of  the  human  intellect.  It  is,  therefore,  an 
attempt  to  posit  such  a  major  as  should  account  to  the 
reason  for  the  whole  facts  of  cognition.  And  conse- 
quently every  realm,  and  every  branch  of  cognition, 
does  necessarily  bring  its  contribution  to  natural  theoU 
ogy.  It  is  true  that  any  branch  of  cognition  may  be 
considered  in  its  separate  isolation,  and  investigated  in 
its  internal  detail  alone ;  but  as  all  branches  of  cogni- 
tion actually  do  meet  in  the  one  universe  with  which 
man  is  acquainted,  "  What  is  the  one  major  substance 
of  that  universe  that  makes  matter  to  be ;  and  the  one 
major  power  of  that  universe  that  makes  matter  to 
function;  and  the  one  major  intelligence  that  makes 
mind  to  be*  and  the  one  major  moral  Ruler,  who 
makes  mind  to  function  towards  a  definite  end  ?  " 

Had  the  universe  been  a  blank  space,  and  man  only 
a  disembodied  reason  capable  of  contemplating  that 
space,  but  incapable  of  making  himself  and  his  own 
mental  operations  objective,  he  would  only  have  posited 
an  infinite  and  invisible  space.  Had  he  been  presented 
with  such  a  physical  universe  as  really  exists  only  at 
rest,  but  still  been  disembodied  and  capable  only  of 
contemplating  the  material  world  existing  in  space,  he 
would  have  posited  substance,,  quality,  and  condition , 


*  At  the  same  time,  an  objection  from  one  science  may  be  fairly 
met  and  triumphantly  overthrown  by  an  argument  from  the  same 
science. 


THEOLOGY STRICTLY    SCIENTIFIC.  489 

and  drawn  the  line  of  distinction  between  the  infinite 
substance  and  the  finite  manifestation. 

Had  the  physical  universe  begun  to  function,  (move,) 
he  would  have  posited  power;  and  had  the  functions 
been  regular,  or  apparently  in  accordance  with  the 
relative  conditions  of  the  various  portions  of  matter, 
he  would  have  posited  constructivity  as  well  as  pro- 
ductivity. 

And  if  he  were  then  endowed  with  a  body,  and  with 
the  power  of  reflection  on  his  own  existence  and  his 
own  operations,  he  would  have  posited  a  mental  power 
and  mental  construction.  And  if  he  found  within  his 
intellectual  nature  a  reason  for  acting  in  one  direction 
rather  than  another,  and  a  conscience  which  laid  on 
him  the  duty  of  obeying  his  reason  rather  than  his 
passions,  he  would  posit  a  moral  intelligence  with  all 
the  preceding  attributes.  But  then  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, that  if  in  his  ignorance  he  failed  at  first  to  ap- 
prehend the  unity  of  design  presented  by  the  actual 
construction  of  the  physical  universe,  he  would  posit 
as  many  different  powers  as  there  appeared  to  be  dif- 
ferent qualities  of  forces,  and  would  endeavor  to  unite 
these  secondary  powers  in  some  higher  unity,  so  as 
still  to  make  the  facts  of  experience  coincide  with  the 
dogmas  of  his  reason.  And  thus,  though  he  would 
posit  power  in  the  general,  he  would  require  to  elabo- 
rate the  sciences  of  the  powers  of  nature  before  he 
was  in  a  condition  to  speak  of  the  character  of  the 
major  power.*     And  so  with  morals.     Man  may,  it  is 

*  "  A  considerable  portion  of  the  qualitative  properties  of  matter 
—  or,  to  speak  more  in  accordance  with  the  language  of  natural 


490  THEOLOGY STKICTLY    SCIENTIFIC. 

true,  posit  a  moral  deity  in  the  general,  and  speak 
of  punishments  and  rewards,  instead  of  mere  occur- 
rences ;  but  what  he  never  can  determine,  until  he  has 
admitted  the  first  propositions  of  moral  science,  is  the 
character  of  the  moral  Ruler  of  the  universe.*  This 
character  may  be  taken  from  revelation,  or  it  may  be 
assumed;  but  proven,  in  the  same  manner  as  any 
other  portion  of  science,  it  never  can  be,  till  moral 
science  is  actually  achieved  and  taught  as  a  branch 
of  knowledge.  If,  then,  moral  science  has  not  yet 
been  evolved,  but  is  only  in  course  of  preparation 
through  the  evolution  of  political  economy,  it  is 
plainly  evident  that  all  speculations  as  to  the  moral 
character  of  the  Deity  are  not  to  be  ranked  as  natural 
theology-! 

philosophy,  of  the  qualitative  expression  of  forces  —  is  doubtless 
still  unknown  to  us ;  and  the  attempt  perfectly  to  represent  unity  in 
diversity  must,  therefore,  necessarily  prove  unsuccessful."  —  Hum- 
boldt's Cosmos,  chap.  i.  63. 

#  It  must  be  distinctly  remembered,  throughout  this  argument, 
that  those  who  do  admit  man  to  be  a  moral  being  have  all  the 
elements  of  a  genuine  natural  theology,  and  are  imperatively 
bound  by  its  conclusions. 

t  We  speak,  of  course,  not  of  such  natural  theology  as  is  elab- 
orated by  the  Christian,  who  has  the  problem  of  the  universe 
solved  for  him  by  revelation,  but  of  such  natural  theology  as  should 
convince  the  world  in  the  same  manner  as  a  correct  system  of 
astronomy  convinces  the  world.  When  ike  fact  of  God's  moral 
existence  is  made  perfectly  indubitable  to  the  Christian  through 
revelation,  he  can  easily  corroborate  his  belief  by  perceiving  the 
marks  of  the  divine  hand  in  all  the  works  of  nature.  But  it  must 
be  remembered  that  the  very  question  of  natural  theology  is  this 
very  fact ;  and  if  the  fact  is  really  involved  in  the  phenomena  of 
nature,  (as  no  doubt  it  is,)  the  scientific  world  may  ultimately  find 


PRESENT    POSITION    OF    NATURAL    THEOLOGY.      491 

If'  natural  theology  be  an  inference  from  the  whole 
realm  of  knowledge,  it  is  plain  that  if  a  portion  of 
that  realm,  and  this  the  most  important  portion,  has 
not  yet  been  accurately  surveyed,  natural  theology 
must  necessarily  be  incomplete;  and  as  it  is  plainly 
apparent  that  moral  science  has  not  yet  been  reduced 
to  ordination,  nor  can  be  so  reduced  till  political  econ- 
omy is  developed  as  a  teachable  branch  of  knowledge, 
it  is  also  plain  that  moral  theology,  which  depends  on 
moral  science,  is  still  incapable  of  assuming  a  scien- 
tific form. 

And  this  we  imagine  to  be  the  present  position  of 
science  and  natural  theology.  Natural  theology,  at 
present,  is  little  more  than  constructive  pantheism  — 
the  universal  prevalence  of  a  power  that  constructs 

itself  absolutely  obliged  to  admit  the  fact,  and  the  sceptic  will  be 
regarded  in  much  the  same  light  as  one  who  should  deny  the 
Newtonian  theory  of  planetary  arrangement.  But  for  this  natural 
theology,  moral  science  is  absolutely  requisite.  The  French  phi- 
losophers of  the  last  century  denied  that  man  was  a  moral  being, 
and  the  English  sensationalists  of  the  present  day  maintain  the 
same  proposition.  And  if  the  proposition  were  true,  moral  theology 
would  be  not  only  impossible,  but  absolutely  unintelligible. 

But  if  moral  science  were  once  made,  (and  it  can  be  made  if 
man  be  a  moral  being,)  such  a  proposition  would  be  universally 
rejected  as  untenable ;  and  it  would  become  a  matter  of  indubita- 
ble truth,  not  only  that  man  was  an  accountable  being,  but  that 
there  must  necessarily  be  a  great  moral  Being  to  whom  humanity 
is  to  render  account.  And  as  this  truth  is  involved  in  man's 
rational  contemplation  of  the  universe,  the  whole  world,  if  it 
continue  to  progress  in  knowledge,  must  necessarily  come  to  it  at 
some  period  or  other.  But  this  natural  theology  cannot  evolve  for 
the  world,  until  moral  science  has  been  so  perfected  as  to  be 
beyond  the  reach  of  question. 


492      PRESENT    POSITION    OF    NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

and  operates  being,  in  fact,  the  theology  of  the  scien- 
tific world.  Nor,  unless  the  scientific  world  accepts 
revelation,  can  natural  theology  assume  a  higher 
character  until  moral  science  be  achieved,  and  then 
moral  theology  must  follow.  If  it  still  be  a  matter 
of  dispute  among  men  of  science,  whether  man  be  a 
moral  being,  or  only  a  politico-economical  being,  it  is 
perfectly  evident  that  science  has  no  groundwork  for 
the  establishment  of  a  moral  universe;  and  if  the 
universe  within  the  range  of  cognition  be  assumed 
non-moral,  there  can  be  no  reason  for  substantiating 
a  moral  cause  as  the  originator  and  director  of  the 
universe.  Nor  are  we  to  admit  mere  assumptions, 
and  presumptions,  and  speculations,  as  science  in  the 
world  of  morals  any  more  than  in  the  world  of  matter. 
Either  it  is  true  that  a  definite  rule  of  moral  action 
can  be  discovered  by  the  reason,  or  it  follows  of 
course  that  rules  of  action  are  not  naturally  impera- 
tive ;  and  if  they  be  not  naturally  imperative,  it  can 
only  be  a  superstition  to  consider  them  as  obligatory. 
So  that  the  possibility  of  moral  science  must  be 
granted,  or  else  we  must  grant  the  non-imperative 
nature  of  all  moral  rules  whatever;  for  certainly  the 
logical  destruction  of  natural  morals  would  entail  the 
destruction,  not  only  of  all  actual  revelation,  but  of  all 
possible  revelation.  If  there  be  no  natural  reason 
which  lays  on  man  an  imperative  obligation  to  act 
rightly,  there  can  be  no  reason  for  acting  in  accordance 
with  a  divine  rule  which  specifies  the  items  of  which 
that  rightly  consists ;  and  as  revelation  does  not  reveal 
man's  moral  nature,  but  only  his  moral  condition,  and 
the  mode  by  which  that  condition  can  be  amended,  it 


PRESENT    POSITION    OF    NATURAL    THEOLOGY.      493 

is  plain  that  if  man's  moral  nature  be  rejected,  (as  it 
really  is  by  the  sensationalist,)  the  revelation  is  inca- 
pable of  reaching  him,  and  must  ever  remain  unintel- 
ligible to  him. 

But  then,  on  the  other  hand,  sensationalism  is  only 
a  partial  view  of  the  phenomenon.  Sensationalism 
considers  not  man,  but  the  product  of  man's  action ; 
it  treats  not  of  mind,  but  of  the  conditions  of  matter ; 
and  as  the  universal  consciousness  of  humanity  is 
against  a  mere  material  contemplation  of  the  universe, 
inasmuch  as  each  man  finds  himself  capable  of  acting, 
and  of  understanding  reasons  for  acting  in  one  mode 
rather  than  another,  sensationalism  must  be  viewed 
only  as  the  philosophy  of  the  world  physical.  And  as 
the  world  physical  is  only  the  unintelligent  object, 
sensationalism  is  only  the  philosophy  of  the  unintelli- 
gent object;  whereas  the  intelligent  subject  (man) 
offers  an  entirely  new  region  of  investigation,  and 
superadds  various  qualitative  predicates,  which  extend 
knowledge  into  an  entirely  different  sphere,  and  con- 
sequently transform  sensationalism  first  into  intellect- 
ualism,  and  ultimately  into  moralism. 

The  physical  world,  when  considered  objectively 
and  exclusively,  (as  it  is  in  physical  science,)  does  not 
present  within  the  field  of  contemplation  the  operation 
of  mind.  For  this  we  must  turn  to  man,  and,  having 
evolved  the  laws  of  physical  operation,  the  laws  of 
man's  operation  fall  next  to  be  considered.  And 
human  action  falls  to  be  considered  logically  in  the 
following  order:  — 

1.  Action  upon  the  material  world,  for  the  direct 
purpose  of  producing  an  effect  upon  the  material 
42 


494  DEPENDENCE    OF    NATURAL    THEOLOGY 

world.     This  involves  the  laws  of  the  arts,  which  laws 
are  drawn  from  the  physical  sciences. 

2.  Action  upon  the  material  world,  for  the  purpose 
of  producing  an  effect  on  man.  This  involves  the  laws 
of  political  economy,  which  laws  are  drawn  from  an 
induction  of  observed  facts,  as  to  what  effects  have 
been  ascertained  to  follow  certain  modes  of  action. 

3.  Action  upon  man  without  forcible  interference, 
for  the  purpose  of  producing  an  effect  on  man.  This 
involves  the  laws  of  social  action,  but  only  such  social 
action  as  does  not  involve  constraint  or  interference 
against  the  will  of  the  party  operated  upon. 

4.  Action  upon  man  by  interference  or  forcible  con- 
trol.    This  involves  the  laws  of  justice. 

Such  are  the  modes  of  human  action,  and  the  laws 
of  these  modes  must  be  evolved  in  this  order.  First, 
the  arts,  (mechanical,  chemical,  agricultural,  &c. ;)  then 
political  economy,  which  treats  of  the  production  of 
wealth ;  then  social  science,  which  treats  of  the  distri- 
bution of  wealth,  the  public  health,  the  public  education, 
the  public  recreation,  &c. ;  and,  last  of  all,  politics, 
which  treats  of  the  laws  which  should  regulate  inter- 
ference, (legislation,  government,  &c.) 

The  two  last  of  these  divisions  alone  are  entitled  to 
the  name  of  moral  science,  which  lays  down  the  laws 
of  human  duty.  Anteriorly  to  the  consideration  of 
man's  action  on  man,  the  concept  of  duty  does  not 
arise.  Justice  is  the  rule  regulative  between  man  and 
man  ;  and  the  consideration  of  man's  relations  to  man 
is  the  first  period  at  which  moral  science  makes  its 
appearance.  In  chronological  evolution,  the  scientific 
world  is  only  attempting  to  complete  the  second 
division,  (political   economy,)    and   to    break   up   the 


ON    NATURAL    SCIENCE.  495 

ground  of  the  third  division,  (social  science.)  The 
fourth  division  is,  as  yet,  almost  unattacked,  and  in 
practice  is  a  mere  superstition. 

Now,  natural  theology  can  never  legitimately  go 
beyond  those  branches  of  science  which  have  been 
evolved  and  reduced  to  scientific  ordination.  And 
every  attempt  to  make  a  more  complete  theology  than 
science  really  warrants,  only  produces  scepticism  on 
the  part  of  those  who  find  an  inconclusive  argument 
advanced  as  a  demonstration.  Moral  theology,  strictly 
and  purely  scientific,  is  at  present  impossible,  (  that  is, 
impossible  for  the  world;)  and  impossible,  because 
moral  science  has  not  yet  made  its  appearance,  and 
because  moral  theology  depends  on  moral  science,  and 
is  an  inference  from  it.  In  Britain,  of  course,  Scrip- 
ture is  the  source  of  theology,  and  moral  theology  is 
derived  from  the  written  revelation.  But,  on  the  con- 
tinent, philosophy  is  the  theology  of  the  great  mass  of 
thinking  men ;  and  their  theology,  derived  from  the 
revelation  of  nature,  does  actually  follow  the  develop- 
ment of  science.  And  as  scepticism  was  first  posited 
with  its  negation,  and  then  pantheism  with  its  most 
general  affirmation,  and  now,  instead  of  a  mere  power, 
an  intelligent  power  is  beginning  to  be  seen  as  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  nature, 
we  may  rest  assured  that,  with  the  development  of 
social  and  moral  science,  (which  cannot  fail  to  undergo 
their  evolution  in  their  order,)  there  will  arise  neces- 
sarily a  moral  theology,  and  the  world  will  be  indoctri- 
nated with  the  theory  of  a  moral  Deity.* 

*  "  Now,  this  moral  theology  has  a  peculiar  advantage  over  the 
speculative,  that  it  leads  infallibily  to  the  conception  of  a  single  all 


496    ULTIMATE    EFFECTS    OF    SCIENTIFIC    KNOWLEDGE. 

Now,  this  consummation  of  science,  although  of 
course  still  insufficient,  is  most  earnestly  to  be  desired, 
not  because  natural  theology  can  ever  be  a  substitute 
for  the  written  Word,  but  because  a  true  natural  theol- 
ogy may  be  the  great  preparative  for  the  universal 
acceptance  of  the  written  Word.  Eighteen  hundred 
years  have  elapsed  since  the  Creator  of  mankind  ap- 
peared on  earth  to  proclaim  the  doctrine  of  human 
restoration ;  and  yet  three  fourths  of  the  world  are 
unacquainted  with  the  truth.  Even  in  those  countries 
where  the  Christian  religion  has  been  accepted,  no 
such  improvement  of  man's  condition  has  followed  as 
would  at  all  justify  the  supposition  that  the  gospel 

most  perfect  and  reasonable  First  Being,  whereunto  speculative  the- 
ology never  directs  us  from  objective  grounds,  and  much  less 
could  be  able  to  convince  us  of  the  same.  For  we  do  not  find 
either  in  transcendental  or  natural  theology,  howsoever  far  reason 
therein  may  lead  us,  any  sufficient  ground  for  admitting  a  single 
Being  only,  which  we  presuppose  for  all  natural  causes,  and  upon 
which  we  had,  at  the  same  time,  sufficient  cause  for  making  these 
in  all  respects  dependent.  On  the  contrary,  if  we  consider  from 
the  point  of  view  of  moral  unity,  as  a  necessary  law  of  the  world, 
the  cause  which  alone  can  give  to  this  the  adequate  effect,  and  con- 
sequently, as  to  ourselves,  obligatory  force,  it  must  then  be  a  single 
supreme  urill  that  comprehends  within  itself  all  these  laws.  For 
how  would  we  find,  under  different  wills,  perfect  unity  of  ends  ? 
This  will  must  be  omnipotent ;  so  that  all  nature,  and  its  reference 
to  morality  in  the  world,  may  be  subjected  to  it  —  omniscient,  so 
that  it  may  cognize  the  internal  of  sentiments,  and  their  moral 
worth  —  omnipresent,  so  that  it  may  be  ready  immediately  for  all 
the  necessities  which  highest  optimism  demands  —  eternal,  so  that 
at  no  time  this  harmony  of  nature  and  liberty  be  wanting."  — 
Kant's  Critic  of  Pure  Reason. 

See,  also,  some  noble  passages  in  Samuel  Clarke's  "  Evidences," 
appended  to  his  "  Demonstration." 


CHRISTIANITY    THE    MAIN    CAUSE  497 

has  ever  yet  borne  its  legitimate  fruits.  The  truth 
has  been  preserved  ;  but  most  assuredly  it  has  yet  to 
achieve  far  more  for  the  whole  race  of  man  than  it  has 
ever  yet  achieved  for  any  one  community.  And, 
again,  when  Luther's  repetition  of  the  fundamental 
truth  of  Christianity  (justification  by  faith)  held  out  a 
promise  of  good,  the  good  was  gradually  sacrificed  to 
political  superstitions ;  and  the  reformation  failed  to 
achieve  more  than  a  partial,  and  very  partial,  benefit 
to  the  world.  In  Germany,  the  church  became  ration- 
alistic ;  in  England,  Erastian,  sectarian,  schismatic, 
rationalistic  ;  and,  lastly,  there  has  come  a  sickly  ten- 
dency to  Roman  paganism  and  idolatry.  In  Scotland, 
moderatism  assailed  the  church ;  and  for  a  long  period 
the  majority  of  the  ministers  were  rather  moralists 
than  Christians.  And  this  rationalistic,  moralist,  or 
moderate  exhibition  of  Christianity  is  only  a  national 
diversity  of  the  same  fundamental  reality  —  namely,  a 
return  to  an  imperfect  theology  of  nature.  In  fact, 
the  history  of  the  reformation  is  rather  the  history  of 
the  dissolution  of  the  papacy,  which  constructed  the 
church  on  false  principles,  than  the  history  of  the  res- 
toration of  the  church  constructed  on  true  principles. 
And  it  would  seem  almost  an  inference  from  the  past 
history  of  ecclesiastical  Christianity,  (we  speak  in  no 
respect  of  spiritual  religion,)  that  the  Christian  church, 
as  one  association,  offers  little  prospect  of  being  reunit- 
ed until  civil  society  has  discovered  the  true  principles 
of  civil  association,  and  founded  the  social  institutions 
of  mankind  on  the  demonstrative  principles  of  equity. 
But  while  the  written  Word  has  not  hitherto  achieved 
a  condition  of  society  such  as  its  principles  would 
42* 


498  OF    HUMAN    CIVILIZATION. 

dictate,  and  such  as,  without  doubt,  it  will  one  day 
achieve  for  man,  we  must  not  overlook  what  it  has 
achieved.  It  has  not  yet  achieved  the  Christianization 
of  mankind ;  but  it,  and  it  as  the  major  cause,  has 
achieved  the  civilization  of  mankind.  And  this  civili- 
zation has  been  the  slow  and  gradual  acquisition  of 
natural  truth,  and  the  reduction  of  that  truth  to  prac- 
tical operation. 

Now,  if  it  be  true  that  all  human  science  ends  in 
morals,  and  that  natural  theology  follows  the  develop- 
ment of  science,  (and  it  can  never  legitimately  be  in 
advance  of  science,)  then  natural  theology  will  come 
ultimately  to  be  a  purely  scientific  moral  theology,  and 
v/ill  thus  be  brought  to  the  point  where  man  identifies 
the  God  of  nature  with  the  God  of  Scripture.  And 
thus  the  long-lost  unity  will  be  once  more  restored,  and 
the  enlightened  reason  of  mankind,  reading  aright  the 
revelation  of  the  true  God  in  the  cosmos  of  creation, 
will  see  —  not  in  doubt  nor  in  darkness,  but  in  the  full 
daylight  splendor  of  its  own  inherent  majesty  —  the 
divinity  of  that  gospel  which  opens  up  the  heaven  of 
the  moral  universe,  and  spreads  before  the  full-grown 
intellect  of  man  the  eternal  joys  of  a  purchased  im- 
mortality. 

"  Truth,  indeed,  once  came  into  the  world  with  her 
divine  Master,  and  was  a  perfect  shape  most  glorious 
to  look  on  ;  but  when  he  ascended,  and  his  apostles 
after  him  were  laid  asleep,  then  straight  arose  a  wicked 
race  of  deceivers,  who,  as  that  story  goes  of  the  Egyp- 
tian Typhon  with  his  conspirators,  how  they  dealt  with 
the  good  Osiris,  took  the  virgin  Truth,  hewed  her  lovely 
form  into  a  thousand  pieces,  and  scattered  them  to  the 


TRUTH    RESTORED    TO    MAN.  499 

four  winds.  From  that  time,  ever  since,  the  sad  friends 
of  Truth  —  such  as  durst  appear  —  imitating  the  care- 
ful search  that  Isis  made  for  the  mangled  body  of 
Osiris,  went  up  and  down,  gathering  up  limb  by  limb 
still  as  they  could  find  them.  "We  have  not  yet  found 
them  all,  lords  and  commons,  nor  ever  shall  do  till  her 
Master's  second  coming.  He  shall  bring  together 
every  joint  and  member,  and  shall  mould  them  into  an 
immortal  feature  of  loveliness  and  perfection." 


APPENDIX 


THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  SCIENCES. 

Having  assumed,  as  the  basis  of  our  argument  for 
the  progression  of  humanity,  the  consecutive  evolution 
of  the  sciences,  and  their  logical  dependence  on  each 
other,  we  have  endeavored  to  present  the  sciences  in  a 
tabulated  form,  which,  if  correct,  should  present  the 
logical  order  in  which  they  must  be  classified,  and  the 
chronological  order  in  which  they  must  be  evolved  by 
the  human  race.  To  have  exhibited  the  chronological 
evolution  of  the  sciences,  would  have  required  a  sepa- 
rate dissertation,  for  which  we  have  not  space  in  the 
present  volume;  but  if  the  reader  will  consider  the 
progress  of  science  from  the  days  of  the  schoolmen 
down  to  the  present  day,  he  will  find  that  the  following 
table,  which  is  merely  logical,  might  be  exhibited,  in 
fact,  as  chronological.  For  that  purpose,  however, 
each  science  would  have  required  to  be  divided  into 
its  separate  portions.  Thus,  acoustics  would  require 
to  be  divided  into  its  mechanics,  or  the  doctrine  of  its 
motions  or  vibrations,  and  its  music,  or  the  doctrine  of 
its  tones.  And,  again,  optics  would  require  to  be  di- 
vided into  its  geometry,  or  the  doctrine  of  its  reflec- 
tion, refraction,  &c,  (in  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  con- 


502  APPENDIX. 

sider  the  motion  of  a  distinct  fluid ;)  into  its  mechanics, 
or  the  doctrine  of  its  motion ;  and  into  its  chemistry, 
or  the  doctrine  of  its  agency  on  other  substances. 
These  various  portions  are  perfectly  distinct,  (as  dis- 
tinct as  the  mechanics  of  solid  matter  from  the  chem- 
istry of  solid  matter  ;)  and  consequently,  in  the  history 
of  evolution,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  the  one  portion 
will  evolve  before  the  other,  although  all  may  be  as- 
sembled under  the  same  name. 

Again,  this  mode  of  viewing  the  progressive  evolu- 
tion of  the  sciences  explains  at  once  the  controversy 
between  the  Baconians  and  the  Aristotelians.  Many 
tirades  have  been  levied  against  Aristotle  and  his  fol- 
lowers, by  those  who  appear  altogether  incapable  of 
comprehending  his  method.  Aristotle's  method  was 
absolutely  necessary,  (meaning  thereby  the  deductive 
method  of  reasoning ;)  and  it  was  perfect,  so  far  as 
the  mathematical  sciences  extended.  Without  Aris- 
totle, there  could  have  been  no  Bacon.  Both  were 
requisite.  The  first  developed  the  general  form  of  all 
reasoning,  and  the  second  applied  the  form  to  the  phe- 
nomena of  matter.  But  the  deductive  mode  is  only 
one  of  the  phases  of  reasoning;  and  the  Baconians, 
overlooking  the  fact  that  the  deductive  mode  was  the 
only  mode  applicable  to  mathematics,  imagined  that 
they  had  invented  a  new  method,  when  they  had  only 
inverted  the  method  which  Aristotle  had  bequeathed 
to  them.  For,  in  fact,  between  the  deductive  method 
and  the  inductive  method  there  is  only  this  difference, 
that  in  the  former  we  begin  with  the  major  and  minor 
premises,  and  deduce  the  consequent ;  whereas,  in  the 
inductive  method,  we  begin  with  the  minor  premiss, 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  503 

(the  observed  conditions,)  and  the  consequent,  (the 
attendant  phenomena,)  and  from  these  infer  the  major 
premiss  ;  that  is,  the  law  or  generalized  fact.  Aristotle 
was  as  necessary  as  Bacon ;  and  though  the  Baconi- 
ans of  the  present  day  do  not  perceive  it,  they  are 
exactly  in  the  same  position  with  regard  to  moral  sci- 
ence that  the  Aristotelians  were  in  with  regard  to 
matter  science.  The  sensationalist  Baconians,  who 
endeavor  to  make  moral  science  by  a  mere  induction 
of  facts,  are  as  much  out  of  their  province  as  the  meta- 
physicians, who  endeavored  to  make  physical  theories 
by  ratiocination.  A  third  method  is  now  requisite, 
and  then  the  scheme  of  knowledge  will  be  completed. 
Aristotle,  Bacon,  and  the  man  to  come,*  will  have 
exhausted  the  whole  doctrine  of  method.  But  each  is 
necessary  in  his  place ;  Aristotle  to  give  the  method 
of  the  mathematical  sciences,  (and  also,  let  it  not  be 
forgotten,  the  method  of  the  physical  sciences  when 
once  they  are  discovered ;)  Bacon,  to  give  the  method 
of  the  physical  sciences,  (in  the  process  of  discovery ;) 
and  the  man  to  come  to  give  the  method  of  the  man 
sciences.  But  even  in  the  man  sciences  there  can  be 
nothing  to  transcend  the  method  of  Aristotle,  as  there 
really  was  nothing  in  the  Baconian  method  to  tran- 
scend the   method   of  Aristotle.      Aristotle  gave   the 

*  To  Kant  this  position  may  perhaps  be  ultimately  assigned,  but 
even  in  that  case  lie  would  be  the  man  to  come,  as  he  has  not  yet 
been  acknowledged  as  the  author  of  the  terminal  method,  which 
must  exhaust  the  realm  of  cognition.  It  is  questionable  whether 
any  future  writer  will  ever  be  able  to  transcend  Kant ;  but  at  the 
same  time  it  is  also  questionable  whether  the  critical  method  can 
be  fully  achieved  before  the  whole  of  the  sciences  are  evolved. 


504  APPENDIX. 

blank  forms  of  reasoning,  and  Bacon  pointed  out  the 
mode  of  putting  real  facts  into  the  minor  propositions 
of  the  syllogisms.  And  whenever  man  science  is  fully 
made,  it  also  will  be  only  a  filling  in  of  real  truth  into 
the  blank  formulae  of  Aristotle,  who,  although  for  a 
time  degraded  from  his  high  position,  will  again  here- 
after be  esteemed  as  the  genuine  founder  of  scientific 
method.  When  physical  science,  passing  through  the 
phase  of  induction,  which  is  the  process  of  discovery, 
shall  have  fairly  established  the  great  major  propo- 
sitions of  the  physical  world,  the  method  of  Aristotle 
will  once  more  be  applicable,  and  his  name  will  again 
be  revered  as  second  to  none  in  the  grand  phenome- 
non of  man's  intellectual  development. 

If,  again,  it  be  true  that  man  evolves  the  sciences 
in  a  certain  chronological  order,  we  learn  to  appreciate 
more  correctly  the  various  labors  of  those  great  men 
whose  names  symbol  the  respective  eras  of  develop- 
ment. Thus  Aristotle  might  lay  bare  the  universal 
doctrine  of  method,  and  after-ages  might  have  little  to 
improve  upon  his  labors.  His  logic  might  be  exhaus- 
tive, and  no  future  writer  might  be  able  to  say  that  he 
had  seen  more  completely  than  Aristotle  into  the  uni- 
versal form  of  science.  But  if  (as  we  affirm)  logic  is 
the  first  and  most  general  of  all  the  sciences,  the  genu- 
ine origin  of  all  systematic  reasoning,  then  logic  neces- 
sarily falls  to  be  classed  first,  and  Aristotle  might  de- 
velop logic,  while  his  opinions  on  all  other  branches 
of  knowledge  were  empirical,  incomplete,  superstitious, 
or  erroneous.  His  logic  might  be  perfect  while  his  poli- 
tics would  be  little  else  than  a  tissue  of  assumptions. 

But  the   most   important   consideration  connected 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  505 

with  the  following  scheme  of  classification  is  the 
logical  dependence  of  one  science  on  its  antecedent 
science.  And  this  dependence  manifests  itself  in  the 
fact,  that  the  one  science  applied  to  the  forms  of  the 
next  fundamental  noun-substantive,  actually  becomes 
the  next  science.  Thus,  logic  applied  to  number  be- 
comes arithmetic;  arithmetic  applied  to  quantities, 
becomes  algebra;  algebra  applied  to  spaces  becomes 
geometry;  and  geometry  applied  to  force  becomes 
statics. 

This  process  cannot  possibly  be  reversed.  It  is  not 
arbitrary,  but  necessary.  It  belongs  not  to  a  mode  of 
classification  which  might  serve  a  temporary  purpose, 
but  to  a  general  mode  of  classification  which  would 
always  impel  man  as  man  to  arrange  the  sciences  in 
this  order,  and  in  no  other,  because  no  other  is  perma- 
nently possible.  Not  that  we  have  succeeded  in  ar- 
ranging the  physical  sciences  in  an  order  altogether  un- 
objectionable, but  that  we  have  exposed  the  principles 
of  classification  which  must  ultimately  prevail  when 
the  doubts  and  difficulties  now  connected  with  the 
physical  sciences  shall  have  been  cleared  away,  and  the 
relations  between  electricity,  chemistry,  and  magnet- 
ism been  so  simplified,  as  to  enable  lines  of  demarca- 
tion to  be  drawn  with  a  precision  which  the  mere 
logician  would  not  now  be  justified  in  attempting. 

Those  who  are  familiar  with  logic  (and  happily  that 
science  is  gradually  regaining  its  position)  will  per- 
ceive that  the  fundamental  nouns-substantive  of  the 
sciences  are  classed  on  their  extension  and  comprehen- 
sion^ the  extension  diminishing  exactly  as  the  compre- 
hension includes  more  and  more  qualities  or  predicates. 
43 


506  APPENDIX. 

And  this  circumstance  affords  a  high  presumption 
that  the  order  is  not  arbitrary,  but  the  genuine  order 
of  nature. 

Science,  in  every  case,  involves  reasoning,  and  where 
there  is  not  reasoning  (as  in  the  descriptive  sciences) 
there  is  only  classification,  which  is  the  preliminary  of 
science.  But,  anterior  to  reasoning,  there  are  the 
fundamental  and  universal  propositions  of  human 
credence,  which  belong  tc  ontology  or  metaphysic. 
And  ontology  furnishes  the  axioms  to  the  mathemati- 
cal sciences,  which  axioms  render  deductive  reasoning 
possible. 

Ontology  posits  what  Kant  has  accurately  termed 
a  synthetic  proposition ;  and  this  synthetic  proposition, 
next  to  the  abstraction,  is  the  very  foundation  of  all 
science  whatever.  True,  the  sensationalists  have  en- 
deavored to  obliterate  this  synthetic  proposition ;  but 
the  current  of  human  credence  is  rapidly  returning 
to  a  more  genuine  estimation  of  the  real  character  of 
the  phenomena  of  thought,  and  the  fundamentals  of 
belief  (never  capable  of  being  rejected  in  fact)  may 
ere  long  be  expected  to  undergo  an  examination  which 
shall  place  them  beyond  dispute. 

But  another  consideration  may  be  made  with  regard 
to  thought.  Two  methods  of  studying  thought  are 
open  to  mankind  :  first,  the  psychological ;  and,  second, 
the  critical.  The  psychological  assumes  the  power 
of  man  to  make  thought  itself  objective,  to  study 
it,  classify  it,  and  reason  with  it ;  the  ultimate  appeal 
being  to  the  human  consciousness.  This  method 
is  ever  open  to  objection.  The  intellectualist  may 
posit  substance,  and  cause,  and  power,  and  appeal  for 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  507 

the  confirmation  of  his  doctrine  to  the  consciousness 
of  mankind.  The  sceptic  at  once  asserts  the  subjec- 
tivity of  the  concepts,  and  uproots  the  very  possibility 
of  proof.  True,  he  says,  there  is  a  substance,  but  that 
substance  is  in  thought;  and  a  cause,  but  the  cause  is 
in  thought;  and  a  power, but  the  power  is  in  thought. 
And  thus  the  intellectualist  is  reduced  to  the  mere 
reiteration  of  his  dogma — a  dogma  which,  so  long  as 
he  confines  himself  to  the  criterion  of  consciousness,  is 
no  more  than  an  assertion  of  his  own  mental  experi- 
ence or  conviction. 

Far  otherwise  with  the  critic.  The  critic  takes  his 
stand  on  the  immovable  basis  of  science,  and,  leaving 
all  questions  of  consciousness  or  of  mental  operation, 
he  makes  the  whole  range  of  the  sciences  objective, 
and  asks  what  thoughts  they  have  posited,  and  what 
methods  they  have  pursued.  He  leaves  it  to  every 
science  in  particular  to  determine  what  is  true  and 
what  is  false  in  each  region  of  inquiry ;  and,  when 
science  has  achieved  her  office,  he  culls  the  first  and 
fundamental  truths  of  each  science,  and  says,  "  These 
are  indisputable  ;  and,  if  you  question  them,  you  must 
fight  your  battle  with  the  world  of  science,  which 
has  established  and  authenticated  these  propositions." 
And  thus  when  he  speaks  of  power,  he  appeals  not  to 
consciousness,  but  to  the  science  of  dynamics,  which 
treats  especially  of  power,  and  performs  with  that 
substantive  operations  which  could  not  be  performed 
without  it. 

The  sciences  are  all  direct  and  spontaneous,  and 
their  office  is  to  determine  what  is  true.  In  geometry, 
for  instance,  the  axioms  are  spontaneously  true ;  and 


508  APPENDIX. 

geometry  never  does,  and  never  can,  inquire  into  the 
objectivity  or  subjectivity  of  her  fundamental  propo- 
sitions. They  are  true  necessarily,  because  no  effort 
of  man  can  conceive  them  otherwise.  And  when 
they  have  been  accepted  on  these  terms  by  geometry, 
they  are  handed  over  to  the  critic ;  whose  office  is  not 
to  determine  what  axioms  are  true,  but  to  examine 
what  they  consist  of,  what  is  their  form,  their  meaning, 
and  their  function. 

And  as  the  sciences,  when  completed,  will  involve 
every  substantive  that  can  enter  philosophy,  and  every 
proposition  that  could  give  rise  to  a  question  on  the 
reality  of  knowledge,  critical  philosophy  will  thus  be- 
come the  genuine  doctrine  of  thought ;  not  inquiring 
into  the  truth  of  the  thought,  for  that  is  the  office  of 
science,  but  into  its  form  and  mechanism.  And  thus 
philosophy  would  be  at  once  the  genuine  scientia  sci~ 
entiarum,  and  the  genuine  exposition  of  the  laws  of 
human  thought,  based  on  the  whole  range  of  science, 
and  appealing  to  ascertained  knowledge  for  the  sub- 
stantiation of  her  fundamental  truths. 

If  psychology  have  any  truths  to  advance,  they 
must  be  advanced  as  scientific,  and  not  philosophic 
truths.  Philosophy  cannot  acknowledge  them  till 
they  have  been  already  established  beyond  dispute ; 
and  then  philosophy  uses  them  for  a  purpose  alto- 
gether distinct  from  the  purpose  of  science.  Science, 
making  its  realm  of  investigation  objective,  inquires 
what  is  true  in  the  object,  and  this  object  may  be  man 
as  well  as  matter.  But  when  science  has  made  her 
truth,  and  achieved  her  independent  inquiry,  philoso- 
phy accepts  the  truth,  and  endeavors,  with  the  whole 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  509 

mass  received  from  the  whole  category  of  the  sciences, 
to  read  aright  the  phenomenon  of  knowledge;  and, 
linking  the  object  with  the  subject,  to  complete  the 
circle  of  cognition,  and,  it  may  be,  to  project  some 
reasonable  anticipation  of  the  future  destiny  of  hu- 
manity. 

The  last  of  the  direct  sciences  is  theology.  Theol- 
ogy completes  the  range  of  spontaneous  science,  and 
closes  the  book  of  science,  properly  so  called.  But 
beyond  theology  lies  critical  philosophy,  which  reflects 
on  the  whole  course  of  knowledge,  and  examines  the 
method  that  has  been  pursued.  And  this  critical  phi- 
losophy can  never  be  achieved  till  the  whole  of  the 
sciences  are  complete  —  complete,  not  in  having  made 
manifest  every  truth  which  they  quantitatively  con- 
tain, but  complete  in  having  posited  their  fundamental 
propositions,  and  acknowledged  the  method  by  which 
they  evolve  truths  of  a  certain  specific  quality.  And 
if  this  be  the  case,  it  is  plainly  evident  that  critical 
philosophy  has  yet  to  undergo  a  new  expansion ;  in 
fact,  that  so  long  as  there  remains  one  qualitative  sci- 
ence to  be  reduced  to  ordination,  critical  philosophy  is 
only  partially  possible.  Moral  science  and  natural 
theology  must  be  truths  for  the  world,  before  critical 
philosophy  can  sum  up  the  whole  facts  of  cognition, 
and  pronounce  judgment  on  the  cosmos  of  man's 
knowledge. 

But  what  is  the  lesson  that  philosophy  can  teach  — 
the  last  problem  of  man's  inquiries  upon  earth  ? 

In  this  philosophy  there  may  lie  involved  the  stu- 
pendous fact  of  a  mystery  insoluble  to  the  reason  —  a 
mystery  that  has  borne  down  humanity,  and  baffled 
43* 


510  APPENDIX. 

the  mightiest  efforts  of  the  intellect.  Ever  and  ever 
there  comes  back  the  appalling  consciousness  of  "a 
reason  that  points  infallibly  in  one  direction,  and  a 
fallen  nature  that  tends  infallibly  in  another."  Science 
is  here  utterly  helpless  to  inform;  and  philosophy, 
while  recording  the  fact,  weeps  over  the  hopeless  mys- 
tery. Man  cannot  solve  the  mystery.  And  thus  phi- 
losophy, reading  the  whole  realm  of  knowledge,  and 
beholding  all  that  the  intellect  can  teach,  lands  at  last 
on  the  shore  of  that  ocean  where  a  higher  than  man 
must  guide  —  where  the  horizon  is  infinity,  and  where 
she  might  gaze  forever  on  the  lost  regions  of  illimita- 
ble space.  That  ocean  philosophy  cannot  traverse. 
Reason  cannot  survey  the  infinite.  Time,  and  earth, 
and  man's  knowledge  are  all  behind;  and  before  is 
the  infinite  ocean  of  immortality.  And  here  philoso- 
phy must  end  with  a  pathless  ocean  and  an  insoluble 
mystery.  Her  work  is  over  —  finished.  She  has  no 
compass  to  guide  on  the  trackless  waters  —  no  beacon 
to  direct  her.  The  loadstar  of  heaven  must  appear, 
and  Faith,  giving  the  hand  to  reason,  may  lead  by  the 
records  of  eternal  Truth. 

Nor  is  this  faith  itself  unreasonable.  It  is  not  mys- 
ticism nor  superstition,  but  credence  of  a  matter  be- 
yond  the  realm  of  reason,  by  means  of  an  evidence 
ivithin  the  bounds  of  reason;  reason  being  judge  of  the 
evidence  which  authenticates  the  matter. 

And  thus  the  last  final  lesson  that  philosophy  can 
teach,  and  which  one  day  it  will  teach  the  world,  is, 
that  there  is  an  insoluble  mystery  within  the  region  of 
cognition ;  and  that,  consequently,  the  only  hope  of 
knowledge  is  in  a  revelation  from  that  divine  Creator 
and  Preserver  whose  moral  existence  has  been  proven 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  511 

by  natural  theology.  And  this  indeed  is  the  true  prov- 
ince of  philosophy,  her  great  work,  her  terrible  achieve- 
ment, save  that  there  is  hope  from  on  high.  She  lands, 
indeed,  at  last  on  the  shore  of  a  boundless  ocean ;  but 
in  so  doing  she  bequeaths  to  man  the  last  record  of  her 
teaching  —  that  in  revelation  alone  can  be  found  the 
truth  that  humanity  requires. 

CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  SCIENCES. 
All  science  presents  itself  under  the  following  as- 
pect :  — 

1.  The  substantive. 

2.  The  relation  between  two  substantives. 
This  is  called  the  proposition. 

Two  propositions  must  in  every  case  be  given  before 
there  can  be  reasoning. 

3.  The  evolution  of  a  new  relation  from  two  propo- 
sitions given.  This  in  its  complete  form  is  called  the 
syllogism. 

This  is  the  universal  form  of  science,  and  it  first 
appears  in  logic,  which  is  the  most  abstract  form  of  all 
science. 

The  evolved  relation  is  always  a  new  relation,  being 
the  relation  between  one  of  the  substantives  of  one  of 
the  given  propositions,  and  one  of  the  substantives  of 
the  other  proposition. 

A  perfect  syllogism  presents  itself  under  the  follow- 
ing general  form :  — 

Major  Premiss.  The  whole  of  B  is  C. 
Minor  Premiss.  The  whole  of  A  is  B. 
Consequent.  The  whole  of  A  is  C. 

In  the  deductive  sciences,  (the  mathematical  sci- 
ences always,  and  the  physical  sciences  when  their 


512  APPENDIX. 

laws  are  discovered,)  the  evolved  relation  is  the  con- 
clusion or  consequent  of  the  syllogism. 

In  the  inductive  sciences,  while  undergoing  then- 
process  of  discovery,  the  evolved  relation  is  the  major 
premiss,  which  then  becomes  sufficient  for  deductive 
reasoning  in  new  cases. 

Every  single  science  consists  of  a  nomenclature,  a 
classification,  and  a  system  of  syllogisms ;  that  is,  of  a 
system  of  propositions  connected  together  by  the  law 
of  reason  and  consequent. 

A  classification  is  improperly  termed  a  science  ;  it  is 
only  a  portion  of  a  science,  the  propositions  which  are 
isolated  in  a  classification  requiring  to  be  connected 
by  the  law  of  reason  and  consequent,  before  science 
properly  so  called  is  achieved. 

In  the  physical  sciences,  matter  invariably  appears 
as  a  power,  or  force,  or  agent,  or  as  acted  on  by  a 
power,  or  force,  or  agent ;  whereas  in  the  mere  classi- 
fication it  is  a  substance* 

In  mechanics,  matter  is  viewed  as  a  power  capable 
of  acting  on  other  matter,  without  producing  a  change 
in  the  qualitative  powers  of  the  portions  of  the  matter 
operated  upon. 

*  Unless  matter  be  conceived  as  a  power,  (a  power  located  or 
conditioned,)  there  cannot  be  science.  There  might  be  a  knowledge 
of  facts,  but  the  facts  must  be  connected  by  the  law  of  reason  and 
consequent,  before  the  facts  will  function  in  science ;  and  they  can 
only  be  connected  by  the  law  of  reason  and  consequent  by  making 
matter  an  agent,  or  power.  But  though  some  matter  is  always 
present  as  a  power,  there  may  also,  in  the  same  syllogism,  be  mat- 
ter present  as  a  substance  —  that  is,  as  an  object  acted  on  by  the 
agent;  while  for  the  moment  the  reaction  of  the  object  on  the  agent 
is  not  taken  into  consideration. 

As  every  major  premiss  represents  a  power,  every  minor  premiss 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  513 

In  chemistry,  matter  is  viewed  as  a  power  capable 
of  producing  a  change  in  the  qualitative  powers  of 
every  portion  of  the  matter  operated  upon. 

In  political  economy,  matter  is  viewed  as  a  power, 
(called  value ;)  which  power  is  the  power  of  exchan- 
ging against  other  articles,  or  against  services :  or  it  is 
viewed  as  a  power  capable  of  producing-  articles  of 
value.  In  political  economy,  man  himself  is  viewed 
as  a  power  capable  of  producing  value,  or  consuming  it. 

In  politics,  man  is  viewed  as  a  conscious  power, 
capable  of  acting  equitably  or  unequitably  towards 
his  fellow-men. 

Poiver,  and  not  substance,  is  the  essence  of  all  phys- 
ical science ;  and  the  object  of  research  is  the  discov- 
ery of  the  exact  specification  of  the  powers  of  nature 
in  their  most  general  form,  so  that  those  powers  shall 
function  in  the  syllogism,  and  produce  logical  conse- 
quents which  shall  coincide  with  the  observed  conse- 
quents wherever  the  verification  can  be  made. 

All  science  exists  in  the  mind,  and  it  is  only  as  the 
substantives  of  the  sciences  are  made  to  function  logi- 
cally in  human  thought  that  science  is  really  achieved. 
Science,  then,  is  a  form  of  thought,  and  when  evolved 

a  classification,  and  every  consequent  a  produced  phenomenon,  mat- 
ter may  appear  in  the  major  as  a  power,  and  in  the  minor  as  a 
substance,  thus :  — 

Major.  Matter  acting,  (a  power.) 

Minor.  Matter  acted  upon,  (a  substance.) 

Consequent.     Produced  phenomenon. 

Dr.  Thomas  Brown,  in  advocating  the  substantial  claims  of  mat- 
ter against  the  potential,  appears  to  have  overlooked  the  fact,  that 
we  know  as  little  of  substance  as  of  power.  Both  are  relative  terms  ; 
and  if  the  one  be  obliterated,  the  other,  by  a  parity  of  reasoning, 
ought  also  to  disappear. 


514  APPENDIX. 

it  is  the  same  for  all  human  intellect;  so  that  it  in- 
volves in  itself  the  unity  of  human  credence,  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  diversity  of  error,  superstition,  or  mere 
opinion. 

First. 

The  foundation  of  human  knowledge  is  Ontology. 

Ontology  furnishes  —  1st.  The  abstraction  or  sub- 
stantive of  the  science ;  and,  2d.  The  axiomatic  prop- 
osition, or  necessary  relation  which  renders  reasoning 
possible.  Ontology  is  not  a  science,  but  is  the  neces- 
sary preparation  for  all  the  sciences.  The  mathemati- 
cal sciences  derive  their  axioms  from  ontology.  On- 
tology presents  itself  in  the  form  — 

A.  The  abstraction  or  substantive  posited. 

A  is  B.  The  relation  or  proposition.  The  synthetic 
proposition  of  Kant,  which  becomes  the  axiom 
in  mathematics. 

Science. 

Science  originates  when  we  apply  a  rational  method 
to  the  object  of  intellectual  perception,  rejecting  all 
human  authority  and  all  human  superstition. 

The  universal  form  of  science  is  Logic.  Logic  fur- 
nishes the  laws  of  identity  and  equality,  and  its  pro- 
cess is  called  reasoning.  Logic  presents  itself  in  the 
form  — 

A  is  B;  B  is  C;  ergo,  A  is  C:  the  law  of  identity. 

A  is  part  of  B  ;  the  whole  of  B  is  part  of  C ;  ergo, 
A  is  part  of  C  :  the  law  of  equality. 

The  doctrine  of  identity  and  equality  is  therefore 
the  first  science,  and  the  sciences  range  themselves  in 
the  order  given  in  the  accompanying  table:  — 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 


515 


THE  REGION  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


THE  REGION  OF 
REALITY. 


METAPHYSIC ;  or,  Formal  Intuition. 


The  necessary  and  uni- 
versal forms  of  thought, 


i  Ontology  or  Metaphysic  in 
spontaneous  operation. 


SCIENCE  ;  or,  Formal  Apprehension.* 


I.  Formal  Science. 
(the  categories.  I 

Identity 
Equality 


I  THE   sciences. 

S  Logic,  or 
Syllogistic 


II.  The  Mathematical  Sciences. 

Number  Arithmetic. 

Quantity  Algebra. 

Space  Geometry. 


III.  The  Force  Sciences. 

I     Forces,  neutralizing  each  other        Statics. 
I     Forces,  producing  motion  Dynamics. 


IV.  The  Matter  Sciences,  or  powers  conditioned.! 
I     inorganic.     I 


Force,  con- 
ditioned in  c  Solids 
?  Liquids 


Sound 
Light 
Heat 


(  Aeriform  fluids 


Imponderables. 


Mechanics. 

Hydrodynamics 

Pneumatics. 

Acoustics. 

Optics. 

Thermology. 

Magnetism. 

Chemistry. 


Magnetic  Force 
Affinity 

of  Solids    \  according   to 

Liquids  >  their  chemical 

Gases     )  classification 

Light 

Heat 
Electric  Force  Electricity 


organic. 


Life  or  Vital  Force 


Vegetable  Physiology 
Animal  Physiology. 


V.  The  Man  Sciences,  or  Mind  Sciences. 

I     Utility  Political  Economy. 

Equity  Politics. 

I     Accountability  Theology  (natural.) 


PHILOSOPHY;  or,  Formal  Reflection. 


Critical  Philosophy  Critic 

Ethics  of  Theology  Dikaistic. 

Expectation  of  a  Future  Life  Elpistic. 


REVELATION. 


The  firmament  of 
Space,  the  knowledge 
of  which  involves  ge- 
ometry and  the  anterior 
sciences. 

The  Heavenly  Bod- 
ies, the  knowledge  of 
which  involves  the  force 
sciences  and  all  the  an- 
terior sciences. 


The  Earth  and  its 
Atmosphere,  the  knowl- 
edge of  which  involves 
the  inorganic  sciences 
and  those  which  precede 
them. 


The  Vegetable  Kingdom 
The  Animal  Kingdom. 

The  Human  Race,  the 
complete  knowledge  of 
which  would  involve  all 
the  sciences,  without 
exception. 


The  Creator,  posited 
by  the  reason  in  natural 
theology. 

The  Divine  Creator, 
made  known  by  person- 
al communication 


Major  .  . 
Minor  .  . 
Consequent 


GENERAL   FORM. 

.  The  Genera!  Proposition. 
.  The  Specified  Condition. 
.    The  Resulting  Proposition. 


f  GENERAL  FORM. 
Major  .     .    Agent     .    .    The  Qualitative  Power. 
Minor   .     .     Object      .     .    The  Classified  Matter. 
Consequent    Phenomenon   The  Resulting  Function. 


516  APPENDIX. 

A  more  uniform  nomenclature  might,  however,  be 
attempted  in  the  following  manner  :  — 

1st.  Primary  Knowledge,  necessary  and  universal. 
Ontologic. 

2d.  Science. 
Logic  or  Syllogistic. 
Mathematic. 
Dynamic. 

Physic.     (A  term  absurdly  applied  in  Britain  to  drugs 
and  drugging.) 

Of  all  the  various  forms  or 
manifestations  of  matter  with 
which  man  is  acquainted, 
classified  specially  in  each 
science. 


Mechanic 
t  Magnetic 
}  Chemic 
(  Electro-Galvanic 


Organic, — 

Botanic. 

Zoologic,  (including  man  as  an  animal.) 

Anthropologic,  or  Man  science. 

Artistic,  (Arts  and  manufactures,  &c.) 
Economic.  (Production  of  wealth.) 
Socialistic.    (Distribution    of    wealth   and 

welfare  of  the  community.) 
Politic*  (The  laws  of  equity.) 

*  The  term  ethic  is  objectionable,  ethos  meaning-  a  manner  or 
custom.  On  the  contrary,  if  it  be  true  that  man  ought  to  be  a  citi- 
zen or  member  of  a  state,  and  not  an  isolated  individual,  the  term 
politic  may  properly  apply  to  the  rules  that  should  regulate  men  as 
citizens ;  that  is,  in  their  actions  towards  each  other,  and  to  the  sys- 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  517 

Theologic*  (The  divine  Creator  of  man  and  the 
universe.) 

3d.  Philosophy. 
Critic         What  have  I  known  ?    \    See  Kant,  Can- 
Dikaistic.    What  ought  I  to  do  ?     >  on  of  Pure  Rea- 
Elpistic.    What  may  I  hope  ?         )  son.     Sect  2. 

Seeing  that  man  is  a  fallen  creature,  and  that  there 
is  an  insoluble  mystery  within  the  region  of  cognition, 
the  two  latter  questions  can  never  receive  a  satisfactory 
answer  from  natural  knowledge.  Revelation  alone 
can  answer  them. 

If  we  view  knowledge  as  necessarily  evolving,  both 
logically  and  chronologically,  in  the  above  order,  the 
scheme  ought  to  explain  the  generation  of  science ; 
that  is,  the  mode  in  which  one  science  grows  out  of, 
and  is  produced  by,  another.  And  to  effect  this  ex- 
planation, we  have  only  to  arrange  the  sciences  as  con- 
secutive, so  that  one  science  applied  to  the  classification 
(or  classified  substantives)  of  the  next  science  should 
produce  the  next  science ;  remembering  always  that 

tem  of  truth  on  which  those  rales  are  founded.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered that  man  is  by  nature  either  a  politic  being  or  not  a  politic 
being  ;  and  very  important  consequences  follow  in  either  case. 

*  In  the  previous  table  we  viewed  theology  from  the  point  of 
view  of  maris  accountability ;  but  when  that  view  has  been  taken, 
theology  must,  of  course,  be  erected  into  a  genus  by  itself,  and  as 
comprehending  all  the  other  sciences.  In  looking  upwards  from 
man,  the  divine  Judge  is  alone  apparent ;  but  in  tracing  the  uni- 
verse from  God,  the  whole  universe  appears  as  his  handiwork. 
Both  of  these  modes  are  legitimate,  but  each  gives  rise  to  a  separate 
series  of  considerations. 
44 


518 


APPENDIX. 


each  science  introduces  a  new  concept,  a  new  nomen- 
clature, and  a  new  series  of  classified  substantives, 
which  are  made  to  function  in  the  mind  by  the  laws 
of  the  previous  science. 

Thus,  ontology  gives  the  laws  to  logic,  while  logic 
gives  the  laws  to  arithmetic,  arithmetic  to  algebra,  and 
so  on. 

Abstraction  gives  the  substantives  to  ontology,  and 
ontology  gives  the  universal  forms  of  rational  thought, 
(or  of  knowledge  ;)  and  these,  applied  to  the  classified 
terms  of  logic,  evolve  the  process  of  reasoning ;  and 
the  process  of  reasoning  applied  to  classifies 
gives  arithmetic  ;  and  so  forth.     TMius 

Ontology. 

ontology,  Logic.  ft    JLtorary. 

Ontology,  Logic,  Arithmetic. 
Ontology,  Logic,  Arithmetic,  Algebra? 
Ontology,  Logic,  Arithmetic,  Algebra,  Geometry. 
Ontology,  Logic,  Arithmetic,  Algebra,  Geometry,  Statics. 

This  table  would  extend  as  far  as  the  mechanics  of 
sound,  light,  and  heat;  and  if  electricity  (or  any 
power  by  whatever  name  known)  should  come  to  be 
viewed  as  the  cause  of  magnetic,  chemic,  and  electric 
phenomena,  the  table  would  then  extend  to  physi- 
ology, the  last  of  the  purely  physical  sciences,  after 
which  intelligence  appears.  A  new  region  is  then 
entered  on. 

On  analyzing  a  science  into  its  general  elements,  a 
correlation  is  observed  to  exist  between  the  operations 
of  nature   and   the  operations  of  the  human  reason. 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  519 

Every  function  in  nature  is  conceived  under  the  con- 
ditions of — 

An  agent,         an  object,         a  phenomenon ; 

or  concretely  — 

Force,  matter,  motion ; 

whereas  the  function,  when  transformed  into  language, 
presents  itself  in  the  form  — 

A  major,  a  minor,  a  consequent ; 

the  syllogism  in  the  reason  being  the  representative  of 
the  function  in  external  nature.  But  as  it  is  the  ra- 
tional apprehension  of  the  function,  and  not  the  func- 
tion itself,  which  constitutes  science,  every  individual 
science  will  present  itself  as  ordinated  on  the  plan  of 
major,  minor,  and  consequent.  And  as  each  science 
may  be  viewed  in  its  general  or  speculative  truth  and  in 
its  practical  application,  each  science  may  present  itself 
as  a  series  of  double  syllogisms,  where  the  consequent 
of  the  speculative  portion  becomes  the  major  premiss 
of  the  practical  portion.  The  following  scheme  will 
be  sufficient  to  illustrate  this  point,  taking  one  example 
from  the  mathematical  sciences,  one  from  the  physical 
sciences,  and  one  from  moral  science.  In  a  special 
treatise  the  subject  might  be  pursued  to  a  much  greater 
length. 

Speculative  Geometry* 

Major.        The  axioms. 

Minor.  The  specification  of  spaces,  (definitions.) 

Consequent  The  function  of  lines,  &c. 


520  APPENDIX. 

Applied  Geometry. 
Major.        The  function  of  lines,  &c. 
Minor.  The  specification  of  concrete  conditions. 

Consequent.  Concrete  determination  of  spaces. 

In  commerce  again,  this  consequent  becomes  the  major  premiss 
of  a  new  syllogism,  e.  g. :  — 

Major.      Concrete  determination  of  spaces,  (so  many  acres  of  land.) 
Minor.  Rate  of  value,  (so  much  per  acre.) 

Consequent.  Concrete  determination  of  value. 

This  is  the  process  that  connects  the  very  highest 
and  most  ultimate  abstractions  with  the  most  imme- 
diate and  concrete  matters  of  practical  life.  It  is  also 
the  process  which  constitutes  the  chain  of  proof  in  any 
particular  science,  the  proven  conclusion  being  trans- 
formed into  an  admitted  major,  for  the  purpose  of 
evolving  a  new  consequent. 

Speculative  Mechanics, 
Major.         General  laws  of  force. 
Minor.  Specification  of  particular  forces. 

Consequent.  Action  of  particular  forces. 

Real  Meclianics,  (Astronomy,  for  instance.) 
Major.         Action  of  particular  forces. 
Minor.  Specification  of  the  conditions  of  matter. 

Consequent.  Action  of  matter. 

Reading  this  last  syllogism  from  the  bottom  up- 
wards, it  becomes  an  inductive  syllogism,  the  forces 
being  inferred  from  the  actions  of  matter  and  the 
conditions  of  matter.     The  consequent,  again,  might 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  521 

become  a  major  in  another  syllogism :  for  instance,  in 
the  determination  of  a  ship's  latitude,  e.  g. :  — 

Major.        Action  of  matter,  (motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies.) 
Minor.  Observed  conditions,  (sun's  apparent  altitude.) 

Consequent.  Latitude  of  observer. 

This  syllogism,  of  course,  involves  numerous  details 
and  special  considerations.  Its  consequent,  again,  be- 
comes available  in  a  new  reasoning,  either  by  itself,  (as 
in  running  down  a  port  or  island  in  the  same  latitude 
—  a  common  practice  among  elementary  navigators,) 
or  combined  with  the  determination  6f  the  longitude. 
Thus,  (the  mariner  knowing  himself  to  be  east  or  west 
of  his  port,)  — 

Major.        Latitude  of  observer. 

Minor.  Latitude  of  desired  port. 

Consequent  Course  to  be  steered. 

So  that  a  few  general  syllogisms,  with  their  propo- 
sitions properly  filled  with  the  specific  details,  lead  from 
celestial  mechanics  to  practical  navigation. 

Speculative  Politics. 

Major.        The  axioms  or  general  laws  of  equity. 
Minor.  Specification  of  particular  actions. 

Consequent  Moral  value  of  actions. 

Politics  applied  as  a  Rule  of  Action. 

Major.        Moral  value  of  actions. 
Minor.  Specification  of  the  conditions  of  men. 

Consequent  Concrete  actions  that  ought  to  result. 

44* 


522  APPENDIX. 

Politics  realized  in  Legislation. 

Major.  Concrete  actions  that  ought  to  result 

Minor.  Concrete  actions  that  do  or  may  result. 

Consequent  Legal  prohibition,  restriction,  &c. 

In  the  foregoing  table  of  the  sciences,  neither  as- 
tronomy nor  geology  appears.  Astronomy  is  not  in 
itself  a  science,  but  a  real  illustration  or  example  of 
the  science  of  mechanics.* 

The  qualitative  forces  of  all  real  matter  have  to  be 
inferred,  (and  herein  lies  the  method  of  induction;) 
but  when  inferred,  the  substantives  are  viewed  as 
functioning  under  the  influence  of  laws  which  are 
more  general  than  any  real  or  concrete  manifestation 
with  which  man  is  acquainted. 

*  When,  however,  knowledge  is  classified  on  its  objective  ele- 
ments, (which  exhibit  the  real  operations,)  the  realm  of  nature  may- 
be divided  into  its  physiologies,  and  these  are  viewed  as  existing 
in  time  and  space.     The  division  would  then  be  into  — 

1.  Astronomy,  or  the  physiology  of  the  siderial  universe. 
%  Geology,  (in  its  most  extensive  signification,)  or  the  physiology 
of  the  terrestrial  world. 

3.  The  vegetable  world. 

4.  The  animal  world. 

5.  The  human  world. 

But,  as  astronomy  and  geology  present  certain  concrete  condi- 
itons,  concrete  arrangements,  and  concrete  functions,  it  seems  more 
simple  to  reserve  the  term  science  for  a  knowledge  of  tlie  principles 
according  to  which  the  functions  are  supposed  to  take  place,  and 
according  to  which  other  concrete  functions  would  have  taken 
place,  had  the  conditions  been  other  than  they  are.  By  this  ar- 
rangement, the  sciences  would  form  the  major  premiss  of  a  great 
syllogism ;  the  conditions  of  the  various  substantives  of  nature,  the 
minor  premiss ;  and  tlie  history  of  real  events  or  functions,  the 
conseqtient. 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIENCES.  523 

Science  is  an  attempt  to  make  the  conceived  sub- 
stantives of  nature  function  in  the  human  mind  cor- 
relatively  with  their  real  functions ;  so  that  from  the 
observed  conditions  of  to-day,  the  reason  may  predict 
what  the  conditions  of  to-morrow  will  be  —  nature 
performing  the  real  operations,  and  reason  performing 
the  rational  computation.  And  if  the  rational  oper- 
ation be  correct,  —  that  is,  coincident  with  the  real 
operation,  —  the  sensations  of  to-morrow  will  confirm 
the  method,  and  authenticate  the  rational  process  of 
the  thought. 

But  if  astronomy  be  viewed  as  only  a  stupendous 
art,  or  real  operation  done,  it  follows,  according  to  the 
same  mode  of  viewing,  that  the  qualitative  character- 
istics of  matter  revealed  by  chemistry  must  also  be 
assembled  in  a  classification,  and  be  viewed  as  func- 
tioning under  the  influence  of  a  general  power ;  and 
if  magnetism,  chemistry,  and  electricity  could  be 
absolutely  identified,  —  on  which,  of  course,  we  can 
offer  no  opinion,  having  only  to  do  with  the  method 
of  classification,  —  then  chemistry  would  recede  from 
its  position  as  a  science,  and  take  up  its  position  as 
the  classification  of  the  science  of  electricity.  But 
these  points  must  all,  in  the  first  place,  be  satisfacto- 
rily determined  by  the  men  of  science,  from  whom 
the  logician  receives  the  materials  that  require  to  be 
schematized. 

When  the  whole  of  the  sciences  are  evolved,  critical 
philosophy  becomes  possible  in  its  complete  form, 
being  always  possible  so  far  as  science  has  actually 
extended,  and  no  farther.  Critical  philosophy  is  the 
final  termination  of  man's  intellectual  labors  on  earth. 


524  APPENDIX. 

It  consists  in  the  reflex  consideration  of  the  scheme 
of  science,  and  critically  examines  the  mode  in  which 
human  intellect,  constituted  as  it  is,  has  been  able  to 
evolve  and  develop  the  sciences.  Critical  philosophy 
pronounces  nothing  on  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the 
sciences,  but  on  their  form,  their  order,  their  relations, 
their  classification,  and  their  functions.  The  whole 
scheme  of  natural  knowledge  being  completed,  the 
last  inference  that  can  be  drawn  from  the  considera- 
tion of  the  whole,  is  the  prospective  destiny  of  man ; 
and  the  scheme  of  natural  knowledge  will  thus  be 
brought  to  the  verge  of  that  region  where  revelation 
alone  can  speak  authoritatively,  and  solve  those  ques- 
tions which  are  insoluble  by  the  unaided  reason. 


NOTES.  525 


NOTE  A.  — p.  140. 

In  political  economy,  land,  labor,  money,  &c,  may 
all  be  reckoned  as  raw  material,  out  of  which  the  ulti- 
mate value  is  produced.  The  agriculturist  inquires 
how  corn  is  manufactured,  but  the  economist  inquires 
how  value  is  manufactured. 


NOTE  B.  — p.  160. 

While  we  hear  so  much  of  the  horrors  of  the 
French  revolution,  it  is  singular  that  we  hear  so  little 
of  the  horrors  that  caused  it.  The  most  infamous 
injustice,  systematically  established  by  law,  seems  to 
excite  little  or  no  indignation ;  while  the  popular  reac- 
tion consequent  on  that  injustice  —  although  only  a 
consequence  flowing  from  the  laws  of  human  nature 
—  is  branded  with  every  epithet  that  language  can 
supply.  Surely,  this  is  a  most  unphilosophical  method 
of  studying  history.  The  condition  of  France  after 
the  revolution  was  incomparably  better  than  its  con- 
dition previous  to  that  great  outbreak;  and  though 
the  passage  was  a  stormy  one,  (from  the  total  absence 
of  religion  among  the  people,)  France  gained  as  much 
in  thirty  years  as  it  would  have  taken  centuries  to 
achieve  had  the  sword  not  been  appealed  to.  The 
condition  of  the  law  in  France  before  the  revolution, 
as  contrasted  with  its  present  condition,  is  exhibited 
in  the  following  quotations  :  — 


526  APPENDIX. 

"  The  ancient  laws  of  France  were  a  mixture  of  the  civil,  feudal, 
and  canon  law.  Partly  they  were  the  doctrines  of  the  authorities 
on  the  civil  law,  and  partly  they  were  the  ordinances  issued  by  the 
various  monarchs.  By  far  the  greatest  portion,  however,  in  bulk, 
consisted  of  the  peculiar  feudal  customs  of  the  various  provinces. 
In  these  the  feudal  system  was  sometimes  retained  in  so  high 
a  state  of  purity,  that  the  co]  lectors  of  provincial  customs  are 
esteemed  excellent  authorities  on  the  subject.  But  it  was  not 
merely  in  each  province  that  there  was  a  local  custom.  The 
power  of  the  crown,  or  any  other  paramount  legislature,  was  so 
feeble,  that  wherever  an  assembly  of  men  were  held  together  by 
one  common  tie,  as  where  they  were  co-vassals  of  one  lord  or 
members  of  the  same  civic  community,  they  had,  in  some  measure, 
a  code  of  laws  of  their  own.  The  royal  codes,  which  existed  on  a 
large  scale,  are  estimated  at  about  300 ;  but  of  the  number  of 
inferior  local  customs  it  would  be  impossible  to  make  an  estimate. 
Voltaire  observes,  that  a  man  travelling  through  his  country  has  to 
change  laws  as  often  as  he  has  to  change  horses,  and  that  the  most 
learned  barrister  in  one  village  will  be  a  complete  ignoramus  a  few 
miles  off.  The  seignorial  courts  were  divided  into  three  grades, 
according  to  the  extent  of  the  penal  authority  exercised  by  them. 
The  principal  courts  of  law  were  the  parliaments  of  the  respective 
provinces.  Seats  in  them  were  generally  held  by  purchase,  or 
were  in  the  hereditary  succession  of  great  families,  who  thus  con- 
stituted a  species  of  professional  nobility.  The  decrees  of  these 
bodies  were  often  baffled  or  reversed  by  the  royal  authority,  exer- 
cised in  the  well-known  form  of  lettres  de  cachet.  These  alterations 
of  the  decisions  of  the  courts,  however,  were  performed  not  as  a 
judicial  revision,  but  by  the  simple  authority  of  the  king ;  and  thus 
the  parliaments,  being  subject  to  no  judicial  control  or  responsi- 
bility, adhered  but  slightly  to  fixed  rules  of  law,  and  often  acted 
according  to  their  own  will  and  discretion.  The  jury,  even  so 
much  of  it  as  may  have  existed  under  the  old  feudal  form,  had 
entirely  disappeared,  and  proceedings  were  conducted  in  secret. 
Criminal  investigations,  instead  of  terminating  in  a  conclusive  trial, 
as  in  England,  were  protracted  through  a  lingering  succession  of 
written  pleadings  and  secret  investigations,  from  which  the  accused 
could  never  calculate  on  being  free.    The  torture  was  extensively 


NOTES.  527 

employed,  but  in  the  general  case  only  when  there  was  as  much 
circumstantial  evidence  as  would  justify  a  conviction  in  this 
country. 

"  The  whole  of  this  system  was  swept  suddenly  away  before  the 
tide  of  the  revolution." 

Present  State  of  the  Law. 

"To  an  unlearned  person  in  this  country  it  is  a  much  easier 
thing  to  know  the  law  of  France,  on  any  particular  point,  than  the 
law  he  is  living  under.  If  an  English  lawyer  is  asked  a  question, 
his  answer  involves  references  to  commentaries,  decisions,  and 
statutes  innumerable ;  but,  in  the  general  case,  the  answer  of  a 
French  lawyer  bears  simple  reference  to  such  a  paragraph  of  such 
a  code."  —  Chambers's  Information  for  the  People,  No.  44,  New 
Series. 

France,  by  her  revolution,  achieved  two  of  the 
greatest  reformations  that  could  possibly  have  been 
devised  for  the  welfare  of  the  country  —  two  vast  and 
permanent  social  changes,  which  continue  to  diffuse 
benefits  of  the  best  and  most  important  character. 
The  first  was  the  revision  and  codification  of  her 
laws ;  the  second,  the  emancipation  and  re-distribution 
of  her  soil.  The  change  in  the  laws  was  a  change 
from  darkness  to  light  —  from  death  to  life  —  from 
corruption  and  impurity  to  comparative  spotlessness 
and  impartiality.  In  this  change  the  France  that 
survived  the  revolution  reaped  a  rich  inheritance  of 
good  —  an  inheritance  which  no  mere  change  of 
dynasty  could  permanently  deprive  her  of;  and  it 
would  have  been  well  for  England  if  she  also  had 
framed  a  homogeneous  system  of  codified  laws,  with 
provisions  at  once  equitable  and  intelligible.  It  is,  of 
course,  true  that  no  mere  code  of  laws  can  entail  the 


528  APPENDIX. 

good  that  depends  on  the  moral  and  intellectual  im- 
provement of  the  population ;  but  it  is  also  true  that 
many  disadvantages  necessarily  arise  where  the  civil 
arrangements  of  a  community  are  regulated  by  an 
indefinite  multitude  of  statutes,  and  an  antiquated 
system  of  administration.  In  England,  the  improve- 
ment of  the  laws  has  been  sacrificed  to  the  interests 
of  the  lawyers. 


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